Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court dismissing certain defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that the defendants' contacts were too attenuated for them to have purposefully established minimum contacts within Nebraska.The out-of-state defendants at issue on appeal facilitated the sale of allegedly defective software installed by a local mechanic in four of Plaintiff's trucks. Plaintiff asserted against them claims for strict liability, negligence, and breach of implied warranties. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the quality and nature of the defendants' activities related to this action did not support personal jurisdiction. View "Wheelbarger v. Detroit Diesel ECM, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of two California statutes— Civil Code section 3333.2, which caps the number of damages a plaintiff may recoup for noneconomic losses at $250,000 (Civ. Code, Section 3333.2, subd. (b)); and Business and Professions Code section 6146, which sets limits on the amount of contingency fees a law firm may charge in representing a plaintiff in a professional negligence action against a health care provider. (Civ. Code, Section 3333.2 and Bus. & Prof. Code, Section 6146 are sometimes referred to collectively as the challenged statutes.)   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment of dismissal. The court held that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge civil code section 3333.2 and Business and Professions Code Section 6146. Further, the court held that the heirs do not have standing because the heir’s alleged injuries are insufficient to confer upon them standing to challenge the statutes in question. Moreover, the court could not conclude Plaintiffs will suffer hardship if declaratory relief is withheld. View "Dominguez v. Bonta" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit against Weinstein Management Co., Inc., and WMCI Charlotte XIII, LLC (collectively, Defendants). In relevant part, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants violated the North Carolina Residential Rental Agreements Act (RRAA), and the North Carolina Debt Collection Act (NCDCA), by charging them out-of-pocket costs for summary ejectment proceedings, including filing fees, service fees, and attorney’s fees (collectively, out-of-pocket expenses). The district court granted Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on these claims, and Plaintiffs appealed. At issue on appeal is whether he 2021 amendment applies retroactively without violating vested rights, thereby extinguishing Plaintiffs’ RRAA and NCDCA claims.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, the 2021 amendment’s text provides that it “is effective when it becomes law and is intended to apply retroactively to all pending controversies as of that date.” The court wrote that given this explicit language from the General Assembly, the intent of the legislature to apply the 2021 amendment retroactively could not be clearer. The North Carolina Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the General Assembly cannot retroactively invalidate common-law rights, which Plaintiffs do not seek to vindicate here. Therefore, the district court was not precluded from applying the 2021 amendment retroactively. View "Tiffany Bass v. Weinstein Management Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Norwegian Cruise Lines Ltd. obtained the injunction barring the Florida Surgeon General from enforcing a prohibition against businesses requiring proof of vaccination as a condition of service. But Norwegian recently filed a suggestion of mootness stating that it no longer requires proof of vaccinations on its cruises. Yet, Norwegian’s filings make clear that it has not suspended its vaccination requirements permanently or categorically. It also continues to defend its entitlement to equitable relief by asking us to leave the preliminary injunction intact.   The Eleventh Circuit denied Norwegian’s motion to dismiss the appeal as moot. The court explained that it agrees with the Surgeon General that a “live dispute” exists because Norwegian has not established that it has relaxed its vaccination requirements permanently or categorically. “The possibility that a party may change its mind in the future is sufficient to preclude a finding of mootness.” The court explained Norwegian has offered no evidence of its vaccine policies or its intentions for the future beyond the boilerplate statement that it is not requiring COVID-19 vaccination for now and for the foreseeable future. Indeed, Norwegian appears to concede that it has not abolished its policy forevermore.’The court saw no reason to believe that Norwegian will not seek to reinstate its policy given its continued insistence that the Florida law is unconstitutional. View "Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd, et al. v. State Surgeon General" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Defense Distributed and the Second Amendment Foundation produce, and make accessible, information related to the 3D printing of firearms. The U.S. Government and various states have imposed restraints on the publication of that information. Plaintiffs have challenged those restraints in federal courts as violating the First Amendment. The instant case involves publication restraints that Defendant, first as Acting Attorney General, then as Attorney General, of New Jersey (“NJAG”), has placed on Plaintiffs.   On remand, the district court severed the claims against the State Department and NJAG and transferred the claims against NJAG to the District of New Jersey. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that that decision was a clear abuse of discretion and ordered the district court to vacate it sever-and-transfer order. The New Jersey court refused to transfer the case back to the Western District of Texas. In response, Plaintiffs moved, in the Western District of Texas, for a preliminary injunction against the publication restraints imposed by NJAG. The district court entered a short order holding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider claims against NJAG and dismissed the preliminary-injunction motion.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal holding that the court no longer has the power to hear the case or grant the relief requested. The court explained that the expectation is that circuit courts direct “the transferor district court to request that the transferee district court return the case.” The refusal of the District of New Jersey to retransfer is unprecedented in that regard. The effect of that decision permits a New Jersey district court functionally to nullify a Fifth Circuit decision. View "Defense Distributed v. Platkin" on Justia Law

