Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc., Smith & Wesson Sales Company, and Smith & Wesson Inc. (collectively, “Smith & Wesson”) and the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey and the New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs. The New Jersey Attorney General issued a subpoena to Smith & Wesson under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, seeking documents related to the company's advertising practices. Smith & Wesson filed a federal lawsuit to enjoin enforcement of the subpoena, alleging it violated various constitutional provisions. The New Jersey Attorney General then filed a subpoena enforcement action in state court. The state court rejected Smith & Wesson’s objections and ordered the company to comply with the subpoena.The state court proceedings concluded before the federal case, with the state court ordering Smith & Wesson to comply with the subpoena. The federal court then dismissed Smith & Wesson’s civil rights action on claim preclusion grounds, giving preclusive effect to the state court’s order. The state appellate court later affirmed the state court judgment. Smith & Wesson appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, arguing that the District Court should not have given preclusive effect to the state court order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s order. The court found that all elements of New Jersey’s claim preclusion test were satisfied. The court also rejected Smith & Wesson’s argument that it had reserved its right to litigate in federal court, finding that such reservation was unavailable in this case. The court emphasized that litigants get one opportunity to make their arguments, not two, and they cannot file a federal lawsuit to hedge against a potentially unfavorable state ruling. View "Smith & Wesson Brands Inc. v. Attorney General of the State of New Jersey" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Chiya Lloyd, filed a complaint against FedLoan Servicing LLC, Equifax Information Services, LLC, Trans Union, LLC, and Experian Information Solutions, Inc., alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The case centered around Lloyd's nine federal student loans serviced by FedLoan, which reported to Experian that Lloyd's payments for certain months were overdue. Lloyd disputed these delinquencies, and Experian requested further information from FedLoan. After several rounds of disputes and investigations, all delinquent marks were removed from Lloyd's credit report. However, Lloyd initiated a civil action against the defendants, alleging that FedLoan failed to properly investigate the accuracy of the information it reported to Experian, and Experian failed to follow its procedures to discover FedLoan’s mistakes.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Experian, finding that Lloyd could not show Experian failed to follow reasonable procedures or conduct a reasonable reinvestigation. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of FedLoan, concluding that Lloyd did not present sufficient evidence of damage to support her claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that Experian had followed the steps set forth by the FCRA for conducting a reinvestigation, and Lloyd failed to show that Experian did not satisfy its statutory requirements. The court also found that Lloyd failed to present a cognizable claim against Experian. Regarding FedLoan, the court found that Lloyd failed to present evidence sufficient to allow a jury to find that FedLoan’s investigation was unreasonable. The court also found that Lloyd failed to provide sufficient evidence to raise a jury question that she sustained actual damages from FedLoan’s reporting. Therefore, her claim failed. View "Lloyd v. FedLoan Servicing" on Justia Law

A group of business associations, including the Fort Worth Chamber of Commerce, challenged a new Final Rule issued by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) regarding credit card late fees. The plaintiffs argued that the district court had abused its discretion by transferring their challenge to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The case had a complex procedural history, with the district court transferring venue twice under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The first transfer was reversed by a different panel because the district court lacked jurisdiction to transfer the case while the plaintiffs' appeal of the denial of its preliminary-injunction motion was pending.The district court in the Northern District of Texas had initially transferred the case to the District of Columbia, but this decision was challenged by the plaintiffs. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had previously issued a writ of mandamus because the district court lacked jurisdiction to transfer the case while the plaintiffs' appeal of the denial of its preliminary-injunction motion was pending. The district court then transferred the case again, this time under § 1404(a), which allows for transfer for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the district court had misapplied the controlling § 1404(a) standard for transferring cases and that the transfer order was a clear abuse of discretion. The court granted the plaintiffs' petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the district court to vacate its transfer order. The court found that the district court had erred in considering the convenience of counsel and in finding that D.C. residents had a localized interest in the case. The court also noted that the district court's familiarity with the case due to a preliminary injunction did not lessen the weight of the court congestion factor in favor of transfer. View "In Re: Chamber of Commerce" on Justia Law

