Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In a personal injury case, Alejandro Lopez Aguilar, the appellant, had filed a lawsuit against Lucky Cab Co. and Adugna Demesash, the respondents. Before trial, Lucky Cab made an offer of judgment to Aguilar for a lump sum of $150,001, explicitly stating that this amount did not include prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs incurred to date. Aguilar accepted the offer. Lucky Cab sent Aguilar both a check for $150,001 and a stipulation and order for dismissal. However, Aguilar did not process the check or consent to the dismissal, arguing that Lucky Cab had not fully paid the offer amount as it had not yet paid any costs or prejudgment interest. The district court granted dismissal with prejudice, concluding that Lucky Cab was entitled to dismissal once it tendered payment within the stipulated window. Aguilar appealed.The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court’s decision. The high court clarified that when an offer of judgment explicitly excludes costs, expenses, interest, and attorney fees, it promises two sums if accepted: (1) the principal amount for the claim(s), specified in the offer; and (2) a separate amount for costs, expenses, interest, and attorney fees that would be recoverable if a judgment were entered based on that offer. Consequently, under Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure (NRCP) 68(d)(2), an offeror cannot obtain dismissal unless they pay both the principal offer and the additional allowance for costs, expenses, interest, and attorney fees. In this case, Lucky Cab did not pay the pre-offer costs and interest that were promised and that Aguilar would be entitled to as a prevailing party. The case was remanded for the district court to determine the amount of awardable pre-offer costs and interest that Lucky Cab must pay to obtain dismissal. View "Aguilar v. Lucky Cab Co." on Justia Law

In March 2015, Jere Hinman hired BrightView Landscape Development, Inc., to design and construct a pool at her residence. BrightView subcontracted with Georgia Gunite and Pool Company, Inc., to install plumbing and spray shotcrete for the pool shell. In November 2015, Hinman contacted BrightView after receiving an unusually high water bill and discovered that the pool was leaking water due to a missing part that was not included in Georgia Gunite’s scope of work. BrightView and Georgia Gunite worked together to address the issue in April 2016. In 2018, Hinman sued BrightView for defective construction of the pool, and BrightView filed a third-party complaint against Georgia Gunite, seeking indemnification based on the subcontractor agreement. Georgia Gunite moved for summary judgment, arguing that BrightView's claim was barred by Tennessee's four-year statute of repose for actions alleging defective improvements to real estate.The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, which granted summary judgment in favor of Georgia Gunite. The court held that, although BrightView's indemnification claim against Georgia Gunite was contractual in nature, it fell within the scope of Tennessee's statute of repose for deficient construction of an improvement to real property because, at its core, it sought to recover damages arising from such deficient construction. The court rejected BrightView's argument that the statute of repose only applies to tort actions. The court also rejected BrightView's argument that the application of the statute of repose in this case would extinguish its claim before it even accrued, noting that this argument is directed at the nature of a statute of repose. The court further held that the repose statute is not mutually exclusive with statutes of limitation. Thus, BrightView's claim against Georgia Gunite was barred because it was not brought within four years after substantial completion of the pool construction. View "Hinman v. ValleyCrest Landscaping Dev." on Justia Law

This case concerns a dispute arising from a real estate transaction between appellants Donnell and Marilyn Bauer and appellees Jesse Lee and Mary A. Beamon. The Bauers sold Lot 24A to the Beamons, failing to disclose certain defects and issues related to the property. After the sale, the Beamons discovered a mold issue in the residence and soil instability on an adjacent lot, Lot 18, which the Bauers had also owned. The Beamons attempted to remediate these issues, incurring significant costs. They ultimately sought to rescind the contract, alleging fraud and deceit by the Bauers.