Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that traditional standing requirements may not apply when an appropriate party seeks to enforce a public official's compliance with Nevada's separation of powers clause, provided that the issue is likely to recur and there is a need for future guidance.Appellant filed a complaint alleging that Respondents' dual service as members of the state legislature and as employees of the state or local government violated the separation of powers clause in the Nevada Constitution. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, concluding that Appellant did not allege a personal injury for traditional standing and did not satisfy the requirements of the public importance exception to standing. The Supreme Court reversed after limitedly expanding the public importance exception in Nevada to cases such as the instant case, holding that the constitutional separation of powers challenge at issue met the requirements for the public-importance exception to standing. View "Nevada Policy Research Institute, Inc. v. Cannizzaro" on Justia Law

The issue this appeal presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on whether a city ordinance requiring guns be safely kept and out of unauthorized hands, was preempted by state law. After robust debate following a mass shooting at the nearby Marysville Pilchuck High School, the Edmonds City Council adopted an ordinance requiring residents to safely store their firearms when not in use. At around the same time, Washington voters enacted Initiative 1639, which, among many other things, criminalized unsafe storage of firearms but in more limited circumstances than Edmonds’ ordinance. The initiative specifically did not “mandate[] how or where a firearm must be stored.” The Supreme Court determined the local ordinance was indeed preempted by the state law. View "Bass v. City of Edmonds" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleges he was unlawfully assaulted, pepper-sprayed, detained in an unlawful mass arrest, and ultimately incarcerated. He sued the City of St. Louis and multiple police officers for First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations, conspiracy to deprive him of civil rights, and supplemental state law claims. One officer moved to dismiss the 1983 claims, arguing plaintiff’s amended complaint failed to state a claim and he is entitled to qualified immunity. The only allegations relating to the defendant’s involvement are that he was working on September 17 and took custody of the plaintiff’s bicycle lying in the street at the time of his arrest. These allegations do not establish a causal link between the plaintiff and the specific wrongs the defendants as a whole allegedly committed. Further, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because the amended complaint did not contain specific and plausible allegations linking the defendant to overt acts alleged as part of the conspiracy of all the defendants. The assertion that he agreed to participate in those acts does not state a plausible claim.Finally, the circuit court held that the district court erred in denying the other defendants' motion to dismiss. The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine was not clearly established. View "Michael Faulk v. Gerald Leyshock" on Justia Law

Appellants (“Defense Distributed”) have challenged publication restraints imposed by the U.S. State Department, federal courts, and the State of New Jersey (“NJ”) after appellants published the internet computer-assisted design (“CAD”) files for a single-round plastic pistol. Although Defense Distributed is still prevented from publishing, the CAD files it published remain available on many other websites. At issue in this combined appeal and motion for mandamus relief stems from a district court’s (“DC”) order severing the case and transferring it to a federal court in NJ. The court found that the Defense Distributed satisfied the first two conditions for mandamus relief. Further, the NJ Attorney General did not carry its burden to demonstrate that transfer is more appropriate than the plaintiffs’ choice of forum.The court concluded that the DC’s order severing and transferring the claims against the NJAG to the District of New Jersey was a clear abuse of discretion, giving rise to an appropriate exercise of the court’s mandamus power. View "Defense Distributed v. Bruck" on Justia Law

RCW 49.60.227 permitted a court to strike a racially restrictive, legally unenforceable covenant from the public records and eliminate the covenant from the title. This case concerned what under the statute, striking from the public records and eliminating from the title meant, and whether a court order declaring the covenant struck and void was all that was required or allowed. Alex May sought a declaratory action under former RCW 49.60.227 (2006) to have a racially restrictive covenant voided and physically removed from the title to his property and from the public records. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals concluded that the statute at issue did not allow the physical removal of the covenant from the title but, instead, allowed only for an order voiding the covenant to be filed with the title. In the interim, the legislature amended RCW 49.60.227, clarifying the procedure under which these covenants were struck and eliminated. The Washington Supreme Court held that the interim amendments in Laws of 2021, chapter 256, section 4 applied, and therefore the Supreme Court did not address the statute under which May initially sought to have the covenants removed. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the trial court for relief under Laws of 2021, chapter 256, section 4. View "In re That Portion of Lots 1 & 2" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and the United States filed suit against the State of Texas, as well as state and local officials, seeking to enjoin enforcement of some or all of the new provisions in Senate Bill 1, which amended various provisions of the Texas Election Code pertaining to voter registration, voting by mail, poll watchers, and more.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the Committees' motion to intervene as defendants, concluding that the Committees have a right to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). The court determined that the Committees made a timely application to intervene by right; they claim interests relating to SB 1 which is the subject of this consolidated suit; their absence from the suit may practically impede their ability to protect their interests; and the existing parties might not adequately represent those interests. Accordingly, the court remanded to allow the Committees to intervene by right in this suit. View "La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Harris County Republican Party" on Justia Law

