Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Bouye financed a furniture purchase with Winner through a retail installment contract (RIC). Winner supposedly sold the debt to Mariner. Bouye defaulted. Mariner, through its attorney (Bruce), sued in state court to recover the debt and attorney’s fees “of one-third of the amount" collected; the RIC limited fees to 15% of the unpaid balance. The attached RIC did not establish a transfer to Mariner. The court ordered Mariner to file proof of assignment. Mariner filed an updated RIC that listed Winner’s store manager as assigning the debt to Mariner. The court granted Mariner summary judgment. The Kentucky appellate court found that Mariner had not sufficiently demonstrated a valid transfer. Mariner dismissed the case.Bouye sued Bruce in federal court under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692(e), 380 days after Mariner sued in state court. The district court dismissed the complaint as untimely under FDCPA’s one-year limitations period. Bruce sought attorney’s fees. Meanwhile, Bouye and Mariner entered into a settlement that released Mariner, later clarifying that Bruce was not released.Three months before the court denied motions for reconsideration and attorney’s fees, Bruce learned of the settlement. The Sixth Circuit first held the settlement did not moot the appeal, then reversed, The statute of limitations did not bar an allegation Bruce filed an updated RIC and moved for summary judgment on that basis, affirmatively misrepresenting that the assignment occurred before Mariner filed suit. View "Bouye v. Bruce" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Credit Bureau Services, Inc. and C.J. Tighe (collectively, the “collectors”) for unfair debt-collection practices. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law to Plaintiff and the plaintiff class. The collectors appealed, alleging amongst various issues, (i) Plaintiff does not have Article III standing, (ii) the district court erred in allowing her to introduce an issue at trial without notice, (iii) the district court erred in determining that the NCPA requires a judgment before collecting prejudgment interest, (iv) the district court abused its discretion in finding Plaintiff an adequate class representative, and (v) the district court abused its discretion in certifying the FDCPA class.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment. The court held that Plaintiff did not suffer a concrete injury in fact as a result of the alleged statutory violations, thus, she lacks Article III standing. The court explained that Plaintiff contends that she suffered an injury in fact when the collectors demanded interest on her debts without a judgment. However, the court reasoned that Plaintiff only received the letter and never paid any part of the interest or principal. Without suffering a tangible harm, Plaintiff must point to an injury that “has a ‘close relationship’ to a harm ‘traditionally’ recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts.” Here, Plaintiff has not shown any harm that bears a “close relationship” to the type of injury that results from reliance on a misrepresentation or wrongful interference with property rights. View "Kelly Bassett v. Credit Bureau Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his claim against TrustedID, Inc. under South Carolina’s Financial Identity Fraud and Identity Theft Protection Act (the “Act”), S.C. Code Ann. Section 37-20-180. The district court held that Plaintiff alleged an Article III injury in fact but failed to state a claim under the Act. Plaintiff agrees with the district court’s decision on standing but appeals its Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.   The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to remand this case to state court where it originated. The court conceded that it is odd that TrustedID failed to comply with the five-digit SSN cutoff, which doesn’t appear to be unique to South Carolina’s Act. But federal courts can’t entertain a case without a concrete injury in fact. The court offered no opinion about whether the alleged facts state a claim under the Act. Absent Article III jurisdiction, that’s a question for Plaintiff to take up in state court. View "Brady O'Leary v. TrustedID, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a putative class action against Cash Advance Centers, Inc., alleging a violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. Section 227. Counsel purporting to represent Cash Advance Centers, Inc., moved to compel arbitration based on arbitration provisions contained in loan agreements between Plaintiff and non-party Advance America, Cash Advance Centers of Missouri, Inc. The district court denied the motion to compel. Counsel also moved to substitute Advance America, Cash Advance Centers of Missouri, Inc., for Cash Advance Centers, Inc., as the party defendant, but the district court denied that motion as well.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained only parties to a lawsuit may appeal an adverse judgment. Because Advance America, Cash Advance Centers of Missouri, Inc., is not a party to the lawsuit, its notice of appeal is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Court. The non-party Advance America, Cash Advance Centers of Missouri, Inc., made no appearance in connection with the motion, and the court’s order addressed only a motion advanced by the party Defendant. The notice of appeal also names Cash Advance Centers, Inc., the party Defendant, as an appellant. But while attorneys purporting to represent Cash Advance Centers, Inc., filed a notice of appeal, counsel acknowledged at oral argument that she represented only non-party Advance America, Cash Advance Centers of Missouri, Inc., and not Cash Advance Centers, Inc. View "Kamisha Stanton v. Cash Advance Centers, Inc" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants under the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), claiming that Defendant violated TILA because it did not provide him those disclosures. The question in this case was whether Plaintiff had Article III standing to pursue his claim, which turns on whether Plaintiff's injuries are traceable to Defendant's failure to disclose.The Eleventh Circuit found that Plaintiff's injuries were traceable to Defendant's failure to disclose and thus reversed the district court's finding to the contrary. The court, however, expressed no opinion about the merits of Plaitniff's claim. View "Gary Walters v. Fast AC, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

