Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-appellant Joyce Flannery sued defendant-respondent VW Credit, Inc. (VW), alleging VW failed to comply with provisions of California's Vehicle Leasing Act (VLA), California's Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and California's Unfair Competition Law. VW filed a demurrer to the complaint, which the trial court sustained without leave to amend. On appeal, Flannery argued the court erred by applying the doctrine of substantial compliance to consumer protection laws. VW has moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely. The Court of Appeal denied the motion to dismiss and reversed the dismissal. Following the trial court's ruling on its demurrer, VW sought and received entry of an order dismissing the complaint again, and provided Flannery with notice of entry of the order. However, before the time in which to appeal from the dismissal expired, VW asked the trial court to vacate the dismissal and enter a new dismissal that included VW's costs. The trial court granted VW's request and entered an order vacating the first dismissal and ordering entry of a second dismissal, which included VW's costs. VW then served Flannery with notice of entry of the second dismissal. Thereafter, Flannery filed a notice of appeal from the second dismissal. VW argued that the notice of appeal was untimely because it was not filed within 60 days after service of notice of entry of the first dismissal; VW contends that, notwithstanding the literal meaning of the trial court's order vacating the first dismissal, the Court of Appeal should interpret the order as simply amending the first judgment to add VW's costs and thereby render Flannery's notice of appeal untimely. The Court interpreted the trial court's order literall: the first dismissal was vacated by the terms of the trial court's order, and a second dismissal was entered from which Flannery filed a timely notice of appeal. With respect to the merits, the Court reversed: "[a]lthough the doctrine of substantial compliance has been employed when doing so avoids injustice and is consistent with the purposes of a particular statute, those considerations are not present here, where VW failed to provide consumers with notice of their right to an appraisal upon early termination of their automobile leases in the language prescribed by Civil Code section 2987." The Court did not reach the question of whether VW's alleged violation of the VLA would support any relief under provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Act and the Unfair Competition Law.View "Flannery v. VW Credit" on Justia Law

A Marion, Indiana small claims court entered a judgment against Kevin about $1,000. He did not pay, although he had agreed to the judgment’s entry. Almost 20 years later Steel, claiming to represent the judgment creditor, asked the court to garnish Harold’s wages. It entered the requested order, which Harold moved to vacate, contending that Steel had misrepresented the judgment creditor’s identity (transactions after the judgment’s entry may or may not have transferred that asset to a new owner) and did not represent the only entity authorized to enforce the judgment. He did not contend that the request was untimely. A state judge sided with Steel and maintained the garnishment order in force. Instead of appealing, Harold filed a federal suit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, contending that Steel and his law firm had violated 15 U.S.C. 1692e by making false statements. The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, ruling that it was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it contested the state court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Section 1692e forbids debt collectors to tell lies but does not suggest that federal courts are to review state-court decisions about whether lies have been told.View "Harold v. Steel" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a proposed class action in Florida state court against BLP, alleging that BLP sent unsolicited faxes in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(C), and its implementing regulations. BLP removed to federal court and BLP served each named plaintiff an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. BLP then moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that the unaccepted Rule 68 offers rendered the case moot. The court concluded that a plaintiff's individual claim is not mooted by an unaccepted Rule 68 offer of judgment, and a proffer that moots a named plaintiff's individual claim does not moot a class action in circumstances like those presented in this case, even if the proffer comes before the plaintiff has moved to certify the class. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the action.View "Jeffrey M. Stein D.D.S., et al. v. Buccaneers Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

IntelliGender sold and advertised the IntelliGender Prediction Test as an accurate predictor of a fetus's gender using the mother's urine sample. The district court approved a Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), settlement between a nationwide certified class of purchasers of the Test and IntelliGender. The State subsequently filed an enforcement action against IntelliGender under the State's Unfair Competition and False Advertising Laws, largely based on the same claims as the class action. The court concluded that the district court correctly denied IntelliGender's motion to enjoin the State's enforcement action in its entirety where IntelliGender had not met its burden of showing that the CAFA class action settlement could bind the State in its sovereign capacity, where it asserted both public and private interests. The court agreed that a CAFA class action settlement, though approved by the district court, does not act as res judicata against the State in its sovereign capacity, even though many of the same claims are included in both actions. Because the State action is brought on behalf of the people, it implicates the public's interests as well as private interests, and therefore the remedial provisions sweep much more broadly. The court concluded, however, that the State is precluded from seeking the same relief sought in the CAFA class action where IntelliGender provided notice to the appropriate parties of the class action and the State chose not to participate. Therefore, the district court erred in denying IntelliGender's motion to enjoin the State's claims for restitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part.View "State of California v. IntelliGender" on Justia Law

