Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In September 2016, Legend’s Creek filed a claim with Travelers for hail and wind damage that had occurred in May 2016 to the north-facing sides of insured condominium buildings. Legend’s Creek retained Kassen to negotiate the claim with Travelers’ agent Knopp. The two initially agreed to repair the north-facing sides of the buildings. Travelers issued a $644,674.87 check. In January 2017, Kassen informed Knopp that the repairs were unacceptable. Travelers investigated and submitted additional checks of $238,766.88 and $28,438.02. Kassen told Knopp that the north-facing sides had to be completely replaced. Travelers agreed and, in February 2018, submitted an estimate. Less than three weeks before the contractual deadline to file suit Kassen demanded the replacement of all sides of the buildings because the new sides did not match to his satisfaction the undamaged ones. Knopp informed Kassen that Travelers would only replace the damaged north-facing sides and paint them to match.Legend’s Creek sued, alleging breach of contract and bad faith. Travelers argued that the lawsuit was brought outside the two-year contractual window and later moved to compel Travelers to submit to an appraisal. The magistrate compelled an appraisal for discovery purposes. The appraiser granted an “award” to Legend’s Creek based on the mismatched sides. The district court granted Travelers summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing the limitations clause and rejecting claims of waiver. View "Legend's Creek Homeowners Associaton, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. of America" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Joseph Amato sold a house at a price that he contended was much less than the property was worth. He sued the broker who listed the property for him, defendant-respondent Steve Downs, as well as the broker’s employer, defendant-respondent Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Company (Coldwell Banker). On the day of trial, the court found that Amato had waived his right to a jury trial by failing to comply with a local pretrial procedural rule. It then denied Amato’s request that a different judge hear the case due to the trial judge’s involvement in pretrial settlement negotiations. After Amato presented his evidence, the court granted a motion for judgment in favor of Downs and Coldwell Banker on all of Amato’s claims. On appeal, Amato argued he was erroneously deprived of his right to a jury trial. Furthermore, the judge should have recused himself as trier of fact, one of Amato's witnesses was dismissed before the witness finished testifying, and defendants' motion should not have been granted. After review, the Court of Appeal found the trial court indeed erred in deeming Amato to have waived jury trial despite his violations of the local rules. Judgment was reversed on this ground, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Amato v. Downs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant John Coates brought an action for breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing against defendant-appellee Progressive Direct Insurance Company. Plaintiff was injured after a motorcycle collision; he was insured by Progressive under a motorcycle policy, an auto policy, and a policy providing UM coverage. Coates moved for partial summary judgment regarding his entitlement to uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits. Progressive moved for summary judgment regarding Coates' bad faith claim. Coates sought more time to conduct discovery to address Progressive's counterclaim on bad faith. The trial court granted Coates' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, allowing his UM claim against Progressive. The trial court also granted Progressive's Motion for Summary Judgment, denying Coates' claim for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court denied Coates' Motion for Additional Time to Respond. After review of the parties’ arguments on appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment on Coates' UM claim. The Court reversed, however, the decisions granting Progressive's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Coates additional time to respond to that motion. View "Coates v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The dispute arose out of a contract between Purple Shovel and two companies Omnipol and Elmex Praha (“Elmex”), for the manufacture and delivery of AK-47 assault rifles. The U.S. Special Operations Command (“SOCOM”) entered into a contract (the “SOCOM contract”) with Purple Shovel to deliver the rifles for a set price. Together, the parties entered into a “Cooperation Agreement.”   Purple Shovel never paid Elmex and, in turn, Elmex failed to pay Omnipol. Plaintiffs brought an action against several individuals allegedly involved in the formation of the two contracts and asserted six claims against Defendants. The District Court dismissed the amended complaint on all counts and with respect to all Defendants.   On appeal, Plaintiffs challenged the district court’s substitution of the United States as a party in the place of the civilian employees. They also challenged the district court’s finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the state law claims due to the bar of sovereign immunity.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s amended complaint. The court held that the district court was correct in concluding both that no additional discovery was needed on the scope-of-employment issue and that the United States had been properly substituted as Defendant. Further, the district court did not err in dismissing the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Omnipol, A.S., et al. v. Christopher Worrell, et al." on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma certified two questions of law to the Oklahoma Supreme Court relating to the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act, and whether it applied to conduct outside of Oklahoma. The matter concenred a dispute between Continental Resources, Inc. (Continental), an oil and gas producer headquartered in Oklahoma, and Wolla Oilfield Services, LLC (Wolla), a North Dakota limited liability company that operated as a hot oil service provider in North Dakota. Continental alleged the parties entered into an agreement for Wolla to provide hot oil services at an hourly rate to Continental's wells in North Dakota. As part of the contract, Wolla agreed to submit its invoices through an "online billing system" and to bill accurately and comprehensively for work it performed. A whistleblower in Wolla's accounting department notified Continental about systematic overbilling in connection with this arrangement. Continental conducted an audit and concluded Wolla's employees were overbilling it for time worked. Wolla denies these allegations. The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded: (1) the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act does not apply to a consumer transaction when the offending conduct that triggers the Act occurs solely within the physical boundaries of another state; and (2) the Act also does not apply to conduct where, even if the physical location is difficult to pinpoint, such actions or transactions have a material impact on, or material nexus to, a consumer in the state of Oklahoma. View "Continental Resources v. Wolla Oilfield Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued PetroTel Oman, LLC (“PetroTel”) and affiliated entities in Texas state court, alleging that they breached an oral contract to compensate him for helping them raise funds for an oil and gas project in Oman. The PetroTel entities removed the action to federal court, arguing that removal was proper under the federal officer removal statute because they “acted under” a federal agency by partnering with the United States International Development Finance Corporation  (“DFC”) to raise funds for the project. The district court remanded the action, rejecting both grounds for removal offered by the PetroTel entities.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding rejecting Defendant’s grounds for removal to federal court. The court held that the federal officer removal statute nor the Grable doctrine provides a basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction in Plaintiff’s breach of contract action against Defendant.   First, the court reasoned that PetroTel did not assist or help the DFC carry out a task that the DFC—or any federal superior—otherwise would have had to do itself. Accordingly, PetroTel did not act under the DFC, so it was not entitled to remove under Sec. 1442(a)(1).  Next, the court held that because Plaintiff’s state court petition does not satisfy the well-pleaded complaint rule, the district court correctly determined that Grable does not provide a basis for federal jurisdiction. View "Box v. PetroTel" on Justia Law

