Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Construction Law
Jerry & John Woods Construction, Inc. v. Jordan
In May 2022, Jerry & John Woods Construction, Inc. ("Woods Construction") entered into a contract with John David Jordan and Carol S. Jordan to construct a house and a metal building. Woods Construction claimed the Jordans failed to pay for the work performed, leading the company to sue them in the Dallas Circuit Court for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The Jordans moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing that Woods Construction's lack of a required residential-home-builder's license barred the company from bringing civil claims. They also filed counterclaims alleging improper and negligent work by Woods Construction.The Dallas Circuit Court denied the Jordans' motion to dismiss but later granted their motion for summary judgment, finding that Woods Construction, as an unlicensed residential home builder, was barred from enforcing the construction contract under § 34-14A-14(d) of the Alabama Code. The court also declared Woods Construction's "Notice of Lis Pendens/Lien" null and void. The court certified its judgment as final under Rule 54(b), despite the Jordans' counterclaims remaining pending.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the Rule 54(b) certification was improper. The court noted that the claims and counterclaims were closely intertwined, as both concerned the same contract and construction work. Additionally, the resolution of the Jordans' counterclaims could potentially moot Woods Construction's claims. Therefore, the court concluded that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in certifying the judgment as final and dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. View "Jerry & John Woods Construction, Inc. v. Jordan" on Justia Law
American Environmental, Inc. v. Burlington School District
American Environmental, Inc. (plaintiff) challenged the Burlington School District (defendant) over a contract awarded for the demolition and remediation of Burlington High School, which was closed due to toxic substances. The District sent a Request for Qualifications to fifteen contractors, including the plaintiff and the winning bidder, EnviroVantage. The plaintiff argued that EnviroVantage did not meet the prequalification criteria and that the contract should have been awarded to them.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction, citing potential financial harm to the District and public interest. The court later granted summary judgment to the District, finding the case moot because the project was substantially complete. The court applied factors from Citineighbors Coalition of Historic Carnegie Hill ex rel. Kazickas v. New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, determining that no effective relief could be granted due to the project's advanced stage.The Vermont Supreme Court took judicial notice of the project's completion, including demolition and soil remediation, based on public records and visual evidence. The court dismissed the appeal as moot, stating that no effective relief could be provided under Rule 75, which does not allow for damages. The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the case met the exception for issues capable of repetition yet evading review, noting the plaintiff's delay in seeking expedited relief and the lack of demonstrated probability of encountering the same situation again. View "American Environmental, Inc. v. Burlington School District" on Justia Law
Busher v. Cook
The case involves a class action lawsuit brought by homeowners in the Falcon Ridge subdivision in Billings, Montana, against Buscher Construction and Development, Inc., and other related entities and individuals (collectively referred to as the "Buschers"). The homeowners alleged that the Buschers negligently designed and developed the subdivisions, failed to construct homes to mitigate against the possibility of differential settlement on hydro-collapsible soils, and failed to disclose material adverse facts known to them as the original owners of all the lots within the subdivision.The District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, certified the class action. The Buschers appealed this decision, arguing that the proposed class did not satisfy the prerequisites for class certification under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and that the court abused its discretion by certifying the class under Rule 23(b)(3).The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the proposed class satisfied the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a). The court also found that the class action was superior to other methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy, as required by Rule 23(b)(3). The court concluded that the homeowners' claims were not dependent upon individual conduct but on the Buschers' alleged uniform negligence. The court also noted that the lower court has the discretion to revisit certification if class claims no longer predominate as the case proceeds. View "Busher v. Cook" on Justia Law
Pinkham v. Plate
