Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a Canadian company, contracted with Plaintiff, a Massachusetts investment bank, to be its exclusive financial advisor for the sale of its business. The parties negotiated and executed the agreement from their respective home offices, contacting each other by phone, e-mail, and internet. Plaintiff later sued in Massachusetts Superior Court alleging breach of contract, among other claims. Defendant removed the case to federal district court. The district court subsequently dismissed the case, concluding that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant consistently with the Due Process Clause. The First Circuit reversed, holding that, in light of the nature, number, origin, and duration of the parties’ contacts in this case, the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction by Massachusetts was consistent with fair play and substantial justice.View "C.W. Downer & Co. v. Bioriginal Food & Sci. Corp." on Justia Law

This lawsuit, which returned to the Supreme Court for a third time, stemmed from the contracts and payments for services in delivering produce. The parties included Hotfoot Logistics, LLC (Hotfoot), a freight property broker with its principal place of business in Little Rock, Arkansas; Western Brokerage, a property broker that that is based in Phoenix, Arizona; Shipping Point Marketing, Inc. (SPM), a shipping company based in Phoenix, Arizona; and Davis Fishgold, the president of SPM, and Louis Fishgold, the president of Western Brokerage. Hotfoot brought an action in an Arkansas state court against SPM, Western Brokerage, and the Fishgolds. After the Supreme Court’s remand in Hotfoot II, the circuit court granted summary judgment for SPM and the Fishgolds based on lack of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in granting SPM’s motion for summary judgment on personal jurisdiction, as the contacts between Hotfoot and the parties were sufficient to warrant personal jurisdiction over the defendants, and the defendants manifestly availed themselves of the privilege of conduct business in Arkansas.View "Hotfoot Logistics, LLC v. Shipping Point Mktg., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, alleging that defendant invaded his privacy by commercial appropriation of his name, image, and website. Defendant demurred to all of plaintiff's claims and the trial court subsequently dismissed the action. The court concluded that plaintiff properly stated a claim for breach of contract where plaintiff pleaded all the elements of a breach of contract in his Second Amended Complaint, and that the demurrer to that cause of action was erroneously sustained. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The court noted its concern about the due process implications of a proceeding in which the court, aware that no record will be made, incorporates within its ruling reasons that are not documented for the litigants or the reviewing courts.View "Maxwell v. Dolezal" on Justia Law

Acumen, the underwriter, filed suit against General Security, the reinsurer, for breach of a reinsurance underwriting agreement. The district court granted partial summary judgment for General Security, certified the judgment under Rule 54(b), and closed the case. The court dismissed Acumen's appeal, holding that the district court's entry of the Rule 54(b) order and judgment was erroneous because the district court did not address separate claims for relief. In the absence of a final judgment on a claim or an otherwise reviewable order, the court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal.View "Acumen Re Mgmt. Corp. v. General Security Nat. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Fleets applied to have their Bank of America (BofA) home loan modified in 2009 under the Making Homes Affordable Act. The result of multiple telephone calls and letters to various BofA-related personnel, the Fleets were either (a) assured the Fleets that everything was proceeding smoothly or (b) told BofA had no knowledge of any loan modification application. Finally, in November 2011, BofA informed the Fleets they had been approved for a trial period plan under a Fannie Mae modification program. All they had to do, was to make three monthly payments starting on December 1, 2011. If they made the payments, then they would move to the next step (verification of financial hardship); if they passed that test, their loan would be permanently modified. The Fleets made the first two payments, for December 2011 and January 2012, which BofA acknowledged receiving, and therefore foreclosure proceedings had been suspended. Toward the end of January 2012, their house was sold at a trustee’s sale. Two days after the sale, a representative of the buyer showed up at the house with a notice to quit. The Fleets informed him that the house had significant structural problems, and he said he was going to rescind the sale. The Fleets continued to try to communicate with BofA regarding the property. A BofA representative left voice mail messages to the effect that BofA wanted to discuss a solution to the dispute, but otherwise it appeared that productive conversation between the Fleets and BofA and between the Fleets and the buyer had ceased. In light of this silence (which they interpreted to mean the buyer was trying to rescind the sale), the Fleets spent $15,000 to repair a broken sewer main, which was leaking sewage onto the front lawn. They were evicted in August 2012. In June 2012, the Fleets sued BofA, the trustee under their deed of trust, BofA officers and some of the employees who had been involved in handling their loan modification, and the buyer of the property and its representative. BofA’s demurrer to the first amended complaint was sustained without leave to amend as to the remaining causes of action promissory estoppel, breach of contract, fraud, and accounting. All of the BofA defendants were dismissed. The Court of Appeal reversed: "Although the Fleets’ amended complaint spreads the fraud allegations over three causes of action and contains a great deal of extraneous information, it also alleges the requisite elements of promissory fraud. [. . .] This cause of action may or may not be provable; what it definitely is not is demurrable." The Court sustained the demurrer to the Fleets' action for promissory estoppel, and affirmed the trial court in all other respects. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Fleet v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

