Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Franklin Building Supply Co., Inc. (“FBS”) filed suit against Aaron Michael Hymas to recover money owed on an open account for construction supplies, equipment, and labor supplied to Crestwood Construction, Inc. FBS claims that Hymas guarantied any unpaid balance on Crestwood’s account. The district court granted FBS’s motion for summary judgment. Shortly thereafter, the district court permitted FBS to correct an error in an affidavit submitted in support of summary judgment regarding the amount of interest owed on the outstanding balance. Hymas twice moved the court to reconsider its order granting summary judgment and the district court denied both motions. He timely appealed. Finding no reversible error, however, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Franklin Building Supply Co. v. Hymas" on Justia Law

The Alabama Supreme Court consolidated cases that arose out of an action brought by Guy Willis against three defendants: Alaska Bush Adventures, LLC ("Alaska Bush") and Hugh and Ryan Krank (collectively, the defendants). The Kranks are the owners and operators of Alaska Bush, an outfitter that provided guided hunting trips in Alaska. In December 2011, Willis entered into a written contract with Alaska Bush pursuant to which Alaska Bush would lead a guided hunting trip in Alaska. Willis also claimed that he entered into a separate oral contract to hunt black bears during that guided hunting trip. The guided hunting trip took place in September 2012. A few months after the trip, Willis sued the defendants in Alabama seeking damages for breach of contract, misrepresentation, and suppression. Willis's claims against defendants centered primarily on his allegations that the equipment Alaska Bush provided for the hunting expedition was inadequate in number, unsafe, and inoperable, and he also alleged that he lost hunting time because the defendants were providing services to other hunters who were apparently not included in the guided hunting trip. Willis claimed that he lost most of his personal hunting equipment and had to leave the trip early because he "was caused to be thrown from an improperly repaired, inspected, and/or working motorized boat ...." Willis further alleged that the defendants misrepresented the quantity of wild game that would be available on the hunt. Willis filed an application for the entry of a default judgment against Ryan, and, on the following day, he filed a similar application against Alaska Bush and Hugh. On December 21, 2012, defendants filed an answer to Willis's complaint and an objection to Willis's applications for entry of a default judgment. Thereafter, defendants filed a motion to compel Willis to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement found in the written contract. Defendants then each filed an individual motion to dismiss Willis's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court issued an order denying the defendants' respective motions to dismiss and their motion to compel arbitration. In case no. 1130184, defendants petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to challenge the denial of their motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction; in case no. 1130231, they appealed the trial court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court concluded after review that defendants were not entitled to mandamus relief on the jurisdiction question, but met their burden in their motion to compel arbitration.View "Willis v. Alaska Bush Adventures, LLC et al." on Justia Law

Blessey filed suit against Jeffboat for breach of contract over a dispute regarding the purchase price of barges. The court did not reach the merits of the appeal because it concluded, under Becker v. Tidewater, Inc., that it did not have jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of Blessey's motion for partial summary judgment. In this case, Blessey seeks the court's review of the district court's disposition of a question of law, but its appeal does not fit the Becker exception because the district court conducted a jury trial. Further, even if the court were to assume arguendo that the court did not have jurisdiction, the court would affirm the district court's denial of partial summary judgment on the merits. The court also concluded that, by adducing some of the same extrinsic evidence at trial that it had sought to exclude in its motion in limine, Blessey waived its right to challenge the district court's admission of that evidence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Blessey's motions for partial summary judgment and in limine.View "Blessey Marine Services, Inc. v. Jeffboat, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Defendant, a Canadian company, contracted with Plaintiff, a Massachusetts investment bank, to be its exclusive financial advisor for the sale of its business. The parties negotiated and executed the agreement from their respective home offices, contacting each other by phone, e-mail, and internet. Plaintiff later sued in Massachusetts Superior Court alleging breach of contract, among other claims. Defendant removed the case to federal district court. The district court subsequently dismissed the case, concluding that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant consistently with the Due Process Clause. The First Circuit reversed, holding that, in light of the nature, number, origin, and duration of the parties’ contacts in this case, the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction by Massachusetts was consistent with fair play and substantial justice.View "C.W. Downer & Co. v. Bioriginal Food & Sci. Corp." on Justia Law

This lawsuit, which returned to the Supreme Court for a third time, stemmed from the contracts and payments for services in delivering produce. The parties included Hotfoot Logistics, LLC (Hotfoot), a freight property broker with its principal place of business in Little Rock, Arkansas; Western Brokerage, a property broker that that is based in Phoenix, Arizona; Shipping Point Marketing, Inc. (SPM), a shipping company based in Phoenix, Arizona; and Davis Fishgold, the president of SPM, and Louis Fishgold, the president of Western Brokerage. Hotfoot brought an action in an Arkansas state court against SPM, Western Brokerage, and the Fishgolds. After the Supreme Court’s remand in Hotfoot II, the circuit court granted summary judgment for SPM and the Fishgolds based on lack of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in granting SPM’s motion for summary judgment on personal jurisdiction, as the contacts between Hotfoot and the parties were sufficient to warrant personal jurisdiction over the defendants, and the defendants manifestly availed themselves of the privilege of conduct business in Arkansas.View "Hotfoot Logistics, LLC v. Shipping Point Mktg., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, alleging that defendant invaded his privacy by commercial appropriation of his name, image, and website. Defendant demurred to all of plaintiff's claims and the trial court subsequently dismissed the action. The court concluded that plaintiff properly stated a claim for breach of contract where plaintiff pleaded all the elements of a breach of contract in his Second Amended Complaint, and that the demurrer to that cause of action was erroneously sustained. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The court noted its concern about the due process implications of a proceeding in which the court, aware that no record will be made, incorporates within its ruling reasons that are not documented for the litigants or the reviewing courts.View "Maxwell v. Dolezal" on Justia Law