After the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) terminated McHugh’s employment, he sued seven individuals under federal law, alleging due process violations, and sued IDOT under an Illinois statute, the Ethics Act. IDOT argued that sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit. The district court held that McHugh’s claim against IDOT could proceed in state court but not federal court, and entered judgment on the merits. The Seventh Circuit modified the judgment to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. If a defendant enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from a claim and invokes that immunity, it deprives a federal court of jurisdiction over the claim. View "McHugh v. Illinois Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment for the State after Plaintiffs alleged numerous state and federal constitutional violations in connection with the State’s Facility Need Review program (“FNR” or “FNR program”).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the FNR program survives rational basis review and the Supreme Court has foreclosed Plaintiffs’ Privileges or Immunities Clause claim. The court explained that the FNR program survives rational basis review because it advances the State’s legitimate interest in enhancing consumer welfare. LDH offers many legitimate reasons for its FNR regime. Of those reasons, Plaintiffs have the most difficulty defeating the contention that LDH uses. The court held in favor of the State because Plaintiffs failed to negate “every conceivable basis which might support” the FNR program. View "Newell-Davis v. Phillips" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 clearly established Defendant Utah Highway Patrolman Blaine Robbins violated Heather Leyva’s Fourteenth and Fourth Amendment rights by pulling her over without reasonable suspicion to do so and by sending her flirtatious texts about the administration of a commercial towing relationship between her employer and the Utah Highway Patrol. Leyva served as the liaison between the Utah Highway Patrol (“UHP”) and West Coast Towing (“WCT”)—one of three towing companies in the Heavy Duty Towing Rotation (“HDTR”). Over time their professional relationship developed into a personal one. Defendant texted Leyva one night asking about work-related matters. In response to one question, Leyva told Defendant to “standby” because she was on the freeway. Defendant asked where and said he would pull her over. Defendant spotted her, turned on his lights, and initiated an apparent traffic stop. Leyva pulled over, not knowing Defendant was the driver of the patrol car, and got her identification ready. Defendant claimed he pulled Leyva over as “a joke between friends.” A month later, Leyva reported to her boss she felt Defendant was sexually harassing her. Her boss contacted UHP to report Leyva’s complaints of sexual harassment. As a result, UHP conducted an investigation. Relevant to the issues on appeal, the investigation found Defendant did not improperly administer the HDTR but concluded his conduct revealed his desire to further his personal relationship with Leyva. It also determined that Defendant lacked reasonable suspicion when he stopped Leyva. The district court found that Defendant did not violate clearly established law. Defendant did not dispute for purposes of this appeal that he violated Leyva’s constitutional rights. He argued only that the district court correctly determined the law was not clearly established for either alleged violation. Plaintiff alleged, and the district court found, that a jury could find Defendant violated Leyva’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court erred by granting summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims insofar as they related to Defendant’s traffic stop of Leyva. But the Court agreed with the district court that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights arising in connection with the administration of HDTR, were not clearly established at the time of the violation. View "Shepherd v. Robbins" on Justia Law

Following his conviction and sentence for first degree murder, James Woo brought a civil replevin action seeking the return of certain property that was lawfully seized by the government as part of his criminal case. The trial court ruled, and the court of appeals agreed (on different grounds), that the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”) barred Woo’s claim. Woo argued on appeal that, if the CGIA precluded his replevin action, he was rendered remediless and the CGIA, as applied to him, violated his rights under the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Because the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that Woo had a remedy in his criminal case to recover any property lawfully seized, and because the Court further concluded that the remedy was constitutionally adequate, the CGIA’s bar of this replevin action did not violate his federal and state constitutional rights to procedural due process. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment, but on slightly different grounds. View "Woo v. El Paso County Sheriff" on Justia Law

Department of Corrections (DOC) officers charged a prisoner with conduct or language likely to interfere with the institution’s orderly administration and security. Following a hearing, a DOC hearing officer imposed a suspended sentence of 10 days’ punitive segregation. The prisoner appealed to the superior court, arguing that the charge was retaliatory and that he had been improperly denied the right to present in-person testimony at his hearing. The superior court rejected the prisoner’s arguments and found that DOC’s decision was supported by “some evidence,” reflecting the statutory standard of judicial review. On appeal, the prisoner argued his due process rights were violated by the hearing officer’s failure to allow in-person testimony and by DOC’s failure to include in the record on appeal a surveillance video viewed at the hearing. He also argued the superior court erred by applying the statutory “some evidence” standard of appellate review. Because the Alaska Supreme Court concluded the prisoner did not show that he was prejudiced by the lack of in-person testimony at the hearing or the surveillance video’s omission from the record on appeal, and because the superior court properly applied the statutory standard of review, judgment was affirmed. View "Nordlund v. Alaska Department of Corrections" on Justia Law