The case involves Scott and Natalie Pinkham, who contracted with Three Peaks Homes, LLC, for the construction of a custom home. The construction did not go as planned and the contract was terminated before the home was completed. Three Peaks subsequently filed two $600,000 mechanics’ liens against the Pinkhams’ home. The Pinkhams then filed a complaint against David Plate, Rebeccah Jensen, Three Peaks, Rebel Crew Construction, LLC, and Legacy Management Enterprises, LLC, asserting several causes of action.The district court denied the Pinkhams’ motion for summary judgment. Later, the Pinkhams’ attorney, Lance Schuster, filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for Plate, Jensen, Three Peaks, and Legacy, which the court granted. The court ordered Appellants to appoint another attorney or appear in person within twenty-one days of service of the order, failing which, the court may enter default judgment against them. The court clerk served a copy of the withdrawal order on Appellants via first class mail.The Pinkhams moved for the entry of default and default judgment against Appellants and for dismissal of Appellants’ counterclaims with prejudice. The district court granted the Pinkhams’ motion without a hearing. Appellants later secured new counsel and filed a motion to set aside the default and default judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), (4), and (6). The district court denied Appellants’ motion.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision denying the motion to set aside the default and default judgment. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that Appellants failed to demonstrate good cause to set aside the entry of default. The court also held that Appellants have failed to establish a right to relief under Rule 60(b). The court declined to award attorney fees on appeal. View "Pinkham v. Plate" on Justia Law
Summit Construction v. Koontz
Summit Construction filed a lawsuit against Jay Koontz and Jennie L. Kennette for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, alleging nonpayment for work performed on Mr. Koontz’s home based on an oral agreement. The work included an addition to the home and extensive renovations to the existing structure. The District Court rejected both claims, determining that there was no enforceable oral contract between the parties and that Summit did not sufficiently prove its damages for the unjust enrichment claim.The District Court found that the parties had not mutually agreed to sufficiently definite terms for an oral contract. The court noted that the project progressed without a clear understanding of the scope of work, how it would be paid for, and who would be responsible for payment. The court also found that Summit's invoices did not clearly define the terms of the contract. Furthermore, the court concluded that Summit had failed to prove the amount by which Mr. Koontz was unjustly enriched, i.e., its damages.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court agreed that Summit had failed to show the existence of an enforceable oral contract with either Mr. Koontz or Ms. Kennette. The court also agreed with the lower court's finding that Summit had failed to establish its damages to a reasonable degree of certainty, which is necessary for an unjust enrichment claim. View "Summit Construction v. Koontz" on Justia Law
Business Interiors Floor Covering Business Trust v. Graycor Construction Company Inc.
A general contractor, Graycor Construction Company Inc., was involved in a dispute with a subcontractor, Business Interiors Floor Covering Business Trust, over unpaid invoices for flooring work performed on a movie theater project. Business Interiors submitted three separate applications for periodic payments, which Graycor neither approved nor rejected within the time limit set by the Prompt Pay Act. As a result, the applications were deemed approved under the Act. Business Interiors sued Graycor for breach of contract and other claims in the Superior Court. The Superior Court granted Business Interiors's motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim and entered separate and final judgment. Graycor appealed.Graycor argued that the original contract was not a "contract for construction" within the meaning of the Act, and that it had a valid impossibility defense due to its failure to pay. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the Act defines its scope broadly, and the subcontract at issue was a "contract for construction" under the Act. The Court also held that common-law defenses are not precluded by the Act, but a contractor that does not approve or reject an application for payment in compliance with the Act must pay the amount due prior to, or contemporaneous with, the invocation of any common-law defenses in any subsequent proceeding regarding enforcement of the invoices. As Graycor sought to exercise its defenses without ever paying the invoices, it could not pursue the defenses. The Court also vacated and remanded the rule 54 (b) certification to the motion judge for reconsideration. View "Business Interiors Floor Covering Business Trust v. Graycor Construction Company Inc." on Justia Law
OSCAR RENDA CONTRACTING, INC. v. BRUCE
The case revolves around a construction dispute where several homeowners in the San Marcial neighborhood sued Oscar Renda Contracting, Inc., for negligence and gross negligence. The homeowners alleged that the company's misuse of heavy equipment and faulty construction techniques caused damage to their homes during the construction of a drainage pipeline. They sought actual damages to restore their properties and exemplary damages based on gross negligence.The trial court found Renda Contracting negligent and grossly negligent. However, the jury was not unanimous in deciding the amount of exemplary damages, with ten out of twelve jurors agreeing. Consequently, the trial court omitted exemplary damages from the judgment. The homeowners appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the decision, arguing that unanimity as to exemplary damages could be implied despite a divided verdict.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment. The court held that under Section 41.003 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, a court may not imply a unanimous jury finding in imposing exemplary damages. The burden to secure a unanimous verdict is on the plaintiff and "may not be shifted." The court concluded that the plaintiff bears the burden to obtain the findings necessary to impose exemplary damages, including that the jury is unanimous as to any amount of exemplary damages awarded. It is the plaintiff who must challenge a divided verdict as infirm or in need of clarification. View "OSCAR RENDA CONTRACTING, INC. v. BRUCE" on Justia Law
Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc.
