Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Alaska Division of Banking and Securities civilly fined Sitnasuak Native Corporation shareholder Austin Ahmasuk for submitting a newspaper opinion letter about Sitnasuak’s shareholder proxy voting procedures without filing that letter with the Division as a shareholder proxy solicitation. Ahmasuk filed an agency appeal, arguing that the Division wrongly interpreted its proxy solicitation regulation to cover his letter and violated his constitutional due process and free speech rights. An administrative law judge upheld the Division’s sanction in an order that became the final agency decision, and the superior court upheld that decision in a subsequent appeal. Ahmasuk raised his same arguments on appeal to the Alaska Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court concluded Ahmasuk’s opinion letter was not a proxy solicitation under the Division’s controlling regulations, therefore reversing the superior court’s decision upholding the Division’s civil sanction against Ahmasuk without reaching the constitutional arguments. View "Ahmasuk v. Division of Banking and Securities" on Justia Law

After the school districts sought modification of existing desegregation consent decrees to allow their exemption from Arkansas's Public School Choice Act, Ark. Code. Ann. 6–18–1906, the district court granted the motions and modified the consent decrees to explicitly limit the transfer of students between school districts. The Department appealed, alleging that the modification imposed an impermissible interdistrict remedy.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that there was a substantial change in Arkansas law after the consent decrees were enacted and the district court's modification was not an impermissible interdistrict remedy. The court explained that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering and crediting evidence of white flight when it determined that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred warranting modification of the consent decrees. Furthermore, based on the court's review of the record and the large degree of deference given to the district court, the court could not find that the district court abused its discretion in modifying the consent decrees. View "United States v. Arkansas Department of Education" on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the district court's order granting CFPB's petition to enforce the law firm's compliance with the Bureau's civil investigative demand (CID) requiring the firm to produce documents and answer interrogatories. The Supreme Court held that the statute establishing the CFPB violated the Constitution's separation of powers by placing leadership of the agency in the hands of a single Director who could be removed only for cause. The Court concluded, however, that the for-cause removal provision could be severed from the rest of the statute and thus did not require invalidation of the agency itself.The panel concluded that the CID was validly ratified, but the panel need not decide whether that occurred through the actions of Acting Director Mulvaney. After the Supreme Court's ruling, the CFPB's current Director expressly ratified the agency's earlier decisions to issue the civil investigative demand to the law firm, to deny the firm's request to modify or set aside the CID, and to file a petition requesting that the district court enforce the CID. The new Director knew that the President could remove her with or without cause, and nonetheless ratified the agency's issuance of the CID. Therefore, this ratification remedies any constitutional injury that the law firm may have suffered due to the manner in which the CFPB was originally structured. The panel explained that the law firm's only cognizable injury arose from the fact that the agency issued the CID and pursued its enforcement while headed by a Director who was improperly insulated from the President's removal authority. The panel concluded that any concerns that the law firm might have had about being subjected to investigation without adequate presidential oversight and control have now been resolved. The panel rejected the law firm's remaining contentions. View "Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Seila Law LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant, a resident of the District of Columbia and a dual citizen of the United States and the Russian Federation, filed a defamation action in district court against appellee, a nonresident alien and citizen of the United Kingdom. Because appellee made his allegedly defamatory statements outside of the District of Columbia, appellant sought to establish personal jurisdiction over appellee under the District's long-arm jurisdiction statute, D.C. CODE 13-423(a)(4). The district court granted appellee's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.The DC Circuit vacated, concluding that it cannot determine whether appellee's non-government contacts with the District satisfy any of the three "plus factors" required under the long-arm statute. In this case, the district court relied on an overly broad construction of the government contacts exception in granting judgment for appellee and denying jurisdictional discovery. Accordingly, the court has no sound basis upon which to credit the district court's judgment. The court remanded for jurisdictional discovery. View "Akhmetshin v. Browder" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that state judges in Dallas, Texas are unconstitutionally denying release to indigent arrestees who cannot pay the prescribed cash bail. The district court certified the suit as a class action and allowed three different categories of judges to be defendants; determined that the Sheriff was not a proper defendant for Section 1983 purposes but did not yet dismiss her from the case; and held that there was a likelihood of success by plaintiffs on their equal-protection and procedural-due-process claims and granted injunctive relief against the judges and the County.With one exception, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that plaintiffs have standing. The court concluded that the suit was properly allowed to proceed against most of the judges and the County. However, in regard to the Criminal District Court Judges, the court held that they are not proper defendants because plaintiffs lack standing as to them and cannot overcome sovereign immunity. The court also held that the Sheriff can be enjoined to prevent that official's enforcement of measures violative of federal law. Finally, the court held that the district court correctly concluded that plaintiffs need not first pursue habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the injunction, with one revision, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Daves v. Dallas County" on Justia Law

