Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Paul Kim, a California resident, purchased an Airstream motorhome from a dealer in California. The warranty agreement for the motorhome included an Ohio choice of law provision and an Ohio forum selection clause. Kim sued Airstream in California, alleging violations of the Song-Beverly Consumers Warranty Act. Airstream moved to stay the lawsuit in favor of the Ohio forum, citing the forum selection clause. Kim opposed, arguing that enforcing the forum selection clause would diminish his unwaivable rights under the Song-Beverly Act.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County severed the choice of law provision as illegal under the Song-Beverly Act’s waiver prohibition but granted Airstream’s motion to stay, concluding that enforcing the forum selection clause would not diminish Kim’s unwaivable California rights. The court relied on Airstream’s stipulation to apply the Song-Beverly Act in the Ohio forum.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision to sever the choice of law provision but reversed the decision to stay the case. The appellate court held that Airstream’s stipulation was insufficient to meet its burden of proving that enforcing the forum selection clause would not diminish Kim’s unwaivable rights. The court instructed the trial court to allow Airstream the opportunity to demonstrate that Ohio conflict of law principles would require the application of the Song-Beverly Act to Kim’s claims, thereby protecting his unwaivable rights. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Kim v. Airstream" on Justia Law

In 2020, the Maryland General Assembly passed the Housing Opportunities Made Equal (HOME) Act, which added "source of income" to the list of prohibited considerations in housing rental or sale. The appellant, a housing voucher recipient, applied to rent an apartment in the appellee's complex. The appellee applied a minimum-income requirement, combining all sources of income to determine if the total exceeded 2.5 times the full gross rent. The appellant's combined income, including her voucher, did not meet this threshold, leading to the rejection of her application. The appellant sued, claiming the minimum-income requirement constituted source-of-income discrimination under § 20-705.The Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted summary judgment to the appellee, finding that the appellee's policy did not discriminate based on the source of income but rather on the amount of income. The court ruled that the appellee neutrally applied its income qualification criteria and rejected the appellant based on the amount of her income, not its source.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the appellee's counting of voucher income in the same manner as other income sources did not entitle it to summary judgment. The court found that this approach did not resolve the appellant's disparate impact claim, which asserts that a facially neutral policy has a disparate impact on a protected group without a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The court vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, emphasizing the need to address the disparate impact analysis. View "Hare v. David S. Brown Enterprises" on Justia Law

Jefferson County, Missouri, filed a lawsuit against several pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), including Express Scripts and OptumRX, alleging that their distribution practices facilitated prescription opioid abuse, resulting in numerous deaths and emergency room visits. The County sought relief under Missouri public nuisance law. The case was initially filed in the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit Court of Missouri and later amended multiple times. On December 1, 2023, the PBMs filed a notice of removal to federal court, citing the federal officer removal statute and other federal statutes.The case was previously part of the federal Opioid Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) but was severed and remanded to Missouri state court in July 2019. During discovery, the County provided a "Red Flag Analysis" identifying prescription claims, including federal claims. The PBMs argued that this analysis indicated the case was removable to federal court. However, the County later disclaimed reliance on federal claims in a joint stipulation.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted the County's motion to remand the case to state court. The district court found that the PBMs' removal was untimely, as they were required to file a notice of removal within 30 days of the February 14, 2022, Red Flag Analysis. The court also determined that removal was not substantively proper under the federal officer removal statute because the County had disclaimed any reliance on federal claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the PBMs had unambiguously ascertained that the February 14, 2022, Red Flag Analysis allowed for removal but failed to act within the required 30-day period. Consequently, the district court's order to remand the case to state court was upheld. View "Jefferson County v. Express Scripts, Inc." on Justia Law

