Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In this dispute over terms of an online auction, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court abused its discretion by improperly admitting evidence and taking judicial notice of the terms. The court explained that Exhibit 41, an internet printout, was not properly authenticated, and the district court abused its discretion by determining that the exhibit was fit under Federal Rule of Evidence 803. Furthermore, the district court erred in taking judicial notice of the terms because a private internet archive falls short of being a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned as required by Rule 201. Because the district court's errors were not harmless, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Weinhoffer v. Davie Shoring, Inc." on Justia Law

Two cases were consolidated for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review. In the first appeal, Singing River MOB, LLC (MOB), argued that the leases between itself and Singing River Health System (SRHS) and the lease between Jackson County, Mississippi (County), and SRHS were valid and that the chancery court erred by finding the leases invalid under Mississippi’s “minutes rule.” In the second appeal, Jackson County and SRHS contended the chancery court erred by fashioning its own equitable relief as a result of the first ruling. MOB also raised its own objection as to the manner in which the equitable relief was fashioned. After careful review, the Supreme Court affirmed and remanded the partial summary-judgment order as to the first appeal (No. 2019-IA-01630-SCT); however, the Court reversed and remanded that order as to the second appeal (No. 2019-IA-01653-SCT). View "Singing River MOB, LLC v. Jackson County" on Justia Law

Ken Rogers and Costas Pavlou entered into an agreement for Rogers to potentially purchase a concession stand from Pavlou. The concession business, costas Place, would operate at the Mississippi State Fair, The agreement required Rogers to pay Pavlou $35,000 “on or before October 25, 2009.” If that condition was satisfied, Pavlou would give Rogers the option to purchase Costas Place for an additional $35,000 payment “on or before two weeks after the last day of the Mississippi State Fair in the year 2011.” Rogers failed to pay the first $35,000 by the deadline; he first made a payment of $30,225 on November 23, 2009, which Pavlou accepted. Then, from 2009 to 2011, Pavlou paid Rogers an equal share of the net income from Costas Place per the agreement. Nevertheless, all that remained was for Rogers to provide the final $35,000 payment in 2011, but the deadline passed. Rogers contended Pavlou waived the 2011 deadline. Rogers claimed that during his divorce proceeding, Pavlou represented to Rogers that he would extend the deadline for the option to purchase the business until after the divorce proceedings ended. Pavlou countered that, pursuant to the contract, Rogers’s option to purchase the business lapsed when he failed to pay the remaining $35,000. Rogers sued Pavlou asserting breach of contract. Including his claims of waiver, Rogers insisted that Pavlou gave reassurances that he would accept that second installment of $35,000 after Rogers’s divorce was final. The case proceeded to trial, but, in the meantime, Pavlou died, and his estate was substituted as party-defendant. After discovery and litigation but before trial, Pavlou’s estate filed two pretrial motions, a motion to take judicial notice of prior testimony and a motion to exclude parol evidence. Pertinent here, the estate sought to introduce Rogers' testimony at his divorce proceeding; Pavlou’s counsel asked the trial judge to “take judicial notice that he testified [the joint venture agreement] was void, that he swore to the Chancery Court it was void.” On the motion to exclude parole evidence, Pavlou’s counsel argued the 2009 agreement “very specifically and expressly said that modifications had to be in writing, that there would be no verbal alterations to the contract.” The trial court granted Pavlou's motion for a directed verdict, finding Rogers failed to present competent proof that Pavlou waived the payment deadline. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Rogers v. Estate of Pavlou" on Justia Law

William Greenwood was in the business of salvaging valuable materials from old buildings. Greenwood was insured by Mesa Underwriters Specialty Insurance Company through a policy sold by Dixie Specialty Insurance. Greenwood was later sued by adjoining building owners who complained he had damaged their property, and Mesa denied coverage based, in part, on a policy exclusion for demolition work. Greenwood later brought suit against his insurers alleging breach of contract and bad-faith denial of coverage. Greenwood averred that his business was actually “deconstruction” rather than demolition, but the trial court granted summary judgment to the insurers. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Estate of Greenwood v. Montpelier US Insurance Company, et al." on Justia Law

