Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Hannah Hekel received a letter from Hunter Warfield, Inc., a debt-collection agency hired by her landlord to collect past-due rent. The letter offered to forgive the debt in exchange for payment of about half of what she owed but included utility fees that may not have been collectible, failed to provide information on how to verify and dispute the debt on the front of the letter, and mentioned an interest rate that was allegedly too high. Hekel claimed these issues violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and alleged harms including procedural injuries, emotional distress, and financial losses.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted summary judgment in favor of Hunter Warfield on all claims. Although the agency mentioned standing as a defense, the district court did not address it.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and focused on the issue of standing, which is a jurisdictional requirement. The court found that Hekel did not demonstrate a concrete injury. Allegations of statutory violations, informational injuries, risk of future harm, emotional distress, and financial losses were deemed insufficient or too conclusory to establish standing. The court emphasized that without a concrete injury, there is no standing, and without standing, the court lacks jurisdiction.The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Hekel v. Hunter Warfield, Inc." on Justia Law

A Californian plaintiff purchased several bottles of Banana Boat sunscreen between 2017 and 2020, including Ultra Sport SPF 100, SPF 50, and SPF 30. She later discovered that the SPF 50 bottle contained 0.29 parts per million (ppm) of benzene, a known carcinogen. She alleged that the products were falsely advertised as safe and that the presence of benzene was not disclosed on the labels. The plaintiff claimed she would not have purchased the products, or would have paid less for them, had she known about the benzene contamination.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the plaintiff’s suit for lack of Article III standing, concluding that she did not demonstrate a non-speculative increased health risk or actual economic harm. The court relied on FDA guidelines permitting up to 2 ppm of benzene in sunscreen, determining that the plaintiff’s allegations did not establish that 0.29 ppm of benzene posed a credible risk of harm or economic injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the district court erred by resolving disputed facts in favor of the defendants and prematurely addressing merits issues intertwined with the jurisdictional question of standing. The Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff adequately established an injury in fact for purposes of Article III standing, as she alleged economic harm from purchasing a product she would not have bought, or would have paid less for, absent the defendants’ misrepresentations. The court also determined that the plaintiff met the causation and redressability elements of standing, as her injury was likely caused by the defendants' alleged misrepresentations and could be redressed by judicial relief. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "BOWEN V. ENERGIZER HOLDINGS, INC." on Justia Law

Karen Richardson obtained a loan in 2008, secured by a promissory note and a deed of trust on her home. After a series of transfers, Nationstar Mortgage, LLC became the holder and servicer of the note. Nationstar appointed members of McCabe, Weisberg & Conway, LLC (MWC) as substitute trustees. In 2015, Nationstar filed for judicial foreclosure, alleging Richardson defaulted on her mortgage. Richardson counterclaimed, challenging Nationstar's standing and alleging violations of lending laws. The Superior Court ruled in favor of Nationstar, and the property was sold in a foreclosure sale.Richardson opposed the ratification of the sale, arguing that Nationstar and MWC provided an incorrect payoff amount, constituting fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty. The Superior Court ratified the sale, concluding that Richardson's right to cure the default had expired before the incorrect payoff amount was provided. Richardson's subsequent appeals were dismissed as moot.Richardson then filed a new suit against Nationstar, MWC, and the trustees, alleging wrongful foreclosure, fraud, and misrepresentation. The Superior Court dismissed her claims against Nationstar and others as barred by res judicata, but held her claims against MWC and the trustees in abeyance. Richardson amended her complaint, and the Superior Court dismissed it again on res judicata grounds, believing she had not disputed privity.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the Superior Court's dismissal on the issue of privity. The court held that MWC and the trustees had not sufficiently demonstrated privity with Nationstar to invoke res judicata. The case was remanded for further proceedings to address the privity issue and any other unresolved claims. View "Richardson v. McCabe, Weisberg & Conway, LLC" on Justia Law

