Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Appellants filed a class action complaint alleging that the circuit court clerk falsely and fraudulently notarized oil-and-gas leases outside the presence of the landowners. The complaint requested an injunction and other relief. After a hearing, the circuit court sua sponte dismissed the case for lack of damages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court improperly dismissed Appellants’ complaint, as the sua sponte dismissal foreclosed the possibility that Appellants might have been able to submit additional evidence indicating that there remained a genuine issue of material fact, i.e., that they had suffered damages. View "Lipsey v. Giles" on Justia Law

In 2001, ASC and Paragon entered into a contract to develop and support computer software for the Chicago Tribune. This software, called the “Single Copy Distribution System” (SCDS) would allow the Tribune to manage and track newspaper deliveries and subscriptions. Tensions emerged and Paragon terminated the contract in 2003. ASC successfully sued Paragon in Ohio state court, obtaining a declaration that ASC was the sole owner of the SCDS. In federal court, ASC alleged copyright infringement, trademark infringement, breach of contract, conversion, tortious interference with a business relationship, unjust enrichment, and unfair competition based on Paragon’s alleged copying of the SCDS software to use in its DRACI software, developed in 2004 for another newspaper. After eight years of litigation, the district court granted summary judgment to Paragon on all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that ASC had never submitted any evidence identifying the unique protectable elements of SCDS, and that there was insufficient evidence to generate even an implication that DRACI is substantially similar to SCDS. View "Automated Solutions Corp. v. Paragon Data Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Patrick O’Basuyi filed suit against several defendants (collectively, “TriStar”) for breach of contract, quantum meruit and fraudulent conveyance. TriStar responded by filing a counterclaim for malicious prosecution. O’Basuyi filed a motion for separate trial of TriStar’s counterclaims. The trial court overruled the motion for separate trial, determining that Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.06, which governs joinder of claims, authorized its denial of O’Basuyi’s motion for separate trial of the malicious prosecution claim. O’Basuyi subsequently sought a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the request writ, holding (1) Rule 55.06 does not permit either joinder or trial of a malicious prosecution counterclaim with the underlying claim; and (2) therefore, the trial court erred in permitting the joint trial of the defendants’ counterclaim and O’Basuyi’s claims. View "State ex rel. O'Basuyi v. Hon. David Lee Vincent III" on Justia Law

Some members of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters (Union), an unincorporated association of carpenters, volunteered to help build a barn for Birchwood Conservation Center, a non-profit organization, but failed to complete the barn. Birchwood filed a complaint alleging breach of contract or promissory estoppel. The trial court dismissed Birchwood’s action for lack of standing. Birchwood then filed an amended complaint substituting four new party plaintiffs who did possess standing. The trial court dismissed the new plaintiffs’ claims, concluding that the Union could not be sued because it was a voluntary association. The court of appeals reversed, determining that the Union waived the defense of lack of capacity to be sued. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal of the case, holding that, under the facts of this case, the Union did not waive the defense of lack of capacity to be sued. View "United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Birchwood Conservancy" on Justia Law

AutoSource Motors, LLC petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Montgomery Circuit Court: (1) to vacate its order denying AutoSource's motion to dismiss the action filed against it by Stephanie Chamberlain for lack of personal jurisdiction; and (2) to enter an order granting AutoSource's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The controversy arose when Chamberlain purchased a vehicle from AutoSource via the Internet. Chamberlain's affidavit did not rebut the prima facie showing made by AutoSource in that her affidavit failed to establish that AutoSource was subject to suit in Alabama pursuant to either general personal jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction; consequently, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred in denying AutoSource's motion to dismiss Chamberlain's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. AutoSource demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief it sought; the Supreme Court granted its petition and issued the writ. View "Chamberlain v. AutoSource Motors, LLC" on Justia Law

