Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

SoCalGas pleaded no contest to a charge of failure to immediately report the release of a hazardous material, and obtained dismissal of other charges, including a count alleging the discharge of air contaminants. Petitioners, residents of the Porter Ranch community, sought to set aside the plea agreement and obtain restitution under the California Constitution, which gives victims the right to seek and secure restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes causing the losses they suffer. The trial court denied petitioners' motion to vacate the plea and require restitution.The Court of Appeal held that the Victim's Bill of Rights in the California Constitution, as amended in 2008 by Proposition 9, does not authorize a victim to appeal from a judgment or order in a criminal case. However, in those rare cases where the trial court fails in its duty to order restitution from the convicted wrongdoer to the victims of the crime, the victims may do what petitioners have done in this case by seeking a writ of mandate. The court held that the trial court did not fail in its duty when it refused to order restitution for all losses caused by the gas leak. The court declined to extend the right to restitution to dismissed charges that are "transactionally related" to the crime of which defendant was convicted. Although the court found no error in the trial court's conclusion that there was no evidence or proffer of evidence to establish that defendant's failure to report the gas leak for three days was a substantial factor in causing the harm victims suffered from the gas leak, the court remanded for a hearing on whether petitioners can prove damages from the three-day delay in reporting the leak, as charged in the criminal complaint. View "Crump v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County" on Justia Law

The State sought a writ of mandate to command the trial court to honor the affidavit of prejudice (peremptory challenge) they filed against the trial court judge Joel Agron, under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. The underlying case was a murder prosecution which the State dismissed and refiled the same day along with the peremptory challenge. Respondent, the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, refused to honor the peremptory challenge, deeming it untimely. Relying on Birts v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.App.5th 53 (2018), the court concluded the State was engaged in prosecutorial “gamesmanship” and attempting to “forum shop[],” and held the second complaint was a continuation of the prior case, not a new case, making the peremptory challenge untimely. The State argued this case fell under Paredes v. Superior Court 77 Cal.App.4th 24 (1999), which recognized that when a criminal case was dismissed and refiled, it was a new case for purposes of Section 170.6. They argued Birts did not apply because they weren’t attempting to avoid a ruling of the trial court. The Court of Appeal agreed and therefore directed the trial court to honor the peremptory challenge. View "California v. Super. Ct. (Olivo)" on Justia Law

The court of appeals reversed Appellant Jeremy Cuevas’ conviction for assault on a peace officer, holding the evidence was insufficient to show that the complainant was discharging an official duty when he was assaulted. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State’s petition for discretionary review to decide whether a peace officer working as private security is discharging an official duty when he is acting under Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code Section 101.07. The Court held that in this case, the evidence was legally sufficient to show that the complainant was discharging an official duty when Appellant assaulted him. Judgment was reversed and the trial court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Cuevas v. Texas" on Justia Law

McDonough processed ballots as a board of elections commissioner in a Troy, New York primary election. Smith was specially appointed to investigate and to prosecute a case of forged absentee ballots in that election. McDonough alleges that Smith fabricated evidence against him and used it to secure an indictment and at two trials before McDonough’s December 21, 2012 acquittal. On December 18, 2015, McDonough sued Smith under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting fabrication of evidence. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit as untimely under a three-year limitations period.The Supreme Court reversed. The statute of limitations began to run when the criminal proceedings against McDonough terminated in his favor—when he was acquitted at the end of his second trial. An accrual analysis begins with identifying the specific constitutional right at issue--here, an assumed due process right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of a government official’s fabrication of evidence. Accrual questions are often decided by referring to common-law principles governing analogous torts. The most analogous common-law tort is malicious prosecution, which accrues only once the underlying criminal proceedings have resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. McDonough could not bring his section 1983 fabricated-evidence claim before favorable termination of his prosecution. The Court cited concerns with avoiding parallel litigation and conflicting judgments and that prosecutions regularly last nearly as long as—or even longer than—the limitations period. View "McDonough v. Smith" on Justia Law

