Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

P.F. Chang’s restaurant company announced that its computer system had been breached and some consumer credit- and debit–card data had been stolen. Kosner had dined at a P.F. Chang’s and paid with his debit card. Four fraudulent transactions were made with the card he had used; he cancelled it and purchased, for $106, a credit monitoring service to protect against identity theft, including against use of the card’s data to open new accounts in his name. Lewert used a debit card at the same restaurant (thought to be not among those breached) and had no fraudulent transactions, but claims that he spent time and effort monitoring his card statements and his credit report. Lewert and Kosner sought to represent a class of all similarly situated customers, under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2). The district court dismissed for lack of standing, finding they had not suffered the requisite personal injury. The Seventh Circuit reversed. At least some of the injuries alleged qualify as immediate and concrete injuries sufficient to support Article III standing; all class members should be allowed to show that they spent time and resources tracking down possible fraud, changing automatic charges, and replacing cards as a prophylactic measure. View "Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc" on Justia Law

Florencio Pacleb filed a class action complaint against Allstate, alleging that he received unsolicited automated calls to his cell phone in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227. Allstate deposited $20,000 in full settlement of Pacleb’s individual monetary claims in an escrow account “pending entry of a final District Court order or judgment directing the escrow agent to pay the tendered funds to Pacleb, requiring Allstate to stop sending non-emergency telephone calls and short message service messages to Pacleb in the future and dismissing this action as moot.” The court affirmed the district court's order denying Allstate’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that, even if the district court entered judgment affording Pacleb complete relief on his individual claims for damages and injunctive relief, mooting those claims, Pacleb would still be able to seek class certification under Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., which remains good law under Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co. The court also concluded that, even if Pitts were not binding, and Allstate could moot the entire action by mooting Pacleb’s individual claims for damages and injunctive relief, those individual claims are not now moot, and the court will not direct the district court to moot them by entering judgment on them before Pacleb has had a fair opportunity to move for class certification. View "Chen v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Graiser, an Ohio citizen, saw a “Buy One, Get One Free” eyeglasses advertisement at the Beachwood, location of Visionworks, a Texas eye-care corporation operating in more than 30 states. According to Graiser, a Visionworks salesperson quoted Graiser “a price of $409.93 for eyeglasses, with a second eyeglasses ‘free.’” Alternatively, the salesperson told Graiser that he could purchase a single pair of eyeglasses for $245.95. Graiser filed a purported class action in state court, alleging violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act. Visionworks removed the case under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), claiming that the amount in controversy recently surpassed CAFA’s jurisdictional threshold of $5,000,000. Graiser successfully moved to remand, arguing that removal was untimely under the 30-day period in 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(3). The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that section 1446(b)’s 30-day window for removal under CAFA is triggered when the defendant receives a document from the plaintiff from which it can first be ascertained that the case is removable under CAFA. The presence of CAFA jurisdiction provides defendants with a new window for removability, even if the case was originally removable under a different theory of federal jurisdiction. View "Graiser v. Visionworks of America, Inc." on Justia Law

Class representatives filed suit alleging that RHI committed numerous violations of Civil Code section 1747.08, also known as the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act. The trial court found RHI was liable for as many as 1,213,745 violations of that statute and set a penalty recovery in the amount of $30 per violation, subject to RHI's right to dispute any specific claim. Francesca Muller, a class member and the person prosecuting the appeal, requested the court order notice of the attorney fee motion be sent to all class members. The trial court denied the request, granted the attorney fee motion, and entered judgment in the action. Muller appealed. Michael Hernandez, class representative, contests each of Muller's claims of error. The court concluded that, under Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, the court must adhere to Eggert v. Pac. States S. & L. Co. and dismiss the appeal. Even if the court were free to disregard Eggert, adhering to Eggert's approach would not leave nonparty class members without protection or appellate recourse. Under California law, where class members are given the option of opting out, they are not bound by the judgment in the class action but instead may pursue their own action. Intervention would have the effect of giving Muller a clear avenue from which to challenge the attorney fee award. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc." on Justia Law

Unifund CCR Partners, a debt buyer, was in the business of purchasing large portfolios of charged-off debts from original debt holders in the hope of eventually collecting from the original debtors. Unifund asserted the right to judgment against defendant David Zimmer for charged-off debt in the amount of $2453.22, plus costs and statutory pre-judgment interest of 12% under 12 V.S.A. 2903, for a credit card account opened in defendant's name with Citibank. Unifund also alleged that defendant was unjustly enriched in that amount “by virtue of non-payment on an account.” At trial, Unifund asserted that it was authorized to collect the debt by a series of limited assignments, from Citibank to Pilot Receivables Management, LLC (Pilot) on June 18, 2012, and from Pilot to Unifund CCR LLC (UCL) and UCL to Unifund, both on June 1, 2013. To establish standing to enforce the underlying debt, Unifund offered testimony of Brian Billings, who spoke in support of the assignment from Citibank to Pilot, and Elizabeth Andres, who spoke in support of the assignments from Pilot to UCL and UCL to Unifund. The trial court found these documents to be inadmissible as hearsay because Unifund had failed to establish the necessary foundation for their admission. The trial court also found that, even if the assignments were admissible as a business record under Rule 803(6), Unifund had failed to establish standing. Unifund raised four arguments on appeal: (1) that documents proffered to establish the assignment of defendant’s debt were not admissible as business records; (2) that the assignment of the right to collect is itself sufficient for standing; (3) that Unifund sufficiently established the terms of the contract between defendant and Citibank, including the contractual interest rate; and (4) that Unifund demonstrated a basis to recover for unjust enrichment. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's analysis and judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Unifund CCR Partners v. Zimmer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging common-law fraud and violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. Plaintiff alleged that she never agreed to the mortgage loan at issue. The court concluded that the district court acted within its discretion in admitting an attorney's testimony under FRE 406 regarding the fact that he had met with plaintiff and had not asked her to sign blank sheets of paper; the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the loan documents at issue under FRE 901(a) for authenticated records and the court rejected plaintiff's argument that admission of the photocopies violated the best evidence rule where the original documents had been lost; plaintiff's FRCP 50 argument fails where the evidence was more than adequate to warrant the jury in finding for defendants' on the case's central issue; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's FRCP 59 motion for a new trial where nothing in the record warranted upsetting the verdict. Accordingly, the court found no error and affirmed the judgment. View "Crawford v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp." on Justia Law

