Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In March 2020, The Vail Corporation and Vail Resorts, Inc. (collectively, “Vail”) closed its ski resorts and did not reopen them until the start of the 2020–2021 ski season. Plaintiffs-Appellants (“Passholders”) were a group of skiers and snowboarders who purchased season passes from Vail to access its resorts during the 2019–2020 ski season. Passholders, on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated individuals, brought contractual, quasi-contractual, and state consumer protection law claims based on Vail’s decision to close due to the COVID-19 pandemic without issuing refunds to Passholders. The district court granted Vail’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss all of Passholders’ claims for failure to state a claim. Passholders appealed, arguing the district court erred in its interpretation of their contracts with Vail. Although it did not agree with the district court’s interpretation of “2019–2020 ski season,” the Tenth Circuit concurred with the ultimate conclusion that Passholders failed to state a contractual claim. Passholders sought only one form of relief in their complaint, but they purchased passes under the condition that the passes were not eligible for refunds of any kind. Recognizing that Passholders might amend their breach of contract and breach of warranty claims to seek other forms of relief, the Tenth Circuit vacated the dismissal of these two claims with prejudice and remanded for the district court to modify its judgment to a dismissal without prejudice. As with Passholders’ breach of contract and breach of warranty claims, the Court concluded the district court correctly dismissed Passholders’ consumer protection claims. Recognizing Passholders could refile these claims to seek an alternative remedy, the Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of Passholders’ state consumer protection law claims with prejudice so the district court could modify its dismissal of these six claims to be without prejudice. View "McAuliffe, et al. v. Vail Corporation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Exile Brewing Company's attempt to intervene in the underlying probate matter and striking Exile's motion to vacate, dismiss, and close two estates seeking to pursue certain claims, holding that the probate court did not err in denying the request to intervene and close the estates.During the 1950s and '60s, Ruth Bisignano owned and operated a popular bar in Des Moines. In 2012, Exile named one of its craft beers "Ruthie" and used Ruth's image. Ruthie died in 1993, and her estate was closed that year. Her husband Frank Bisignano died three years later, and his estate was closed in 1999. In 2020, Plaintiff successfully filed petitions to reopen both estates. Subsequently, as administrator of Frank's estate, Plaintiff sued Exile alleging common law appropriation and other claims. Exile filed a motion to vacate, dismiss, and close both estates, arguing that the probate court lacked statutory jurisdiction to reopen the estates. The probate court denied the motion, concluding that Exile had no right to intervene in the probate proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the probate court correctly determined that Exile was an interloper with no ability to challenge the estates' reopening. View "In re Estate of Bisignano" on Justia Law

Ring manufactures and sells home security and smart home devices including video doorbells, security cameras, and alarms. The plaintiffs purchased video doorbell and security camera products from Ring and subsequently filed a class action complaint against Ring asserting claims under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, false advertising law, and Unfair Competition Law. They sought injunctive relief requiring Ring to prominently disclose to consumers certain information about its products and services.Ring moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration provision in its terms of service. The plaintiffs did not dispute that they agreed to Ring’s terms of service but argued the arbitration provision violates the California Supreme Court’s 2017 “McGill” holding that a pre-dispute arbitration agreement is invalid and unenforceable under state law insofar as it purports to waive a party’s statutory right to seek public injunctive relief.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of Ring's motion to compel arbitration. The parties did not “clearly and unmistakably" delegate to the arbitrator exclusive authority to decide whether the arbitration provision is valid under McGill. The contract language at issue is commonly understood to preclude public injunctive relief in arbitration. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1, does not preempt McGill’s holding. The contract’s severability clause means the plaintiffs’ claims cannot be arbitrated and may be brought in court. View "Jack v. Ring LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kamiya Perry appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendant Kia Motors America, Inc. (Kia) after a jury found in favor of Kia in her automobile defect trial. On appeal, she argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury that Kia had concealed evidence (certain engineering documents) during discovery; (2) the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of Kia’s paralegal who verified discovery requests relevant to the engineering documents; and (3) she was not given a fair trial because the jurors were required to deliberate in a small room, which, in the midst of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, incentivized the jury to complete their deliberations quickly. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Perry v. Kia Motors America, Inc." on Justia Law

Colorado’s Attorney General and the Administrator of the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code (“UCCC”) (collectively, “the State”) sought to enjoin the respondent corporate entities and individuals that made up the career school known as CollegeAmerica (collectively, “CollegeAmerica”) from engaging in conduct that the State believed to be in violation of Colorado law. Specifically, the State contended that several aspects of CollegeAmerica’s marketing and admissions operations constituted deceptive trade practices under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (“CCPA”) and that CollegeAmerica’s institutional loan program, “EduPlan,” was unconscionable under the UCCC. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded, as did the division below, that the State’s CCPA civil penalty claims were equitable in nature and thus CollegeAmerica was not entitled to a jury trial on those claims. The Court further concluded the division erred in remanding this case for a new trial without first assessing whether CollegeAmerica had, in fact, had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of significant public impact and, if so, whether the evidence sufficiently established such an impact. Finally, the Court concluded the division correctly determined that CollegeAmerica’s EduPlan loans as a whole were not unconscionable, although the Supreme Court disagreed with the division’s conclusion that individualized evidence regarding the probability of repayment was necessary to establish unconscionability. View "Colorado v. Center for Excellence in Higher Education" on Justia Law

