Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A group of car owners from ten states sued Nissan, alleging that certain models equipped with automatic electronic braking systems had a defect causing "phantom activations" at inappropriate times, such as at railroad crossings or in parking garages. The plaintiffs claimed this defect breached warranties, constituted fraud, violated consumer protection statutes, and unjustly enriched Nissan. They sought to certify ten statewide classes of owners or lessees of the affected models.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee certified the ten classes under Civil Rule 23(b)(3), finding that the plaintiffs had demonstrated common questions of law or fact. Nissan appealed, arguing that the classes did not meet the requirements for certification, particularly due to differences in the software updates that had been applied to the braking systems over time.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court had not conducted a rigorous analysis of the commonality requirement. The appellate court noted that the district court failed to consider the material differences in the software updates and how these differences might affect the existence of a common defect. Additionally, the district court did not analyze the elements of each state law claim to determine whether they could be resolved with common answers.The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's certification of the classes and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court emphasized the need for a detailed examination of the elements of each claim and the impact of the software updates on the alleged defect. The court also held that the district court must perform a Daubert analysis to ensure the reliability of the plaintiffs' expert testimony, which was critical to establishing the commonality of the defect across the different models and software versions. View "IN RE: NISSAN NORTH AMERICA,INC. LITIGATION" on Justia Law

The case involves the San Diego City Attorney filing a complaint against Experian Data Corp. for violating the unfair competition law (UCL) by failing to promptly notify consumers of a data breach as required by Civil Code section 1798.82(a). The City Attorney sought civil penalties and injunctive relief. The UCL claim is subject to a four-year statute of limitations, and the key issue is whether the discovery rule can delay the accrual of this non-fraud civil enforcement action.The Superior Court of Orange County initially overruled Experian's demurrer, which argued the complaint was time-barred. The court found the complaint did not show on its face that the UCL claim accrued before March 6, 2014. However, the court later granted Experian's motion in limine to exclude evidence relating to civil penalties, concluding the discovery rule did not apply to the UCL claim because it was a non-fraud claim and an enforcement action seeking civil penalties. The court also denied the City Attorney's motion for reconsideration and motion to file a Third Amended Complaint.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and concluded that the discovery rule can apply to delay the accrual of the UCL claim. The court found that the nature of the claim, the enforcement action seeking civil penalties, and the involvement of a governmental entity did not preclude the application of the discovery rule. The court noted that the discovery rule has been applied to various types of claims, including those involving civil penalties and enforcement actions by governmental entities.The appellate court reversed the trial court's orders granting Experian's motion in limine and denying reconsideration. The case was remanded for the trial court to reconsider the application of the discovery rule and determine when the UCL claim accrued based on the actual or constructive knowledge of the relevant actors. The trial court was also directed to reconsider the City Attorney's request to file a Third Amended Complaint. View "People v. Experian Data Corp." on Justia Law

LVNV Funding, LLC (LVNV) filed a debt collection lawsuit against Yolanda Rodriguez (Rodriguez). Rodriguez cross-complained, alleging identity theft and violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Rosenthal Act). Rodriguez discovered that LVNV had sued the wrong person, as the debt was incurred by a different Yolanda Rodriguez with a different date of birth and Social Security number. LVNV dismissed its suit after this was demonstrated, but Rodriguez continued with her cross-claim, arguing that the FDCPA and Rosenthal Acts are strict liability statutes that penalize false or misleading debt collection actions unless they fit within a narrow “bona fide error” defense.The Superior Court of Fresno County granted LVNV’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike Rodriguez’s cross-complaint, concluding that Rodriguez could not establish a probability of prevailing on the merits because there was nothing false, deceptive, or misleading about the debt collection action. The court found that even the “least sophisticated debtor” would have recognized the address on the documentation was not hers, and there was “nothing inherently false about the complaint” merely because it was served on the wrong Yolanda Rodriguez.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the FDCPA creates a strict liability cause of action for attempts to collect a debt that misrepresent or falsely present the “character” or “amount” of a debt owed, including cases of mistaken identity. The court found that Rodriguez’s claims had minimal merit, satisfying the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. The appellate court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "LVNV Funding v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