In 2006, several borrowers sued their lender, CashCall, Inc., alleging CashCall monitored their telephone conversations without their knowledge or consent. Over CashCall's objections, the trial court certified a class on one of the claims, an alleged violation of Penal Code section 632, which imposes liability on a "person" who intentionally "eavesdrops upon or records [a] confidential communication" and engages in this conduct "without the consent of all parties." After class certification, CashCall successfully moved for summary adjudication on the section 632 claim. The trial court found as a matter of law a corporation does not violate the statute when one of its supervisory employees secretly monitors a conversation between a customer and another corporate employee, reasoning that two employees are a single "person" within the meaning of the statute. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the statute applies even if the unannounced listener is employed by the same corporate entity as the known recipient of the conversation, concluding the trial court's statutory interpretation was inconsistent with section 632's language and purpose. The Court also rejected CashCall's alternative argument that summary adjudication was proper because the undisputed facts established the telephone conversations were not "confidential communication[s]." On remand, CashCall moved to decertify the class on grounds that the issue whether any particular class member could satisfy a reasonable-expectation test (as the Court discussed in its earlier opinion) required an assessment of numerous individual factors (including those identified in the earlier opinion) and these individual issues predominate over any remaining common issues, making a continued class action unmanageable. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing CashCall did not meet its burden to establish changed circumstances necessary for class decertification and, alternatively, common issues continued to predominate in the case. The court granted the decertification motion. Plaintiffs appealed the decertification, but finding no error in that decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed.View "Kight v. CashCall" on Justia Law

The Fleets applied to have their Bank of America (BofA) home loan modified in 2009 under the Making Homes Affordable Act. The result of multiple telephone calls and letters to various BofA-related personnel, the Fleets were either (a) assured the Fleets that everything was proceeding smoothly or (b) told BofA had no knowledge of any loan modification application. Finally, in November 2011, BofA informed the Fleets they had been approved for a trial period plan under a Fannie Mae modification program. All they had to do, was to make three monthly payments starting on December 1, 2011. If they made the payments, then they would move to the next step (verification of financial hardship); if they passed that test, their loan would be permanently modified. The Fleets made the first two payments, for December 2011 and January 2012, which BofA acknowledged receiving, and therefore foreclosure proceedings had been suspended. Toward the end of January 2012, their house was sold at a trustee’s sale. Two days after the sale, a representative of the buyer showed up at the house with a notice to quit. The Fleets informed him that the house had significant structural problems, and he said he was going to rescind the sale. The Fleets continued to try to communicate with BofA regarding the property. A BofA representative left voice mail messages to the effect that BofA wanted to discuss a solution to the dispute, but otherwise it appeared that productive conversation between the Fleets and BofA and between the Fleets and the buyer had ceased. In light of this silence (which they interpreted to mean the buyer was trying to rescind the sale), the Fleets spent $15,000 to repair a broken sewer main, which was leaking sewage onto the front lawn. They were evicted in August 2012. In June 2012, the Fleets sued BofA, the trustee under their deed of trust, BofA officers and some of the employees who had been involved in handling their loan modification, and the buyer of the property and its representative. BofA’s demurrer to the first amended complaint was sustained without leave to amend as to the remaining causes of action promissory estoppel, breach of contract, fraud, and accounting. All of the BofA defendants were dismissed. The Court of Appeal reversed: "Although the Fleets’ amended complaint spreads the fraud allegations over three causes of action and contains a great deal of extraneous information, it also alleges the requisite elements of promissory fraud. [. . .] This cause of action may or may not be provable; what it definitely is not is demurrable." The Court sustained the demurrer to the Fleets' action for promissory estoppel, and affirmed the trial court in all other respects. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Fleet v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Trinity EMS, Inc. appealed a circuit court order dismissing its collection action against defendant Timothy Coombs. Plaintiff obtained a default judgment against defendant in 2003. Defendant made some payments, but as of March 2012, the judgment had not been satisfied. Plaintiff filed a new suit in 2012, for a new judgment, which it could use to attach the defendant’s real estate, because the first judgment was outside of the statute of limitations for an action of debt upon a judgment. In dismissing plaintiff's 2012 suit, the trial court ordered that "all hearings should be scheduled in [the 2003 action’s docket]." Plaintiff moved for reconsideration. The court denied the motion, finding (in relevant part): "There is no Cause of Action for obtaining 'an attachment' which is what Plaintiff is seeking. . . . Plaintiff has a judgment. It was apparently never recorded and is beyond the limitation period set forth in RSA 511." On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in dismissing its 2012 action because its complaint set forth a claim upon which relief could have been granted. The Supreme Court disagreed after review of the pertinent New Hampshire case law: plaintiff stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the Court reversed the dismissal of the plaintiff's action and remanded for further proceedings. View "Trinity EMS, Inc. v. Coombs " on Justia Law