The case involves Leah Lorch, who filed a lawsuit against Kia Motors America, Inc. The case was initially assigned to Judge Robert C. Longstreth for all purposes. However, due to Judge Longstreth's unavailability, the case was reassigned to Judge Timothy B. Taylor. Upon learning of this reassignment, Lorch's counsel filed a peremptory challenge against Judge Taylor under section 170.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, asserting that Judge Taylor was prejudiced against Lorch. However, Judge Taylor denied the challenge, ruling it was untimely under the master calendar rule. The trial proceeded, resulting in a defense verdict in favor of Kia Motors.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Lorch's peremptory challenge, ruling it was untimely under the master calendar rule. The court also refused to stay the trial, and Judge Taylor immediately began a two-day jury trial, which resulted in a defense verdict and judgment in favor of Kia Motors. Lorch then filed a petition within the statutory 10-day period, contending that her peremptory challenge was timely because it was filed before the trial started. She sought to vacate Judge Taylor’s orders denying her section 170.6 challenge and contended that all of Judge Taylor’s subsequent orders, as well as the judgment, were void for lack of jurisdiction.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, held that Lorch’s section 170.6 challenge was timely filed before the commencement of the trial and rejected Kia’s laches argument. The court also concluded that the Superior Court of San Diego County's local rule, which purports to provide any superior court judge with the power to act as a master calendar department for purposes of assigning cases for trial, is inconsistent with section 170.6 and case law interpreting the statute. The court granted the petition with directions to vacate the void orders and judgment entered by Judge Taylor after denying the peremptory challenge. View "Lorch v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a data privacy dispute involving Pebbles Martin and LCMC Health Holdings and Louisiana Children’s Medical Center (collectively, “LCMC”). Martin filed a class action suit alleging that LCMC violated Louisiana law by embedding tracking pixels onto its website that shared her private health information with third-party websites. The question before the court was not to determine the merits of Martin’s claims, but instead to determine which forum—state or federal—is proper to hear this dispute. LCMC argued that the suit should proceed in federal court because it acted under the direction of a federal officer when it allegedly violated Louisiana law. Martin, however, argued that the suit should remain in state court because LCMC fails to show a basis for federal jurisdiction.LCMC had removed the case to federal court, invoking the federal officer removal statute as the basis for jurisdiction. Martin moved to remand to state court, and the district court granted Martin’s motion, holding that LCMC did not act under the direction of a federal officer when it disclosed private health information to third-party websites. LCMC appealed the remand order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court concluded that LCMC did not act under the direction of a federal officer when it embedded tracking pixels onto its website. The court noted that a hospital does not act under the direction of the federal government when it maintains an online patient portal that utilizes tracking pixels. Therefore, the federal officer removal statute does not provide jurisdiction for this case to be heard in federal court. The court affirmed the district court’s order remanding this case to state court. View "Martin v. LCMC Health Holdings" on Justia Law

The case involves Earl John and Christine Dwyer, who sued Ameriprise Financial, Inc. for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation. In 1985, Ameriprise fraudulently and negligently induced the Dwyers to purchase a universal whole life insurance policy by misrepresenting that their quarterly premium payments would remain the same for the life of the policy. The Dwyers surrendered life insurance policies they had purchased from other companies to facilitate this purchase. In reality, if the Dwyers’ premium payment had remained the same, the policy would have lapsed for insufficient funds in 2020.The trial court found Ameriprise guilty of violating Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (CPL) and awarded the Dwyers compensatory damages. However, the court declined to award treble damages under the CPL, reasoning that they would be duplicative of the punitive damages awarded by the jury on the common-law claims. The Superior Court affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The court held that treble damages under the CPL are a separate remedy available to the Dwyers and must be considered by the trial court without regard to a punitive damages award on related common-law claims. The court concluded that nullifying the availability of a statutory award because of a common-law award is not a permissible exercise of discretion. Therefore, the court reversed the order of the Superior Court and remanded the case for reconsideration of damages under the CPL. View "Dwyer v. Ameriprise Financial" on Justia Law

Two consumers, Tanethia Holden and Mark Mayer, entered into separate purchase agreements for timeshares with Holiday Inn Club Vacations Inc. Both stopped making monthly payments and considered their agreements to be canceled. However, Holiday disagreed and reported their debts to Experian, a consumer reporting agency. After unsuccessful attempts to resolve their disputes with Holiday, both Holden and Mayer filed individual actions under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), alleging that Holiday inaccurately reported that they owed debts and failed to reasonably investigate their disputes.The District Courts granted summary judgment for Holiday in both cases, finding the alleged inaccuracies were legal disputes and therefore not actionable under the FCRA. The courts reasoned that a plaintiff asserting a claim against a furnisher for failure to conduct a reasonable investigation cannot prevail on the claim without demonstrating that had the furnisher conducted a reasonable investigation, the result would have been different; i.e., that the furnisher would have discovered that the information it reported was inaccurate or incomplete.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower courts' decisions, but for a different reason. The court held that whether the alleged inaccuracy is factual or legal is beside the point. Instead, what matters is whether the alleged inaccuracy was objectively and readily verifiable. In this case, it was not. Thus, Mayer and Holden had no actionable FCRA claims. The court declined to impose a bright-line rule that only purely factual or transcription errors are actionable under the FCRA. Instead, it held that in determining whether a claimed inaccuracy is potentially actionable under the FCRA, a court must determine whether the information in dispute is 'objectively and readily verifiable.' View "Tanethia Holden v. Holiday Inn Club Vacations Incorporated" on Justia Law

