Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (MCWE) appealed an order denying its special motion to strike, made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute), which was directed to three affirmative defenses for setoff pleaded by Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC (NHOM) in its answer to MCWE’s cross-complaint. The appeal presented two issues: (1) could a special motion to strike under section 425.16 (b) be directed to an affirmative defense pleaded in an answer; and (2) did an affirmative defense for setoff constitute a cause of action or claim for relief subject to an anti-SLAPP motion to strike.The Court of Appeal answered the questions presented: (1) no - an anti-SLAPP motion could not be directed to an affirmative defense; and (2) also no - an affirmative defense for setoff cannot constitute a cause of action or claim for relief subject to an anti-SLAPP motion. Only a “cause of action” asserted by a plaintiff, cross-complainant, or petitioner could be the subject of an anti-SLAPP motion. "A cause of action seeks relief. An affirmative defense cannot seek relief and is not asserted by a plaintiff, a cross-complainant, or a petitioner." Further, the Court held setoff, as an affirmative defense, could not give rise to affirmative relief. "California Supreme Court authority holds that the affirmative defense of setoff may only be used defensively and does not permit recovery of the damages sought to be set off against the opposing party’s recovery." View "Morris Cerullo World Evangelism v. Newport Harbor Offices etc." on Justia Law

Trinh sued Fineman, who had been appointed by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County as a receiver in a case involving the dissolution of Trinh’s beauty school. She alleged that Fineman did not give her a proper accounting of the escrow account related to that case and accused him of theft. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, explaining that Trinh had not raised “any claims arising under federal law or [alleged] that the parties are citizens of different states.” The Third Circuit remanded to allow Trinh to amend her complaint. Her amended complaint asserted that Fineman, as the receiver, was “abusing his state power.”The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Although Trinh’s complaint arguably raised a section 1983 claim, Fineman, as a court-appointed receiver, is entitled to absolute, quasi-judicial immunity from suit when acting with the authority of the court. Erroneous, controversial, and even unfair decisions do not divest a judge of immunity. Fineman was duly appointed by the state court and the transcript of that court's hearing reflects that the judge was aware of, and approved of, all of his expenditures. View "Trinh v. Fineman" on Justia Law

In 1992, Grant was convicted of homicide and other crimes that he had committed while he was a juvenile. He was sentenced to life imprisonment under the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines. Parole is unavailable to those convicted of federal crimes, so the sentence effectively condemned Grant to die in prison. In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court held (Miller v. Alabama) that the Eighth Amendment permits a life-without-parole (LWOP) sentence for a juvenile homicide offender only if the sentencer could have imposed a lesser punishment based on the offender’s youth at the time of the offense.At Miller’s resentencing, the judge recognized that youth can impair judgment and thereby mitigate culpability, stated that a life sentence for Grant would be too harsh, given his juvenile offender status and individual circumstances, and sentenced Grant to a term of 60 years on his homicide-related convictions with an undisturbed five-year consecutive sentence, Grant argued that his 65-year sentence violates Miller because it incarcerates him to his life expectancy, thereby amounting to a de facto LWOP sentence. Grant contends that Miller forbids such a sentence for a juvenile homicide offender unless he or she is incorrigible, which Grant is not. The Third Circuit affirmed. Miller only entitled Grant to a sentencing hearing at which the district court had the discretion to impose a sentence less than LWOP in view of Grant’s youth at the time of his offenses; that is what he received. View "United States v. Grant" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and two of his children filed a 30-count pro se complaint in federal district court asserting a wide variety of constitutional, statutory, and tort claims against 18 named defendants. The district court dismissed the entire complaint on Rooker-Feldman grounds.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of the complaint, concluding that the court's own review of the complaint shows that several of the claims plaintiffs raised do not fall within that doctrine's narrow bounds. The court clarified that Rooker-Feldman is a limited doctrine that applies only when litigants try to appeal state court losses in the lower federal courts. In this case, the district court erred by dismissing plaintiffs' complaint in one fell swoop without considering whether each individual claim sought "review and rejection" of a state court judgment. The court also concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to three federal claims plaintiffs raised before this court, seeking damages for issues collateral to a state court judgment rather than relief from that judgment itself. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Behr v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, owners and operators of greyhound-racing businesses, filed suit against the Florida Attorney General, seeking a declaration that a newly enacted state law prohibiting gambling on greyhound racing is unlawful and an injunction to prevent her from enforcing it. The district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice based on lack of standing.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, holding that plaintiff's alleged injuries are not traceable to any conduct of the Attorney General—either in enforcing or threatening to enforce the law or otherwise—and that plaintiffs' injuries would not be redressable by relief from this court. Therefore, plaintiffs lack Article III standing to bring their claims against the Florida Attorney General. View "Support Working Animals, Inc. v. Governor of Florida" on Justia Law

