Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-appellant James McKenzie appealed a trial court’s order awarding him only $28,350 of the nearly $48,000 in attorney fees he sought in this case, following the parties’ settlement of McKenzie’s claim under the automobile “lemon law” provisions of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. The trial court refused to award McKenzie any of the attorney fees incurred in the wake of Ford’s initial offer because it viewed the compromise offer ultimately accepted by McKenzie as essentially identical to the offer he had initially rejected – distinguished only by his “demand that [he] be allowed to file [a fee] motion.” The court concluded McKenzie unreasonably delayed settlement for the sole purpose of ginning up his fee award. The Court of Appeal reversed. The Court found the trial court’s comparative assessment of Ford’s two settlement offers was erroneous as a matter of law. "Even Ford concedes its initial settlement offer incorporated numerous extraneous provisions – including broad releases of both Ford and nonparties, an illegal confidentiality clause characterized as 'material' to the settlement, and what amounted to an opt-out provision in Ford’s favor – all of which were excised from the offer McKenzie later accepted. These differences are significant, and thus McKenzie’s rejection of the initial offer was reasonable, requiring his counsel to continue working on the case." The Court held further that the trial court’s erroneous comparison of Ford’s initial compromise offer with the offer McKenzie later accepted fatally undermined its conclusion that the entire amount of hours billed by McKenzie’s counsel in the wake of that initial offer was unjustified. The court’s additional finding, that McKenzie’s two attorneys also engaged in instances of duplicative billing after Ford’s initial offer, did not support a complete denial of fees for that period. Consequently, the case was remanded back to the trial court with directions to reconsider the fee award. View "McKenzie v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, a wood manufacturer, alleging that wood he bought for a fence at his home was not properly pressure-treated and that it prematurely rotted. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims under the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), Ala. Code 8-19-5(5), (7), and for breach of express warranty. The court held that where a conflict exists between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which authorizes class actions including for consumer claims of this kind, and the ADTPA, which creates a private right of action but forbids private class actions, Rule 23 controls. The court also concluded that Alabama law allows a consumer to recover for breach of an express warranty, even in the absence of privity, in some circumstances. In this case, the court held that the complaint adequately alleges the required circumstances and thus states an express warranty claim on which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Lisk v. Lumber One Wood Preserving" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action against HCP, alleging causes of action for violation of the unfair competition law (UCL), Bus. & Prof. Code, 7200 et seq.; common law fraudulent concealment; and violation of the false advertising law (FAL), Bus. & Prof. Code, 17500. Plaintiff argued that, although HCP does not fall within the literal definition of a “health care service plan” as defined in Health and Safety Code section 1345, subdivision (f)(1), due to the level of risk it assumed, HCP operated as a health care service plan without obtaining the license required by the Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975, Health and Safety Code section 1340 et seq., and without meeting the regulatory mandates required of health care service plans. The trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrers filed by HCP and entered a judgment of dismissal. The court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in invoking the abstention doctrine as to the statutory causes of action but not as to the common law cause of action for fraudulent concealment. However, the court found that plaintiff failed to plead a claim for fraudulent concealment, and that she has failed to demonstrate how she could amend the operative complaint to cure the defect. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hambrick v. Healthcare Partners Med. Grp." on Justia Law

In May 2006, Sparkle Hill, Inc. and its vice president and owner (collectively, Sparkle Hill), received an unsolicited advertisement on Sparkle Hill’s fax machine from Interstate Mat Corporation (Interstate). Nearly five years later, Sparkle Hill filed suit in federal district court individually and on behalf of others who also received an identical fax from Interstate in May 2006 alleging that Interstate violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Interstate moved for summary judgment on the ground that a four-year statute of limitations barred Sparkle Hill’s claim. Sparkle Hill did not oppose the merits of Interstate’s limitations defense. The district court entered summary judgment dismissing the case, concluding that Sparkle Hill’s silence constituted a concession and that, on the merits, Sparkle Hill’s claim was time-barred. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Appellant waived its arguments for finding error in the district court’s decision to hold it accountable for its lack of opposition to Interstate’s limitations defense. View "Sparkle Hill, Inc. v. Interstate Mat Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dione Aguirre appealed an order denying class certification. Plaintiff sued defendants Amscan Holdings, Inc., and PA Acquisition, doing business as Party America (collectively, Party America) on behalf of herself and similarly situated individuals, alleging Party America violated Civil Code the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of 1971 (Civil Code section 1747 et seq.) by routinely requesting and recording personal identification information, namely ZIP Codes, from customers using credit cards in its retail stores in California. The trial court found that plaintiff's proposed class of "[a]ll persons in California from whom Defendant requested and recorded a ZIP code in conjunction with a credit card purchase transaction from June 2, 2007 through October 13, 2010" was not an ascertainable class due to "plaintiff's inability to clearly identify, locate and notify class members through a reasonable expenditure of time and money [. . .] bars her from litigating this case as a class action." Plaintiff appealed, arguing the trial court erred in determining the class was not ascertainable based upon the finding that each individual class member was not specifically identifiable from Party America's records (and thus, notice to the class could not be directly provided to class members.) The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard in determining the proposed class was not ascertainable and erred in its conclusion. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Aguirre v. Amscan Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Five individuals (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) each filed a petition for individual bankruptcy under Chapter 13 in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland. LVNV Funding, LLC and its affiliated companies (collectively, “Defendants”) filed a proof of unsecured claim based on defaulted debts it had acquired against each plaintiff. Each Chapter 13 plan was approved. Defendants’ claims were allowed, and they received payments from the Chapter 13 trustees on these claims. Plaintiffs subsequently filed this putative class action lawsuit in the District of Maryland alleging that Defendants violated the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and various Maryland laws by filing proofs of claim without a Maryland debt collection license. The district court dismissed the action, concluding (1) the state common law claims were barred by res judicata, and (2) the federal and state statutory claims failed to state a claim. The Fourth Circuit affirmed but on res judicata grounds, holding (1) Plaintiffs’ claims were based on the same cause of action as Defendants’ claims in the confirmed bankruptcy plans and were thus barred by res judicata; and (2) Plaintiffs’ statutory claims were subject to the normal principles of res judicata and were thus precluded by the confirmation of the Chapter 13 plans. View "Covert v. LVNV Funding, LLC" on Justia Law