The Plaintiffs sued Payday Financial, Webb, an enrolled member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, and other entities associated with Webb, alleging violations of civil and criminal statutes related to loans that they had received from the defendants. The businesses maintain several websites that offer small, high-interest loans to customers. The entire transaction is completed online; a potential customer applies for, and agrees to, the loan terms from his computer. The district court dismissed for improper venue, finding that the loan agreements required that all disputes be resolved through arbitration conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe on their Reservation in South Dakota. Following a limited remand, the district court concluded that, although the tribal law could be ascertained, the arbitral mechanism detailed in the agreement did not exist. The Seventh Circuit held that the action should not have been dismissed because the arbitral mechanism specified in the agreement is illusory. Rejecting an alternative argument that the loan documents require that any litigation be conducted by a tribal court on the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Reservation, the court stated that tribal courts have a unique, limited jurisdiction that does not extend generally to the regulation of nontribal members whose actions do not implicate the sovereignty of the tribe or the regulation of tribal lands. View "Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC" on Justia Law

MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC (MPHJ) owned several patents relating to network scanner systems. Through subsidiary licensees, MPHJ wrote to various business and non-profit organizations operating in Vermont, requesting the recipient to confirm it was not infringing MPHJ’s patents or, alternatively, to purchase a license. If there was no response, a Texas law firm sent follow-up correspondence stating that an infringement suit would be filed. The State of Vermont filed suit against MPHJ in Vermont state court alleging MPHJ engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices under the Vermont Consumer Protection Act, stating that the letters contained threatening, false, and misleading statements. MPHJ removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, asserting federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction. The State moved to remand the case back to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. MPHJ opposed the State’s motion to remand, and filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and a motion for sanctions. Finding that it lacked jurisdiction to grant MPHJ its requested relief, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and appeal. View "Vermont v. MPHJ Technology Investments" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Richard Salzer received medical care at an SSM Healthcare of Oklahoma (SSM) facility for injuries he sustained in an accident. At the time of his treatment, he had a health insurance plan (the "Plan"). Salzer entered into a contract with SSM to receive its services (the "Hospital Services Agreement"), under which he "authorized disclosure of [his] medical information for billing purposes and authorized [his] health insurance company to pay." SSM had an existing contract with Salzer's health insurance company (the "Provider Agreement") which required SSM to submit covered medical charges to Salzer's insurance company and accept discounted payment from the insurer. Although the Provider Agreement prohibited SSM from seeking payment for a covered charge from Salzer, SSM sought the non-discounted amount directly from him. Salzer sued SSM alleging breach of contract and other state law claims based on SSM's attempt to collect payment for medical care from Salzer instead of his health insurance company. SSM removed the case to federal district court. Salzer challenged the district court's denial of his motion to remand based on its determination that his claims were completely preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Salzer v. SSM Health Care of Oklahoma" on Justia Law