Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada considered a dispute between LaMont’s Wild West Buffalo, LLC and Nathanial Terry. LaMont’s had acted as an order-buyer to procure 517 bison for Terry’s Montana ranch under an oral agreement. After the bison were delivered, Terry ceased communication and did not pay LaMont’s finder’s fee. LaMont’s sued Terry for breach of contract and related claims. In response, Terry filed frivolous counterclaims, which were later dismissed.After winning the case, LaMont’s sought attorney fees as sanctions under Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure (NRCP) 11 and Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 18.010(2)(b) and 7.085. However, the district court denied these motions, finding that LaMont’s had not complied with NRCP 11's safe harbor provision, a procedural requirement for seeking sanctions.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed in part and reversed in part the lower court's decision. The Court agreed that LaMont’s had not complied with NRCP 11's procedural requirements, and thus was not entitled to attorney fees under this rule. However, the Court held that these procedural requirements did not apply to NRS 18.010(2)(b) and 7.085. The Court concluded that these statutes provided independent mechanisms for sanctions, and as such, the district court had erred in applying NRCP 11's procedural requirements to them. The case was remanded with instructions for the district court to determine whether LaMont’s was entitled to attorney fees under these statutes. View "LaMont's Wild W. Buffalo, LLC v. Terry" on Justia Law

In a case before the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, the plaintiffs, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, sued TNA NA Manufacturing, Inc. and Food Design, Inc., claiming negligence and product liability for a listeria outbreak that resulted from using the defendants' food processing equipment. The outbreak cost the plaintiffs around $20 million. The trial court and Court of Appeals upheld that the plaintiffs had waived any action in tort through their purchase contract with the defendants, as the contract contained a waiver of tort liability. The Supreme Court of Oregon, however, disagreed.The court ruled that, under Oregon law, a contract will not be construed to provide immunity from consequences of a party’s own negligence unless that intention is clearly and unequivocally expressed. The court found that the language in the contract between the plaintiffs and defendants did not meet this standard. The court held that to waive tort liability, contract language must be clear and explicit, stating that the waiver will not be deduced from inference or implication. The text of the contract must unambiguously show that the parties intended to disclaim actions outside of contract, i.e., actions in tort.Consequently, the court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings. The court confirmed that, while no magic words are required for a waiver of tort liability to be effective, the use of terms such as "negligence" or "tort" may be helpful in demonstrating an explicit intent to waive such liability. View "Certain Underwriters v. TNA NA Manufacturing" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Yarnell, filed a wrongful death action against Clinton No. 1, Inc., a healthcare and rehabilitation center, alleging that Clinton's negligence led to her mother's death from COVID-19. The Missouri Supreme Court addressed whether Clinton's proposed theories of immunity barred Yarnell's claims, which were based on the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act and two Missouri acts.Yarnell's mother had contracted with Clinton for a private room, but Clinton placed her with a roommate, which Yarnell claimed exposed her mother to COVID-19, violated their agreement, and ultimately led to her mother's death. Clinton argued that Yarnell's claims were barred by the PREP Act, which provides immunity for healthcare providers administering or using covered countermeasures during a public health emergency, and Missouri laws granting immunity to healthcare providers during an emergency declared by the governor and in COVID-19 exposure actions.The court found that Yarnell's petition did not implicate a covered countermeasure under the PREP Act, as it made no reference to the administration or use of a diagnostic test or any other covered countermeasure. The court also found that Clinton failed to demonstrate it agreed to be deployed during the emergency or that the governor or any state agency acted on such agreement and deployed Clinton, which would have entitled it to immunity under Missouri law. Lastly, the court noted that Yarnell had adequately alleged her harm was caused by Clinton's recklessness, and the two COVID-19 statutes would not foreclose relief if Yarnell were able to prove such recklessness. Therefore, the court quashed its preliminary writ of mandamus, allowing Yarnell's case to proceed. View "State ex rel. Clinton No. 1 vs. Baker" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm") brought a lawsuit against Michael Angelo, alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). The lawsuit claimed that Angelo submitted fraudulent bills to the insurance company. Angelo later filed a separate action against State Farm under the False Claims Act ("FCA"), alleging that the insurance company wrongfully avoided paying medical benefits. This action was unknown to State Farm at the time because FCA complaints are required to be filed under seal.The two parties entered into a settlement agreement in February 2021, resolving the RICO action. As part of the agreement, Angelo agreed to take all necessary steps to dismiss certain claims against State Farm. After the settlement agreement was signed, the FCA complaint was unsealed and served on State Farm. State Farm then sought to enforce the settlement agreement, arguing that it required Angelo to dismiss the FCA action as well.Angelo argued that the settlement agreement did not apply to the FCA action because the FCA claims were unrelated to the settled RICO claims. However, the district court disagreed and ordered Angelo to seek the government's consent to dismiss his FCA claims against State Farm. Angelo appealed this decision, claiming it violated his First Amendment rights and the FCA.