Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Delaware’s Constitution contains a political balance requirement for appointments to the state’s major courts. No more than a bare majority of judges on any of its five major courts “shall be of the same political party.” Art. IV, section 3. On three of those courts, those members not in the bare majority “shall be of the other major political party.” Adams, a Delaware lawyer and political independent, sued, claiming that those requirements violate his First Amendment right to freedom of association by making him ineligible to become a judge unless he joins a major political party.The Supreme Court held that because Adams has not shown that he was “able and ready” to apply for a judicial vacancy in the imminent future, he failed to show a “personal,” “concrete,” and “imminent” injury necessary for Article III standing. A grievance that amounts to nothing more than abstract and generalized harm to a citizen’s interest in the proper application of the law is not an “injury in fact.” Adams must at least show that he is likely to apply to become a judge in the reasonably foreseeable future if not barred because of political affiliation. Adams’ only supporting evidence is his statements that he wanted to be, and would apply to be, a judge on any of Delaware’s courts. The evidence fails to show that, when he filed suit, Adams was “able and ready” to apply for a judgeship in the reasonably foreseeable future. Adams’ statements lack supporting evidence, like efforts to determine possible judicial openings or other preparations. Adams did not apply for numerous existing judicial vacancies while he was a registered Democrat. He then read a law review article arguing that Delaware’s judicial eligibility requirements unconstitutionally excluded independents, changed his political affiliation, and filed suit. View "Carney v. Adams" on Justia Law

El Paso County and BNHR, a community organization headquartered in El Paso, filed suit challenging the government's use of funds allocated for 10 U.S.C. 284 and 2808 purposes to construct a wall on the southern border. The district court enjoined defendants from using section 2808 funds to build the border wall but declined to enjoin defendants from using section 284 funds.The Fifth Circuit held that El Paso County and BNHR do not have standing to challenge either the section 2808 or section 284 expenditures. The court concluded that a county's loss of general tax revenues as an indirect result of federal policy is not a cognizable injury in fact. In this case, El Paso County only alleges a loss of general tax revenue, and thus has not established a cognizable injury in fact sufficient to establish standing to challenge the government's section 2808 expenditures. Even if El Paso County's alleged economic injury were cognizable, the county fails to demonstrate that the injury is redressable by a favorable decision in this case. The court explained that an order granting relief against the section 2808 expenditures would not rescind the proclamation and accordingly would not redress any harm caused by the proclamation. Therefore, the alleged reputational injuries do not provide El Paso County standing to challenge the section 2808 expenditures. Furthermore, BNHR failed to establish standing to challenge the government's section 2808 expenditures by establishing an injury in fact. In this case, BNHR's single vague, conclusory assertion that the organization had to divert resources is insufficient to establish that the section 2808 construction has "perceptibly impaired" the organization's ability to carry out its mission. Likewise, the court concluded that El Paso County and BNHR do not have standing to challenge the government's section 284 expenditures. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for plaintiffs; vacated the district court's injunction enjoining the section 2808 expenditures; and remanded for dismissal of all claims for lack of jurisdiction. View "El Paso County v. Trump" on Justia Law

Reents obtained a tax deed to 10 locked and gated acres in Rockford. In 2017, the Attorney General, at the request of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, filed a civil enforcement action for violations of 415 ILCS 5/1, against Reents and Stateline Recycling, including allegations of open dumping of waste without a permit; disposal, storage, and abandonment of waste at an unpermitted facility; open dumping of waste resulting in litter and the deposition of construction and demolition debris; and failure to pay clean construction and demolition debris fill operation fees. Reents refused to permit an inspection of the property during pretrial discovery. The Winnebago County circuit court granted a motion to compel her to comply with the Rule 214(a) inspection request. After Reents asserted a good-faith objection and respectfully refused to comply, the court held her in contempt so that she could file an appeal. The appellate court reversed, citing Fourth Amendment principles.The Illinois Supreme Court vacated. The appellate court erred in deciding the appeal on constitutional grounds; the issue presented involves a civil discovery order that the appellate court should have reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Reents did not raise any constitutional issues and has forfeited any such challenge. Courts should not find discovery rules unconstitutional when a particular case does not require it. The circuit court applied the plain language of Rule 214(a) as written. View "Madigan v. Stateline Recycling, LLC" on Justia Law