Acumen, the underwriter, filed suit against General Security, the reinsurer, for breach of a reinsurance underwriting agreement. The district court granted partial summary judgment for General Security, certified the judgment under Rule 54(b), and closed the case. The court dismissed Acumen's appeal, holding that the district court's entry of the Rule 54(b) order and judgment was erroneous because the district court did not address separate claims for relief. In the absence of a final judgment on a claim or an otherwise reviewable order, the court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal.View "Acumen Re Mgmt. Corp. v. General Security Nat. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Fleets applied to have their Bank of America (BofA) home loan modified in 2009 under the Making Homes Affordable Act. The result of multiple telephone calls and letters to various BofA-related personnel, the Fleets were either (a) assured the Fleets that everything was proceeding smoothly or (b) told BofA had no knowledge of any loan modification application. Finally, in November 2011, BofA informed the Fleets they had been approved for a trial period plan under a Fannie Mae modification program. All they had to do, was to make three monthly payments starting on December 1, 2011. If they made the payments, then they would move to the next step (verification of financial hardship); if they passed that test, their loan would be permanently modified. The Fleets made the first two payments, for December 2011 and January 2012, which BofA acknowledged receiving, and therefore foreclosure proceedings had been suspended. Toward the end of January 2012, their house was sold at a trustee’s sale. Two days after the sale, a representative of the buyer showed up at the house with a notice to quit. The Fleets informed him that the house had significant structural problems, and he said he was going to rescind the sale. The Fleets continued to try to communicate with BofA regarding the property. A BofA representative left voice mail messages to the effect that BofA wanted to discuss a solution to the dispute, but otherwise it appeared that productive conversation between the Fleets and BofA and between the Fleets and the buyer had ceased. In light of this silence (which they interpreted to mean the buyer was trying to rescind the sale), the Fleets spent $15,000 to repair a broken sewer main, which was leaking sewage onto the front lawn. They were evicted in August 2012. In June 2012, the Fleets sued BofA, the trustee under their deed of trust, BofA officers and some of the employees who had been involved in handling their loan modification, and the buyer of the property and its representative. BofA’s demurrer to the first amended complaint was sustained without leave to amend as to the remaining causes of action promissory estoppel, breach of contract, fraud, and accounting. All of the BofA defendants were dismissed. The Court of Appeal reversed: "Although the Fleets’ amended complaint spreads the fraud allegations over three causes of action and contains a great deal of extraneous information, it also alleges the requisite elements of promissory fraud. [. . .] This cause of action may or may not be provable; what it definitely is not is demurrable." The Court sustained the demurrer to the Fleets' action for promissory estoppel, and affirmed the trial court in all other respects. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Fleet v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

Jang assigned his patent rights to the companies in exchange for an upfront payment and a promise under defined circumstances to pay additional compensation if the companies sold stents covered by Jang’s patents. In 2005, Jang sued for breach of contract. In the first two appeals, the Federal Circuit addressed claim construction disputes relevant to whether the accused stents were covered by Jang’s patents. In the meantime, the companies sought ex parte reexamination with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, asserting invalidity. An examiner rejected the claims, which were canceled in issued reexamination certificates. In 2014, the district court denied the companies’ motion for summary judgment, finding that a patentee is not precluded from recovering royalties until the date the assignee first challenges the validity of the patent, so Jang could seek royalties prior to the challenge. The district court certified an interlocutory appeal. The Federal Circuit declined to transfer the petition to the Ninth Circuit despite the underlying contract claim and denied the petition for interlocutory review, stating that it is not clear that the identified legal issues will in fact be controlling, and each question depends on the resolution of factual issues not yet addressed by the district court.View "Jang v. Boston Scientific Corp." on Justia Law

The Swareks filed suit against Herman Derr and DPI in Chancery Court, alleging that Derr and his corporation breached a contract for the sale of Mississippi farmland. Derr died while the action was pending and years later, Derr Heirs filed suit against the Swareks in the German Regional Court seeking a declaratory judgment that they were not liable for any claims arising from the putative land contract. After the initiation of the German lawsuit but before the decision of the Regional Court, the Swareks dismissed all of their claims against Derr with prejudice and withdrew a pending motion to substitute the Derr Heirs in the Mississippi action. The Regional Court dismissed the Derr Heirs' claim but the German Higher Regional Court reversed. Subsequently, the Derr Heirs returned to Mississippi and attempted to enforce a German order for costs in federal district court. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to enforce the German cost award where the Higher Regional Court's decision to sidestep the comity determination and readjudicate claims that had already been settled in the Chancery Court violated the Mississippi public policy of res judicata and the Swarek's right to permanently terminate their claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Derr, et al. v. Swarek, et al." on Justia Law