In this case, Bayer U.S. LLC, a pharmaceutical company, recalled millions of dollars’ worth of Lotrimin and Tinactin spray products in October 2021 after discovering benzene contamination in products dating back to 2018. The plaintiffs, who purchased these products during the recall period, did not allege physical injuries but sought compensation for economic losses, claiming the contaminated products were worth less than uncontaminated ones.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for lack of standing, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege economic loss or harm from increased risk of future physical injury. The court found the plaintiffs' allegations too conclusory and lacking in specific facts to support their claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court concluded that the District Court erred in applying a heightened standard for standing. The Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged economic injury under the benefit-of-the-bargain theory, as the contaminated products were unusable and therefore worth less than the uncontaminated products they had bargained for. The court noted that the plaintiffs need not show that all products in the recall were contaminated but must plausibly allege that their specific products were contaminated.The Third Circuit reversed the District Court's dismissal of the complaint for lack of standing as to some plaintiffs and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The appellate court emphasized that the plaintiffs' allegations, supported by the recall and additional testing data, were sufficient to establish standing at the motion-to-dismiss stage. View "Huertas v. Bayer US LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, residents of Wisconsin, filed two class action complaints against Experian Information Solutions, Inc. under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). They alleged that Experian failed to include a required statement in the "Summary of Rights" portion of their consumer reports, violating 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(c)(2)(D). Plaintiffs sought actual, statutory, and punitive damages. Experian removed the cases to federal court, where Plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing they lacked standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution because they did not suffer a concrete harm. The federal court agreed and remanded the cases to state court.In state court, Experian moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing Plaintiffs lacked standing under Wisconsin law and that their FCRA claim did not fall within the statute's "zone of interests." Plaintiffs contended California law should apply and that they had standing under it. The trial court, referencing the recent Limon v. Circle K Stores Inc. decision, which required a concrete injury for standing in California state courts, granted Experian's motion. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing Limon was wrongly decided.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found Limon persuasive, holding that Plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not allege a concrete or particularized injury. The court noted that under both California and federal law, an informational injury without adverse effects is insufficient to confer standing. Consequently, the judgment in favor of Experian was affirmed. View "Muha v. Experian Information Solutions" on Justia Law

In November 2014, the plaintiff purchased a recreational vehicle (RV) from a dealership, with the defendant bank financing the purchase. The sales contract inaccurately reflected the downpayment as $19,100 in cash instead of $1,000 in cash and $18,100 in trade-in value. The plaintiff later discovered issues with the RV and filed a lawsuit in February 2017, alleging violations of the Automobile Sales Finance Act (ASFA) due to the incorrect downpayment disclosure.The Superior Court of Fresno County reviewed the case and concluded that the four-year statute of limitations for written contracts applied, rather than the one-year statute for statutory penalties. The court granted summary adjudication in favor of the plaintiff against the dealership for violating the ASFA, and the dealership's liability was extended to the bank under the Federal Trade Commission’s holder rule. The court entered judgment requiring the bank to accept the return of the RV and pay the plaintiff $42,263.64.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and determined that the rescission and restitution remedy under the ASFA is a penalty. The court concluded that the one-year statute of limitations for actions upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture applied. The court noted that the ASFA imposes strict liability without regard to actual damages or fault, and the legislative history indicated the remedy was intended as a penalty. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Pompey v. Bank of Stockton" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between a taxpayers' association and a water district over the imposition of groundwater replenishment charges. The taxpayers' association alleged that the water district's charges violated constitutional provisions and unfairly benefited large agricultural businesses. The association sought a writ of mandate to stop the collection of these charges and to vacate the resolutions imposing them. They also claimed conversion, civil conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and violations of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) against the water district's board members, general manager, and consulting firms.The Superior Court of Riverside County denied the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion, which sought to strike several causes of action on the grounds that they arose from protected activities. The court found that the public interest exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute applied. Additionally, the court sustained the defendants' demurrer to the first amended petition and complaint, finding the claims time-barred under the validation statutes. The court also awarded over $180,000 in attorney's fees to the plaintiffs, deeming the anti-SLAPP motion frivolous.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the public interest exemption did not apply because the relief sought could only be provided by the water district, not the individual defendants. The court found that the anti-SLAPP motion should have been granted for most causes of action, except for conversion and the writ of mandate against the general manager. Consequently, the fee award was reversed. The court also affirmed the demurrer ruling, as the claims against the individual defendants were not legally sufficient. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Powell" on Justia Law