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's denial of the Beamons’ rescission claim, finding that the Beamons had waived their right to rescission by taking possession of the property, engaging in mold eradication, and attempting to remediate the soil conditions on the hillside. These actions were found to be inconsistent with an intent to rescind.However, the court reversed the lower court's award of damages to the Beamons for breach of contract. The court found that the Beamons had not alleged breach of contract in their complaint, and thus could not recover damages on that basis. Furthermore, the court found that the Bauers' constitutional right to a jury trial had been violated, as the Beamons’ claim for rescission, an equitable remedy, had been tried without a jury, and the Bauers were not given a jury trial on the legal claim for damages. View "BAUER V. BEAMON" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa to dismiss the lawsuit of Iowa-based livestock feed seller Hawkeye Gold, LLC against China National Materials Industry Import and Export Corporation, also known as Sinoma, for lack of personal jurisdiction. Hawkeye Gold sued Sinoma to recover an unpaid default judgment it obtained against Sinoma's now-defunct wholly owned United States subsidiary, Non-Metals, Inc., for breach of a contract to purchase livestock feed. After six years of litigation, the District Court dismissed the case because it did not have personal jurisdiction over Sinoma, a decision which Hawkeye Gold appealed. The Appeals Court, after reviewing the evidence, agreed with the District Court's conclusion that Sinoma had insufficient minimum contacts with Iowa to support personal jurisdiction. The Court also rejected Hawkeye Gold's argument that Sinoma was a party to the contract or that Non-Metals was the alter-ego of Sinoma. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the District Court's denial of Hawkeye Gold's request for sanctions against Sinoma for alleged discovery violations. View "Hawkeye Gold, LLC v. China National Materials" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed a district court's judgment, which had dismissed the claims of Jacob Ebel, John Ebel, and Ordeen Ebel (collectively, "the Ebels") for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, breach of contract, and tortious interference. The Ebels had sought enforcement of contracts they claimed were formed when their bids for parcels of real property owned by the estate of Mark Engelhardt were accepted. The district court had dismissed the Ebels' claims, asserting that the parties did not satisfy the statute of frauds, which requires contracts for the sale of real property to be in writing. The Supreme Court found that the district court misapplied the law because the statute of frauds was not specifically pled or otherwise raised by the parties. The Supreme Court noted that under Rule 8 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, the statute of frauds must be specifically pled as an affirmative defense. Therefore, the case was reversed on the ground that the district court incorrectly applied the statute of frauds when the defense was not properly raised. View "Ebel v. Engelhart" on Justia Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Fonda Jo Powell and Mary T. Henke, as co-personal representatives of the Estate of June A. Slagle, alongside Helen Verhasselt, the trustee of the June Slagle Family Mineral Trust, filed an appeal against Statoil Oil & Gas LP (now known as Equinor Energy LP). The plaintiffs appealed from a judgment of dismissal entered after the district court granted Statoil's motion for summary judgment, concluding that a dispute of title allowed Statoil to suspend royalty payments and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to statutory interest. The plaintiffs argued that the district court erred in concluding there was a title dispute, while Statoil argued that this action was barred by the statute of limitations.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the decision of the district court, concluding that the action was not barred by the statute of limitations and that the court erred in concluding that Statoil lawfully suspended royalty payments. The court determined that a ten-year statute of limitations applied to the claim for untimely payment of royalties under the oil and gas lease, as per N.D.C.C. § 28-01-15(2). Furthermore, the court concluded that, when a dispute is between the mineral developer and the mineral owner, notice of the dispute is required under N.D.C.C. § 47-16-39.4. As Statoil did not provide evidence that it had notified June Slagle of a title dispute, it was required to pay interest on the unpaid royalties at a rate of 18% per annum. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Powell v. Statoil Oil & Gas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of North Carolina was required to decide whether a trial court can refuse to hear oral testimony during a summary judgment hearing on the mistaken belief that the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure prohibit the receipt of such testimony. The plaintiff, a corporation, had sued the defendants for breach of a commercial lease, and the defendants counterclaimed for fraud. During the summary judgment hearing, the trial court declined a request by the defendants to introduce live testimony, asserting that it was not permitted during a summary judgment hearing. The defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court's summary judgment order and remanded the case, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that a trial court errs if it fails to exercise its discretion under the misapprehension that it has no such discretion, referring to Rule 43(e) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure that allows for the introduction of live oral testimony during a summary judgment hearing at the discretion of the trial court. The court found that the trial court was mistaken in its belief that it could not allow oral testimony, and this error warranted vacatur and remand