Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Macanthony Canady petitioned the superior court for a writ of habeas corpus seeking early parole consideration under Proposition 57. He asserted the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (Department) regulation purporting to implement Proposition 57 was inconsistent with the Proposition. Specifically, the Department’s regulation did not consider conduct credits inmates earned while incarcerated in the calculation of inmates’ nonviolent early parole eligible dates.The trial court agreed with Canady and invalidated the Department’s regulations as contradicting the stated purposes of the Proposition. The Attorney General appealed, contending the order had to be reversed because the Department’s regulation was: consistent with the plain language of the Proposition, authorized by the broad discretion granted to it by the Proposition, and consistent with the voters’ intent in passing the Proposition. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the trial court's order. View "In re Canady" on Justia Law

In 2019, Jones pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine base and was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 10 years’ imprisonment. Jones filed a pro se emergency motion, seeking compassionate release because of the pandemic. Jones may have respiratory issues, is over 40 years old, and is obese. One out of every four prisoners has tested positive for COVID-19 in the prison where Jones is incarcerated.District courts may reduce the sentences of incarcerated persons in “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Previously, only the Bureau of Prisons could file motions for compassionate release. The Bureau rarely did so. The 2018 First Step Act allows incarcerated persons to file their own motions.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Jones’s motion. In making sentence-modification decisions under section 3582(c)(1)(A), district courts must find both that “extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant the reduction and that the "reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission” before considering relevant 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)sentencing factors. Sentencing Guideline 1B1.13, which has not been amended to reflect the First Step Act, is not an “applicable” policy statement in cases where prisoners file their own motions. District courts must supply specific factual reasons for their decisions. Here, the court found for the sake of argument that an extraordinary and compelling circumstance existed but that section 3553(a)'s factors counseled against granting release. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Federal judges may release prisoners for compassionate reasons. Previously, that authority required a motion by the Bureau of Prisons. The 2018 First Step Act created a judicial power to grant compassionate release on a prisoner’s own request; the prisoner must first allow the Bureau to review the request and make a recommendation (or let 30 days pass in silence), 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Gunn’s sentence for drug and firearm offenses runs into 2024. She sought release under section 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that, because of her age (62) and medical condition, she faces extra risks should she contract COVID-19.The district court denied relief, citing the requirement ”that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." The Sentencing Commission, which lacks a quorum, has not updated its policy statements to implement the Act. The most recent Guidelines Manual refers to a “motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons" and covers only prisoners who suffer from certain medical problems.The Seventh Circuit vacated. The Manual lacks an applicable policy statement; any decision is “consistent with” a nonexistent policy. “Consistent with” differs from “authorized by.” While a judge acting on a prisoner’s motion may lack the Director's advice, contemplated by Manual, about whether an “extraordinary and compelling reason” exists, the First Step Act does not muzzle the Director. Until an amended statement is adopted, district judges must operate under the statutory criteria: ”extraordinary and compelling reasons.” View "United States v. Gunn" on Justia Law

On July 24, 2020, the district court denied Payton’s motion for compassionate release or a reduction of his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). A notice of appeal, dated August 9, was filed in the district court on August 10. A defendant’s notice of appeal in a criminal case must be filed in the district court no later than 14 days after the challenged judgment or order is entered. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A). A section 3582(c) motion is a continuation of the criminal proceedings, so the 14-day deadline applies. Rule 4(b)(1)(A)'s deadline is not jurisdictional but is a claims-processing rule; the government can waive an objection to an untimely notice. If the government raises the issue of timeliness, the court must enforce the time limits.In response to the government’s motion to dismiss, Payton asserted that the prison has been “on an institution-wide lockdown and getting copies in this environment is problematic” and argued excusable neglect. Rule 4(b)(4) authorizes the district court to extend the time for filing an appeal for up to 30 days if the court finds “good cause” or “excusable neglect.” The Sixth Circuit remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the district court to determine whether Payton has shown excusable neglect or good cause. View "United States v. Payton" on Justia Law

On April 22, 2019, the district court denied petitioner's first three claims for habeas relief, but reserved his 18 U.S.C. 924(c) claim for later resolution because, at the time, United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2324 (2019), had not been decided. The district judge explained that his opinion resolves three of petitioner's claims but leaves the 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion open until the court is able to resolve petitioner's fourth claim. In order for petitioner to appeal the final order in a section 2255 habeas case, section 2253(c)(1) requires him to obtain a certificate of appealability. Petitioner moved for a certificate of appealability a week after the district court issued its order and the district judge granted the certificate solely on petitioner's recantation claim without commenting on the finality of the underlying order— which, of course, left one claim pending.The DC Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the district court's judgment was not final. The court rejected petitioner's claims under Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964), which he claims "opens the door a little bit" and allows ostensibly nonfinal orders to be regarded as "practically" final. The court also concluded that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 do not facilitate jurisdiction here. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

