Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Breadeaux’s Pisa, LLC (“Breadeaux”) initiated this action against its franchisee, Beckman Bros. Ltd. (“Main Street Pizza”), in federal court seeking a preliminary injunction, a permanent injunction, and a declaratory judgment. After litigating its preliminary injunction, mediating, and participating in discovery proceedings, Breadeaux filed a demand for arbitration in which it sought to relitigate its preliminary injunction and avoid the court’s adverse discovery rulings. Breadeaux then moved to stay all proceedings pending completion of arbitration. The district court denied Breadeaux’s motion.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Section 3’s stay provision is mandatory when “the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration” under a valid arbitration agreement. 9 U.S.C. Section 3. The court wrote that it is unpersuaded by Breadeaux’s assertion that the only reasonable reading of the arbitration provision in the Agreement is that all claims or disputes, besides Breadeaux’s equitable claims, must be arbitrated. Additionally, Breadeaux elected to enforce the Agreement by judicial process, not through mediation and arbitration. Under these circumstances, Breadeaux’s claims are not referable. View "Breadeaux's Pisa, LLC v. Beckman Bros. Ltd." on Justia Law

At the request of Plaintiffs/cross-defendants, the trial court issued a prejudgment right to attach orders (RTAO) in the aggregate amount of $7,192,607.16 against their former employer, NMSI, Inc. Appealing the orders as authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(5),1 NMSI contends Plaintiffs failed to establish the probable validity of their claims because, contrary to the allegations in their first amended complaint, the agreements underlying their breach of contract causes of action had been modified through an exchange of emails, as well as by the parties’ subsequent conduct. NMSI also contends the amounts to be attached were not readily ascertainable, and the court erred in considering documents incorporated by reference into the applications for a writ of attachment.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding of the probable validity of Plaintiffs’ contract claims. The court explained that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the November 3, 2020 email does not show that “both Plaintiffs personally supervised the calculations of the Brea branch profit and loss figures . . . which reflected the modified profit-sharing model, which they then sent to and confirmed with NMSI’s accounting team,” and its further finding that the email did not confirm the modified revenue sharing agreement because it “failed to include the attachment with the cover email,” so “it cannot be determined from the November 2020 email what Plaintiffs were confirming.” The court held that the trial court did not err in determining the claims were for a fixed or readily ascertainable amount. View "Park v. NMSI, Inc." on Justia Law

Seven years ago, A.D. was hired to create a PVT (“pressure volume temperature”) simulation software program. Sah was hired by A.D. to develop a PVT software program in exchange for a stake in one of A.D.’s companies, IPSS. Eight months later, a product called InPVT hit the market. Plaintiff Calsep started looking into InPVT. In Calsep’s assessment, A.D. didn’t have the technical skills or resources to develop a PVT product. Calsep filed another motion to compel, alleging that A.D. still hadn’t adequately disclosed his source code control system. Although A.D. had “produced [a] purported source code system” in April and July, Calsep claimed that these productions were “undoubtedly incomplete” and “had been manipulated.” Believing the deletions to be intentional, Calsep filed a motion for sanctions. Afterward, A.D. filed a motion for reconsideration based on newly discovered forensic images that “vindicated” him. The magistrate judge recommended denying the motion, and the district court agreed, denying the motion for reconsideration of the sanctions order. A.D. appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision on A.D.'s motion for reconsideration. The court explained that A.D. cannot offer any reason—other than mere forgetfulness—why he couldn’t acquire the images sooner. Further, A.D. hasn’t shown that he acted with diligence during the case to locate these images. Moreover, the court explained that although A.D. argues that the images change the game, Calsep’s expert insists that too much data is still missing from the source code control system, rendering a proper review impossible. The court noted that there was no reason to question the district court’s judgment crediting Calsep’s expert testimony. View "Calsep v. Dabral" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Delaware Supreme Court's review stemmed from a failed, multibillion-dollar merger (the “Merger”) of two fuel pipeline giants - The Williams Companies, Inc. (“Williams”) and Energy Transfer LP (“ETE”). The parties spent a decade litigating over various fees to which they argued they were entitled under the Merger Agreement. ETE continued to assert its entitlement to a $1.48 billion breakup fee, despite being the party who terminated the Merger. It also disputed that it had to pay Williams a $410 million reimbursement fee, which it was required to pay if the Merger failed and certain conditions were met. Finally, ETE argued a related $85 million attorney’s fee award was unreasonable. But the Supreme Court found no error with the Court of Chancery’s opinions that held ETE was not entitled to an over-one-billion-dollar fee and find that ETE had to pay Williams the $410 million reimbursement fee and the related $85 million in attorney’s fees. View "Energy Transfer, LP v. The Williams Companies, Inc." on Justia Law

