Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Appellants Icon Legacy Custom Modular Homes, LLC and Icon Legacy Transport, LLC challenged a series of trial court orders in favor of appellees Dagney Trevor, Merusi Builders, Inc., Osborne Construction, LLC, and Paul Osborne. This appeal arose from the sale and construction of a new modular home that suffered from significant deficiencies. Trevor purchased the modular home; Icon Legacy Custom Modular Homes, LLC (Icon Legacy) and Icon Legacy Transport, LLC (Icon Transport) manufactured and transported the home; Osborne Construction, LLC (Osborne Construction) and Paul Osborne (Osborne) were collectively the contractor involved in the assembly the home; Merusi Builders, Inc. (Merusi) was a subcontractor involved in the assembly of the home. Though not parties to this appeal, Vermont Modular Homes, Inc., David Curtis, and Blane Bovier were Icon’s Vermont-based “approved builders” and three of the defendants in the suit below. In 2015, Trevor purchased an Icon Legacy Custom Modular Home as a replacement to one she lost to fire. The home sustained significant water damage during a rainstorm when water entered the home before the roof installation was complete. Other structural defects emerged after Trevor moved into the home. Although Icon and Vermont Modular Homes repaired some of the damage, major defects relating to both the water damage and alleged improper construction remained in the home. Ultimately judgement was entered against Icon. Icon appealed, arguing multiple errors leading to the outcome against it. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed as to the trial court's thirty-percent upward adjustment of the lodestar damages calculation, and remanded for the trial court to strike that amount from Trevor's attorney fee award. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Trevor v. Icon Legacy Custom Modular Homes, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

At the motion-to-dismiss stage, dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds is permissible only if a plaintiff's claims are conclusively time-barred on the face of the complaint. The DC Circuit reversed the district court's determination that Capitol Services' lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations because Capitol Services was on "inquiry notice" of defendant's alleged interference with its contract long before the limitations period expired.The record was inconclusive as to whether Capitol Services had knowledge of Vesta's role prior to August 28, 2014, three years before this suit against Vesta was filed. Therefore, when during that intervening period Capitol Services had inquiry notice of Vesta's potential role was an open factual question that could not be resolved at this time in the proceedings. Finally, Vesta's collateral estoppel claim failed because critical elements of collateral estoppel have not been established. View "Capitol Services Management v. Vesta Corp." on Justia Law

After defendant Randal Tyson’s first failed attempt at removing the case to federal court, his codefendant, Dulany Hill, filed a second notice of removal. Hill’s notice of removal was identical to the one Tyson had filed, merely substituting Hill’s name in the place of Tyson's. During this second removal period, the court denied defendant’s untimely motion to strike, which was fully briefed before the second notice of removal was filed. Less than a month later, the federal court again remanded the case. Thereafter, defendant failed to respond to the complaint or to appear for a case management conference. The court entered defendant’s default. Defendant took no further action in the case until eight months after the remand, when he moved to set aside the default. The court denied the motion and entered a default judgment against defendant. Defendant appealed the default judgment, contending the court did not have jurisdiction to rule on his motion to strike while the case was removed to federal court. He claimed the court’s ruling on the motion to strike, while it purportedly lacked jurisdiction, commenced an inappropriate responsive pleading timeline and resulted in a default judgment that the Court of Appeal should set aside. The Court of Appeal concluded the second notice of removal was untimely, frivolous, and duplicative. Under these unique circumstances, the trial court retained jurisdiction to rule on the motion to strike. View "ClipperJet Inc. v. Tyson" on Justia Law

Antero Resources Company and South Jersey Gas Company entered into an eight-year contract for Antero to deliver natural gas from the Marcellus Shale formation to gas meters located on the Columbia Pipeline in West Virginia. The parties tied gas pricing to the Columbia Appalachia Index.During performance of the contract, the price of natural gas linked to the Index increased. South Jersey contested the higher prices, arguing that modifications to the Index materially changed the pricing methodology, and that the Index should be replaced with one that reflected the original agreement. Antero disagreed. South Jersey then sued Antero in New Jersey state court for failing to negotiate a replacement index, and began paying a lower price based on a different index. Antero then sued South Jersey in federal district court in Colorado, where its principal place of business was located, for breach of contract for its failure to pay the Index price. The lawsuits were consolidated in Colorado and the case proceeded to trial. The jury rejected South Jersey’s claims, finding South Jersey breached the contract and Antero was entitled to $60 million damages. South Jersey argued on appeal the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment in its favor as a matter of law, or, alternatively, that the court erred in instructing the jury. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding a reasonable jury could find South Jersey breached its contract with Antero because the Index was not discontinued nor did it materially change. Furthermore, the Court found no defects in the jury instructions. View "Antero Resources Corp. v. South Jersey Resources Group" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's motion to set aside a jury verdict in favor of Appellee, holding that the circuit court erred in finding that Appellant waived its statute of limitations argument when it did not refile a plea in bar after Appellee filed a second amended complaint.In moving to set aside the verdict Appellant argued that the circuit court erred when it denied Appellant's proposed jury instructions relating to the statute of limitations defense. The circuit court denied Appellant's motion, admitting that it erred in ruling that it had previously decided Appellant's plea in bar of the statute of limitations but then concluding that Appellant waived its statute of limitations argument when it did not refile a plea in bar after Appellee filed a second amended complaint. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the circuit court erred in not permitting Appellant to present its statute of limitations defense to the jury. View "Ferguson Enterprises, Inc. v. F.H. Furr Plumbing" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court rendering summary judgment in favor of Defendants after concluding that Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claims were governed by Delaware law and were thus time-barred, holding that Connecticut law, rather than Delaware law, controlled the timeliness of Plaintiff's claims.Plaintiff brought unjust enrichment claims against Defendants seeking recovery for alleged overpayments issued to Defendants by Plaintiff's putative predecessor in interest pursuant to a limited partnership agreement. The trial court concluded that Plaintiff's claims were governed by Delaware law and were therefore time-barred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Delaware law governed the substantive rights and liabilities of the parties arising out of the limited partnership agreement, but Connecticut law governed matters of judicial administration and procedure; and (2) because Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claims had a common-law origin, the limitation period properly was characterized as procedural, and therefore, Connecticut law governed the timeliness of Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claims. View "Reclaimant Corp. v. Deutsch" on Justia Law