Defendant spearheaded a get-rich-quick scam—which promised to make consumers rich but ultimately defrauded them of hundreds of millions of dollars. In response, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) brought suit against Defendant and other scam participants under Sections 13(b) and 19 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”) and under the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, alleging that the scam violated Section 5 of the FTCA and the FTC’s Telemarketing Sales Rule. In 2012, the district court granted summary judgment to the FTC, holding that Defendant’s scam indeed violated Section 5 of the FTCA and the Telemarketing Sales Rule. To remedy the established violations, the district court granted both injunctive and monetary relief. Defendant never challenged the statutory validity of the equitable monetary relief, nor appealed from the 2012 judgment—which has remained on the books all this time.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from an equitable money judgment. The panel held that Defendant failed to establish a certain type of jurisdictional error. Defendant failed to show that the equitable monetary judgment here—which was consistent with then-prevailing precedent—rested on a total want of jurisdiction or lacked even a colorable basis. Second, Defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that the equitable monetary portion of the judgment lacked prospective application under Rule 60(b)(5). The panel held that the first relevant set of considerations—the nature and relationship of the intervening change in the law—did not establish that the district court abused its discretion in denying relief. View "FTC V. GARY HEWITT, ET AL" on Justia Law

In this "highly unusual" personal jurisdiction dispute the Supreme Court held that Texas courts have specific jurisdiction over German automobile manufacturers based on their intentional post-sale tampering with affected vehicles that were owned, operated, and serviced in Texas.The State and several local governments brought civil actions to enforce state environmental laws against Defendants - German automobile manufacturers that intentionally evaded federal emissions standards by embedding illegal emissions-defeating technology in graded vehicles. At issue was whether the manufacturers' contacts with Texas satisfied the constitutional requisites to exercising specific personal jurisdiction. The trial court ruled that the manufacturers were amenable to specific personal jurisdiction in Texas, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where the manufacturers developed the product, controlled the distribution stream that brought the product to Texas, and "called all the shots," the trial court did not err in exercising specific personal jurisdiction over the German manufacturers. View "State v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft" on Justia Law

Young alleged that Midland improperly pursued a debt collection lawsuit and obtained a default judgment against her for a delinquent credit account of $8,529.93. She sought vacatur of the default judgment and damages under the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. She claimed that Midland falsely and deceptively represented in the debt collection lawsuit that they effected substituted service of process on her, and then relied on this false representation to obtain the default judgment and attempt to collect on it. The complaint also cited the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. 1692). Midland responded with a motion to strike all of Young’s causes of action under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP statute), The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion, finding thatYoung did not show she would probably prevail on the merits of her claims.The court of appeal reversed. Young showed she would probably prevail on the merits of her Rosenthal Act cause of action; she produced prima facie evidence that Midland falsely represented substituted service on her was effected in the debt collection lawsuit. She was not required under the Rosenthal Act section 1788.17 to show that Midland knowingly made this false representation. View "Young v. Midland Funding LLC" on Justia Law

The National Advertising Division (“NAD”), a self-regulatory organization, concluded that Defendant Young Living Essential Oils, LC’s (“Young Living”) claims that its oils are “therapeutic-grade” and impart physical and/or mental health benefits are “unsupported,” and recommended that Young Living stop making these claims. Plaintiff had already spent money on Young Living’s products, including lavender oil advertised to “promote [a] feeling of calm and fight occasional nervous tension” and peppermint oil that allegedly “helps to  maintain energy levels.” Feeling misled by claims that the products would have effects like “promoting feelings of relaxation & tranquility,” Plaintiff sued, on behalf of herself and other similarly situated individuals, asserting claims under common law and various state statutes that she believes protect consumers like her against companies like Young Living. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s suit, finding that Young Living’s claims that its products would do things like “help to maintain energy levels” was run-of-the-mill puffery that companies use when trying to persuade potential customers to part with their dollars.   The Second Circuit vacated in part and affirmed in part. The court vacated the district court’s ruling insofar as it dismissed the New York General Business Law claims for being based on statements of non-actionable puffery and the unjust enrichment claim for not satisfying the Rule 9(b) requirement. The court affirmed the ruling as to the dismissal of the breach of warranty claims. The court found that Plaintiff’s stated the circumstances constituting fraud with sufficient particularity to satisfy Rule 9(b) and certainly with enough particularity to give fair notice of her claim and enable the preparation of a defense. View "MacNaughton v. Young Living Essential Oils, LC" on Justia Law

Pucillo, an Indiana resident who formerly used the last name Lock, had previously leased an apartment from Main Street. He filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in May 201, and listed as a debt past‐due rent he allegedly owed Main. The bankruptcy court granted him a discharge in September 2017, including any debt to Main. That bankruptcy discharge is listed on Pucillo’s credit reports but Main was not notified of Pucillo’s bankruptcy. In July 2017, 10 weeks before the discharge, Main had placed Pucillo’s account with National Credit for collection. Over the next 18 months, National sent Pucillo two collection letters, stating that if payment was made, National “will update credit data it may have previously submitted regarding this debt.”The week before Pucillo received the second letter, he filed suit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692e (demanding payment of a debt not owed) and section 1692c(c) (failure to cease communications and cease collections). He alleged that National’s continued communications “confused and alarmed” him. National did not actually give information to a credit reporting agency—before or after his bankruptcy discharge. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Pucillo lacked Article III standing to sue. Pucillo’s allegations of ʺconfusion,” “stress,” “concern,” and “fear” are not sufficiently concrete to result in an injury in fact that would give him standing to sue. View "Pucillo v. National Credit Systems, Inc." on Justia Law