Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

This appeal stemmed from a condominium construction project in Stratton. Owner-developer The Stratton Corporation and Intrawest Stratton Development Corporation (collectively "Stratton") sued the project's general contractor, Engelberth Construction, Inc., seeking to recover for alleged construction defects and faulty workmanship that resulted in water damage to the project. Engelberth filed third-party complaints for indemnification against its subcontractors. The trial court granted summary judgment to Engelberth on Stratton's claims, finding the claims barred by the statute of limitations. Given its summary judgment ruling, and without objection, the court dismissed Engelberth's third-party claims as moot. Engelberth later sought to amend the dismissal order to provide that the third-party claims were dismissed without prejudice. The court denied its request, and Engelberth appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Stratton Corp. v. Engelberth Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, plaintiffs Byron and Margo Guillory filed suit against several defendants, including Pelican Real Estate, Inc. and its professional liability insurer, St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. Essentially, plaintiffs alleged the home they purchased contained a redhibitory defect. At issue in these consolidated applications was whether the court of appeal erred in reversing the judgment of the district court which dismissed plaintiffs’ suit as abandoned. For the reasons that follow, the Supreme Court concluded the suit was abandoned, and therefore reversed the judgment of the court of appeal. View "Guillory v. Pelican Real Estate, Inc." on Justia Law

Belasco bought a new Manhattan Beach residence in 2004 from the builder (Wells). In 2006, Belasco filed a complaint with the Contractors State License Board, alleging construction defects. Belasco and Wells settled the dispute in 2006, with Wells paying $25,000 and Belasco executing a release and a Civil Code 15241 waiver of all known or unknown claims. In 2012, Belasco sued, based on an alleged roof defect discovered in 2011. The trial court entered summary judgment, finding the action barred by the settlement. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that: the 2006 general release and waiver for patent construction defects is not a “reasonable release” of a subsequent claim for latent defects under section 929 and the Right to Repair Act (section 895); a reasonable release can only apply to a “particular violation” and not to a latent defect under section 945.5(f), and the 2006 settlement was too vague to be a valid; section 932 authorizes an action on “[s]ubsequently discovered claims of unmet standards;” public policy prohibits use of a general release and section 1542 waiver to bar a subsequent claim for latent residential construction defects; and a genuine issue of fact existed concerning fraud and negligence claims that would void the settlement under section 1668. View "Belasco v. Wells" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased a home from Laux. Almost two years later, she sued the homebuilder, Shapell for strict liability, negligence, and fraudulent concealment, claiming Shapell built the home on unstable and uncompacted “fill” soil and with an inadequate foundation, causing “substantial differential movement” and numerous defects such as cracked floors, walls, and ceilings. The court granted Shappel summary judgment as to fraudulent concealment and later and entered judgment for Shapell on the other claims, concluding plaintiff lacked standing because her claims accrued when Laux owned the home and he did not assign the claims to plaintiff. The court of appeal reversed. Construing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, there is a triable issue of material fact regarding whether Shapell fraudulently concealed information about the property’s soil conditions. Plaintiff was entitled to have a jury determine the disputed factual issues of when and to whom the causes of action accrued. View "Stofer v. Shapell Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a construction company, filed a five-count complaint in superior court against Defendants, alleging breach of contract, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and violation of the Prompt Payment Act. In the fifth count of the complaint, Plaintiff sought enforcement of a mechanic’s lien it recorded against Defendants’ property. Plaintiff then moved for summary judgment on its claims for breach of contract, violation of the Prompt Payment Act, and enforcement of the mechanic’s lien. The superior court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff on those three counts but made no mention of Plaintiff’s quantum meruit or unjust enrichment claims. Defendants appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as interlocutory, as there was no final judgment on any of Plaintiff’s causes of action where two of Plaintiff’s claims were still pending.View "Warren Constr. Group, LLC v. Reis" on Justia Law

