Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

This action involved a request for documents under Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Plaintiff, the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan (the ACLU), submitted a FOIA request to defendant, the Calhoun County Sheriff’s Office (the CCSO), seeking disclosure of all records related to the December 2018 detention of United States citizen Jilmar Benigno Ramos-Gomez. Ramos-Gomez’s three-day detention at the Calhoun County Correctional Facility occurred pursuant to an Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGSA) executed between United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the jail. The CCSO denied the ACLU’s request, asserting that the requested records were exempt from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(d) because they related to an ICE detainee. The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court's review centered on whether a federal regulation with a nondisclosure component, 8 CFR 236.6 (2021), could be the basis for exempting public records from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(d). The Supreme Court held that it could not, "for the simple reason that a regulation is not a statute." The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ holding to the contrary, and the Court overruled Soave v. Dep’t of Ed, and Mich Council of Trout Unlimited v. Dep’t of Military Affairs, as to their erroneous interpretations of MCL 15.243(1)(d). The case was remanded back to the Calhoun Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "American Civil Liberties Union Of Michigan v. Calhoun County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Williams and Burton each filed civil rights complaints in the Western District of Pennsylvania against employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and moved to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). Burton alleged that the defendants retaliated against him after he filed a grievance, concerning his use of the law library. Williams alleged that prison staff refused to accommodate his special dietary needs. Both plaintiffs consented to have their cases heard by magistrate judges, who dismissed the cases before the defendants consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction.The Third Circuit vacated. A magistrate judge can acquire jurisdiction to decide a case only by the consent of the parties, 28 U.S.C. 631(c)(1); “consent of the parties” does not mean consent just of the prisoner-plaintiff. The jurisdictional requirement cannot be waived by the parties. If the requirements of Section 636(c)(1) are not satisfied, the “magistrate judge [is deprived] of jurisdiction over the case” and the appellate court is statutorily deprived of appellate jurisdiction over the magistrate judge’s orders. Consent could not be implied in this case and retroactive, post-judgment consent cannot satisfy the statutory requirement. View "Burton v. Schamp" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Maldonado and Hill filed suit in Florida state court, asserting violations of their federal and state constitutional rights to the free exercise of their religion. After plaintiffs were granted in forma pauperis status by the state court, the case was removed to federal court where plaintiffs did not seek in forma pauperis status. The district court dismissed Maldonado's claims under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g)—the three-strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)—and dismissed Hill's claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.In regard to Maldonado, the Eleventh Circuit held that a case commenced in state court by a prisoner and removed by a defendant to federal court—with the defendant paying the filing fee after removal—is not subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). In regard to Hill, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing his claims for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims. View "Maldonado v. Baker County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit treated the petition for rehearing en banc as a petition for panel rehearing; granted the petition for panel rehearing; and withdrew its prior opinion in this case.Plaintiffs, two Planned Parenthood entities and three Jane Does, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the Louisiana Department of Health is unlawfully declining to act on Planned Parenthood's application for a license to provide abortion services in Louisiana. The district court denied the Department's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1); the Department filed an interlocutory appeal; and plaintiffs moved to dismiss.The court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal because the Department asserted sovereign immunity in the district court. Therefore, the court has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. The court further concluded that at least one of the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief is a valid invocation of federal jurisdiction under Ex parte Young. In this case, because plaintiffs' requested injunction to "promptly rule" on the license application satisfies the requirements of Ex parte Young, the court concluded that plaintiffs have survived the Department's Rule 12(b)(1) motion and the case may proceed. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Planned Parenthood Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Phillips" on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit concluded that unresolved questions of state law must be certified to the Texas Supreme Court. The court certified the following questions of state law to the Supreme Court of Texas: Whether Texas law authorizes the Attorney General, Texas Medical Board, the Texas Board of Nursing, the Texas Board of Pharmacy, or the Texas Health and Human Services Commission, directly or indirectly, to take disciplinary or adverse action of any sort against individuals or entities that violate the Texas Heartbeat Act, given the enforcement authority granted by various provisions of the Texas Occupations Code, the Texas Administrative Code, and the Texas Health and Safety Code and given the restrictions on public enforcement in sections 171.005, 171.207 and 171.208(a) of the Texas Health and Safety Code. View "Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson" on Justia Law