for reconsideration. The Supreme Court thereby modified and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals to vacate the trial court's summary judgment order and remand the case. View "D.V. Shah Corp. v. VroomBrands, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves an Iowa attorney, Marc Harding, who hired an Indiana-based doctor, Rick Sasso, to provide expert witness services in a potential medical malpractice suit in Iowa. After things did not go as planned, Harding sued Sasso in Iowa to recover a portion of the $10,000 retainer he had paid, plus additional damages. Sasso moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the Iowa court did not have personal jurisdiction over him. The district court denied the motion, and Sasso appealed. The court of appeals reversed the district court's decision and ordered the case to be dismissed, but the Supreme Court of Iowa granted Harding's application for further review.The Supreme Court of Iowa held that the Iowa court could exercise personal jurisdiction over Sasso. The court found that Sasso had sufficient minimum contacts with Iowa to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him with respect to the contract dispute. Sasso had entered into a contractual relationship with Harding, who is an Iowa lawyer, and agreed to evaluate a medical malpractice claim involving Iowa residents and to provide expert testimony at any trial in the medical malpractice case, which would have been venued in Iowa. The court also found that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be unreasonable or offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Iowa vacated the decision of the court of appeals, affirmed the district court's order denying Sasso's motion to dismiss, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Harding v. Sasso" on Justia Law

In a dispute before the Supreme Court of Mississippi, Amrut Patel claimed that Dilip Bhana failed to repay three loans. The Chancery Court of DeSoto County had granted a judgment in favor of Patel in 2014. In 2021, Patel attempted to renew the judgment by filing a notice of renewal with the DeSoto County Circuit Court. In 2022, Patel pursued executing the judgment in the DeSoto County Chancery Court. However, Bhana filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the judgment had expired because Patel did not properly renew it. The chancery court denied Bhana’s motion to dismiss.Bhana's case was brought before the Supreme Court of Mississippi on interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court clarified that there are three ways to renew a judgment in Mississippi: filing a notice of renewal with the clerk of the court that rendered the judgment, filing a motion to renew in the court that rendered the judgment, or filing a new suit on the judgment in any court in which venue is proper. The court found that Patel did not follow any of these methods properly. Patel had filed a notice of renewal in the circuit court, not the chancery court that had issued the judgment, and he had not filed a new suit to renew the judgment.The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that Patel's judgment against Bhana had expired because Patel had not renewed it in any manner provided by law or case precedent. The court also ruled that Bhana did not waive his statute of limitations defense and that the chancery court had abused its discretion by finding Bhana’s motion to dismiss untimely. Consequently, the court reversed the chancery court’s denial of Bhana’s motion to dismiss and rendered judgment in favor of Bhana. View "Dilip v. Patel" on Justia Law

In this case, Nova Group/Tutor-Saliba (“NTS”) was awarded a construction contract by the United States Department of the Navy to build a new aircraft carrier maintenance pier at a naval base. The contract required NTS to demolish an old pier, design and build a replacement pier, and construct a new structure known as the Mole Quaywall, which would be designed by the government. During construction, NTS encountered unexpected subsurface soil conditions that complicated and increased the cost of the project. NTS sought additional compensation from the government alleging differing site conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims which had denied NTS's claim for additional compensation. The Court of Federal Claims found that NTS had not established a Type I differing site condition because the contract documents disclosed that NTS would encounter unpredictable subsurface conditions and possible obstructions. It also found that NTS had failed to prove a Type II differing site condition, as it had not demonstrated that any of the potential causes for hard driving were unknown or unusual in the region or materially different from comparable work. The Court of Appeals agreed with these findings and also ruled that the parol evidence rule had not been violated as NTS claimed. The Court of Appeals found that the parol evidence rule does not prevent a party from presenting evidence that a recital of fact in an integrated agreement may be untrue, and the challenged evidence was not introduced to modify any term of the contract. Therefore, the appeal by NTS was denied and the decision of the Court of Federal Claims was affirmed. View "NOVA GROUP/TUTOR-SALIBA v. US " on Justia Law