Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Kendall Hunt Publishing Company (Kendall Hunt) filed suit against The Learning Tree Publishing Corporation (Learning Tree) in district court in Iowa, where Kendall Hunt is located. The complaint alleged, as relevant here, claims of copyright infringement, tortious interference with contract, and unfair competition. The district court1 granted Learning Tree’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that the California corporation lacked minimum contacts with Iowa.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that Learning Tree’s contacts with Iowa were as follows: it maintains a nationally available website through which an Iowa resident purchased the allegedly infringing work. This conduct was not “uniquely or expressly aimed at” Iowa, however, particularly in light of the fact that Learning Tree did not advertise in Iowa and its litigation-anticipated sale to a Kendall Hunt employee occurred in Iowa. Although Kendall Hunt argued in its brief that this online sale was sufficient to create jurisdiction in Iowa, our court subsequently decided on similar facts that a single online sale did not establish personal jurisdiction over Defendant. The remaining specific-jurisdiction analysis factors do not tip the balance in Kendall Hunt’s favor. The court concluded that because Learning Tree’s connections with Iowa were not such that it would reasonably have anticipated being haled into court there, the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the corporation. View "Kendall Hunt Publishing Company v. The Learning Tree Publishing Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of a putative class of students, sued Southern Methodist University (“SMU”) for refusing to refund tuition and fees after the university switched to remote instruction during the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim.   The Fifth Circuit reversed that decision in light of King v. Baylor University, 46 F.4th 344 (5th Cir. 2022), which was issued after the district court’s ruling and which teaches that Hogan adequately pled a breach-of-contract claim. Alternatively, the district court held that Texas’s Pandemic Liability Protection Act (“PLPA”) retroactively bars Plaintiff’s claim for monetary relief and is not unconstitutionally retroactive under the Texas Constitution. That latter ruling raises a determinative-but-unsettled question of state constitutional law, which the court certified to the Texas Supreme Court: Does the application of the Pandemic Liability Protection Act to Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim violate the retroactivity clause in article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution? View "Hogan v. Southern Methodist Univ" on Justia Law

Defendant Union Mutual Fire Insurance Company appealed a superior court grant of summary judgment to plaintiff CC 145 Main, LLC, in a declaratory judgment action regarding the interpretation of an insurance policy exclusion. CC 145 Main owned an apartment building and purchased a “Businessowners Coverage” insurance policy that included “all risk” property insurance, which provided that Union Mutual would “pay for direct physical loss of or damage to” the covered property, unless coverage was specifically limited or excluded by the policy. The insured property sustained damage when a tenant poured cat litter down a toilet, clogging an interior pipe and causing water to overflow from a shower and toilet. The property required significant cleaning and repair, and tenants were required to temporarily relocate. CC 145 Main filed a claim with Union Mutual for water damage, which Union Mutual denied pursuant to a provision in the insurance policy excluding coverage for damage caused by “[w]ater that backs up or overflows or is otherwise discharged from a sewer, drain, sump, sump pump or related equipment.” CC 145 Main filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the water exclusion does not apply to its claim. Union Mutual filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the damage at issue was caused by water that overflowed from “drains” within the meaning of the exclusion. The trial court concluded it was unclear whether the word “drain” in the water exclusion applied to shower and toilet drains and, therefore, the water exclusion was ambiguous and had to be construed in favor of CC 145 Main. Defendant challenged the trial court’s ruling that the policy’s water damage exclusion was ambiguous and its decision to construe the policy, therefore, in favor of CC 145 Main. But finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "CC 145 Main, LLC v. Union Mutual Fire Insurance Company" on Justia Law