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, stating that the settlement agreement clearly encompassed the FCA action. The court also held that the district court had not erred in requiring Angelo to seek the government's consent to dismiss his FCA claims. Angelo's First Amendment claim was deemed forfeited as it was raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration and was thus untimely. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Angelo" on Justia Law

In the case, a group of students from the University of San Francisco (USF) sued the university for breach of contract, alleging that the university did not deliver on its promise to provide in-person instruction and should refund a portion of their tuition fees due to the transition to remote learning during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three affirmed the trial court's decision, which granted USF's motion for summary adjudication, concluding that the students failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether USF promised to provide exclusively in-person instruction.The court determined that there was an implied-in-fact contract between USF and the student appellants, established through matriculation and the payment of tuition. However, the court found that the contract did not explicitly promise exclusively in-person instruction. The court also distinguished between general expectations of in-person classes and enforceable contractual promises for exclusively in-person instruction. The court held that the students failed to establish a breach of contract based on the transition to remote learning during the COVID-19 pandemic.The court further held that the students could not pursue quasi-contract claims, as a valid and enforceable contract existed between the students and USF. The students' promissory estoppel claim also failed, as they did not establish any clear and unequivocal promises from USF for in-person instruction. The court stated that the record did not reflect any such promise.The court dismissed the students' claims relating to the Fall 2020 and Spring 2021 semesters, as they were aware these semesters would be conducted either entirely remotely or in a hybrid format prior to enrolling or paying tuition for those semesters. Thus, the students could not reasonably have believed USF contractually promised to provide in-person education for these semesters. View "Berlanga v. University of San Francisco" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiffs, Stowe Aviation, LLC and Stowe Airport Investment, LP, appealed from a denial of their motion to reopen a breach-of-contract case with the Vermont Agency of Commerce and Community Development. The plaintiffs had signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Agency in 2014, outlining their intention to develop and expand the Morrisville-Stowe State Airport using funds secured through the EB-5 program. However, the Agency later transferred its obligations under the MOU to the Department of Financial Regulation (DFR) without informing the plaintiffs, leading to the failure of the airport project.The plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Agency, alleging that the Agency breached its contract by failing to perform under the MOU and by transferring its obligations to the DFR without notice. The trial court dismissed the claims, and the case was closed. The plaintiffs then moved to reopen the case and amend their complaint, but the trial court denied their motion. The plaintiffs appealed this order.The Supreme Court of Vermont reversed the order and remanded the case, holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion to reopen the case. The Supreme Court reasoned that plaintiffs could potentially obtain relief to cure a pleading deficiency under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), and it was inappropriate for the trial court to deny relief simply because plaintiffs did not request leave to amend in their opposition papers before the court entered judgment. On remand, the plaintiffs must demonstrate a valid basis to vacate the previously entered judgment to prevent manifest injustice before they can file their amended complaint. View "Stowe Aviation, LLC et al. v. Agency of Commerce & Community Development" on Justia Law

In a dispute between Sealy Emergency Room, L.L.C., Dr. Kannappan Krishnaswamy, and Free Standing Emergency Room Managers of America, L.L.C. (FERMA), along with its doctors, the Supreme Court of Texas ruled on two issues regarding the finality and appealability of judgments. The case arose from a contractual dispute between Sealy ER and FERMA, with both parties filing various claims and counterclaims against each other. The trial court granted FERMA's motion for partial summary judgment, dismissing all of Sealy ER's claims, and later granted FERMA's motion to sever these claims into a separate action.The Supreme Court held that when claims are severed into separate actions, the test for finality applies to each action separately. Thus, any claims that remain pending in the original action are not relevant in deciding whether there is a final judgment in the severed action. Procedural errors in ordering a severance do not affect the finality of the judgment or appellate jurisdiction.Secondly, the court held that when a party seeks attorney’s fees as a remedy for a claim under a prevailing-party standard, a summary judgment against the