BACTES Imaging Solutions, LLC ("BACTES") contracted with health care providers to respond to pre-litigation requests from attorneys seeking access to their clients’ medical records. One option available to the attorney, among others, was to hire and pay BACTES to provide photocopies of the records. Spencer S. Busby, APLC ("Busby") was the class representative for a class of 9,691 attorneys who hired BACTES to provide photocopies of their clients’ medical records. Busby sued BACTES, claiming it charged photocopying rates exceeding the rates permitted by the California Evidence Code section 1158. After a bench trial, the trial court found BACTES acted as an agent of the health care providers when it responded to the attorneys’ requests for medical records; however, it found BACTES acted as an agent of the requesting attorneys when it photocopied the medical records and provided them to the attorneys. Because BACTES did not act as an agent of the health care providers when it provided the photocopied records to the attorneys, the court found BACTES did not violate section 1158. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Spencer S. Busby, APLC v. BACTES Imaging Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the doctrine of present execution does not permit an interlocutory appeal from a superior court judge's order denying a motion to enforce an alleged settlement agreement.Plaintiff filed this action asserting claims for summary process eviction and breach of contract regarding Defendant's lease of office space. The parties' counsel engaged in settlement negotiations via e-mail. Thereafter, Defendant moved to enforce what it asserted was a binding settlement agreement. After the motion judge denied the motion Defendant filed a petition for interlocutory review asserting that its interlocutory appeal was proper under the doctrine of present execution. A single justice presented questions for appellate review. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Defendant was not entitled to an interlocutory appeal under the doctrine of present execution. View "CP 200 State, LLC v. CIEE, Inc." on Justia Law

A patient sued a hospital after learning that a hospital employee intentionally disclosed the patient’s health information in violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). The patient alleged the disclosure breached the hospital’s contractual obligations to him. The superior court instructed the jury to return a verdict for the hospital if the jury found that the employee was not acting in the course and scope of employment when she disclosed the patient’s information. The jury so found, leading to judgment in the hospital’s favor. The Alaska Supreme Court found the jury instruction erroneously applied the rule of vicarious liability to excuse liability for breach of contract. "A party that breaches its contractual obligations is liable for breach regardless of whether the breach is caused by an employee acting outside the scope of employment, unless the terms of the contract excuse liability for that reason." The Court therefore reversed judgment and remanded for further proceedings, in particular to determine whether a contract existed between the patient and hospital and, if so, the contract’s terms governing patient health information. View "Guy v. Providence Health & Services Washington" on Justia Law

Jeanne and Nevin Tergesen appealed a judgment dismissing their complaint and awarding Nelson Homes, Inc. damages for its breach of contract counterclaim. The Tergesens argued the district court erred in dismissing their rescission and breach of contract claims, and the court erroneously found the Tergesens breached the contract. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in dismissing the Tergesens’ claims or finding the Tergesens breached the contract, but the court did err in calculating the amount of prejudgment interest on Nelson Homes’ damages. View "Tergesen, et al. v. Nelson Homes" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a contract dispute between Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation (the Tribe) and Lynn Becker, a non-Indian. The contract concerned Becker’s work marketing and developing the Tribe’s mineral resources on the Ute reservation. Becker sued the Tribe in Utah state court for allegedly breaching the contract by failing to pay him a percentage of certain revenue the Tribe received from its mineral holdings. Later, the Tribe filed this lawsuit, challenging the state court’s subject-matter jurisdiction under federal law. The district court denied the Tribe’s motion for a preliminary injunction against the state-court proceedings, and the Tribe appealed. After its review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding the Tribe was entitled to injunctive relief. The appellate court found the trial court’s factual findings established that Becker’s state-court claims arose on the reservation because no substantial part of the conduct supporting them occurred elsewhere. And because the claims arose on the reservation, the state court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction absent congressional authorization. Accordingly, under the particular circumstances of this appeal, the Tenth Circuit "close[d] this chapter in Becker’s dispute with the Tribe by ordering the district court to permanently enjoin the state-court proceedings." View "Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah, et al. v. Lawrence, et al." on Justia Law

This case involved the purchase and leaseback of a vacant hotel and restaurant. Buyers-plaintiffs claimed the sellers-defendants surreptitiously substituted altered versions of the lease and financing instruments containing terms extremely adverse to the buyers, and which they alleged were neither bargained for nor agreed to. Acting under the misapprehension that plaintiffs’ theory was promissory fraud, the superior court sustained a demurrer brought by defendants Inn Lending LLC (Inn Lending) and Rajesh Patel on the grounds that “[i]nsufficient facts” were alleged showing they “made promises” upon which plaintiffs relied. The court also determined that related causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and financial elder abuse also failed. "Fraud in the execution is distinct from promissory fraud, which involves false representations that induce one to enter into a contract containing agreed- upon terms." The Court of Appeal found the allegations made in this case were "quite literally, a textbook cause of action for fraud in the execution," and reversed the superior court's judgment. View "Munoz v. PL Hotel Group, LLC" on Justia Law