A group of business associations, including the Fort Worth Chamber of Commerce, filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Texas against the Consumer Protection Financial Bureau (CFPB). The plaintiffs challenged a new Final Rule issued by the CFPB regarding credit card late fees and sought a preliminary injunction against the rule. The plaintiffs requested expedited briefing and review due to the imminent effect of the rule and the substantial compliance it required.The district court, instead of ruling on the motion for a preliminary injunction, considered whether venue was appropriate in the Northern District of Texas and invited the CFPB to file a motion to transfer the case. The CFPB complied, and the district court granted its motion, transferring the case to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs then petitioned for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by transferring the case while their appeal was pending and, alternatively, lacked jurisdiction to transfer the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs, stating that the district court acted without jurisdiction. The court explained that once a party properly appeals something a district court has done, in this case, the effective denial of a preliminary injunction, the district court has no jurisdiction to do anything that alters the case’s status. The court clarified that its decision was not about the correctness of the district court’s transfer order but rather about whether the court had jurisdiction to enter it. The court concluded that the district court did not have jurisdiction to transfer the case.The court granted the petition for mandamus, vacated the district court’s transfer order, and ordered the district court to reopen the case. The court also instructed the district court to notify the District of Columbia that its transfer was without jurisdiction and should be disregarded. View "In re: Chamber of Commerce" on Justia Law

The case involves the Arkansas Voter Integrity Initiative, Inc., and Conrad Reynolds (appellants) who filed a complaint against John Thurston, the Arkansas Secretary of State, the Arkansas State Board of Election Commissioners, and Election Systems and Software, LLC (appellees). The appellants claimed that the voting machines approved by the state did not comply with the Arkansas Code and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) because voters could not independently verify their selections on the ballot before casting their votes. They argued that the machines printed ballots with both bar codes and the voter's selections in English, but the vote tabulator only scanned the bar codes. Since most voters cannot read bar codes, the appellants claimed that voters were unable to verify their votes as required by state and federal law. They also alleged that the appellees committed an illegal exaction by using public funds for the purchase and maintenance of these machines and that Election Systems and Software, LLC violated the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and committed fraud by claiming that its machines complied with state and federal law.The Pulaski County Circuit Court dismissed the appellants' complaint. The court found that the voting machines complied with the Arkansas Code and HAVA. The court also denied the appellants' motion for recusal and their motion for a new trial. The appellants appealed these decisions.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the voting process complied with the Arkansas Code and HAVA. The court also found that the appellants failed to demonstrate evidence of bias or prejudice sufficient to warrant the recusal of the circuit court judge. Finally, the court found that the appellants were not deprived of their right to a jury trial and that the circuit court did not err by denying their motion for a new trial. View "ARKANSAS VOTER INTEGRITY INITIATIVE, INC., AND CONRAD REYNOLDS v. JOHN THURSTON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ARKANSAS SECRETARY OF STATE; THE ARKANSAS STATE BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS, IN ITS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AND ELECTION SYSTEMS AND SOFTWARE, LLC" on Justia Law

FedEx Ground Package Systems, Inc. (FXG) filed a lawsuit against Route Consultant, Inc., alleging that the latter company had made nine false or misleading statements about FXG's business practices. FXG contended that these statements were intended to foster discontent between FXG and its contractors, thereby damaging FXG and benefiting Route Consultant. The suit was brought under both the Lanham Act's false advertising provision and the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act's statutory disparagement provision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit confirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the case. The court found that FXG had failed to plausibly allege that Route Consultant made a single false or misleading statement. The court emphasized that only statements of fact--not opinions, puffery, or rhetorical hyperbole--are actionable under the false advertising provision of the Lanham Act. Moreover, a plaintiff must plead and prove the literal falsity of the defendant's statement or demonstrate that the statement is misleading. FXG's complaint did not meet these standards.The court also held that FXG's claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act failed for the same reasons as its Lanham Act claim. Thus, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of FXG's lawsuit against Route Consultant. View "FedEx Ground Package Systems, Inc. v. Route Consultant, Inc." on Justia Law