Absolute Essence LLC sought to enter the medical marijuana market in Arkansas but was unable to secure a license. The company invested over a million dollars in the application process, including finding a location and addressing zoning issues. The Arkansas Medical Marijuana Commission outsourced the review process to Public Consulting Group, Inc., which scored 197 applications in two weeks. Absolute Essence received a low score and alleged that the scoring process was manipulated, with conflicts of interest among the scorers favoring larger, established players and resulting in racial disparities in license awards.The case was initially filed in state court, alleging tortious interference, fraud, racial discrimination, and civil conspiracy. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, which dismissed the case for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court found that Absolute Essence's tortious interference claim failed because it did not establish a precise business expectancy with a specific third party. The fraud claim was dismissed due to a lack of justifiable reliance, as the company’s actions predated the involvement of the outside scorers. The race-discrimination claims were dismissed for failing to allege intentional discrimination, as the complaint only suggested a disparate impact without sufficient factual support. Finally, the civil conspiracy claim was dismissed because it could not stand without an underlying tort.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Absolute Essence did not plead enough facts to support any of its claims. View "Absolute Essence LLC v. Public Consulting Group LLC" on Justia Law

Marco Fernandez applied to rent an apartment, and RentGrow, Inc. provided a tenant screening report to the property owner. The report inaccurately indicated that Fernandez had a "possible match" with a name on the OFAC list, which includes individuals involved in serious crimes. However, the property manager did not understand or consider this information when deciding on Fernandez's application. Fernandez sued RentGrow, alleging that the company violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by not ensuring the accuracy of the OFAC information.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland certified a class of individuals who had similar misleading OFAC information in their reports. The court rejected RentGrow's argument that Fernandez and the class lacked standing because they did not demonstrate a concrete injury. The district court held that the dissemination of the misleading report itself was sufficient to establish a concrete injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court's conclusion. The appellate court held that reputational harm can be a concrete injury, but only if the misleading information was read and understood by a third party. In this case, there was no evidence that anyone at the property management company read or understood the OFAC information in Fernandez's report. Therefore, Fernandez failed to demonstrate a concrete injury sufficient for Article III standing. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's class certification order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Fernandez v. RentGrow, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Plaintiff-Appellant Joel J. Malek, who filed a complaint alleging that Defendants-Appellees, including Leonard Feigenbaum and AXA Equitable Life Insurance Co., engaged in a deceptive marketing scheme to trick him and others into replacing their existing life insurance policies with more expensive and less valuable ones. Malek claimed violations of New York law and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed Malek’s complaint and denied him leave to amend. The court found that Malek’s New York claims were time-barred and that he failed to plead the existence of a RICO enterprise. Malek served a motion for reconsideration on the Defendants but did not file it with the court until after the deadline. The district court subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The Defendants moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that Malek’s notice of appeal was untimely because he did not file his motion for reconsideration within the required timeframe, thus failing to toll the deadline for filing a notice of appeal. The Second Circuit reiterated its holding in Weitzner v. Cynosure, Inc. that Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) requires timely filing, not just service, of a post-judgment motion to toll the appeal deadline. The court also concluded that under Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) is a mandatory claim-processing rule not subject to equitable tolling.The Second Circuit found that Malek’s notice of appeal was untimely and dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court also determined that Malek’s notice of appeal could not be construed to include the order denying reconsideration. View "Malek v. Feigenbaum" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of consumers, alleged that Strange Honey Farm, LLC, fraudulently marketed its honey products as "100% raw Tennessee honey." They claimed the honey was not raw, as it was heated during processing, not purely honey, as it was diluted with corn syrup, and not from Tennessee, as it was sourced from Vietnam. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Strange Honey, its owners, and two supermarket chains that sold the honey, asserting fraudulent misrepresentation and violations of various state consumer protection laws.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee dismissed the claims against all defendants except one, citing a lack of specificity required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The court also denied plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend their complaint. Plaintiffs then voluntarily dismissed the remaining defendant and appealed the district court's decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and addressed several jurisdictional issues. The court determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the district court's eventual entry of final judgment, after the premature notice of appeal, ripened the appellate jurisdiction. On the merits, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, finding that the plaintiffs' complaint failed to meet the specificity requirements of Rule 9(b). The court noted that the complaint did not adequately allege why the statements on the honey labels were false or when the statements were made to the plaintiffs. The court also upheld the district court's denial of leave to amend, concluding that the proposed amendments would be futile as they did not cure the deficiencies in the original complaint. View "Greer v. Strange Honey Farm" on Justia Law