An Asset Purchase Agreement provided that the sellers could receive variable payments (Earn-Out Consideration) if the post-merger company (IAS) achieved specific benchmarks. Section 2.6(c) specifies that IAS had to provide the sellers with the computation for each period, to become final unless they submitted a “notice of disagreement.” Any disagreement would be settled according to Section 2.3(e),” which refers to resolution by an accounting firm. Section 11.17, however, directs the parties generally to use non-binding mediation, followed by litigation if mediation fails.IAS determined that the company did not meet its targets. The sellers claim that IAS intentionally prevented the company from hitting its targets. Negotiations failed. The sellers sued for breach of contract and tortious interference; later, they filed a notice of disagreement and sought a declaration that the lawsuit was outside the scope of sections 2.3(e) and 2.6(d). IAS sought to compel arbitration under 2.3(e). The district court held that the Agreement contained a valid agreement to arbitrate. An accounting firm subsequently determined that the sellers had no right to Earn-Out Consideration. The district court entered judgment for IAS.The Third Circuit vacated. The Purchase Agreement contains an agreement to submit narrow disputes to an accounting firm for expert determination, not arbitration. Although the statement of IAS’s financial benchmarks becomes final after the expert completes its accounting analysis, the authority to resolve legal questions—like whether IAS violated the duty of good faith— remains with the courts. View "Sapp v. Industrial Action Services LLC" on Justia Law

In March 2020, Concord Baptist Church of Jefferson City, Inc. (Concord Baptist) sustained damage to its facilities in a severe storm. After disagreements with its insurer, Church Mutual Insurance Company (Church Mutual), regarding the amount of loss, Concord Baptist initiated this action, alleging breach of contract and vexatious refusal to pay. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Church Mutual, concluding that the undisputed facts demonstrated that Concord Baptist failed to comply with a cooperation clause contained in the insurance policy, which precluded coverage. Concord Baptist appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because Concord Baptist admits that it materially breached the policy, the court need not address Concord Baptist’s argument regarding whether the failure to submit to an EUO was a material breach. However, the court noted that Missouri courts have found a material breach where an insured failed to submit to an EUO before commencing an action against the insurer. Regarding the second element, whether Church Mutual suffered substantial prejudice from Concord Baptist’s material breach, the court agreed with the district court that the undisputed facts show that it did. Finally, as to the third element, whether Church Mutual exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to procure Concord Baptist’s cooperation, the court again agreed with the district court that the undisputed facts demonstrate Church Mutual’s diligence. View "Concord Baptist Church of Jefferson City v. Church Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

This dispute involves several insurers and one defendant insurer’s alleged duty to defend a lawsuit brought against a general contractor of a residential building project. The district court entered partial summary judgment, holding that the defendant insurer had a duty to defend the general contractor in the underlying action for construction defects. The court also issued a stay of other issues raised by the parties, and administratively closed the case. After the defendant insurer filed the present appeal, the underlying action was resolved in a settlement agreement.   The Fourth Circuit concluded that it lacks jurisdiction to consider the present interlocutory appeal challenging the defendant insurer’s duty to defend the general contractor. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal. The court explained that while the relief granted in the district court’s order originally may have been prospective in nature, the resolution of the underlying action has eliminated from that order any forward-looking mandate. Thus, the court explained that the order before the court in this appeal currently lacks the character of an injunction and does not require the court to consider any question separate from issues that may be appealed after entry of a final judgment in the district court. View "Westfield Insurance Company v. Selective Insurance Company" on Justia Law

MSSC, Inc., sued Airboss Flexible Products Co., alleging anticipatory breach of contract and seeking to enforce a purchase order between the parties after Airboss threatened to stop filling orders unless MSSC agreed to a price increase. Airboss supplied products to MSSC, and MSSC used those products to manufacture parts for their customers. The parties’ purchase order for the Airboss products was identified as a “blanket” order that listed the parts to be supplied but did not include specific quantities. Instead, the purchase order indicated that quantities would be based on the needs of an MSSC customer. MSSC was obligated to create and send “releases” per the terms and conditions, but neither the purchase order nor the terms and conditions obligated MSSC to send any number of firm orders to Airboss—either as a raw number or as a percentage of MSSC’s total need. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction in favor of MSSC, finding that the contract was a requirements contract and was likely enforceable. Airboss moved for summary judgment, arguing that the purchase order failed to satisfy the statute of frauds of the Uniform Commercial Code, MCL 440.1101 et seq. In response, MSSC moved for summary judgment, arguing that the blanket purchase order was a requirements contract that satisfied the statute of frauds. The trial court granted MSSC’s motion, concluding that because the purchase order was identified as a “blanket” order, it contained a “quantity term” that satisfied the statute of frauds. Airboss appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Contrary to the lower courts, the Michigan Supreme Court found the parties entered into a release-by-release contract, which allowed Airboss to stop selling parts to MSSC. View "MSSC, Inc v. Airboss Flexible Products Co." on Justia Law

