Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In this case, consumers brought tort claims against a mattress retailer and manufacturer, alleging injuries suffered while sleeping on a defective mattress. The plaintiffs settled with the retailer and later dismissed their claims against the manufacturer, Tempur-Pedic North America, LLC, before filing a new lawsuit. The manufacturer then moved for costs as the prevailing party in the dismissed lawsuit. The trial court awarded some costs to the manufacturer, including costs for depositions that were noticed but did not occur. The consumers appealed this decision, arguing it was improper to award costs for depositions that did not occur.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two disagreed with the consumers and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that there is no blanket exception to awarding costs for depositions that were noticed but did not occur. The court explained that the proper analysis focuses on whether costs were reasonably necessary to litigating a case when incurred, not whether the costs could have been avoided in retrospect. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the costs were reasonably necessary. View "Garcia v. Tempur-Pedic North America, LLC" on Justia Law

In California, plaintiff Jasmine Moten appealed the trial court’s decision to grant an anti-SLAPP motion filed by defendant, Transworld Systems Inc. (Transworld). Moten had taken out a student loan which she later defaulted on, leading to Transworld, a debt collection company, servicing the loan. Transworld filed a debt collection action against Moten on behalf of National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-3 (NCSLT 2007-3), to whom the loan had been assigned. Moten filed a class action lawsuit against Transworld, alleging that it did not have a valid legal claim as it had manufactured documents to prove ownership of the loan by NCSLT 2007-3. She claimed that these deceptive practices violated the Robbins-Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, as well as Unfair Competition and Unlawful Business Acts and Practices. The trial court granted Transworld's anti-SLAPP motion, which led to Moten's appeal. The Court of Appeal for the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two reversed the trial court’s decision, ruling that the trial court erred in applying the litigation privilege to Moten's claims. The appellate court remanded the case back to the trial court to determine whether Moten has a probability of prevailing on her claims and to consider the public interest exception of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17. View "Moten v. Transworld Systems Inc." on Justia Law

In the case between Lisa Stettner, Michele Zousmer and Mercedes-Benz Financial Services USA, LLC, the dispute centered on a vehicle turn-in fee that Mercedes-Benz charges at the end of their lease agreements. Stettner and Zousmer considered this fee to be taxable and filed a suit accusing Mercedes-Benz of violating California’s Unfair Competition Law and for declaratory relief.However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District found that the plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing the lawsuit, which is a prerequisite for a taxpayer to challenge the validity of a tax in court. Moreover, the court ruled that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a judicial remedy because there was no prior legal determination resolving the taxability issue.The court also stated that the trial court was correct to deny the plaintiffs' request to amend their complaint to include a copy of the lease agreements. The court found that the definition of the vehicle turn-in fee in the lease agreements did not rectify the defects in the plaintiffs' first amended complaint. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court’s order sustaining the demurrers. View "Stettner v. Mercedes-Benz Financial Services USA, LLC" on Justia Law

In a class action lawsuit, plaintiffs accused Eden Creamery, LLC of underfilling its pints of Halo Top ice cream. After the discovery period, the plaintiffs attempted to amend their complaint to include a new theory of liability (fraud by omission) and a new defendant (Wells Enterprises). The district court denied this motion, stating that plaintiffs failed to show good cause for amending their complaint. The plaintiffs then moved to voluntarily dismiss their claims without prejudice, which the district court also denied, instead dismissing the individual claims with prejudice and the class claims without prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend the complaint, as the plaintiffs failed to show good cause for amending after the deadline to do so had passed. However, the court found that the district court had abused its discretion by denying the plaintiffs' motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice, as the defendants did not demonstrate that they would suffer legal prejudice if the case were dismissed without prejudice. The court held that a defendant must show legal prejudice to prevent a dismissal without prejudice. Uncertainty from unresolved disputes or inconvenience of defending another lawsuit does not constitute legal prejudice. The case was remanded with instructions to dismiss the action without prejudice, and the district court was instructed to consider whether any conditions should be imposed on the dismissal, such as an appropriate amount of costs and fees. View "KAMAL V. EDEN CREAMERY, LLC" on Justia Law

