Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs brought a claim on behalf of thousands of West Virginia’s foster children challenging the State’s administration of child welfare services. Invoking Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the district court abstained from hearing the case in deference to parallel state-court proceedings. Plaintiffs alleged that a federal class action is the most—if not the only—effective way to achieve the kind of systemic relief they seek.The Fourth Circuit reversed holding that principles of federalism not only do not preclude federal intervention, they compel it. Plaintiffs bring federal claims, and federal courts “are obliged to decide” them in all but “exceptional” circumstances. The court explained that Younger’s narrow scope safeguards Plaintiffs’ rights, bestowed on them by Congress in the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, to present their claims to a federal tribunal. 28 U.S.C. Section 1331. The court further wrote For years, West 4 Virginia’s response to any foster-care orders entered as part of the individual state hearings seems to have been to shuffle its money and staff around until the orders run out, entrenching rather than excising structural failures. Thus, forcing Plaintiffs to once more litigate their claims piecemeal would get federalism exactly backward. View "Jonathan R. v. Jim Justice" on Justia Law

Missouri challenged the Secretary of the Treasury’s implementation of the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA), Pub. L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4. Missouri argues that the Secretary’s “erroneously broad interpretation” of a provision in ARPA—the “Offset Restriction”—is unconstitutional. The district court dismissed the case, finding that Missouri lacked standing and that Missouri’s claims were not ripe for adjudication.   On appeal, Missouri identifies five specific ways it has been injured: (1) the broad interpretation of the Offset Restriction punishes Missouri for exercising its constitutional right to set taxes; (2) the Secretary’s “embrace of the broad interpretation” has harmed Missouri’s interest in the offer Congress provided to the State; (3) Treasury’s regulations make ARPA’s requirement more onerous, leading to greater compliance costs; (4) under the broad interpretation, there is an increased chance Missouri will lose ARPA funds; and (5) under the pre-enforcement test, Missouri has alleged an intention to engage in conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by statute, with a credible threat of enforcement hanging over it.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that Missouri has not alleged an injury in fact. The court explained that Missouri has only alleged a “conjectural or hypothetical” injury, not one that is actual or imminent. It has also not alleged a future injury that is “certainly impending” or even likely to occur. Instead, Missouri asked the court to declare, in the abstract, what a statute does not mean. It asked the court to enjoin a hypothetical interpretation of the Offset Restriction that the Secretary has explicitly disclaimed, without alleging any concrete, imminent injury from the Secretary’s actual interpretation. View "State of Missouri v. Janet Yellen" on Justia Law

Golden Gate, which operates a Berkeley horse racing track, sued Action, an animal rights organization, and individuals who allegedly climbed over a fence surrounding the race track, lit incendiary devices that produced smoke, then lay down on the track with their arms connected using PVC to make removing them difficult. The trespassers prevented scheduled races. The complaint alleged trespass and intentional interference with prospective economic relations. The complaint alleged that “each of the defendants" was "the agent, co-conspirator, aider and abettor, employee, representative, co-venturer, and/or alter ego of each and every other defendant,” but did not specify the circumstances upon which Action’s alleged vicarious liability was based. Action responded by filing an anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation, Code of Civil Procedure 425.16) motion, claiming it “had no involvement in the civil disobedience.”The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion, ruling that Action failed to show that the complaint challenged protected activity. The court of appeal affirmed. Claims alleging that an advocacy organization is vicariously liable for a third party’s illegal conduct may be subject to a demurrer or other summary challenge, but they cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute unless the organization’s alleged liability is premised on constitutionally protected activity. The only fair reading of the complaint is that the wrong on which the claims against Action are based was the organization’s alleged involvement in the illegal trespass, not its speech or petitioning activity. View "Golden Gate Land Holdings LLC v. Direct Action Everywhere" on Justia Law

The Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) has denied prisoner requests to hold religious gatherings for the Nation of Gods and Earths (“the Nation”).   In response, Plaintiff, brought this suit against the TDCJ’s Deputy Director of Volunteer Services and Special Populations, in the hope of vindicating the rights of the Nation’s adherents to congregate. The suit was initially filed pro se over half a decade ago. But Tucker began receiving the aid of pro bono legal counsel a few years later. The State now says that it has promulgated a new policy to govern congregation requests on behalf of the Nation’s adherents. As a result, the State contends that this suit is now moot.   On appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment to the congregation claim, holding that there were genuine disputes of material fact as to “whether the state’s ban: (1) advances a compelling interest (2) through the least restrictive means.” Tucker v. Collier (Tucker I), 906 F.3d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 2018). After adopting the changes, TDCJ sought summary judgment on the grounds that Tucker’s case was. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim as moot.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and found that the case is not moot. The court explained that TDCJ’s policy change gives Plaintiff nothing more than the right to apply for a congregation—to date TDCJ has never approved the Nation for congregation. And it is the latter that this suit seeks to obtain. View "Tucker v. Gaddis" on Justia Law