Jim Bakker and Morningside filed suit against several out-of-state defendants in Missouri federal court, alleging that defendants, while acting in their official capacities, violated their First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In February 2020, as the Covid-19 pandemic was beginning in the United States, Jim Bakker and Morningside began advertising a product called Silver Solution on the Jim Bakker Show. Bakker and Morningside claimed that Silver Solution "has been proven by the government that it has the ability to kill every pathogen it has ever been tested on;" that it "has been tested on other strains of the coronavirus and has been able to eliminate it within 12 hours;" and that it is "patented, it works, we have tested it, it works on just about everything." Bakker and Morningside allege that defendants' investigations into Silver Solution violate their constitutional rights and that the state statutes defendants have acted under are unconstitutional.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction. Assuming defendants fell under Missouri's long-arm statute, the court concluded that asserting personal jurisdiction in this case violates due process where the only contact with Missouri were letters and emails directed at Morningside Church and Bakker, rather than the forum state. Therefore, after considering the five factor test for assessing the sufficiency of a defendant's contacts, the court concluded that Bakker and Morningside have not demonstrated that defendants' conduct connects them to the forum in a meaningful way. View "Morningside Church, Inc. v. Rutledge" on Justia Law

On various dates between March and July 2020, the Governor and Secretary of Health of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania entered orders to address the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiffs, Pennsylvania citizens, elected officials, and businesses, challenged three pairs of directives: stay-at-home orders, business closure orders, and orders setting congregation limits in secular settings. The district court concluded that the orders violated the U.S. Constitution. While the appeal was pending, circumstances changed: more than 60% of Pennsylvanians have received a COVID vaccine. An amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution and a concurrent resolution of the Commonwealth’s General Assembly now restricts the Governor’s authority to enter the same orders. In addition, the challenged orders have expired by their own terms. The Third Circuit vacated the judgment and dismissed an appeal as moot. No exception to the mootness doctrine applies View "County of Butler v. Governor of Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's political retaliation claim related to disciplinary measures and his ultimate termination from the Sheriff's Office. The court concluded that there was no error in the district court's determination that collateral estoppel barred plaintiff from pursuing his political retaliation claim based on those issues he raised in his termination appeal; the district court could give the Iowa Civil Service Commission's determination preclusive effect; and plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case that his two-day suspension was political retaliation because he could not establish a causal connection between the suspension and his political campaign. View "Charleston v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

Herrera, an Illinois state prisoner, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against three correctional officers of the Cook County Jail for failing to protect him from assault and denying him prompt medical care. In his timely filed original complaint, Herrera named each of the defendants “John Doe” as a nominal placeholder until he could ascertain the proper identities of the officers. Herrera then twice amended his complaint to include their actual names—but did so outside of the two-year limitations period set by Illinois law.The district court denied a motion to dismiss, reasoning that suing “John Doe” defendants constituted a “mistake” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), so that Herrera’s amended complaint “related back” to his original complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Knowingly suing a John Doe defendant is not a “mistake” within the meaning of Rule 15(c). Whether Herrer satisfies the factual test for equitable tolling is beyond the scope of an interlocutory appeal and should be considered on remand. View "Herrera v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted the petition for rehearing, withdrew its prior opinion, and substituted the following opinion in its place. The court denied the petition for en banc rehearing.Six Louisiana parishes, joined by the Louisiana Attorney General and the Louisiana Secretary of Natural Resources, brought forty-two suits challenging decades of drilling activities by various oil companies. The court concluded that because an expert report filed by the parishes revealed a new theory of liability for the first time, the companies' removal based on federal officer jurisdiction was timely. However, rather than deciding whether federal-officer jurisdiction exists, the court remanded for the district courts to address this question with the benefit of its recent en banc decision in Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 951 F.3d 286, 290 (5th Cir. 2020). In addition, the court agreed with both district courts that there is no federal-question jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Parish of Plaquemines v. Chevron USA, Inc." on Justia Law