Chen sued BMW for breach of warranty and for violating the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code 1790) and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (section 1750). After the suit was pending for about a year, the defendants communicated an offer under Code of Civil Procedure Section 998, to have a $160,000 judgment entered against them; the defendants would pay Chen’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, as determined by the court. Chen would return the vehicle. Chen rejected the offer as “fatally vague and uncertain. The litigation continued for another two years. The parties settled on the day of the trial. The terms of the settlement were essentially identical to the section 998 offer.Chen moved as a prevailing party for attorney fees and costs of $436,071.82. The trial court awarded only $53,509.51, including only fees and costs accrued through July 2017, 45 days after the section 998 offer was made. The court of appeal affirmed. BMW’s offer complied with the statutory requirements and Chen did not achieve a result more favorable than its terms. The statute, therefore, disallowed recovery of attorney fees and costs accrued after the offer was made. View "Chen v. BMW of North America" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s post-trial dismissal of his case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. A jury found that AXA Equitable Life Insurance Company negligently reported false medical information about Plaintiff to an information clearinghouse used by insurance companies, causing him to become uninsurable. Despite the fact that the parties satisfied the requirements for federal diversity jurisdiction, and the fact that both parties litigated the entire case through trial under North Carolina law, the district court decided that Connecticut law applied and found itself deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction by virtue of a Connecticut statute.   The Fourth Circuit found that the district court erred and concluded that choice of law is waivable and was waived here. And even if Connecticut’s law applied, it would not have ousted federal jurisdiction. Further, the court held that the district court also erred by concluding that Connecticut’s CIIPPA divested it of subject-matter jurisdiction despite that statute affecting only choice of law rather than choice of forum. AXA’s alternative argument for affirmance based on the nature of Plaintiff’s s injury and its causation was thoroughly briefed and argued before the court, and the court found it to be without merit. But because AXA’s argument for post-trial relief challenging the number of damages was neither raised nor briefed before this court, the court remanded to the district court to consider that issue in the first instance. View "Malcolm Wiener v. AXA Equitable Life Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Aguilar incurred debt from a consumer credit account with OneMain Financial, which assigned the account to OneMain Trust. The debt was later sold to CACH, which sued to collect the charged-off debt. CACH dismissed that action without prejudice, following Aguilar’s attempt to file a cross-complaint alleging violations of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Civ. Code, 1788), premised on incorporated provisions of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and an alleged violation of the California Fair Debt Buying Practices Act, based on CACH’s apparent misidentification of the charge-off creditor as OneMain Financial rather than OneMain Trust.Aguilar sued CACH and its counsel, alleging false or misleading representations in the collection action, in violation of the Rosenthal Act. The defendants filed a successful anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The trial court struck the Rosenthal Act claim. The court of appeal affirmed. The trial court correctly considered whether Aguilar made a prima facie showing of a material misrepresentation under the Rosenthal Act, insofar as the alleged violation is premised on a purported failure to comply with FDCPA requirement, and found the complaint lacked minimal merit. Materiality is a proper consideration under the Rosenthal Act where the alleged state law violation is premised on enumerated provisions of the federal statute, which federal courts uniformly interpret as incorporating a materiality requirement. View "Aguilar v. Mandarich Law Group, LLP" on Justia Law

Michael Smalley sued Subaru of America, Inc. (Subaru) under California’s lemon law. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998, Subaru made a settlement offer to Smalley, which Smalley did not accept. The matter went to trial, and Smalley prevailed, but recovered less than the section 998 offer. In accordance with the fee shifting rules of section 998, the trial court awarded Smalley his pre-offer costs, but awarded Subaru its post-offer costs. Smalley appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded the section 998 offer was valid, reasonable, and made in good faith. Therefore, it affirmed the trial court’s costs awards. Because of the pendency of the appeal on the costs awards, the trial court deferred a ruling on Smalley’s motion for attorney fees. Smalley also appealed the order delaying ruling on the attorney fees motion. The Court of Appeal concluded that order is not appealable, and no grounds existed to construe it as an extraordinary writ. That appeal was dismissed. View "Smalley v. Subaru of America, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff bought a laptop with a manufacturer’s warranty from Target. He filed a class action on behalf of “all citizens of Arkansas who purchased one or more products from Target that cost over $15 and that were subject to a written warranty.” His theory was that Target violated the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act’s Pre-Sale Availability Rule by refusing to make the written warranties reasonably available, either by posting them in “close proximity to” products or placing signs nearby informing customers that they could access them upon request. Target filed a notice of removal based on the jurisdictional thresholds in the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. The district court the class action against Target Corporation to Arkansas state court.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the remand order and return the case to the district court for further consideration. The court explained that the district court applied the wrong legal standard. The district court refused to acknowledge the possibility that Target’s sales figures for laptops, televisions and other accessories might have been enough to “plausibly allege” that the case is worth more than $5 million. The district court then compounded its error by focusing exclusively on the two declarations that accompanied Target’s notice of removal. The court wrote that the district court’s failure to consider Target’s lead compliance consultant’s declaration, Target’s central piece of evidence in opposing remand, “effectively denied” the company “the opportunity . . . to establish [its] claim of federal jurisdiction.” View "Robert Leflar v. Target Corporation" on Justia Law