The plaintiff entered into a lease agreement with the defendant for a new vehicle, which later exhibited multiple defects. Despite several repair attempts, the issues persisted. The plaintiff then filed a lawsuit against the defendant, alleging violations of California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, seeking various forms of relief including replacement or restitution, damages, and attorney fees.The case proceeded to trial in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, where the jury found the defendant liable and awarded the plaintiff damages. However, the jury did not find the defendant’s violation to be willful, thus no civil penalties were awarded. Subsequently, both parties filed motions regarding costs and attorney fees. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant, limiting the plaintiff to pre-offer costs and attorney fees, and awarding the defendant post-offer costs based on a prior settlement offer under California Code of Civil Procedure section 998.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court addressed two main issues: whether a section 998 offer consisting of two simultaneous offers is valid, and whether an offer that promises to pay for statutory categories of damages with disputes resolved by a third party is sufficiently certain. The court concluded that simultaneous offers are generally invalid under section 998 due to the uncertainty they create for the trial court in determining whether the judgment is more favorable than the offer. However, since only one of the defendant’s two offers was invalid, the remaining valid offer was operative. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the plaintiff was limited to pre-offer costs and attorney fees, and the defendant was entitled to post-offer costs. View "Gorobets v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC" on Justia Law

Hannah Hekel received a letter from Hunter Warfield, Inc., a debt-collection agency hired by her landlord to collect past-due rent. The letter offered to forgive the debt in exchange for payment of about half of what she owed but included utility fees that may not have been collectible, failed to provide information on how to verify and dispute the debt on the front of the letter, and mentioned an interest rate that was allegedly too high. Hekel claimed these issues violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and alleged harms including procedural injuries, emotional distress, and financial losses.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted summary judgment in favor of Hunter Warfield on all claims. Although the agency mentioned standing as a defense, the district court did not address it.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and focused on the issue of standing, which is a jurisdictional requirement. The court found that Hekel did not demonstrate a concrete injury. Allegations of statutory violations, informational injuries, risk of future harm, emotional distress, and financial losses were deemed insufficient or too conclusory to establish standing. The court emphasized that without a concrete injury, there is no standing, and without standing, the court lacks jurisdiction.The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Hekel v. Hunter Warfield, Inc." on Justia Law

A Californian plaintiff purchased several bottles of Banana Boat sunscreen between 2017 and 2020, including Ultra Sport SPF 100, SPF 50, and SPF 30. She later discovered that the SPF 50 bottle contained 0.29 parts per million (ppm) of benzene, a known carcinogen. She alleged that the products were falsely advertised as safe and that the presence of benzene was not disclosed on the labels. The plaintiff claimed she would not have purchased the products, or would have paid less for them, had she known about the benzene contamination.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the plaintiff’s suit for lack of Article III standing, concluding that she did not demonstrate a non-speculative increased health risk or actual economic harm. The court relied on FDA guidelines permitting up to 2 ppm of benzene in sunscreen, determining that the plaintiff’s allegations did not establish that 0.29 ppm of benzene posed a credible risk of harm or economic injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the district court erred by resolving disputed facts in favor of the defendants and prematurely addressing merits issues intertwined with the jurisdictional question of standing. The Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff adequately established an injury in fact for purposes of Article III standing, as she alleged economic harm from purchasing a product she would not have bought, or would have paid less for, absent the defendants’ misrepresentations. The court also determined that the plaintiff met the causation and redressability elements of standing, as her injury was likely caused by the defendants' alleged misrepresentations and could be redressed by judicial relief. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "BOWEN V. ENERGIZER HOLDINGS, INC." on Justia Law