Dent and RLD (Petitioners) had several supply and marketing contracts with energy companies (Respondents). Respondents terminated the Petitioners' at-will consulting agreements. Petitioners filed an Illinois Supreme Court Rule 224 petition seeking disclosure from Respondents of the names and addresses of three unidentified individuals who might be responsible in damages to Petitioners, alleging that those individuals publicized false and defamatory statements about Dent that caused respondents to terminate their contractual relationships. Petitioners alleged that the unnamed individuals accused Dent of drunken conduct and of sexual misconduct. The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the petition, stating that the circuit court abused its discretion when it sua sponte dismissed the petition based upon its determination that Petitioners knew the identity of Respondents and their attorneys; Respondents and their attorneys were not potential defendants responsible in damages for defamation or breach of contract.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal. The appellate court erred in holding that a section 2-615 motion to dismiss cannot consider affirmative defenses apparent on the face of the petition, such as the existence of qualified privilege. The existence of qualified privilege on the part of the unidentified individuals was apparent from the face of the petition. Respondents, having raised nothing more than a conclusory denial, failed to sufficiently allege abuse of that privilege. View "Dent v. Constellation NewEnergy, Inc." on Justia Law

Dynamic CRM Recruiting Solutions sued UMA Education in Harris County district court for alleged misappropriation of Dynamic’s software in breach of their licensing agreement (“the Agreement”). UMA removed the action to federal district court, which in turn remanded it to state court based on the parties’ contractual forum selection clause.The Fifth Circuit found that the forum state is Texas, and the Agreement provides that its interpretation shall be governed by Texas law. The court reasoned that contractual choice-of-law clauses are generally valid under Texas law unless they violate one of the limitations set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws Sec. 187 (1971), and neither party here has argued that this clause is invalid on this ground.Further, since the Agreement provides that disputes arising thereunder must be “brought before the district courts of Harris County”, UMA has contractually waived its right to remove the suit. UMA also argued that the district court abused its discretion in allowing Dynamic to drop its claims for conversion, quantum meruit, lien foreclosure, and violations of the TTLA. The court found that it need not reach the jurisdictional point because the district court properly allowed Dynamic to amend its complaint. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling. View "Dynamic CRM v. UMA Education" on Justia Law

This case arises from a dispute regarding a joint financial venture between Noble Capital Fund Management, L.L.C. (“Noble”) and US Capital Global Investment Management, L.L.C. (“US Capital”). Noble created two separate funds, collectively the “Feeder Funds."Noble and the Feeder Funds initiated a JAMS arbitration against US Capital, alleging various claims including the breach of contractual and fiduciary duties. US Capital was unable to pay the arbitration fees, and the JAMS panel terminated the arbitration.On November 24, 2020, Noble and the Feeder Funds sued US Capital in Texas state court for various claims including fraud and fraudulent inducement. US Capital appeals the denial of its motion to compel arbitration and stay judicial proceedings and the denial of its motion to transfer.The court explained the Federal Arbitration Act requires that, where a suit is referable to arbitration, judicial proceedings be stayed until arbitration "has been had." Here, there is no arbitration to return this case to and parties may not avoid resolution of live claims by compelling a new arbitration proceeding after the first proceeding failed. Further, the court found no pendent jurisdiction over the denial of the motion to transfer. The court affirmed the district court’s ruling and dismissed the appeal of the district court’s denial of the motion to transfer. View "Noble Capital Fund v. US Capital Global" on Justia Law

PCS Nitrogen sought insurance coverage for liability arising from contamination of a fertilizer manufacturing site in Charleston, South Carolina, claiming its right to coverage stemmed from an assignment of insurance benefits executed by Columbia Nitrogen Corporation in 1986. Respondents, the insurance carriers who issued the policies at issue, claimed they owed no coverage because Columbia Nitrogen Corporation executed the assignment without their consent. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Respondents, and the court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted PCS's petition for a writ of certiorari, finding Columbia Nitrogen Corporation executed a valid post-loss assignment of insurance rights in 1986. "PCS cannot be denied coverage on the basis that Respondents did not consent to the assignment." The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "PCS Nitrogen, Inc. v Continental Casualty Company, et al." on Justia Law