party on that claim also disposes of its fee request. Therefore, the court’s failure to specifically deny the fee request will not prevent finality if the court’s orders in fact dispose of all parties and claims.In this case, the court concluded that the trial court’s order granting partial summary judgment disposed of all parties and claims that were later severed into a new action. As a result, the severed action became final when the severance order was signed, and Sealy ER timely appealed. The court of appeals erred in holding that it lacked appellate jurisdiction, so the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the court of appeals to address the merits of the appeal. View "SEALY EMERGENCY ROOM, L.L.C. v. FREE STANDING EMERGENCY ROOM MANAGERS OF AMERICA, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The case involves Pablo Abreu, a student who was expelled from Howard University College of Medicine. Abreu appealed his expulsion, arguing that the university violated his rights under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1972 by refusing to grant him additional opportunities to retake a required examination, in light of his diagnosed test-taking-anxiety disability. The district court dismissed his complaint, applying a one-year statute of limitations and ruling that his claims were time-barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed with the lower court's application of a one-year statute of limitations to Abreu’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. The court pointed to its decision in another case, Stafford v. George Washington University, in which it concluded that a three-year statute of limitations should apply to civil rights claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Since Abreu's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims were also civil rights claims alleging discrimination, the court ruled that the three-year statute of limitations should apply. This made Abreu’s claims timely since he filed the suit less than three years after his expulsion.The court then remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. However, it affirmed the dismissal of Abreu's contractual claims, agreeing with the district court that Abreu failed to state a claim for breach of contract. View "Abreu v. Howard University" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, SanJuana Andrade, filed a lawsuit against the Western Riverside Council of Governments (Council) on the basis that she had been fraudulently enrolled in a Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) program. She claimed that her signature was forged on the PACE loan agreements, resulting in a lien on her home and increased property tax assessments that she had not agreed to. Following an investigation by the state Department of Financial Protection and Innovation, which confirmed the contractors’ fraud, the Council released its assessment and the lien on Andrade’s home. In January 2022, Andrade filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs under Civil Code section 1717, which provides for attorney’s fees in any action on a contract where the contract specifically provides for such fees. The trial court denied Andrade’s motion, concluding that the contractual fee provisions were limited in scope and did not entitle Andrade to attorney’s fees because they concerned fees for “a judicial foreclosure action.”On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court's decision. It held that under section 1717, a fee provision must be construed as applying to the entire contract unless each party was represented by counsel in the negotiation and execution of the contract, and the fact of that representation is specified in the contract. The Court found that limiting the fee provisions to foreclosure proceedings would be the precise kind of lopsided arrangement that section 1717 prohibits. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court to determine whether Andrade is “the party prevailing on the contract” and therefore entitled to attorney's fees. View "Andrade v. Western Riverside Council of Governments" on Justia Law

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Jet Midwest International Co., Ltd. (Jet Midwest International) sought attorneys’ fees and costs from Jet Midwest Group, LLC (JMG) and other defendants (collectively referred to as the Ohadi/Woolley defendants). The request was made in connection with a fraudulent transfer action filed under the Missouri Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (MUFTA), following a term loan agreement between Jet Midwest International and JMG which JMG failed to repay. The district court awarded attorneys’ fees and costs against the Ohadi/Woolley defendants, who were not parties to the term loan agreement, based on its finding that they conspired with JMG to violate the MUFTA.On appeal, the Eighth Circuit found that the district court erred in awarding attorneys’ fees and costs against the Ohadi/Woolley defendants based on the term loan agreement since they were not parties to that agreement. However, the court held that the district court's finding of "intentional misconduct" by the Ohadi/Woolley defendants in conspiring with JMG to violate the MUFTA could justify an attorneys’ fees award under the "special circumstances" exception to the American Rule (which generally requires each party to bear its own attorneys’ fees).The court vacated the award and remanded the case back to the district court to calculate a reasonable attorneys’ fee using the lodestar method (multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rates), and to determine the extent to which the claimed costs are recoverable under the relevant statute. The court's holding did not limit JMG’s ultimate responsibility for attorneys’ fees and costs under the term loan agreement. View "Jet Midwest International Co. v. Ohadi" on Justia Law