This summary judgment matter arose from a petition for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration (amongst other things) that defendant First Guaranty Bank (the “Bank”) applied an incorrect interest rate and thus miscalculated the principal owed on a Promissory Note executed by borrower-petitioner Leisure Recreation & Entertainment, Inc. (“Leisure”) in favor of the Bank in December 1991 (the “Note”). The Louisiana Supreme Court granted Leisure’s writ application to determine whether the court of appeal erred in applying the “voluntary payment doctrine” to hold that Leisure was estopped from recovering payments voluntarily made, regardless of whether owed. In addition, the Court reviewed whether the court of appeal erred in determining the Note presented an alternative obligation as to the Prime Rate interest structure for years 11 through 30 of its repayment, whether it erred in imposing its own interest rate structure during that period, and whether the Bank’s prescription arguments preclude Leisure’s recovery of any interest paid and not due between 2001 and 2013. Finding the “voluntary payment doctrine” contravened the Louisiana Civil Code, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal insofar as it: (1) reversed the portion of the district court’s judgment denying the motion for summary judgment filed by the Bank as to the voluntary payment affirmative defense; (2) dismissed Leisure’s claim for declaratory relief as to the interest it voluntary paid the Bank between 2001 and 2013; and (3) rendered judgment ordering the Bank to repay Leisure “any overcharge of interest in excess of the prime rate that Leisure paid on the [Note] since the filing of its suit on October 7, 2013, together with interest thereon from the date of judicial demand until paid.” Finding that the Note set forth an “alternative obligation,” the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal insofar as it: (1) reversed the district court decree that Leisure was entitled to select the Prime Rate structure pursuant to La. C.C. art. 1810; and (2) reversed the district court’s declaration that Leisure paid all indebtedness owed to the Bank on the Note as of June 28, 2015, and was owed return of all amounts paid thereafter. The case was remanded to the court of appeal for consideration of the Bank’s arguments on appeal that were pretermitted by the court of appeal opinion and were not in conflict with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Leisure Recreation & Entertainment, Inc. v. First Guaranty Bank" on Justia Law

In October 2017, plaintiffs Sadie Boyd (a student at Twin Valley Middle High School in Whitingham, Vermont) Madeleine Klein (a resident and property owner in Whitingham), and the Town of Whitingham filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant State of Vermont, arguing that the education funding and property taxation system set forth in 16 V.S.A. ch. 133 and 32 V.S.A. ch. 135 violated the Education Clause, the Proportional Contribution Clause, and the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution. They claimed that the system was unconstitutional because it deprived plaintiff Boyd of an equal educational opportunity, required plaintiff Klein to contribute disproportionately to education funding, and compelled the Town to collect an unconstitutional tax. The civil division granted the State’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the alleged inequities were caused by the statutes in question or that the education property taxation system lacked a rational basis. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Boyd, et al. v. Vermont" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this federal action after a Connecticut probate court issued an order recognizing the validity of a state lien against plaintiff's interest in an estate. The district court applied the doctrine established in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and abstained from adjudicating plaintiff's suit because of the ongoing state probate proceedings.The Second Circuit clarified that Younger abstention applies only to a narrow class of state civil proceedings. Civil probate proceedings are no more invulnerable to federal court interference than any other state civil proceedings, unless the state order at issue protects the State's administration of its judicial system or its process for compelling compliance with the judgments of its courts. The court concluded that the district court appears to have misunderstood the narrow scope of Younger abstention to extend to state probate proceedings that concern the validity of a lien. The court considered the Commissioner's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cavanaugh v. Geballe" on Justia Law

Dr. Jacob Schmitz appealed a district court judgment ordering: (1) the State Board of Chiropractic Examiners to disclose a limited portion of a recording from an April 2020 executive session of the Board; (2) denying the disclosure of any portion of a May 2020 executive session; and (3) the denial of his motion for attorney’s fees. In June 2020, Dr. Schmitz commenced this lawsuit, alleging that the Board violated the law regarding access to public records and meetings. The North Dakota Supreme Court declined to address Dr. Schmitz’s allegation that his right to due process was violated by the in-camera review because it was not properly preserved; reversed the denial of attorney’s fees; and remanded for additional portions of the executive sessions to be disclosed to Dr. Schmitz and for a determination of an appropriate award of attorney’s fees. View "Schmitz v. State Board of Chiropractic Examiners" on Justia Law