Lezah Roberts entered into a fixed-price contract with Advanced Building Design, a Maryland-based firm, to build a handicap-accessible addition to her home in the District of Columbia. The project, which began in 2017 and was expected to take six months, remained unfinished nearly two years later. The project went over budget due to price increases and change orders, and Advanced sought to recoup these overages from Roberts. After initially agreeing to cover some additional costs, Roberts eventually refused to pay further increases, leading Advanced to cease work on the project. Roberts then filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a claim under the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA) for unfair trade practices.The Superior Court granted Advanced’s motion to dismiss Roberts’s suit, citing a mandatory forum selection clause in the contract that designated Maryland as the exclusive forum for litigation. Roberts appealed, arguing that the forum selection clause was unenforceable because it conflicted with the CPPA and was unconscionable.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and disagreed with Roberts on both counts. The court held that the CPPA does not preclude parties from selecting their preferred forum and that the forum selection clause did not contravene public policy or demonstrate procedural or substantive unconscionability. Consequently, the court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal of Roberts’s complaint. View "Roberts v. Advanced Building Design" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Tidrick purchased a vehicle from FCA US LLC (FCA) and experienced transmission issues, leading her to request FCA repurchase the vehicle under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. FCA initially declined, prompting Tidrick to file a lawsuit in Orange County Superior Court. The parties eventually settled, with FCA agreeing to repurchase the vehicle, pay restitution, and cover attorney fees and costs. Tidrick sought $82,719.33 in attorney fees and costs, but the trial court awarded her only $15,000, a significant reduction.The Orange County Superior Court, where the case was initially filed, awarded Tidrick $15,000 in attorney fees and costs, applying hourly rates prevailing in Fresno County, where Tidrick resided and purchased the vehicle. The court justified this by referencing Code of Civil Procedure section 395, subdivision (b), which it interpreted as mandating venue in Fresno County. The court also criticized the number of hours billed and the lack of a settlement agreement copy, suggesting the litigation was unnecessarily prolonged.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court erred in applying Fresno County rates instead of Orange County rates, as venue was proper in Orange County where FCA's principal place of business is located. The appellate court also found that the trial court abused its discretion by not properly applying the lodestar method to calculate attorney fees and failing to specify the amount of costs awarded. The appellate court reversed the trial court's award and remanded the case with directions to recalculate the attorney fees using Orange County rates and to clarify the costs awarded. View "Tidrick v. FCA US LLC" on Justia Law

CPI Security Systems, Inc. filed a lawsuit against Vivint Smart Home, Inc., alleging that Vivint engaged in deceptive practices to lure away CPI’s customers. Vivint sales representatives falsely claimed that Vivint had acquired CPI, that CPI was going out of business, or that Vivint needed to upgrade CPI’s equipment. These tactics led many CPI customers to switch to Vivint, causing significant losses for CPI. A jury found Vivint liable for violating the Lanham Act, the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA), and for committing the common-law torts of unfair competition and tortious interference with contracts. The jury awarded CPI $49.7 million in compensatory damages and $140 million in punitive damages.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina upheld the jury’s verdict. Vivint appealed, raising several issues, including the requirement of CPI’s reliance on false statements for the UDTPA claim, the sufficiency of evidence supporting the damages award, the application of North Carolina’s cap on punitive damages, and the admission of prejudicial evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and found no reversible error. The court held that CPI was not required to prove its own reliance on Vivint’s false statements to establish a UDTPA claim, as the claim was based on unfair competition rather than fraud. The court also found that the evidence presented by CPI was sufficient to support the jury’s damages award. Additionally, the court ruled that the district court correctly applied North Carolina’s cap on punitive damages by considering the total compensatory damages awarded. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Vivint’s motion to bifurcate the trial or in its evidentiary rulings. The reassignment of the trial judge post-trial did not warrant a new trial. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "CPI Security Systems, Inc. v. Vivint Smart Home, Inc." on Justia Law