In two separate class actions, Kenneth Hasson and Jordan Schnur alleged that FullStory, Inc. and Papa John’s International, Inc. unlawfully wiretapped their online communications using FullStory’s Session Replay Code. This code intercepts detailed user interactions on websites without user consent. Hasson, a Pennsylvania resident, claimed FullStory wiretapped him while he browsed Mattress Firm’s website. Schnur, also from Pennsylvania, alleged similar wiretapping by Papa John’s website.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed both cases for lack of personal jurisdiction. In Hasson’s case, the court found that FullStory, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Georgia, did not have sufficient contacts with Pennsylvania. The court denied Hasson’s request for jurisdictional discovery. In Schnur’s case, the court ruled that Papa John’s, also a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Georgia, did not expressly aim its conduct at Pennsylvania, despite operating numerous restaurants in the state.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed these dismissals. The court affirmed the dismissal in Schnur’s case, agreeing that Schnur failed to show that Papa John’s expressly aimed its conduct at Pennsylvania under the Calder “effects” test. The court noted that merely operating a website accessible in Pennsylvania does not establish personal jurisdiction.However, the court vacated the dismissal in Hasson’s case and remanded it for further consideration. The court held that the District Court should have also considered whether personal jurisdiction was proper under the traditional test as articulated in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court. This test examines whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum and whether the plaintiff’s claims arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. The court instructed the District Court to reassess FullStory’s contacts with Pennsylvania under this framework. View "Hasson v. Fullstory Inc" on Justia Law

The case involves family members of drug abusers suing wholesale distributors of prescription medications. The plaintiffs alleged that the distributors violated state and federal laws by failing to report suspicious orders of controlled substances, which led to the drug abusers' addictions and subsequent harm to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sought damages under the Georgia Drug Dealer Liability Act (DDLA) and other legal theories.The case was initially tried in a lower court, where a jury returned a verdict in favor of the distributors. The plaintiffs then moved for a new trial, arguing that a juror was dishonest during the selection process and introduced extraneous prejudicial information during deliberations. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial, leading to the current appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. The plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in denying their motion for a new trial and in refusing to instruct the jury on willful blindness. The distributors cross-appealed, arguing that if the judgment was vacated, the DDLA should be declared unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. The court held that the trial court was authorized to credit the juror's testimony over the plaintiffs' evidence and that the jury was properly instructed on the relevant legal issues. The cross-appeal was dismissed as moot. View "CARDINAL HEALTH INC. v. POPPELL" on Justia Law

Craig and Brianna Dulworth discovered that Experian, a credit-reporting agency, incorrectly reported their automobile loan as discharged through bankruptcy, despite their reaffirmation and continued payments. After Experian ignored their correction letters, the Dulworths sued in Indiana state court, alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Experian removed the case to federal court and issued broad subpoenas to the Dulworths' law firm, Stecklein & Rapp, seeking extensive information, including details about the firm's business structure and interactions with other clients.Stecklein & Rapp sought relief from the subpoenas in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, where compliance was required. The district court found the requested materials irrelevant to the Dulworths' lawsuit, quashed the subpoenas, and awarded $93,243.50 in attorney fees and costs to Stecklein & Rapp. Experian appealed both the fee award and the discovery ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court affirmed the district court's ruling, agreeing that the subpoenas were overly broad and irrelevant to the case. The court emphasized that the Fair Credit Reporting Act required Experian to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation upon receiving a dispute notice, regardless of whether the notice came directly from the consumer or through their attorney. The court also upheld the attorney fees award, noting that Experian failed to take reasonable steps to avoid imposing an undue burden on Stecklein & Rapp, justifying the sanctions under Rule 45(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. View "Stecklein & Rapp Chartered v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law