After losing millions of dollars because of delays and coordination failures in building a hospital, W.J. O’Neil Company sued its construction manager in state court. In subsequent arbitration, the architect and a design subcontractor (defendants) were added to the arbitration on indemnity claims. In the arbitration, O’Neil did not formally assert claims against those defendants, but O’Neil’s claims against its construction manager arose from the defendants’ defective and inadequate design of the hospital. O’Neil won the arbitration against its construction manager, but the construction manager did not establish its indemnity claims, so the defendants were not held liable. No party sought judicial confirmation or review of the arbitration award. O’Neil then sued the defendants in federal court. The district court dismissed, finding the claims barred by Michigan’s doctrine of res judicata. The Sixth Circuit reversed. An arbitration award cannot bar a claim that the arbitrator lacked authority to decide, and an arbitrator lacks authority to decide a claim that the parties did not agree to arbitrate. O’Neil did not agree to arbitrate the claims at issue. View "W.J. O'Neil Co. v. Shepley, Bulfinch, Richardson & Abbott, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners found allegedly defective plumbing parts in their residences. Petitioners provided Nev. Rev. Stat. Ch. 40 prelitigation notice to the general contractor/developer, Centex Homes, informing it of the alleged defect. Centex forwarded the notice to various subcontractors and suppliers, including Uponor, Inc. Uponor declined to make repairs. Petitioners filed a complaint against Centex, and Centex filed a third-party complaint against numerous subcontractors, including RCR Plumbing & Mechanical, Inc. RCR filed a fourth-party complaint against Uponor. The district court stayed the proceedings and directed RCR to provide Uponor notice of the construction defectsafter Uponor moved to dismiss the fourth-party complaint against it based on lack of notice. Once RCR provided notice, Uponor made repairs. Petitioners sought an extraordinary writ arguing that neither they nor RCR were required to give Uponor Chapter 40 notice and an opportunity to repair prior to RCR’s filing of its fourth-party complaint. The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus, holding that claimant homeowners or subcontractors are not required to give notice to other subcontractors, suppliers, or design professionals prior to commencing or adding an action against them.View "Barrett v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court " on Justia Law

The Gagnards built a house in Los Altos, California, then sold the home to Goldman in January, 2004. Since then, Goldman has sued the Gagnards and those involved with the construction and sale of the house in various tribunals. In 2011, Goldman registered a foreign arbitral award in Illinois. She then sought citations to discover and collect assets. The district court issued denied reconsideration motions and granted a turnover order. After filing an appeal, the Gagnards paid $1.3 million to Goldman in satisfaction of the judgment. Goldman accepted the payment, and refunded money she had collected in excess of the judgment balance. The district discharged all pending citations and allowed the Gagnards to file a counterclaim against Goldman, claiming unjust enrichment, but subsequently dismissed the counter-complaint. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on the failure, by the Gagnards to act in a timely manner. View "Goldman v. Gagnard" on Justia Law

Petitioners were two German limited liability corporations who were sued by a homeowners association for alleged construction defects in plumbing parts. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaints, arguing that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over them because they had no direct connection to Nevada, did not manufacture or distribute the allegedly faulty plumbing parts, and had no responsibility or control over their American subsidiaries such that the subsidiaries’ contacts with Nevada could be imputed to Petitioners. The district court asserted jurisdiction over Petitioners, determining that the companies’ American subsidiaries acted as Petitioners’ agents and concluding that the subsidiaries’ contacts with Nevada could be imputed to Petitioners. Petitioners filed a petition for writ of prohibition challenging the validity of the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over them. The district court granted the petition, holding that no agency relationship was shown in this case, and accordingly, the district court exceeded its jurisdiction in imputing the subsidiaries’ contacts to Petitioners. View "Viega GmbH v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

In 1990, construction was completed on a condominium development. In 2003, the Oaktree Condominium Association (“Oaktree”) discovered that there was a defect in the construction. In 2007, Oaktree filed an action against the builder of the condominiums. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Oaktree. The trial court, however, ruled that Oaktree’s claims were time-barred under a ten-year statute of repose enacted by the General Assembly in 2007. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that although the statute of repose was not in effect at the time that Oaktree’s action accrued, the action was nonetheless time-barred because Oaktree did not file its action within two years of accrual. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the jury verdict in favor of Oaktree, holding (1) Ohio’s construction statute of repose is unconstitutional as applied to Oaktree because the retroactive application of the statute would bar Okatree’s accrued action; (2) a cause of action that has accrued but on which no suit has been filed by the effective date of repose is governed by the relevant statute of limitations; and (3) the complaint was filed within four years of its accrual and was therefore timely under the relevant statute of limitations. View "Oaktree Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Hallmark Bldg. Co." on Justia Law