Joshua Lapin, acting pro se, filed a complaint against Zeetogroup, LLC and “John Doe Sender” alleging 46 violations of SDCL 37-24-47, which prohibits misleading, falsified, or unauthorized spam emails. Lapin claimed he received these emails between June 15 and July 25, 2021, at his email address, which he argued was a “South Dakota electronic mail address.” The circuit court dismissed Lapin’s claims on summary judgment, concluding that Lapin was not a “resident of this state” during the time he received the emails and, therefore, could not prove his email address was a “South Dakota electronic mail address” as required by SDCL 37-24-47. Lapin appealed.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, South Dakota, denied Lapin’s motion for partial summary judgment and granted Zeetogroup’s motion for summary judgment. The court found that Lapin was not a resident of South Dakota when he received the emails because he was traveling internationally as a “digital nomad” and was not physically present in the state. The court also held that SDCL 37-24-41(14) does not impose a durational residency requirement and that Lapin could sue over emails received after he became a physical resident of South Dakota.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the term “resident” in SDCL 37-24-41(14)(c) requires actual residency, not just legal residency or domicile. The court concluded that Lapin’s 30-day stay in an Airbnb in South Dakota and his subsequent travels did not establish him as a resident of South Dakota during the time he received the emails. Therefore, Lapin was not entitled to the protections of SDCL 37-24-47. View "Lapin v. Zeetogroup" on Justia Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit against Matt Martorello for violating civil provisions of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The plaintiffs, a group of Virginia citizens, alleged that Martorello orchestrated a "Rent-A-Tribe" scheme with the Lac Vieux Desert Band of Chippewa Indians to issue high-interest loans that circumvented state usury laws by claiming tribal immunity. The loans were made through tribal entities, Red Rock Tribal Lending, LLC, Big Picture Loans, LLC, and Ascension Technologies. The plaintiffs sought damages under federal civil RICO law.The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the tribal entities from the case due to sovereign immunity but allowed the claims against Martorello to proceed. The court found that Martorello had made material misrepresentations about the lending operations and granted class certification. Martorello's subsequent interlocutory appeals were denied, and the district court eventually granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding them over $43 million in damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. Martorello challenged three district court rulings: the denial of his motion to dismiss for failure to join necessary and indispensable parties, the application of Virginia law instead of tribal law, and the rejection of his "mistake of law" defense. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. It held that the tribal entities were not indispensable parties due to their settlement agreement, Virginia law applied to the off-reservation lending activities, and a mistake-of-law defense was irrelevant to the civil RICO claims, which did not require proof of specific mens rea beyond the predicate acts. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in any of its rulings. View "Williams v. Martorello" on Justia Law

Vivos Therapeutics, Inc. filed a lawsuit against Ortho-Tain, Inc. in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The lawsuit stemmed from communications made by Ortho-Tain’s CEO and attorney to Benco Dental Supply, alleging that Vivos misrepresented Ortho-Tain’s products as its own. Vivos’s amended complaint included claims for false advertising under the Lanham Act, violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, libel per se, slander per se, intentional interference with contractual relations, and a declaratory judgment that Vivos did not violate the Lanham Act.The District Court for the District of Colorado denied Ortho-Tain’s motion to dismiss, which argued that certain claims should be dismissed based on the Colorado litigation privilege. Ortho-Tain appealed the denial, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit previously held that it lacked jurisdiction over the denial of immunity for Neff’s communications due to disputed factual issues. The Tenth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to consider whether the communications were made in good faith contemplation of litigation.On remand, the district court again denied Ortho-Tain’s motion to dismiss, stating that it would not make a factual determination on whether the communications were made in good faith at the pleading stage. Ortho-Tain appealed this decision, arguing that the district court failed to properly analyze the good faith of the communications.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that it could not review the district court’s denial of immunity because it involved disputed factual issues. Without jurisdiction over the denial of immunity, the Tenth Circuit also declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the remaining interlocutory rulings. View "Vivos Therapeutics. v. Ortho-Tain" on Justia Law

In March 2021, the district attorneys of Riverside, San Diego, Los Angeles, and Santa Clara counties filed a civil enforcement action against Credit One Bank, N.A. (Credit One) on behalf of the People of the State of California. The lawsuit alleged that Credit One engaged in debt collection practices that violated California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Unfair Competition Law. The People sought injunctive relief, civil penalties, restitution, and other equitable relief. Credit One responded with written discovery requests and later noticed the deposition of the People’s person most qualified (PMQ) to testify on 25 topics, including two document requests.The trial court denied the People’s motion to quash the deposition notice but instructed them to refile it as a motion for a protective order. The court granted the protective order in part, limiting the deposition topics and document requests but requiring the People to designate a PMQ. The People challenged this order, arguing that they should not be subject to deposition under the Code of Civil Procedure and that the deposition would be tantamount to deposing opposing counsel.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the People, represented by government agencies, are subject to deposition under section 2025.010 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, the court agreed that deposing the People in this context is effectively deposing opposing counsel. Therefore, the court applied the standard from Carehouse Convalescent Hospital v. Superior Court, requiring Credit One to demonstrate “extremely” good cause for the deposition. The trial court had not applied this standard, so the appellate court granted the petition and ordered the trial court to reconsider the People’s motion for a protective order using the correct standard. View "People v. Superior Ct. (Credit One Bank)" on Justia Law