After movants, who were the plaintiffs in a separate but similar case, were denied intervention in the district court, they moved to intervene in the Secretary of State's ongoing appeal concerning signature-verification procedures for ballots.The Fifth Circuit denied the motion to intervene because intervention on appeal is reserved for exceptional cases and movants' reasons for intervening do not come close to that high threshold. The court rejected movants' argument in favor of intervention because their appeal needs to be consolidated with the Secretary's appeal. The court explained that, because both movants and the Secretary are appealing from the same order, both appeals have been docketed under the same case number in this court. Therefore, assuming the motion to intervene in the Secretary's appeal is denied, the same merits panel will hear both the Secretary's appeal of the summary judgment and movants' appeal of the denial of their motion to intervene. The court stated that, to the extent movants want their voices heard, the proper procedure is to move to appear as amici curiae, not to move to intervene. Finally, the court declined to strike the motion. View "Richardson v. Texas Secretary of State" on Justia Law

The New Hampshire Department of Justice (DOJ) appealed a superior court order denying its motion to dismiss a petition filed by plaintiffs' New Hampshire Center for Public Interest Journalism, The Telegraph of Nashua, Union Leader Corporation, Newspapers of New England, Inc., Seacoast Newspapers, Inc., Keene Publishing Corporation, and American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire. The petition sought a declaration that the “Exculpatory Evidence Schedule” (EES), excluding the names of police officers with pending requests to be removed from the list, had to be made public pursuant to the New Hampshire Right-to-Know Law. In denying the motion to dismiss, the trial court rejected the DOJ’s arguments that the EES was “confidential” under RSA 105:13-b (2013) and that it was exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law either because it was an “internal personnel practice” or a “personnel file” under RSA 91-A:5, IV (2013). After review, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s determinations that the EES was neither “confidential” under RSA 105:13-b nor exempt from disclosure under the Right-to-Know Law as an “internal personnel practice” or a “personnel file.” Nonetheless, the Court vacated the trial court’s decision and remanded for it to determine, in the first instance, whether as the DOJ contended, the EES constituted an “other file[] whose disclosure would constitute invasion of privacy.” View "New Hampshire Center for Public Interest Journalism v. New Hampshire Department of Justice" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that Code of Civil Procedure section 351 impermissibly burdens interstate commerce, and thus the dormant Commerce Clause, when it is used to toll the statute of limitations against a judgment debtor who moved away from California to engage in commerce after the judgment was entered.The court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to debtor on the ground that creditor's lawsuit is time-barred. In this case, creditor filed suit in 2018 to enforce a 1997 judgment against a judgment debtor who departed California in 1998 to start a new business in Nevada. In light of the general law governing the dormant Commerce Clause, and the specific application of that law to tolling statutes aimed at out-of-state defendants in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc. (1988) 486 U.S. 888, the court explained that analyzing whether section 351 violates that clause is a three-step process: first, the court determined that debtor engaged in interstate commerce; second, section 351 does not discriminate against interstate commerce in purpose or practical effect; and third, section 351 places burdens on interstate commerce that are clearly excessive in relation to its putative local benefits. The court rejected creditor's arguments to the contrary. View "Arrow Highway Steel, Inc. v. Dubin" on Justia Law

