Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The PBA appeals the district court's order denying its motion to intervene in the consolidated cases captioned In re New York City Policing During Summer 2020 Demonstrations, asserting interests in the litigation that it argues the parties to the actions cannot adequately represent. Therefore, the PBA claims it is entitled to intervene as of right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a).The Second Circuit held that the district court erred in holding that the PBA did not have a cognizable interest in the personal safety of its member officers at the merits stages of the actions seeking injunctive or declaratory relief and that such interests were adequately represented. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of intervention with respect to the actions seeking declaratory injunction relief, and affirmed the district court's denial of intervention with respect to those actions seeking neither declaratory nor injunctive relief. View "Payne v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Kentucky’s attorney general and its Secretary of Health and Family Services were defendants in a suit concerning House Bill 454, regulating abortion procedures. Plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the attorney general, stipulating that the attorney general’s office reserved “all rights, claims, and defenses . . . in any appeals” and agreed to be bound by the judgment. The district court enjoined HB 454's enforcement.While an appeal was pending, Kentucky elected a new attorney general, Cameron. Former attorney general Beshear became Governor. Cameron entered an appearance as counsel for the new Secretary. A divided Sixth Circuit panel affirmed. The Secretary opted not to challenge the decision. The attorney general moved to withdraw as counsel for the Secretary and to intervene on the Commonwealth’s behalf, then filed a timely petition for rehearing en banc. The Sixth Circuit denied the motion to intervene.The Supreme Court reversed. Although the attorney general could have filed a notice of appeal, his failure to do so did not mean his motion for intervention should be treated as an untimely notice of appeal. The Sixth Circuit panel failed to account for the strength of the attorney general’s interest in defending HB 454 after the Secretary acquiesced. The attorney general sought to intervene “as soon as it became clear” that the Commonwealth’s interests “would no longer be protected” by the parties. While the rehearing petition pressed an issue (third-party standing) not raised in the Secretary’s appellate briefs, allowing intervention would not have necessitated resolution of that issue. The plaintiffs’ “loss of its claimed expectations around the election of a Governor with a history of declining to defend abortion restrictions is not cognizable as unfair prejudice.” View "Cameron v. EMW Women's Surgical Center, P. S. C." on Justia Law

Vanndrya Srouy graduated from Crawford High School (Crawford) in the San Diego Unified School District (the District). While a student at Crawford, he was a member of its varsity football team. After Srouy graduated, he found himself named as a co-defendant in a lawsuit filed by a football referee, John Herlich, who claimed to have been injured when Srouy blocked an opponent, who fell into Herlich, during a school football game. The District (as co-defendant) rejected Srouy’s tender of his defense in the Herlich lawsuit. Srouy then filed underlying lawsuit against the District, claiming the District violated a mandatory duty to defend him in the Herlich lawsuit. Srouy alleged this duty arose under the free school guarantee and the equal protection clause of the California Constitution; title 5, section 350 of the California Code of Regulations; and/or Education Code section 44808. The trial court granted the District’s demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed Srouy’s operative complaint. "Although Srouy’s plight evokes our sympathy," the Court of Appeals found its ability to respond was "constrained by the law, and the allegations of this case do not afford a judicial solution. We leave it to the Legislature to determine whether the needs of student athletes in Srouy’s position are sufficiently addressed by current law, and if not, to craft an appropriate solution." Judgment was affirmed. View "Srouy v. San Diego Unified School District" on Justia Law

In 2016, the out-of-state petition circulators challenged Section 2869 of the Pennsylvania Election Code, which requires that any circulator of nomination petitions be “a qualified elector of the Commonwealth, who is duly registered and enrolled as a member of the party designated in said petition.” The district court found that the ban was not facially unconstitutional, but was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs for the 2020 election only. The plaintiffs did not appeal the conclusion that the ban was not facially unconstitutional. The court declined to expand the injunctive relief to cover future elections for the plaintiffs and all similarly situated individuals. The Third Circuit held that permanent injunctive relief for all future elections is appropriate for the plaintiff circulators only, not to all similarly situated individuals, and only if the plaintiffs continue to submit to Pennsylvania’s jurisdiction. The request for permanent relief for the plaintiffs and all similarly situated individuals goes beyond the specific plaintiffs and circumstances of this litigation and seeks facial relief. A factual record specific to each similarly situated individual circulator will be necessary to determine the appropriate relief in future elections. Each individual circulator will need to demonstrate their willingness to submit to Pennsylvania’s jurisdiction for the purpose of nomination circulation. View "Benezet Consulting LLC v. Secretary Commonwealth of Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