In 1990, Johnson, who is schizophrenic, was convicted of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury. He served nine years in prison before being paroled as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). In 2000, he was civilly committed to Napa State Hospital under the MDO Act. He was twice released as an outpatient (2004-2008, and 2008-2014) but was returned to the hospital each time after he went absent without leave. Following several commitment extensions, in 2019, the trial court ordered Johnson’s MDO commitment extended for one year. Johnson was 69 years old.The court of appeal reversed, finding that the order was not supported by substantial evidence. The trial court’s only rationale for finding “that by reason of [his] severe mental health disorder, [Johnson] represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others,” was that “it does appear that the evidence shows that a high probability of decompression [sic] will occur which could result in a serious threat of substantial physical harm to others, harm to himself, and because of misperceptions and decompensation, he can be a substantial danger, and that he does not voluntarily follow his treatment plan.” The sole evidence of dangerousness was from decades earlier, with only friendly and nonconfrontational behavior ever since, even while Johnson was AWOL, off of his medications, and decompensating. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Coby Edwards of gross sexual imposition, a class AA felony. Prior to trial, Edwards retained a psychologist to testify about the accuracy of the child victim’s memories. Trial was held on July 16-18, 2019. Shortly before Edwards began presenting his case, his attorney informed the district court his expert would not be testifying because “He could not make it today.” Additionally, during cross-examination of a police detective by Edwards’ counsel, the detective made a statement regarding Edwards’ post-arrest silence. The statement received no objection, nor was a motion made to strike the statement as non-responsive. On appeal, Edwards argued it was reversible error when his retained expert did not testify. Furthermore, he argued the district court obviously erred by failing to require that his retained expert witness testify at trial. The North Dakota Supreme Court found no error: At trial, Edwards’ counsel first informed the district court the expert witness would testify, and the next day told the court the expert would not be testifying. No offer of proof was made to establish what the expert would state during testimony. Edwards did not otherwise discuss the issue at trial. Thus, the Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "North Dakota v. Edwards" on Justia Law

Simmons pleaded guilty to drug charges. Simmons’s judgment became final on September 22, 2016, He had until September 22, 2017, to file a motion to vacate. On August 13, 2018, Simmons moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255 and cited Section 2255(f)(2), which provides “[t]he limitation period shall run from . . . the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action.” Simmons explained that, after his sentencing, he returned to state custody until December 2016 and served time at Wayne County Jail after that. Simmons claimed that those law libraries did not have federal law materials, which was an impediment to filing a 2255 Motion. He arrived at a federal facility on August 29, 2017. He claimed that the only way to obtain Section 2255 materials there was to request them but “you have to know what you need.”The district court dismissed, finding that Simmons had not sufficiently alleged what specific legal materials he was missing and how the lack of those materials prejudiced his ability to pursue his section 2255 rights. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Even if a lack of federal materials, combined with a lack of a legal assistance program, constituted an unconstitutional impediment, a prisoner is required to allege a causal connection between the purported constitutional impediment and how the impediment prevented him from filing on time. Simmons did not. View "Simmons v. United States" on Justia Law

Here, the Supreme Court addressed the propriety of a criminal defense subpoena served on Facebook seeking restricted posts and private messages of one of its users, who was a victim and critical witness in the underlying attempted murder prosecution, holding that the trial court erred in denying Facebook's motion to quash the subpoena.Lance Touchstone, the defendant in the prosecution below, argued that the trial court properly denied Facebook's motion to quash. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the trial court erred by conducting an incomplete assessment of the relevant factors and interests when it found that Defendant established good cause to acquire the communications at issue from Facebook. After highlighting seven factors a trial court should explicitly consider and balance in ruling on a motion to quash a subpoena directed to a third party the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order denying the motion to quash and remanded the matter to the trial court to conduct further proceedings consistent with the guidelines set forth in this opinion. View "Facebook, Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

According to the complaint, “Plaintiff/Petitioner the People for the Ethical Operation of Prosecutors and Law Enforcement . . . is an association of residents of Orange County that includes at least one member who pays property taxes to Orange County.” People for the Ethical Operation of Prosecutors and Law Enforcement was a watchdog group seeking to ensure Orange County law enforcement agencies complied with their constitutional and statutory duties. The other plaintiffs were three individuals who were Orange County residents, and who had various interests in ensuring the integrity of the criminal justice system. The defendants were Todd Spitzer and Don Barnes who were the elected District Attorney and Sheriff, respectively. The gist of the complaint was that defendants operated an illegal and clandestine confidential informant (CI) program. The basic structure of the alleged CI program was that the Sheriff recruited confidential informants from among the prison population, moved those informants near a criminal defendant to facilitate a surreptitious interrogation, notwithstanding that the defendant was represented by counsel, which rendered the interrogations illegal under Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The Sheriff allegedly kept extensive logs of these interactions, but kept those logs secret, even from the courts. The District Attorney used information from these interrogations, despite knowing their illegality, and did not disclose information about the CI program to defendants, in violation of their discovery duties. This appeal stemmed from a dismissal following a sustained demurrer in plaintiffs’ taxpayer suit against the Orange County officials. The trial court ruled that plaintiffs did not have standing to pursue taxpayer claims for waste under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a, nor a petition for a writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the point of taxpayer standing, as well as the related doctrine of public interest standing in mandamus proceedings, was to confer standing on the public at large to hold the government accountable to fulfill its obligations to the public. "The fundamental rights at stake fit comfortably within the doctrines of taxpayer and public interest standing." View "People for the Ethical Operation of Prosecutors etc. v. Spitzer" on Justia Law