Rosenberg-Wohl had a State Farm homeowners insurance policy, covering her San Francisco home. The policy required lawsuits to be “started within one year after the date of loss or damage.” In late 2018 or early 2019, Rosenberg-Wohl noticed that an elderly neighbor twice stumbled on Rosenberg-Wohl’s outside staircase and learned that the pitch of the stairs had changed. The staircase needed to be replaced. In April 2019, Rosenberg-Wohl authorized the work and contacted State Farm. On August 9, she submitted a claim for the money she had spent. On August 26, State Farm denied the claim. Rosenberg-Wohl’s husband, an attorney, later contacted State Farm “to see if anything could be done.” In August 2020 a State Farm adjuster said it had reopened the claim. Days later, it was denied.In October 2020, Rosenberg-Wohl filed suit, alleging breach of the policy and bad faith. That lawsuit was removed to federal court and was dismissed based on the one-year limitation provision. It is currently on appeal. Another action alleges a violation of California’s unfair competition law. The California court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of that suit, rejecting arguments that the one-year limitation provision does not apply to the unfair competition claim, and that State Farm waived the limitation provision. View "Rosenberg-Wohl v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co." on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of an insurance dispute between Plaintiff and Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois. After an accident in which her vehicle suffered substantial damage, Plaintiff made a claim under her Safeco-issued insurance policy for the damage. Safeco declared her vehicle a total loss and paid her what it deemed to be the actual cash value of her vehicle. The district court granted summary judgment to Safeco.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that as proof that a policyholder is reasonably likely to need to incur dealer fees, Plaintiff pointed to the facts that (1) she incurred dealer fees in purchasing both the Lexus that was totaled and her Subaru replacement vehicle, (2) approximately 50-70% of Safeco policyholders are likely to purchase a vehicle from a dealer, and (3) approximately 85-95% of dealerships charge dealer fees. These facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, do not give rise to a genuine dispute of material fact. Plaintiff’s three data points show a reasonable likelihood that a policyholder will incur dealer fees if she chooses to purchase her replacement vehicle from a dealer. And they show that a policyholder is reasonably likely to purchase a replacement vehicle from a dealer. But they do not show that a policyholder is reasonably likely to need to purchase a replacement vehicle from a dealer. Plaintiff has failed as a matter of law to satisfy the Mills standard; therefore, the district court correctly awarded Safeco summary judgment on this issue. View "Gina Signor v. Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff twice lost out on a promotion, she sued Union Pacific for discrimination. The question is whether a dispute over the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement required dismissal. Union Pacific to sought dismissal under the Railway Labor Act, see 45 U.S.C. Section 151, et seq., which requires disputes over the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement to go to arbitration. The district court granted the motion to dismiss.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the parties agree that this case does not involve an attempt to “form” or “secure” a collective-bargaining agreement, so it does not fall into the major-dispute category. In a failure-to-promote case like this one, Plaintiff must establish that (1) she “was a member of a protected group; (2) she was qualified and applied for a promotion to a position for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) she was not promoted; and (4) similarly situated employees, not part of the protected group, were promoted instead.” The sticking point is whether she actually applied for either promotion: she says she did, but Union Pacific disagreed. Whether faxed resumes count as applications under the collective-bargaining agreement is something she will have to prove to establish her prima-facie case. Perhaps the best evidence of its importance was the prominent role it played at trial, especially in the questioning by Plaintiff’s attorney. In these circumstances, the issue is one for the National Railroad Adjustment Board to decide. View "Nancy Avina v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law