In a dispute involving the foreclosure of a home, the Supreme Court of Alabama upheld the decisions of the lower court in favor of the purchasers of the foreclosed property and the mortgagee. The original homeowners, the Littlefields, defaulted on their mortgage payments and the property was subsequently foreclosed on by Planet Home Lending, LLC ("Planet"), and then sold to Terry Daniel Smith and Staci Herring Smith. The Littlefields refused to vacate the property, leading the Smiths to initiate an ejectment action against them. The Littlefields responded with counterclaims against the Smiths and Planet, arguing that the foreclosure was void because Planet had failed to comply with the mortgage's notice requirements. The Supreme Court of Alabama rejected the Littlefields' arguments, holding that any alleged noncompliance with the notice requirements would have rendered the foreclosure voidable, not void. The court concluded that because the Littlefields did not challenge the foreclosure before the property was sold to the Smiths, who were considered bona fide purchasers, the foreclosure could not be set aside. The court also noted that the Littlefields failed to challenge other rulings related to their counterclaims against Planet and their forfeiture of redemption rights, leading to these aspects of the lower court's judgment being affirmed as well. View "Littlefield v. Smith" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Maria Del Rosario Hernandez, filed a lawsuit against MicroBilt Corporation alleging the company violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act after the lender denied her loan application based on inaccurate information provided by a MicroBilt product. MicroBilt moved to compel arbitration based on the terms and conditions that Hernandez agreed to while applying for the loan, which included an arbitration provision. However, Hernandez had already submitted her claims to the American Arbitration Association (AAA) for arbitration.The AAA notified MicroBilt that its agreement with Hernandez was a consumer agreement, which meant the AAA's Consumer Arbitration Rules applied. Applying these rules, the AAA notified MicroBilt that its arbitration provision included a material or substantial deviation from the Consumer Rules and/or Protocol. Specifically, the provision’s limitation on damages conflicted with the Consumer Due Process Protocol, which requires that an arbitrator should be empowered to grant whatever relief would be available in court under law or in equity. After MicroBilt did not waive the damages limitation, the AAA declined to administer the arbitration under Rule 1(d).MicroBilt asked Hernandez to submit her claims to a different arbitrator, but she refused, requesting a hearing before the District Court. She argued that she must now pursue her claims in court because the AAA dismissed the case under Rule 1(d). The District Court reinstated Hernandez’s complaint and granted MicroBilt leave to move to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 4. However, the District Court denied MicroBilt’s motion to compel, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, stating that Hernandez had fully complied with MicroBilt’s arbitration provision, which allowed her to pursue her claims in court. The court held that it lacked the authority to compel arbitration. The court rejected MicroBilt's arguments that the AAA administrator improperly resolved an arbitrability issue that should have been resolved by an arbitrator, that the provision’s Exclusive Resolution clause conflicted with Hernandez’s return to court, and that the AAA’s application of the Consumer Due Process Protocol was unreasonable. The court concluded that it lacked the authority to review the AAA’s decision or to sever the damages limitation from the arbitration provision. View "Hernandez v. MicroBilt Corp" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a resident of California. While present in California, Plaintiff used his iPhone’s Safari browser to navigate to the website of California-based retailer IABMFG to purchase fitness apparel. Although Plaintiff claims he did not know it at the time, IABMFG’s website used software and code from Shopify, Inc. to process customer orders and payments. Shopify, Inc. is a Canadian corporation with its headquarters in Ottawa, Canada. Plaintiff filed a putative class action lawsuit in California alleging that Shopify violated various California privacy and unfair competition laws because it deliberately concealed its involvement in consumer transactions. The district court agreed, dismissing the second amended complaint without leave to amend. Plaintiff timely appealed.