Hill filed suit in state court, asking a judge to compel Young, his prison’s warden, to mail two complaints that Hill wanted to file in federal court. The defendants removed Hill’s suit to federal court. The district judge dismissed the complaint, observing that its records showed that the two complaints at issue had been filed.At Hill’s request, the Seventh Circuit vacated language from the judgment: “This dismissal shall count as one of [Hill’s] allotted ‘strikes’ under" 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). This statute provides: In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal ... under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained ... brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed" as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.Section 1915(g) requires prepayment of the docket fees only if the plaintiff has thrice “brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States” decided on one of the listed grounds. Hill did not “bring” this suit in a court of the United States. Defendants brought it to federal court under 28 U.S.C. 1441(a). This suit does not count as a “strike.” While the comment is dicta and is not binding in future litigation, it aggrieves Hill by drawing a future judge’s attention to this suit. View "Hill v. Madison County" on Justia Law

In September 2014, prior to the request for the records at issue in this case, the Abolitionist Law Center published a report which alleged a causal connection between the ill health of inmates at SCI-Fayette, and the facility’s proximity to a fly ash dumpsite. In response to the report, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) coordinated with the Department of Health (DOH) to investigate the allegations (the No Escape Investigation). Reporter Christine Haines of The Herald Standard (Appellees) sent an e-mail Right-to-Know-Law (RTKL) request to the DOC seeking documentation of inmate illnesses. The DOC denied Appellees' request in its entirety, citing several exceptions under Section 708(b) of the RTKL, as well as attorney-client privilege and deliberative process privilege grounds. Then in December 2014, in-house counsel for the DOC disclosed fifteen pages of records to Appellees. Appellees asked DOC to verify that its December disclosure was a complete response. Several additional records were subsequently released, but implicitly, the records released were the DOC's response. In February 2015, Appellees filed a petition for enforcement with the Commonwealth Court, seeking statutory sanctions and attorney fees alleging DOC demonstrated bad faith in responding to the request for records. The court identified records that the DOC should have provided. But because the panel could not discern the full extent of any non-compliance by DOC, the panel directed the parties to file a stipulation as to the disclosure status of court-identified five classes of records. Appellees' motion was thus denied without prejudice, and the court reserved judgment on the issue of bad faith sanctions. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted appeal in this matter to consider the assessment of sanctions and fees based on the Commonwealth Court's finding of bad faith and willful and wanton behavior. The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed, finding that Section 1304(a0(1) of the RTKL “permit[s] recovery of attorney fees when the receiving agency determination is reversed, and it deprived a requester of access to records in bad faith.” View "Uniontown Newspaper, et al v. PA Dept of Cor." on Justia Law

David Buller appealed a district court order granting a petition for commitment of a sexually dangerous individual. On January 23, 2020, the State filed a petition for civil commitment of Buller as a sexually dangerous individual. On January 28, 2020, following a preliminary hearing, the district court entered an order of dismissal of the petition after finding the State failed to establish Buller had a condition that was manifested by a sexual disorder, personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction. On January 30, 2020, sua sponte and without notice to the parties, the court issued an order vacating the prior order dismissing the petition and finding probable cause was established to commit Buller. On February 19, 2020, Buller filed a petition for writ of mandamus to this Court. This Court exercised supervisory jurisdiction and vacated the district court’s January 30, 2020 order after considering the procedural irregularity of the second order issued sua sponte and without notice to the parties. On March 6, 2020, the State filed a new petition and started a new proceeding seeking commitment of Buller as a sexually dangerous individual. Buller requested dismissal of the new petition asserting res judicata precluded a second petition because the January 28, 2020 order dismissing the petition following the preliminary hearing was not vacated in the first proceeding. After completion of an evaluation in which two doctors reached an opinion Buller met the criteria of a sexually dangerous individual, the district court again issued an order granting the petition seeking commitment. Buller argued the proceedings in this case were bared by res judicata and the order for commitment was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Interest of Buller" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant and the Hoopa Valley Tribe for violations of state tort and contract law. The district court, ruling on a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, found sovereign immunity barred suit against defendant, in his official capacity, and the Hoopa Valley Tribe, dismissing the claims with prejudice.The Fifth Circuit held that it lacked original jurisdiction, concluding that the district court did not have federal-question jurisdiction over this case; the Hoopa Valley's presence as a party to the suit destroyed complete diversity and thus the district court did not have diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332; and the district court did not have supplemental jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. 1367. The court also held that the district court erred when it dismissed claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) with prejudice. Accordingly, the court vacated in part, affirmed the dismissal in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice. View "Mitchell v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Defendant Gemini Insurance Company appealed a district court's holding La. C.C. arts. 2315.1, 2315.2 and 199 were “unconstitutional as applied to children given in adoption” and overruling the defendants’ peremptory exceptions of no right of action. At issue was whether plaintiffs Daniel Goins and David Watts, two adult children who were given in adoption as minors, had a right to bring wrongful death and survival actions stemming from the deaths of their biological father and his two minor children, who were not given in adoption, and were plaintiffs’ biological half-siblings. After a de novo review, based on the clear and unambiguous wording of La. C.C. arts. 2315.1 and 2315.2, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded Goins and Watts were “children of the deceased” and “brothers of the deceased” who were permitted to bring wrongful death and survival actions arising from the death of their biological father and half-siblings. In view of the Court's holding that plaintiffs had a right to assert survival and wrongful death actions, the Court declined to address their argument that La. C.C. arts. 2315.1, 2315.2 and 199 were unconstitutional as applied to children given in adoption. View "Rismiller v. Gemini Insurance Co." on Justia Law