To dispute a property tax assessment under Detroit ordinances and Michigan state law, taxpayers “make complaint on or before February 15th" before the Board of Assessors. Any person who has complained to the Board of Assessors may appeal to the Board of Review. For the Michigan Tax Tribunal to have jurisdiction over an assessment dispute, “the assessment must be protested before the board of review.” On February 14, 2017, Detroit mailed tax assessment notices to Detroit homeowners, including an “EXTENDED ASSESSORS REVIEW SCHEDULE” that would conclude on February 18, just four days later. At a City Council meeting on February 14, the city announced: “The Assessors Review process will end this year February the 28th.” News outlets reported the extension and that Detroit had waived the requirement of appearance before the Board of Assessors so residents could appeal directly to the Board of Review. Detroit did not distribute individualized mailings to so inform homeowners.Plaintiffs filed a class action, alleging violations of their due process rights; asserting that Michigan’s State Tax Commission assumed control of Detroit’s flawed property tax assessment process from 2014-2017 so that its officials were equally responsible for the violations; and claiming that Wayne County is “complicit” and has been unjustly enriched. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing the Tax Injunction Act and the principle of comity. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that a state remedy is uncertain. View "Howard v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

After a man was found incompetent to stand trial, and his civil commitment proceeding was dismissed, he stayed in jail for six more years. Plaintiff, the man’s guardian, filed suit against the District Attorney, Sheriffs, and Clay County under Section 1983, challenging the man’s years-long detention.   The district court first dismissed the District Attorney from the case. However, the court determined that the Sheriffs were not entitled to qualified immunity on the detention claim because their constitutional violations were obvious. It denied summary judgment to Clay County too, finding that there was strong evidence that the Sheriffs were final policymakers for the county.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Clay County’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to the Sheriffs.  The court first held that it lacked jurisdiction over the ruling keeping Clay County in the case. The Court explained that, unlike the Sheriffs, municipalities do not enjoy immunity. Further, the court wrote it did not have pendent party jurisdiction over Clay County. Defendants assume that if Clay County’s liability is “inextricably intertwined” with that of the individual officers, that provides “support [for] pendent appellate jurisdiction.” But the court has never permitted pendent party (as opposed to pendent claim) interlocutory jurisdiction.   Further, taking the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, the Sheriffs violated the man’s due process right by detaining him for six years in violation of the commit-or-release rule and the circuit court’s order enforcing that rule. The court explained that it was clearly established that the Sheriffs could be liable for a violation of the man’s clearly established due process right. View "Harris v. Clay County, MS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Abade Irizarry, a a YouTube journalist and blogger, was filming a DUI traffic stop in Lakewood, Colorado. Officer Ahmed Yehia arrived on the scene and stood in front of Irizarry, obstructing his filming of the stop. When Irizarry and a fellow journalist objected, Officer Yehia shined a flashlight into Irizarry’s camera and then drove his police cruiser at the two journalists. Irizarry sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Officer Yehia violated his First Amendment rights. The district court granted the motion, concluding that the complaint alleged a First Amendment constitutional violation based on prior restraint and retaliation. Although the Tenth Circuit had not previously recognized a First Amendment right to record police officers performing their official duties in public, the district court, relying on out-of-circuit decisions, held that the First Amendment guaranteed such a right, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. The district court nonetheless held that Officer Yehia was entitled to qualified immunity because Irizarry had not shown a violation of clearly established law. The Tenth Circuit found the complaint alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim under clearly established law, so Officer Yehia was not entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, judgment was reversed. View "Irizarry v. Yehia" on Justia Law