CSX Transportation, Inc. is a freight railroad company. General Mills, Inc. operates a cereal processing plant in Georgia near one of CSX’s rail lines. A small connecting railroad connects CSX’s main rail line to General Mills’s plant. A contract between CSX and General Mills governs the use of the sidetrack.A General Mills employee suffered severe injuries while working on the sidetrack and then sued CSX for negligence. A jury found CSX liable, and CSX sought indemnification from General Mills, citing a contractual provision providing General Mills was required to indemnify CSX—regardless of whether CSX alone was responsible. The district court dismissed one of CSX’s breach-of-contract claims and granted General Mills summary judgment on the other.The Eleventh Circuit found that, under the parties’ agreement, General Mills was not required to indemnify CSX if CSX was solely negligent. However, the court disagreed with the district court that Georgia's vouchment doctrine barred CSX from litigating the issue of General Mills’s negligence. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit remanded for the district court to determine if General Mills was at least partially at fault for the injury. If so, then General Mills must indemnify CSX for at least a portion of the settlement and related expenses. View "CSX Transportation, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was hired as the Superintendent of Dothan City Schools in Dothan, Alabama. The employment contract stated Plaintiff could only be terminated for cause. Furthermore, the contract stated that the termination would not be effective until the Board provided Plaintiff with a statement of the cause for termination and allowed her an opportunity for a hearing. Lastly, the employment contract provided that Plainitff could resign with or without cause as long as she gave at least 120 days notice in writing of her resignation to the Board. Six days after Plaintiff’s intent to resign was sent, Plaintiff alleges that the Board voted to terminate Plaintiff’s contract. She brought claims for deprivation of due process and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, conspiracy to violate civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1985, and breach of contract. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s due process claims and affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s conspiracy and breach of contract claims. The court explained that instead of construing all ambiguities in Plaintiff’s favor, the district court used the minutes to recharacterize the allegations within Plaintiff’s complaint. When taking the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint as true, there is a plausible claim for relief. In paragraph 18 of the complaint, Plaintiff’s classifies her communication as an “intent” to resign, not an actual resignation. The court wrote that the district court erred by ignoring that Plaintiff had a plausible claim to relief and not drawing reasonable inferences in her favor. View "Phyllis Edwards v. Dothan City Schools, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Defendant for breach of contract in connection with their rental of Defendant’s home. Defendant failed to file an answer, and the trial court entered a default judgment for $59,191. The judgment included $1,000 in attorneys’ fees pursuant to a provision in the parties’ lease agreement authorizing attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party not to exceed $1,000. Defendant appealed, and the Second Appellate District affirmed. While the appeal was pending, the trial court granted in part Plaintiffs’ motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 685.080, subdivision (a), for an order allowing their costs of enforcing the judgment. The trial court awarded $27,721 in attorneys’ fees under section 685.040, which allows as an award of costs attorneys’ fees incurred in enforcing a judgment “if the underlying judgment includes an award of attorney’s fees to the judgment creditor pursuant to subparagraph (A) of paragraph (10) of subdivision (a) of Section 1033.5.” Section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(10)(A), in turn, provides that attorneys’ fees may be awarded as costs where authorized by contract. In this appeal, Defendant contends the trial court erred in awarding over $1,000 in attorneys’ fees for enforcing the judgment because the lease authorized attorneys’ fees “not to exceed $1,000.”   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that once the judgment was entered, the terms of the lease, including the $1,000 limitation on fees, were merged into and extinguished by the judgment. Because the judgment included an award of attorneys’ fees authorized by contract, section 685.040 allowed an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in enforcing the judgment. View "Nash v. Aprea" on Justia Law