The Arbitration Certification Program (ACP) certifies the qualified dispute resolution process identified in the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Civil Code 1790, the “lemon law.” Not all automobile manufacturers must have an ACP certified program. Those manufacturers who choose to operate a certified arbitration process have limited lemon law liability. Plaintiffs bought new cars that were under the original manufacturers’ warranties when they sought declaratory relief claiming that public statements in ACP publications were illegal underground regulations not adopted in conformity with California’s Administrative Procedures Act, because the ACP states that car manufacturers may adjust the price of a defective vehicle to be repurchased from its owner as a lemon for excessive wear and tear and that it is not within an arbitrator’s purview to make such an adjustment. The court concluded plaintiffs were interested persons under Government Code 11350 and denied a motion to dismiss. The court of appeal vacated. Plaintiffs may not invoke the doctrine of public interest standing, and their individual interests in the controversy are too conjectural to confer standing to bring an action for declaratory relief. View "CA Dep't. Consumer Affairs v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A collection company, acting on behalf of a hospital, sued John Brown. The lawsuit stemmed from Brown’s nonpayment for medical services. Though Brown initially answered, claiming entitlement to a set-off, he later tried to amend his answer to add a recoupment defense aimed at whittling down his amount owed. The county court judge denied the amendment, but certified the judgment as final and appealable under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). But instead of seeking the intended review by the Mississippi Supreme Court, Brown chose to file his appeal with the circuit court, which affirmed the county court judgment and also entered a Rule 54(b) certification. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found several "jurisdictional snags" with Brown’s case: (1) the county court’s judgment did not decide a “claim” between two parties, thereby making its Rule 54(b) certification invalid; (2) recoupment was a defense under Mississippi law inappropriate for final-judgment entries under Rule 54(b); and (3) appeals from interlocutory judgments of a county court must be filed with the Supreme Court, not the circuit court. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court lacked a final, appealable judgment and an improper interlocutory appeal, the Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Brown v. Collections, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, Henderson Square Condominium Association sued, alleging: breach of the implied warranty of habitability, fraud, negligence, breach of the Chicago Municipal Code’s prohibition against misrepresenting material facts in marketing and selling real estate, and breach of a fiduciary duty. The defendants were developers that entered into a contract with the city for a mixed use project, the Lincoln-Belmont-Ashland Redevelopment Project. Sales in the project had begun in 1996. The trial court dismissed, finding that plaintiffs failed to adequately plead the Chicago Municipal Code violation and breach of fiduciary duty and that counts were time-barred under the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-214). The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. A condominium association generally has standing to pursue claims that affect the unit owners or the common elements. A question of fact remains as to whether defendants’ failure to speak about construction deficiencies or to adequately fund reserves, coupled with earlier alleged misrepresentations, amounted to fraudulent concealment for purposes of exceptions to the limitation and repose periods. It is possible that minor repairs, along with the limited nature of water infiltration, reasonably delayed plaintiffs’ hiring of professional contractors to open the wall and discover latent defects. The date when plaintiffs reasonably should have known that an injury occurred and that it was wrongfully caused was a question of fact. View "Henderson Square Condo. Ass'n v. LAB Townhomes, LLC" on Justia Law

The Ticket Law, N.J. Stat. 56:8-35.1, part of New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act, says: It shall be an unlawful practice for a person, who has access to tickets to an event prior to the tickets’ release for sale to the general public, to withhold those tickets from sale to the general public in an amount exceeding 5% of all available seating for the event. The Consumer Fraud Act permits private plaintiffs to sue any person who violates the Act and causes them to suffer ascertainable damages. Plaintiffs wanted to attend Super Bowl XLVIII, which was held in New Jersey in 2014. One plaintiff bought two tickets on the resale market, allegedly for much more than face price. They assert that the NFL’s method of selling tickets to Super Bowl XLVIII violated the Ticket Law and resulted in unjust enrichment. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal. Neither plaintiff has constitutional standing to bring this case. Otherwise, anyone who purchased a Super Bowl ticket on the resale market would have standing to sue in federal court based on nothing more than conjectural assertions of causation and injury. Article III requires more. The court declined to interpret the Ticket Law’s meaning. View "Finkelman v. Nat'l Football League" on Justia Law