Martov participated in a wire fraud scheme in which he collected fraudulently obtained debit card numbers and personal identification numbers and then distributed them to others who used the information to make cash withdrawals from ATMs. The conduct cost the victims approximately $1.2 million. When he was arrested, the government seized Martov’s watch, $4,035 in cash, a car, and nine firearms. In exchange for Martov’s guilty plea under 18 U.S.C. 1343, the government dropped other charges and agreed not to pursue criminal forfeiture. The government initiated administrative forfeiture proceedings, 18 U.S.C. 983, by sending notice to Martov and his attorney. Martov responded to the notice by filing claims for the car and guns. The government denied both claims and declared the property forfeited. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief while noting “reservations with the procedural path that the government took in executing the forfeiture.” The government had missed certain statutory deadlines. Martov, who only argued that the seizure was improper and that the forfeiture action violated his plea agreement, failed to advance any meritorious arguments. View "Martov v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the district court's dismissal of their complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and, in the alternative, failure to state a claim. Although plaintiffs challenged the inclusion of marijuana on Schedule I of the federal Controlled Substances Act, they did not first pursue reclassification through the administrative process defined in the Act.The Second Circuit held that plaintiffs' action was premature, because plaintiffs should attempt to exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking relief from this court. However, the court noted that it was troubled by the DEA's history of dilatory proceedings and thus, rather than dismiss the case, the court held it in abeyance and retained jurisdiction in this panel to take whatever action might become appropriate if the DEA does not act with adequate dispatch. View "Washington v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus to compel Appellee, Judge Megan E. Shanahan of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, to provide public records relating to his incarceration, holding that Appellant improperly sought records under the Public Records Act rather than the Rules of Superintendence.Appellant was convicted of aggravated burglary, abduction, and rape. Appellant later filed motions seeking the inspection and release of public records relating to his case. Judge Shanahan denied the motions, noting that Appellant could access all publicly available records through the clerk of courts. Appellant then filed his petition for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals dismissed the writ, concluding that since Appellant was incarcerated, a sentencing court must first determine that the court records were necessary to support a justiciable claim. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding that the court of appeals erred in applying the Ohio Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, to Appellant's records request and that the court of appeals correctly dismissed the case. View "State ex rel. Husband v. Shanahan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied as moot Relator's complaint seeking a writ of mandamus against Larry Greene, the administrative assistant for the warden of the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, to compel the production of public records, holding that Relator was not entitled to mandamus because he received the documents that he requested.After Relator, an inmate, submitted a public-records request he filed a complaint for writ of mandamus against Greene. Eight days later, Relator was provided with copies of the requested records. Greene filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Relator filed to attach certain documents to the complaint. Three months late, Relator filed a motion asking the Court to consider the affidavit and exhibits attached to his complaint as substantive evidence. The Supreme Court (1) denied the writ of mandamus as moot; (2) denied Relator's demand for statutory damages and court costs on the merits; and (3) denied Relator's motion to have the attachments to his complaint accepted as service as moot. View "State ex rel. Martin v. Greene" on Justia Law

Respondents, Mississippi death row inmates, filed suit challenging the state's lethal injection procedures under the Eighth Amendment. Respondents sought discovery by serving a subpoena on the VDOC. The VDOC provided some documents and then moved to quash the subpoena in district court.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the VDOC's motion to quash the subpoena on the merits, holding that the district court reasonably found that respondents did not have a need for further discovery from the VDOC, a nonparty, that outweighed the burdens the discovery would impose. Accordingly, the court need not reach the state sovereign immunity issue. View "Virginia Department of Corrections v. Jordan" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a 2013, hit-and-run investigation that escalated into an officer-involved shooting. Michael Rogers appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants Corporal Matthew Morgan, the State of Delaware, and the Department of Public Safety Division of State Police. Corporal Morgan responded to a hit-and-run call and ran the license plate of the offending vehicle, which belonged to Michael. Corporal Morgan traveled to Michael’s home, where Michael’s elderly mother, Lorraine Rogers, answered the door. Ms. Rogers, who lived with her son, invited Corporal Morgan into the home as she went to wake Rogers, who was heavily inebriated and asleep in his bedroom. When Rogers refused to step outside to investigate damage to his vehicle, Corporal Morgan gripped Rogers' arm to lead him outside. Rogers immediately began fighting Corporal Morgan, who ended the fight by shooting Rogers. The State then charged Rogers with resisting arrest and several counts of assault. At the first criminal trial, Rogers filed a motion to suppress evidence resulting from Corporal Morgan’s entrance into the home, which Michael claimed was a warrantless search without valid consent. The court denied Roger's motion to suppress, finding his mother invited the Corporal into the home, and neither Rogers nor his mother revoked consent. The jury was unable to reach a verdict, resulting in a mistrial. The State re-indicted Rogers for assault and resisting arrest; Rogers pled nolo contendere to resisting arrest charge, and the State dropped the assault charges. Rogers' plea resulted in his conviction for one count of resisting arrest with force or violence, for which he was sentenced to jail time followed by probation. Michael filed this civil action in Superior Court alleging federal and state invasion of privacy claims, among other counts. Corporal Morgan moved for summary judgment on the grounds that collateral estoppel barred Michael’s invasion of privacy claims, since the judge in the criminal trial had found that Corporal Morgan had permission to be in the home when the altercation ensued. The superior court agreed with the Corporal and granted summary judgment. Finding no reversible error in the superior court's judgment, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rogers v. Morgan, et al." on Justia Law