A mother no longer wished to serve as her adult daughter’s guardian due to fear of her daughter’s violence. The superior court held a hearing to determine whether to allow the mother to resign and appoint a public guardian from the Office of Public Advocacy (OPA) to serve as the daughter’s guardian instead. After a brief exchange, the superior court allowed the daughter to waive her right to counsel and consent to appointment of a public guardian. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed because the superior court did not sufficiently establish that the waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary. View "In the Matter of the Protective Proceeding of Amy D." on Justia Law

Municipal authorities in Oklahoma fined Plaintiff BNSF Railway Company for violating its Blocked Crossing Statute—setting up a preemption challenge between the federal Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”) and the Blocked Crossing Statute. Defendants argued the Federal Railroad Safety Act (“FRSA”), not the ICCTA, applied to Oklahoma’s statute and did not preempt it. The district court held that the ICCTA preempted Oklahoma’s Blocked Crossing Statute because it regulated railroad operations. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the federal district court and affirmed its decision. View "BNSF Railway v. City of Edmond, et al." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in sealing and ordering redaction of voluminous documents related to litigation challenging Louisiana's abortion laws without a proper legal basis, and therefore vacated the district court's sealing orders. The sealed or redacted documents include a transcript of proceedings held in open court, a famous Pennsylvania grand jury report that is available as a book on www.amazon.com and that was adapted as a motion picture, an arrest report from a police department's public website, articles from The New York Times and Rolling Stone, and an obituary from a public website. The court concluded that the district court misapprehended the nature and extent of the public's right to judicial records; on remand, the district court shall not seal or order redaction of any publicly available documents or information; the district court also used the wrong legal standard for sealing documents; and the district court erred by failing to evaluate all of the documents individually. The court issued a limited remand for the district court to evaluate the sealing orders under the proper legal standard within 30 days of the issuance of this opinion. View "June Medical Services, LLC v. Phillips" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from plaintiffs' action alleging that nuclear waste materials from various St. Louis sites leaked into Coldwater Creek and its 100-year floodplain in St. Louis County, damaging their health and property. Following Cotter's removal to federal court on the basis of the Price-Anderson Act (PAA), the district court concluded that the PAA did not apply and remanded to state court. After plaintiffs amended their complaint in state court, Cotter filed a third party action for contribution against seven defendants, including Mallinckrodt, which then removed the entire lawsuit under the PAA and other bases. The district court granted the motion and Cotter appealed.After determining that the court has jurisdiction over the appeal, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court abused its discretion by determining that the PAA does not apply to plaintiffs' claims against Cotter because Cotter lacked an applicable license or indemnity agreement. Contrary to the district court's ruling, the court concluded that the PAA provides federal question jurisdiction over all "nuclear incidents," regardless of whether the defendant had an applicable license or indemnity agreement. The court explained that the PAA's text and history support its conclusion. In this case, the PAA Act provides original federal question jurisdiction for all nuclear incidents regardless of whether the defendant had an applicable indemnity agreement. View "In Re: Cotter Corporation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's application seeking a writ of mandamus precluding the district court from requiring adherence to an unconstitutional statute, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 52.380 violates the separation of powers doctrine.In 2019, the Supreme Court amended Nev. R. Civ. P. 35, which governs mental and physical examinations of a party that are ordered during discovery in civil litigation. Thereafter, the Legislature enacted section 52.380, which governs conditions for such examinations. Rule 35 disallows observers at certain mental examinations, prohibits the examinee's attorney from attending any examination, and allows audio recordings only upon a showing of good cause. Section 52.380, however, allows the examinee's attorney to attend and make audio recordings of all mental and physical examinations. The district court concluded that section 52.380 supersedes Rule 35 such that the real party in interest's examinations in this case must follow the statutory procedures. The Supreme Court granted mandamus relief, holding (1) section 52.380 is unconstitutional because it attempts to abrogate an existing rule of procedure that this Court prescribed under its inherent authority to regulate the judicial process; and (2) the district court manifestly abused its discretion by allowing the examinations to proceed under section 52.380. View "Lyft, Inc. v. District Court" on Justia Law