Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2007, the State of Mississippi, through the Attorney General’s office, filed suit against Louisville Tire Center, Inc. d/b/a Fair Oil Company (Fair Oil) for violating Mississippi’s price-gouging statute. Fair Oil filed a successful motion for summary judgment on the basis that the price-gouging statute was unconstitutional as written; however, on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for the Chancery Court to examine Fair Oil’s conduct in light of the statute’s language. After remand, several years passed without activity in the case, and in July 2015, the Chancery Court granted Fair Oil’s motion to dismiss for want of prosecution pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). The State appealed that decision. Finding no error in the dismissal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mississippi, Ex Rel. Hood, Attorney General v. Louisville Tire Center, Inc." on Justia Law

Real parties in interest, Kevin Hicks et al., filed an action against petitioner Elliott Homes, Inc. (Elliott), the builder of their homes, seeking damages for construction defects. Elliott moved to stay the litigation until real parties in interest complied with the prelitigation procedure set forth in “SB 800” or “Right to Repair Act” (Act), Civil Code sections 895 through 945.5. Real parties in interest opposed the motion, arguing that the prelitigation procedure did not apply because they had not alleged a statutory violation of the Act. The trial court denied Elliott’s motion for a stay, and Elliott petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate compelling the trial court to vacate its order, and enter a new order granting the motion for a stay. The Court issued an alternative writ of mandate and stayed the proceedings in the trial court. Elliott contended the trial court erred in concluding that real parties in interest did not need to comply with the prelitigation procedure set forth in the Act prior to filing the underlying action and in denying the motion to stay. The Court of Appeal granted the petition. View "Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In cases consolidated for review, the issues presented for the Supreme Court involved the scope of the State’s authority to regulate so-called “payday loans” pursuant to OCGA 16-17-1, et seq., known as the Payday Lending Act. Pursuant to the statute, the State filed suit alleging that CashCall, Inc. (“CashCall”), Delbert Services Corporation (“Delbert Services”), Western Sky Financial, LLC (“Western Sky”), and Martin A. Webb (collectively “Defendants”) violated OCGA 16-17-2 (a) by engaging in a small-dollar lending enterprise that collected illegal usurious interest from Georgia borrowers. Defendants operated outside the State of Georgia and their dealings with Georgia borrowers occurred telephonically or over the Internet, and when a loan is funded, the funds are transferred to the borrower via electronic transfer to the borrower’s bank account. The State sought civil penalties and injunctive and other equitable relief. Defendants filed motions to compel arbitration and to dismiss the action. The trial court referred the case to a special master who recommended the case be dismissed, but the trial court rejected the special master’s recommendation and denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the State’s claim was not barred by the language of OCGA 16-17-1 (d). Because the trial court found a substantial likelihood that the State would prevail on the merits of the claim at trial, and found a substantial threat existed that the State would suffer irreparable injury in that there might not be sufficient funds available to satisfy a judgment should the State prevail at trial, the trial court ordered Defendants to deposit a $15 million sum into the court’s registry and to make quarterly deposits of any additional amounts that could be collected from Georgia borrowers in the future. The trial court, however, agreed to stay the granted relief during an appeal, upon the Defendants’ deposit of an additional $1 million into the escrow account created following entry of the consent order requiring the deposit of $200,000. In a separate order, the trial court denied the State’s motion to add as defendants J. Paul Reddam and WS Funding, LLC (“WS Funding”). Defendants filed a notice of appeal and the State filed a notice of cross-appeal. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the order denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss, affirmed the modification of the injunction order, and reversed the order denying the State’s motion to add defendants. View "Western Sky Financial, LLC v. Georgia" on Justia Law

A person who pays for a trip to the emergency room out-of-pocket can be charged significantly more for care than a person who has insurance. This case centered on whether a person could maintain an action challenging this variable pricing practice under the Unfair Competition Law, the Consumer Legal Remedies Act or and action for declaratory relief. The Court of Appeals concluded after review of this case that most of the claims asserted by plaintiff Gene Moran lacked merit. However, he sufficiently alleged facts supporting a conclusion that he had standing to claim the amount of the charges defendants' hospital bills self-pay patients was unconscionable. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court's dismissal of Moran's case, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Moran v. Prime Healthcare" on Justia Law