Jang assigned his patent rights to the companies in exchange for an upfront payment and a promise under defined circumstances to pay additional compensation if the companies sold stents covered by Jang’s patents. In 2005, Jang sued for breach of contract. In the first two appeals, the Federal Circuit addressed claim construction disputes relevant to whether the accused stents were covered by Jang’s patents. In the meantime, the companies sought ex parte reexamination with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, asserting invalidity. An examiner rejected the claims, which were canceled in issued reexamination certificates. In 2014, the district court denied the companies’ motion for summary judgment, finding that a patentee is not precluded from recovering royalties until the date the assignee first challenges the validity of the patent, so Jang could seek royalties prior to the challenge. The district court certified an interlocutory appeal. The Federal Circuit declined to transfer the petition to the Ninth Circuit despite the underlying contract claim and denied the petition for interlocutory review, stating that it is not clear that the identified legal issues will in fact be controlling, and each question depends on the resolution of factual issues not yet addressed by the district court.View "Jang v. Boston Scientific Corp." on Justia Law

The Swareks filed suit against Herman Derr and DPI in Chancery Court, alleging that Derr and his corporation breached a contract for the sale of Mississippi farmland. Derr died while the action was pending and years later, Derr Heirs filed suit against the Swareks in the German Regional Court seeking a declaratory judgment that they were not liable for any claims arising from the putative land contract. After the initiation of the German lawsuit but before the decision of the Regional Court, the Swareks dismissed all of their claims against Derr with prejudice and withdrew a pending motion to substitute the Derr Heirs in the Mississippi action. The Regional Court dismissed the Derr Heirs' claim but the German Higher Regional Court reversed. Subsequently, the Derr Heirs returned to Mississippi and attempted to enforce a German order for costs in federal district court. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to enforce the German cost award where the Higher Regional Court's decision to sidestep the comity determination and readjudicate claims that had already been settled in the Chancery Court violated the Mississippi public policy of res judicata and the Swarek's right to permanently terminate their claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Derr, et al. v. Swarek, et al." on Justia Law

Western Horizons sued Dakota Travel Nurse, a North Dakota corporation that contracts with healthcare facilities to provide licensed nursing staff, alleging Western Horizons and Dakota Travel Nurse entered a 2008 contract for Dakota Travel Nurse to provide licensed nursing staff for Western Horizons Care Center, a nursing home in Hettinger owned and operated by Western Horizons. Western Horizons claimed the parties' contract required Dakota Travel Nurse to "indemnify, hold harmless and defend Western Horizons against any and all claims, losses, demands, actions, administrative proceedings, liabilities and judgments, including reasonable attorneys fees, court[] costs and other expenses, arising from or associated with the action or inaction of [Dakota Travel Nurse] personnel." Western Horizons alleged Dakota Travel Nurse refused to defend or indemnify Western Horizons in a nursing home resident's prior lawsuit against Western Horizons for injuries allegedly arising from the actions or inactions of Dakota Travel Nurse personnel providing care to the resident at the time of his injury. Dakota Travel Nurse was not a party to the resident's prior lawsuit, and Dakota Travel Nurse refused Western Horizons' tender of a defense in that action. Western Horizons thereafter settled the resident's lawsuit and brought this action against Dakota Travel Nurse, seeking a monetary judgment equal to the amount paid to settle the resident's lawsuit, plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by Western Horizons in defense of that action. Western Horizons Living Centers petitioned the Supreme Court for a supervisory writ directing the district court to reverse an order compelling Western Horizons to answer discovery requests by Dakota Travel Nurse, Inc., for information involving a nursing home resident's prior lawsuit against Western Horizons. Western Horizons argued that its insurer's claims file in the prior lawsuit was protected by the lawyer-client privilege and that settlement negotiations and related documents from the prior lawsuit are not subject to discovery in this action. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded this was an appropriate case to exercise our supervisory jurisdiction. The Supreme Court directed the district court to vacate its order compelling discovery. The case was then remanded for further proceedings. View "Western Horizons Living Centers v. Feland" on Justia Law

The superior court issued a declaratory judgment interpreting a settlement agreement between Nautilus Marine Enterprises and Exxon Mobil Corporation, then decided that Exxon was the prevailing party. Nautilus appealed awards of attorney fees and costs as excessive. It focused particularly on out-of-state hourly billing rates that the superior court accepted, the number of hours billed, and the court's imposition of a fee enhancement and sanction. Nautilus also contested the court's determination of prevailing party status, its award of costs, and its failure to apportion fees and costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remand for the superior court to recalculate the attorney fees award based on Alaska rates and for apportionment of fees and costs; the Court affirmed on all other issues. View "Nautilus Marine Enterprises, Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants alleging fraud, defamation, abuse of process, breach of fiduciary duty, and other claims. Plaintiff also requested declaratory judgment, accounting, and injunctive relief. Pursuant to the parties’ prior agreement, which included an arbitration clause, the trial court granted Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration on all counts with the exception of claims involving defamation and abuse of process. Because Defendants appealed, the trial court refrained from ruling on Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief. Consequently, Plaintiff petitioned the court of appeals, without success, for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed. Plaintiff also appealed the trial court’s order compelling arbitration. Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ appeals were consolidated. The court of appeals affirmed the entirety of the trial court’s order compelling arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of Plaintiff’s appeal because Plaintiff attempted to appeal from a non-final order; and (2) the court of appeals correctly determined that the abuse of process and defamation claims fell outside the agreement to arbitrate.View "Linden v. Griffin" on Justia Law