The facts of this case involved the formation of a promissory note between James Rhea and Career General Agency, Inc, GuideOne America Insurance Co. and Dennis Basden. The promissory note was allegedly signed in 2007 and paid off by 2017. Rhea filed this suit in 2018 claiming unconscionability, unjust enrichment, conversion and negligent infliction of emotional distress against Career General. Career General filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the general three year statute of limitations expired in 2010. Rhea argued that under the doctrine of equitable estoppel and the continuing tort doctrine, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until he finished paying the note in 2017. In February 2020, the trial court granted Career General’s motion to dismiss finding that equitable estoppel and the continuing tort doctrine did not apply and that the statute of limitations barred Rhea’s claim. Ninety-nine days later, Rhea filed a “Motion for New Trial, Amended Judgment or Reconsideration under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 59” stating that he had not received notice of the court’s order and asking the court to reconsider whether equitable estoppel and the continuing tort doctrine should apply. In June 2020, Career General responded to the Rule 59 motion and argued that Rhea had failed to present: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) new evidence not previously available; or (3) a need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. But Career General did not raise the issue of timeliness in their response. After a hearing in April 2021, the trial court denied Rhea's motion. The Mississippi Supreme Court found after review that the Court of Appeals in this case reached the correct decision but for the wrong reason. Regardless of whether the parties or the court raised the issue of timeliness, the Supreme Court held the Court of Appeals correctly found that it did not have appellate jurisdiction to review the February 2020 order. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was thus affirmed. View "Rhea v. Career General Agency, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the conclusion of the trial court that Plaintiff failed to establish Defendant's requisite minimum contacts with Tennessee, and thus the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendant with respect to Plaintiff's suit, holding that the trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiff's complaint.Plaintiff, a Tennessee resident, hired Defendant, an Alabama corporation with its principal place of business in Alabama, to build a house on a parcel of land in Alabama. Upon becoming dissatisfied with the quality and expense of the construction work Plaintiff filed suit in the Davidson County Chancery Court. The trial court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Defendant's contacts with Tennessee were minor and attenuated. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of the minimum contacts necessary for a Tennessee court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant. View "Baskin v. Pierce & Allred Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Darren and Tamara Berger (“Bergers”) appealed a judgment dismissing their claims of violation of a planned unit development (PUD), breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, private nuisance, and negligence against their neighbors Jason and Krysta Sellers (“Sellers”), Sellers’ homebuilder Jordan Anderson and Big River Builders, Inc. (together, “Builder”), and the Misty Waters Owners’ Association (“Association”). Sellers and Builder cross-appealed the judgment dismissing their claims of defamation, interference with contract and business, and negligence against Bergers and neighbor Jeff Carlson. The central issue in this case was whether the PUD minimum setback from the bay could be changed by obtaining a new Letter of Map Revision (LOMR) from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) without an amendment to the PUD. To this, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the PUD unambiguously set the minimum setback from the bay as the contour line in the 2005 LOMR-F and therefore Sellers’ home violated the PUD. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Bergers’ claims against Sellers for violation of the PUD, breach of restrictive covenants, negligence (drainage), and private nuisance (setbacks). The Court remanded with instructions to grant Bergers partial summary judgment on their claims against Sellers for violation of the PUD and breach of restrictive covenants and for declaratory relief (against Sellers) as requested in their motion for partial summary judgment. The Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on Bergers’ claims against the Association for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence. The Court affirmed the court’s grant of summary judgment on all of Bergers’ claims against Builder, namely the PUD violation, breach of restrictive covenants, and negligence. The Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on Bergers’ claims against the Association for breach of restrictive covenants and private nuisance. The Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on all of Sellers’ and Builder’s claims. View "Berger, et al. v. Sellers, et al." on Justia Law