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. For specific jurisdiction to exist over Shopify, Plaintiff’s claim must arise out of or relate to Shopify’s forum-related activities. The panel held that there was no causal relationship between Shopify’s broader business contacts in California and Plaintiff’s claims because these contacts did not cause Plaintiff’s harm. Nor did Plaintiff’s claims “relate to” Shopify’s broader business activities in California outside of its extraction and retention of plaintiff’s data. Because there was an insufficient relationship between plaintiff's claims and Shopify’s broader business contacts in California, the activities relevant to the specific jurisdiction analysis were those that caused Plaintiff’s injuries: Shopify’s collection, retention, and use of consumer data obtained from persons who made online purchases while in California. The panel held that Shopify, which provides nationwide web-based payment processing services to online merchants, did not expressly aim its conduct toward California. View "BRANDON BRISKIN V. SHOPIFY, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs s filed a class action complaint and sought to represent a class of individuals whose Healthcare Revenue tradelines had been wrongly “re-aged” by Experian. They alleged that Experian “willfully” violated its obligation under the Fair Credit Reporting Act to “follow reasonable procedures” to ensure consumer credit reports were prepared with “maximum possible accuracy” when it allowed credit reports to reflect allegedly inaccurate status dates. The district court denied Experian’s summary judgment motion. After the close of discovery, Plaintiffs moved to certify a class of all consumers “whose Experian credit reports had an account or accounts reported by [Healthcare Revenue] with an inaccurately displayed Date of Status and were viewed by one or more third parties.” The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and denied class certification. Plaintiffs petitioned for permission to appeal the district court’s class certification order under Rule 23(f).   The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that the denial of Plaintiffs' motion for class certification was an abuse of discretion because the district court’s analysis of Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement was based on its contrary interpretation of the second option in section 1681n(a)(1)(A). The court wrote that a consumer alleging a willful violation of the Act doesn’t need to prove actual damages to recover “damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000.” While the parties raise other issues that may ultimately affect whether the class should be certified, the district court’s order denying class certification only relied on its interpretation of section 1681n(a)(1)(A) and didn’t address these other arguments. View "Omar Santos, et al v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Nabozny received a letter at her Wisconsin home, offering to settle an unpaid credit-card debt. The letter summarized basic information about her debt: the creditor, the outstanding balance, the account number, and her name and address. The letter was from Optio under its operating name of Qualia, but it was printed and mailed by RevSpring, a third-party printing and mail vendor. Nabozny did not give Optio consent to share the information about her debt with RevSpring.Nabozny filed a purported class action, alleging that Optio’s communication with RevSpring violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, which provides that “a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer” without the consumer’s consent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Nabozny’s suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Nabozny lacks standing to sue because she “suffered no concrete injury.” The court noted recent decisions in other circuits that sharing a debtor’s data with a third-party mail vendor to populate and send a form collection letter “causes no harm that our legal tradition recognizes as sufficient to support a suit in federal court under Article III of the Constitution.” View "Nabozny v. Optio Solutions LLC" on Justia Law

Huber visited Crozer doctors on four separate occasions, incurring debts to Crozer of $178, $78, $83.50, and $178. Crozer's debt collection agency, SAI, sent a form collection letter, with an “Account Summary” that provided two figures: the specific debt SAI sought to collect, entitled “Amount,” and a second figure, entitled “Various Other Acc[oun]ts Total Balance.” The fourth such letter to Huber informed Huber that she owed an “Amount” of $178, while her “Various Other Accounts Total Balance” was $517.50. Huber testified that she was confused as to how much she owed in total: Was it $695.50 or $517.50. She consulted a financial advisor.Huber filed this putative class action, asserting a “false, deceptive, or misleading” means of collecting a debt and failure to disclose the “amount of the debt” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692. The district court held, on summary judgment, that there was no actionable failure to disclose but found the letters “misleading and deceptive,” and certified the class.The Third Circuit affirmed. Huber has standing, but not under the “informational injury doctrine.” Huber did not identify omitted information to which she has entitlement but the financial harm she suffered in reliance on the letter bears a “close relationship” to the harm associated with the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation. The court remanded for determination of whether any of the class members suffered any consequences beyond confusion. View "Huber v. Simons Agency Inc" on Justia Law