The case involves two plaintiffs, Glen A. Canner and Louis D. Puteri, who separately sued a condominium association, Governors Ridge Association, Inc., alleging that the foundations supporting their respective units were defective. The units, part of a common interest community, were purchased by Canner and Puteri in 2001 and 2002 respectively. The defendant had affirmed its responsibility for any foundation settlement issues. However, despite the units suffering significant, uneven settling and the defendant hiring several companies to investigate potential repairs from 2012 to 2016, no repairs were ultimately made. The plaintiffs commenced their actions in 2016 and 2017, alleging that the defendant had negligently designed and constructed the foundations and had violated its duties under the Common Interest Ownership Act (CIOA) by failing to conduct necessary repairs.The trial court concluded that the CIOA claims were time-barred by the statutory three-year limitation period generally applicable to tort actions. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgments, concluding that the limitation period set forth in § 52-577 applied because the claims sounded in tort rather than contract. The Appellate Court also agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the declaration and bylaws created no duty to repair because the relevant declaration required the defendant to repair only insured common elements, and there was no requirement that the foundations themselves be insured.The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the Appellate Court properly applied the statute of limitations set forth in § 52-577 to the portion of the CIOA claims seeking recovery for negligence during the course of construction of the foundations. However, the Supreme Court found that the Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court’s disposition, in favor of the defendant, of the claims that the defendant had violated its contractual duties under the bylaws to maintain, repair or replace common elements when it failed to effectuate repairs to the foundations. The Supreme Court concluded that the claims that the defendant breached its contractual duties imposed under the bylaws by failing to repair the foundations were governed by the six-year limitation period applicable to contract claims in § 52-576. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Canner v. Governors Ridge Assn., Inc." on Justia Law
Sunstone Realty v. Bodell Construction
A dispute arose between SunStone Realty Partners X LLC (SunStone) and Bodell Construction Company (Bodell) over the postjudgment interest rate applied to a domesticated Hawaii judgment in Utah. Following arbitration in Hawaii over construction defects in a condominium development, SunStone obtained a judgment against Bodell exceeding $9.5 million, which it domesticated in Utah. Bodell requested the Utah court to apply Utah's lower postjudgment interest rate instead of Hawaii's higher one. SunStone opposed this, arguing that the Utah Foreign Judgment Act (UFJA) required the application of Hawaii's rate, or alternatively, that their contract or principles of comity mandated the Hawaii rate.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the district court's decision to apply Utah's postjudgment interest rate. The court found that the UFJA, which does not specifically address postjudgment interest, instructs Utah courts to treat a foreign domesticated judgment like a Utah judgment for enforcement purposes. Since postjudgment interest serves, at least in part, as an enforcement mechanism, the UFJA requires the imposition of Utah’s postjudgment interest rate. Further, the construction contract did not require the application of the Hawaii postjudgment interest rate. The court did not consider principles of comity because the UFJA mandates a result. View "Sunstone Realty v. Bodell Construction" on Justia Law
TriCoast Builders, Inc. v. Fonnegra
In this case, the Supreme Court of California held that a trial court has discretion to grant or deny relief from a jury trial waiver under section 631(g) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court is not required to grant relief just because proceeding with a jury would not cause hardship to other parties or the court. The court should consider various factors, including the timeliness of the request and the reasons supporting the request. The court further held that a litigant who challenges the denial of relief from a jury waiver for the first time on appeal must show actual prejudice to obtain reversal.The case involved TriCoast Builders, Inc. and Nathaniel Fonnegra. Fonnegra hired TriCoast to repair his house after a fire, but he was unhappy with the quality of the work and terminated the contract. TriCoast sued Fonnegra for damages. Fonnegra initially demanded a jury trial, but waived this right on the day of the trial. TriCoast, which had not demanded a jury trial or paid the jury fee, requested a jury trial after Fonnegra’s waiver. The trial court denied their request and a bench trial was held. TriCoast appealed the judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in denying their request for a jury trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, concluding that TriCoast had not established the prejudice necessary to justify reversing the trial court's judgment. View "TriCoast Builders, Inc. v. Fonnegra" on Justia Law