After the State of Hawaii filed suit against several pharmaceutical companies in state court for allegedly deceptive drug marketing related to the medication Plavix, the companies turned to federal court, seeking an injunction against the state court litigation based on a violation of their First Amendment rights.The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the state court litigation is a quasi-criminal enforcement proceeding and that Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), bars a federal court from interfering with such a proceeding. The panel explained that, even though the state proceeding is being litigated by private counsel, it is still an action brought by the State of Hawaii. The panel stated that what matters for Younger abstention is whether the state proceeding falls within the general class of quasi-criminal enforcement actions—not whether the proceeding satisfies specific factual criteria. Looking to the general class of cases of which this state proceeding is a member, the panel concluded that Younger abstention is appropriate here. In this case, the State's action has been brought under a statute that punishes those who engage in deceptive acts in commerce, and the State seeks civil penalties and punitive damages to sanction the companies for their allegedly deceptive labeling practices. Because the companies' First Amendment concerns do not bring this case within the scope of Younger's extraordinary circumstances exception, they have no bearing on the application of Younger. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action. View "Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Connors" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that Godiva chocolate stores had printed too many credit card digits on hundreds of thousands of receipts over the course of several years, and pointed out that those extra numbers were prohibited under a federal law aimed at preventing identity theft. After the parties agreed on a class settlement, the Supreme Court issued Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, which held that a party does not have standing to sue when it pleads only the bare violation of a statute.The Eleventh Circuit held that plaintiff has no standing because he alleged only a statutory violation and not a concrete injury. In this case, plaintiff alleged that a cashier handed him a receipt containing some of his own credit card information printed on it. Although the receipt violated the law because it contained too many digits, the court explained that plaintiff has alleged no concrete harm or material risk of harm stemming from the violation. Therefore, this amounts to nothing more than a "bare procedural violation, divorced from concrete harm." Consequently, the court cannot evaluate the fairness of the parties' settlement and vacated the district court's order approving it. View "Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc." on Justia Law

Tennessee voters must apply to vote absentee. The county administrator of elections determines whether the voter has established eligibility to vote absentee, and compares the signature of the voter on the request with the signature on the voter’s registration record. Voters who qualify to vote absentee receive a ballot, an inner envelope and an outer envelope, and instructions. The inner envelope has an affidavit; the voter must verify that he is eligible to vote in the election. The ballot must be received no later than when the polls close. Upon receipt by mail of the absentee ballot, the administrator "shall open only the outer envelope and compare the voter’s signature on the [affidavit] with the voter’s signature" on the registration record. If the administrator determines the signatures do not match, the ballot is rejected; the voter is “immediately” notified in writing. Voters who are concerned that their absentee ballot might be rejected may cast a provisional ballot before being notified of a rejection.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction to prohibit the enforcement of the signature verification procedures. The plaintiffs cannot cite with certainty or specification any past erroneous rejection of an absentee ballot; their speculative allegations of harm are insufficient to establish standing. The plaintiffs have not demonstrated that anyone whose ballot may be erroneously rejected will ultimately be unable to vote, either absentee or by provisional ballot; there is no evidence that anyone’s constitutional rights are likely to be infringed. View "Memphis A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Hargett" on Justia Law

President Trump filed suit against the District Attorney of the County of New York, alleging that a grand jury subpoena issued on August 29, 2019 by the District Attorney to Mazars USA, LLP, the President's accounting firm, is overbroad and was issued in bad faith. The subpoena directed Mazars to produce financial documents—including tax returns—relating to the President, the Trump Organization, and affiliated entities, dating back to 2011. The district court granted the District Attorney's motion to dismiss the second amended complaint based on failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the claim of overbreadth is not plausibly alleged for two interrelated reasons. First, the court concluded that the President's bare assertion that the scope of the grand jury's investigation is limited only to certain payments made by Michael Cohen in 2016 amounts to nothing more than implausible speculation. Second, the court concluded that, without the benefit of this linchpin assumption, all other allegations of overbreadth—based on the types of documents sought, the types of entities covered, and the time period covered by the subpoena, as well as the subpoena's near identity to a prior Congressional subpoena—fall short of meeting the plausibility standard. Finally, the court concluded that the President's allegations of bad faith fail to raise a plausible inference that the subpoena was issued out of malice or intent to harass. The court considered the President's remaining contentions on appeal and found no basis for reversal. The court ordered an interim stay of enforcement of the subpoena under the terms agreed to by the parties. View "Trump v. Vance" on Justia Law