The Los Angeles Department of Transportation (“LADOT”) required e-scooter operators to provide vehicle location data through an application programming interface called Mobility Data Specification (“MDS”). Used in conjunction with the operators’ smartphone applications, MDS automatically compiles real-time data on each e-scooter’s location by collecting the start and end points and times of each ride taken.   The Ninth Circuit amended its prior opinion affirming the district court’s order dismissing, for failure to state a claim, an action brought by an e-scooter user alleging that the City of Los Angeles’ e-scooter permitting program violates the Fourth Amendment and California law.   The court first held that Plaintiff’s complaint alleged facts giving rise to Article III standing and therefore the court rejected LADOT’s assertion that the complaint was beyond the court’s constitutional purview because it was premised on a hypothetical invasion of privacy that might never occur. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff as it was required to do at the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) stage, the proper reading of the complaint was that Plaintiff alleged that the collection of the MDS location data itself—without more—violated his constitutional rights.   The court concluded that the third-party doctrine, which provides that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties, foreclosed Plaintiff’s claim of a reasonable expectation of privacy over the MDS data. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim under the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“CalECPA”) on the grounds that the statute did not provide Plaintiff with authorization to bring an independent action to enforce its provisions. View "JUSTIN SANCHEZ V. LADOT" on Justia Law

LuAnn Erickson appealed a district court order granting her motion to vacate its previous order recognizing a tribal court restraining order under N.D.R.Ct. 7.2, but concluding that the tribal court restraining order was entitled to full faith and credit under 18 U.S.C. § 2265. Erickson argued that the court erred in granting full faith and credit to the tribal court order, because the tribal court lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction, and the tribal court failed to provide her reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard. Specifically she averred she was not properly served with the tribal court proceedings. The North Dakota Supreme Court found the district court record did not reflect Erickson was properly served with the tribal court proceedings under the Tribal Code. “Without proper service on Erickson, a hearing should not have been held, and a permanent protection order should not have issued.” Further, because the record demonstrated that Erickson was notified of the protection order proceedings after a permanent protection order was already entered, it follows that she was not afforded reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard to satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 2265(b)(2). “Although Erickson responded to Baker’s attorney’s email attaching exhibits, this email was sent to Erickson the day before the hearing. Further, the email did not contain any information that would have informed Erickson a hearing would be conducted the following day. We conclude this is insufficient to satisfy due process requirements.” Therefore, the district court erred in according full faith and credit to the tribal court restraining order. The district court order granting Erickson’s motion to vacate its previous order recognizing a tribal court restraining order was affirmed; however, insofar as the order granted full faith and credit to the tribal court restraining order, judgment was reversed. View "Baker v. Erickson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Cl.G., on behalf of his minor son, C.G., appealed a district court’s dismissal of his case against Defendants-Appellees Cherry Creek School District (District or CCSD) and various employees for alleged constitutional violations stemming from C.G.’s suspension and expulsion from Cherry Creek High School (CCHS). In 2019, C.G. was off campus at a thrift store with three friends. He took a picture of his friends wearing wigs and hats, including “one hat that resembled a foreign military hat from the World War II period.” C.G. posted that picture on Snapchat and captioned it, “Me and the boys bout [sic] to exterminate the Jews.” C.G.’s post (the photo and caption) was part of a private “story,” visible only to Snapchat users connected with C.G. on that platform. Posts on a user’s Snapchat story are automatically deleted after 24 hours, but C.G. removed this post after a few hours. He then posted on his Snapchat story, “I’m sorry for that picture it was ment [sic] to be a joke.” One of C.G.’s Snapchat “friend[s]” took a photograph of the post before C.G. deleted it and showed it to her father. The father called the police, who visited C.G.’s house and found no threat. Referencing prior anti-Semitic activity and indicating that the post caused concern for many in the Jewish community, a CCHS parent emailed the school and community leaders about the post, leading to C.G.'s expulsion. Plaintiff filed suit claiming violations of C.G.'s constitutional rights. Defendants moved to dismiss, which was ultimately granted. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the First Amendment limited school authority to regulate off-campus student speech, particularly speech unconnected with a school activity and not directed at the school or its specific members. Defendants maintained that C.G. was lawfully disciplined for what amounts to off-campus hate speech. According to Defendants, although originating off campus, C.G.’s speech still spread to the school community, disrupted the school’s learning environment, and interfered with the rights of other students to be free from harassment and receive an education. The Tenth Circuit determined Plaintiff properly pled that Defendants violated C.G.’s First Amendment rights by disciplining him for his post; the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s first claim was reversed in part. The Court affirmed dismissal of Plaintiff’s further facial challenges to CCSD’s policies. Questions of qualified and absolute immunity and Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim were remanded for further consideration. View "C1.G v. Siegfried, et al." on Justia Law