Ali sought to pursue 42 U.S.C. 1983 proceedings challenging as unconstitutional an executive order of Maryland’s Governor that prohibits boycotts of Israel by business entities that bid on the state’s procurement contracts. According to the Initial Complaint, “Ali is a computer software engineer who wishes to submit bids for government software project contracts but is barred from doing so due to the presence of mandatory ‘No Boycott of Israel’ clauses.”The district court dismissed with prejudice Ali’s lawsuit for want of Article III standing to sue. The Fourth Circuit affirmed but modified the judgment to provide that the dismissal is without prejudice. The court first disagreed with Ali’s interpretation of the Order. The Order indicates that if a business entity has engaged in anti-Israel national origin discrimination in the process of preparing a bid for a state procurement contract, the entity is barred from being awarded the contract; if the entity has engaged in a boycott of Israel entirely unrelated to the bid formation process, the Order is of no relevance. The court rejected Ali’s argument that the certification requirement constitutes an unconstitutionally vague loyalty oath. The Order does not require the entity to pledge any loyalty to Israel or profess any other beliefs. View "Ali v. Hogan" on Justia Law

This action involved a request for documents under Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Plaintiff, the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan (the ACLU), submitted a FOIA request to defendant, the Calhoun County Sheriff’s Office (the CCSO), seeking disclosure of all records related to the December 2018 detention of United States citizen Jilmar Benigno Ramos-Gomez. Ramos-Gomez’s three-day detention at the Calhoun County Correctional Facility occurred pursuant to an Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGSA) executed between United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the jail. The CCSO denied the ACLU’s request, asserting that the requested records were exempt from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(d) because they related to an ICE detainee. The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court's review centered on whether a federal regulation with a nondisclosure component, 8 CFR 236.6 (2021), could be the basis for exempting public records from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(d). The Supreme Court held that it could not, "for the simple reason that a regulation is not a statute." The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ holding to the contrary, and the Court overruled Soave v. Dep’t of Ed, and Mich Council of Trout Unlimited v. Dep’t of Military Affairs, as to their erroneous interpretations of MCL 15.243(1)(d). The case was remanded back to the Calhoun Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "American Civil Liberties Union Of Michigan v. Calhoun County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Williams and Burton each filed civil rights complaints in the Western District of Pennsylvania against employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and moved to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). Burton alleged that the defendants retaliated against him after he filed a grievance, concerning his use of the law library. Williams alleged that prison staff refused to accommodate his special dietary needs. Both plaintiffs consented to have their cases heard by magistrate judges, who dismissed the cases before the defendants consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction.The Third Circuit vacated. A magistrate judge can acquire jurisdiction to decide a case only by the consent of the parties, 28 U.S.C. 631(c)(1); “consent of the parties” does not mean consent just of the prisoner-plaintiff. The jurisdictional requirement cannot be waived by the parties. If the requirements of Section 636(c)(1) are not satisfied, the “magistrate judge [is deprived] of jurisdiction over the case” and the appellate court is statutorily deprived of appellate jurisdiction over the magistrate judge’s orders. Consent could not be implied in this case and retroactive, post-judgment consent cannot satisfy the statutory requirement. View "Burton v. Schamp" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Maldonado and Hill filed suit in Florida state court, asserting violations of their federal and state constitutional rights to the free exercise of their religion. After plaintiffs were granted in forma pauperis status by the state court, the case was removed to federal court where plaintiffs did not seek in forma pauperis status. The district court dismissed Maldonado's claims under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g)—the three-strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)—and dismissed Hill's claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.In regard to Maldonado, the Eleventh Circuit held that a case commenced in state court by a prisoner and removed by a defendant to federal court—with the defendant paying the filing fee after removal—is not subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). In regard to Hill, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing his claims for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims. View "Maldonado v. Baker County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit treated the petition for rehearing en banc as a petition for panel rehearing; granted the petition for panel rehearing; and withdrew its prior opinion in this case.Plaintiffs, two Planned Parenthood entities and three Jane Does, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the Louisiana Department of Health is unlawfully declining to act on Planned Parenthood's application for a license to provide abortion services in Louisiana. The district court denied the Department's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1); the Department filed an interlocutory appeal; and plaintiffs moved to dismiss.The court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal because the Department asserted sovereign immunity in the district court. Therefore, the court has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. The court further concluded that at least one of the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief is a valid invocation of federal jurisdiction under Ex parte Young. In this case, because plaintiffs' requested injunction to "promptly rule" on the license application satisfies the requirements of Ex parte Young, the court concluded that plaintiffs have survived the Department's Rule 12(b)(1) motion and the case may proceed. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Planned Parenthood Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Phillips" on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit concluded that unresolved questions of state law must be certified to the Texas Supreme Court. The court certified the following questions of state law to the Supreme Court of Texas: Whether Texas law authorizes the Attorney General, Texas Medical Board, the Texas Board of Nursing, the Texas Board of Pharmacy, or the Texas Health and Human Services Commission, directly or indirectly, to take disciplinary or adverse action of any sort against individuals or entities that violate the Texas Heartbeat Act, given the enforcement authority granted by various provisions of the Texas Occupations Code, the Texas Administrative Code, and the Texas Health and Safety Code and given the restrictions on public enforcement in sections 171.005, 171.207 and 171.208(a) of the Texas Health and Safety Code. View "Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson" on Justia Law