RFD-TV, LLC, a television programming service, executed an affiliation agreement with Sunflower Broadband Corporation that granted Sunflower a nonexclusive right to distribute RFD programming to Sunflower’s subscribers in Kansas in exchange for a fee. Knology, Inc., subsequently purchased Sunflower’s assets. Prior to this purchase Knology was providing cable service to subscribers in South Dakota. Knology later became a wholly owned subsidiary of WOW! Cable. Two years later, Knology and WOW ceased distribution of RFD programming and did not pay fees. RFD sued Knology and WOW (collectively, Appellees) for breach of contract. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over them. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the minimum contacts requirement between Appellees, as nonresident defendants, and the State had not been met. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the district court (1) did not err in dismissing the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction; and (2) erred in dismissing the case with prejudice. View "RFD-TV v. WildOpenFence Fin." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Alabama corporation, filed a breach of contract action against Defendant, a North Carolina limited liability company, in Alabama, alleging breach of contract. The Alabama court entered a default judgment against Defendant. Plaintiff subsequently filed a request to file a foreign judgment in a North Carolina court, presenting a certified copy of the Alabama judgment. In response, Defendant filed a motion for relief from and notice of defense to the foreign judgment. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion, concluding that, in accordance with N.C. R. Civ. P. 60(b), the intrinsic fraud of Plaintiff in obtaining the underlying Alabama judgment precluded enforcement of the Alabama judgment as a judgment of North Carolina. The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order, concluding that intrinsic fraud was not a sufficient ground under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to deny Plaintiff’s motion to enforce the Alabama judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals as modified, holding that the Alabama judgment was a final judgment and was entitled to the same credit in North Carolina that it would be accorded in Alabama, and Rule 60(b) had no applicability as a defense to a foreign judgment. View "DocRx, Inc. v. EMI Servs. of N.C., LLC" on Justia Law

Pyramid Tech filed suit against its insurer, alleging express breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith. Without holding a Daubert hearing, the district court excluded Pyramid Tech's expert witnesses and granted summary judgment to the insurer, finding insufficient evidence that a flood caused damage to Pyramid Tech's property. The court held that, after an expert establishes admissibility to the judge's satisfaction, challenges that go to the weight of the evidence are within the province of a fact finder, not a trial court judge. A district court should not make credibility determinations that are reserved for the jury. In this instance, the district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert evidence of David Spiegel and Ken Pytlewski, but did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert evidence of Del Mortenson. The district court erred in granting summary judgment against Pyramid Tech's claims where genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the insurer breached its contract with Pyramid Tech and breached the implied covenant of good faith. However, to the extent such claims were premised on Pyramid Tech's business interruption theory, no material issues of fact existed and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment against that theory of liability. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for retrial. View "Pyramid Tech. v. Allied Public Adjusters" on Justia Law

Dozens of suits were filed against Irving Oil Limited (IOL) alleging environmental contamination by methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) occurring from 1979 to the present. At the time of this opinion, all of the MTBE suits against IOL had been settled. In 2009, IOL filed a complaint asking the superior court to declare that ACE INA Insurance (ACE) had a duty to defend and indemnify in the MTBE suits. The superior court granted IOL’s motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part, concluding that it could not declare that IOL was entitled a judgment on the duty-to-defend count as a matter of law. IOL appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed IOL’s appeal and ACE’s cross-appeal, holding that although a decision that an insurer does not have a duty to defend its insured is ordinarily immediately appealable under the death knell exception to the final judgment rule, the exception did not apply in this case because there were no MTBE cases pending against IOL. View "Irving Oil Ltd. et al. v. ACE INA Ins." on Justia Law

GDG filed suit, alleging that the Government of Belize breached a contract for the lease of office telecommunications. The district court dismissed based on the doctrines of forum non conveniens and international comity without reaching the merits of the dispute. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing for forum non conveniens without first evaluating the significance of a forum-selection clause in the underlying contract. Accordingly, the court vacated the forum non conveniens dismissal and remanded to allow the district court to determine the enforceability and significance of the forum-selection clause. The court also vacated the district court's dismissal on the alternative ground of international comity where retrospective international comity did not apply without a judgment from a foreign tribunal or parallel foreign proceedings and where prospective international comity did not apply to this commercial contract dispute. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "GDG Acquisitions, LLC v. Government of Belize" on Justia Law