Issiah Andra, a Missouri resident, filed a petition against Texas-based Left Gate Property Holding, Inc. after Andra purchased on eBay a vehicle from Left Gate that did not meet Andra’s expectations. The circuit court dismissed the petition for lack of personal jurisdiction over Left Gate. Andra appealed, arguing that Left Gate had sufficient minimum contacts with Missouri to be subject to personal jurisdiction in Missouri in accordance with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Left Gate’s conduct in Missouri fell within Missouri’s long-arm statute, and Left Gate had sufficient minimum contacts with Missouri to satisfy the due process clause. View "Andra v. Left Gate Prop. Holding, Inc." on Justia Law

McHughes Law Firm filed a lawsuit on behalf of Precision Analytics, Inc., McHughes’ client, against Lillie McMullen asserting that McMullen was responsible for a consumer debt incurred on a credit card issued to her ex-husband. After that lawsuit was dismissed, McMullen filed a complaint against McHughes, alleging that McHughes violated the Arkansas Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and that McHughes invaded her privacy and engaged in malicious prosecution while attempting to collect on the consumer debt owned by Precision. The circuit court dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that McMullen’s complaint failed to meet the pleading requirements of Ark. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) and that McMullen failed to allege facts to establish various elements of her state-law claims. View "McMullen v. McHughes Law Firm" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Joyce Flannery sued defendant-respondent VW Credit, Inc. (VW), alleging VW failed to comply with provisions of California's Vehicle Leasing Act (VLA), California's Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and California's Unfair Competition Law. VW filed a demurrer to the complaint, which the trial court sustained without leave to amend. On appeal, Flannery argued the court erred by applying the doctrine of substantial compliance to consumer protection laws. VW has moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely. The Court of Appeal denied the motion to dismiss and reversed the dismissal. Following the trial court's ruling on its demurrer, VW sought and received entry of an order dismissing the complaint again, and provided Flannery with notice of entry of the order. However, before the time in which to appeal from the dismissal expired, VW asked the trial court to vacate the dismissal and enter a new dismissal that included VW's costs. The trial court granted VW's request and entered an order vacating the first dismissal and ordering entry of a second dismissal, which included VW's costs. VW then served Flannery with notice of entry of the second dismissal. Thereafter, Flannery filed a notice of appeal from the second dismissal. VW argued that the notice of appeal was untimely because it was not filed within 60 days after service of notice of entry of the first dismissal; VW contends that, notwithstanding the literal meaning of the trial court's order vacating the first dismissal, the Court of Appeal should interpret the order as simply amending the first judgment to add VW's costs and thereby render Flannery's notice of appeal untimely. The Court interpreted the trial court's order literall: the first dismissal was vacated by the terms of the trial court's order, and a second dismissal was entered from which Flannery filed a timely notice of appeal. With respect to the merits, the Court reversed: "[a]lthough the doctrine of substantial compliance has been employed when doing so avoids injustice and is consistent with the purposes of a particular statute, those considerations are not present here, where VW failed to provide consumers with notice of their right to an appraisal upon early termination of their automobile leases in the language prescribed by Civil Code section 2987." The Court did not reach the question of whether VW's alleged violation of the VLA would support any relief under provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Act and the Unfair Competition Law.View "Flannery v. VW Credit" on Justia Law

A Marion, Indiana small claims court entered a judgment against Kevin about $1,000. He did not pay, although he had agreed to the judgment’s entry. Almost 20 years later Steel, claiming to represent the judgment creditor, asked the court to garnish Harold’s wages. It entered the requested order, which Harold moved to vacate, contending that Steel had misrepresented the judgment creditor’s identity (transactions after the judgment’s entry may or may not have transferred that asset to a new owner) and did not represent the only entity authorized to enforce the judgment. He did not contend that the request was untimely. A state judge sided with Steel and maintained the garnishment order in force. Instead of appealing, Harold filed a federal suit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, contending that Steel and his law firm had violated 15 U.S.C. 1692e by making false statements. The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, ruling that it was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it contested the state court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Section 1692e forbids debt collectors to tell lies but does not suggest that federal courts are to review state-court decisions about whether lies have been told.View "Harold v. Steel" on Justia Law