SWMO, LLC appealed district court orders granting partial summary judgment to Mon-Dak Plumbing and Heating, Inc. and RK Electric relating to their work performed on a building owned by SWMO. SWMO contracted with Eagle Rigid Spans for the construction of a commercial building in Williston, North Dakota. Eagle was the general contractor and Mon-Dak and RK Electric were subcontractors for the project. Mon-Dak and RK Electric contracted with Eagle to provide HVAC, plumbing, and electrical work on the building. During construction, SWMO noticed defects in the materials and workmanship and believed the building was not properly constructed. The trial court ultimately awarded Mon-Dak $125,600 and RK Electric $114,242 from funds deposited into court by SWMO. SWMO claimed disputed issues of fact precluded summary judgment. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined The district court provided no analysis of the documents in its summary judgment orders. "By not addressing the evidence submitted by SWMO, the district court in effect found Mon-Dak’s and RK Electric’s evidence was more persuasive." In viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to SWMO at the time of the motions, SWMO raised a genuine issue of material fact, and Mon-Dak and RK Electric were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Although the court later found at trial that Eagle materially misrepresented the true amounts paid to its subcontractors, the court did not make findings on whether Eagle misrepresented the payments made to Mon-Dak and RK Electric. The Court therefore reversed and remanded for further findings relating to amounts Mon-Dak and RK Electric were entitled to recover from funds SWMO deposited into court; the parties' remaining arguments were without merit or not necessary to the Court's decision. The trial court was affirmed in all other respects. View "SWMO, LLC v. Eagle Rigid Spans Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a purported class action against Xoom, alleging that the company breached a customer agreement by failing to set their electricity rates according to their actual or estimated supply costs. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim and denied plaintiffs' post-judgment request for leave to amend under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b).The Second Circuit held that the district court failed to accept as true plausible allegations in the complaint and the proposed amended complaint (PAC). In this case, plaintiffs have alleged, with the support of the expert calculations included in the complaint and the PAC, that XOOM's rates showed significant upward deviations from the Market Supply Cost and continued to rise even when that cost fell. Therefore, these allegations were sufficient to state a claim for breach of contract. Furthermore, there was no support for the district court's suggestion that plaintiffs fabricated their calculations. Likewise, the district court erred in denying plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint, and the district court should have accepted the PAC, notwithstanding its presentation after judgment was entered. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mirkin v. XOOM Energy, LLC" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of a diversity action based on a forum selection clause in the parties' Asset Purchase Agreement. The panel applied its decision in Yei A. Sun v. Advanced China Healthcare, Inc., 901 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2018), which was decided after the district court ruled in this case, and held that the forum-selection clause here was unenforceable because it contravened the strong public policy declared by Idaho Code 29-110(1). Therefore, the panel remanded so the district court could apply a traditional forum non conveniens balancing analysis. View "Gemini Technologies, Inc. v. Smith & Wesson Corp." on Justia Law

The federal district court for the District of South Carolina certified a question of law to the South Carolina Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was asked to construe section 38-77-350(C) of the South Carolina Code (2015) and determine whether, under the facts presented, an insurance company was required to make a new offer of underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage when an additional named insured is added to an existing policy. In 2012, Wayne Reeves acquired an insurance policy from Progressive Direct Insurance Company (Progressive) covering his motorcycle. When the policy was issued, Wayne declined optional UIM coverage. In 2015, Wayne's wife (Jennifer) and son (Bryan) were added to the policy as "drivers and household residents," because they also drove motorcycles. In 2017, Bryan sold his motorcycle and purchased another motorcycle, a 2016 Harley Davidson, which was added to the policy. At the time, Wayne had Bryan added as named insured to the policy. Progressive did not offer Bryan any optional coverages. Later in 2017, Bryan was involved in an accident while driving his 2016 Harley Davidson. Bryan ultimately made a claim against Progressive to reform the policy to include UIM coverage based on Progressive's failure to offer him the optional coverage. Progressive contended that adding Bryan as a named insured was a change to an existing policy, and as a result, Progressive was not required to offer Bryan UIM coverage. Based on the undisputed facts, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court concluded under South Carolina law, Progressive was not required to make an additional offer of UIM coverage to Bryan. View "Progressive Direct v. Reeves" on Justia Law