A client personally financed the sale of his business corporation. His attorney drafted documents that secured the buyer’s debt with corporate stock and an interest in the buyer’s home. Over seven years later the government imposed tax liens on the corporation’s assets; according to the client, it was only then he learned for the first time that his attorney had not provided for a recorded security interest in the physical assets. The client sued the attorney for malpractice and violation of the Alaska Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA). The superior court held that the statute of limitations barred the client’s claims and granted summary judgment to the attorney. But after review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that it was not until the tax liens were filed that the client suffered the actual damage necessary for his cause of action to be complete. Therefore, the Court reversed the superior court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jones v. Westbrook" on Justia Law

Hoffman, “a serial pro se class action litigant,” frequently sues under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, serving as both the sole class representative and sole class counsel. Hoffman has sued nearly 100 defendants in New Jersey state court in less than four years. Hoffman sued Nordic for its allegedly false and misleading advertisements for fish oil supplements. The suit was removed to federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to state a claim. Hoffman filed a second suit, alleging the same facts and legal theories, but with a smaller class, to reduce the amount recoverable and defeat federal jurisdiction. Nordic again removed the suit. The district court declined to remand the case and dismissed, finding the action procedurally barred under New Jersey’s entire controversy doctrine and, in the alternative, that Hoffman’s claims under the Consumer Fraud Act failed for substantially the same reasons they failed in the earlier suit. The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court was permitted to “bypass” the jurisdictional inquiry in favor of a non-merits dismissal on claim preclusion grounds. View "Hoffman v. Nordic Naturals, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review arose from a deficiency action brought by appellant SunTrust Bank (“SunTrust”) as the assignee under a motor vehicle conditional sales contract following its repossession and sale of a motor vehicle purchased by appellee Mattie Venable. Specifically, the issue was which statute of limitations applied here: the four-year statute of limitation set forth in OCGA 11-2-725 (1) applicable to actions on contracts for the sale of goods, or the six-year statute of limitation found in OCGA 9-3-24, generally applicable to actions on simple written contracts. After review, the Court concluded that this action was subject to the four-year statute of limitation found in 11-2-725 (1). View "SunTrust Bank v. Venable" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a purported class action against Moscov, his law firm Weinstein, Pinson & Riley, and a debt collection agency NCO Financial, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, arising out of attempts to collect on student loan debts allegedly owed by the plaintiffs. The complaint asserted that the defendants included a misleading and deceptive statement in a paragraph of the debt-collection complaint they filed against the plaintiffs in state court: Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 1692g(a), Defendants are informed that the undersigned law firm is acting on behalf of Plaintiff to collect the debt and that the debt referenced in this suit will be assumed to be valid and correct if not disputed in whole or in part within thirty (30) days from the date hereof. Plaintiffs claimed that the statement was misleading and deceptive as to the manner and timing of their response to the state lawsuit. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that the statements fall within the category: communications which are plainly deceptive and misleading to an unsophisticated consumer as a matter of law. View "Marquez v. Weinstein, Pinson & Riley, P.S" on Justia Law

Respondents filed a class-action complaint alleging, among other claims, that MoneyMutual, LLC, which operates a website allowing individuals to apply for short-term loans known as payday loans, matched Respondents with payday lenders that were unlicensed in Minnesota and that the terms of the payday loans were illegal. MoneyMutual moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that it could exercise specific personal jurisdiction over MoneyMutual based on MoneyMutual’s email correspondence with residents and advertising in Minnesota. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that sufficient minimum contacts existed for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over MoneyMutual and that exercising personal jurisdiction over MoneyMutual comported with notions of fair play and substantial justice. View "Rilley v. MoneyMutual, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs each purportedly owed a debt; each creditor filed suit in Cook County seeking to collect on that debt. After each plaintiff failed to appear, a Cook County Circuit Court entered a default judgment. B&G, a debt collector, filed an affidavit for a wage deduction in the First Municipal District in downtown Chicago and obtained a summons against Plaintiffs’ respective employers. Plaintiffs allege it was this final act that violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) venue provision, 15 U.S.C. 1692i(a)(2), because B&G should have filed the affidavits in the Sixth Municipal District in Markham, Illinois (the municipal district closest to Plaintiffs) and not in the First Municipal District. The Cook County Circuit Court’s Municipal Department has been sub‐divided into six smaller units called municipal districts. B&G moved to dismiss on the basis that B&G’s filing of an affidavit for a wage deduction did not constitute a “legal action” against a “consumer” within the meaning of the FDCPA. The district courts agreed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that such actions are not against the consumer. View "Etro v. Blitt & Gaines, P.C." on Justia Law