Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff alleged that Defendant had interfered with a release and settlement agreement (“RSA”) entered into by Plaintiff and non-party Dr. Hans Peter Wild, establishing the terms of the breakup of their personal and professional relationship. Subsequently, Wild and Defendant began a personal relationship. In this action, Plaintiff claimed that Wild breached the RSA and that Defendant persuaded Wild to breach the RSA. Plaintiff sought recovery of $150 million in damages, as well as punitive damages. On April 10, 2020, the district court granted Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to file her notice of appeal and affirmed the district court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety pursuant to California’s Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (“anti-SLAPP”) statute and dismissing the action. The panel held that the notice of appeal was timely. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a) required a separate document to implement the district court’s April 10 Order on Plaintiff’s anti-SLAPP motion. But the judgment was not “set forth on a separate document” until May 1, 2020. Therefore, Plaintiff’s notice of appeal was timely when filed on May 28, 2020.   The panel held that where an anti-SLAPP defendant lodges a factual challenge, district courts may properly consider extrinsic evidence in evaluating whether a defendant has met her prima facie burden under step one. Here, the district court correctly evaluated Defendant’s challenge as a factual one based on her own statements in her anti-SLAPP motion and her reliance on extrinsic evidence at both steps. View "LEZLIE GUNN V. CHRISTINE DRAGE" on Justia Law

This case started more than fifty years ago when Minnie Liddell sued to desegregate the St. Louis public school system. The NAACP joined the lawsuit, and the State of Missouri (among others) became a defendant. The parties struck a deal that lasted until 1999 when they agreed to end Missouri’s remedial obligations. The Missouri Legislature ratified the parties’ settlement agreement and created a charter-school option. A group of charter schools complained to the Missouri Legislature, which altered the funding formula in 2006. The revised formula, part of Senate Bill 287, is what has led to the current dispute. The St. Louis Public School District and one of the plaintiffs asked the district court to enforce the settlement agreement by having Missouri reimburse it for the special-sales-tax revenue it had lost under the new funding formula. The district court sided with Missouri, and both sides appealed. Plaintiffs continued to believe that the St. Louis Public School District should receive all the special-sales-tax revenue. And Missouri argued that the desegregation-spending condition finds no support in the settlement agreement.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment but vacated the part requiring charter schools to spend those funds on “desegregation measures.” The court explained that there has been no “disproportionate adverse financial impact” on the St. Louis Public School District because it never had a right to keep all the special-sales-tax revenue for itself. Moreover, the court rejected the argument that allowing charter schools to spend their money as they see fit is inconsistent with the “purpose” of the settlement agreement. View "Deric Liddell v. State of Missouri" on Justia Law

Plaintiff spent more than twelve years in state prison because of his wrongful conviction for two murders. In 2015, the state district court granted the Harris County District Attorney’s motion to dismiss the charges against Plaintiff and Plaintiff was released from prison. Plaintiff filed a petition with the Texas Office of the Comptroller for compensation under the Tim Cole Act, which provides state compensation to individuals who have been wrongfully convicted of state crimes in state courts. His petition was denied because (1) it was not based on a finding that Plaintiff was “actually innocent,” (2) Plaintiff had not received a pardon, and (3) the district attorney had not filed a qualifying motion. While Plaintiff was pursuing compensation under the Tim Cole Act, he brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action in federal district court. The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissed the remainder of Plaintiff’s 1983 claims.   The Fifth Circuit previously certified a question to the Texas Supreme Court in this matter, asking whether the Tim Cole Act bars maintenance of a federal lawsuit involving the same subject matter that was filed before the claimant received compensation under the Tim Cole Act. Having received a response from the Texas Supreme Court in the affirmative, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. In light of this clarified meaning of Section 103.153(b) of the Tim Cole Act, the court analyzed the district court’s grant of Defendants summary judgment motion and found that Plaintiff’s federal lawsuit is barred by his acceptance of Tim Cole Act compensation. View "Brown v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

President Biden invoked his authority under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (“Procurement Act”) to direct federal agencies to include in certain contracts a clause requiring covered contractor employees to follow COVID-19 safety protocols, including vaccination requirements, in order for employees to be eligible to work on federal government projects. Plaintiffs sued to enjoin the vaccination mandate. This lawsuit revolved around four documents that comprise the Contractor Mandate: the Executive Order, the Task Force Guidance, the Office of Management and Budget Determination, and the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council Guidance. The district court granted a permanent injunction against the Contractor Mandate, effective in any contract that either involved a party domiciled or headquartered in Arizona and/or was performed “principally” in Arizona.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting a permanent injunction and dissolved the injunction. First, the panel held the Major Questions Doctrine—which requires that Congress speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast economic and political significance—did not apply. Second, the panel held that even if the Major Questions Doctrine applied, it would not bar the Contractor Mandate because the Mandate is not a transformative expansion of the President’s authority under the Procurement Act. Third, the panel held that the Contractor Mandate fell within the President’s authority under the Procurement Act. Fourth, the panel held that the nondelegation doctrine and state sovereignty concerns did not invalidate the Contractor Mandate. Finally, the panel held that the Contractor Mandate satisfied the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act’s procedural requirements. View "KRISTIN MAYES, ET AL V. JOSEPH BIDEN, ET AL" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned whether Dr. Timothy Shrom and Debra Shrom were eligible under the Pennsylvania Storage Tank and Spill Prevention Act (Act) for payment from the Underground Storage Tank Indemnification Fund (Fund) for costs they incurred in remediating contamination caused by fuel releases from underground storage tanks (USTs or tanks) located on their property. The Fund concluded, and the Underground Storage Tank Indemnification Board (Board) ultimately agreed, that the Shroms were ineligible for such payment because the subject USTs were not registered with the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) as required by Section 503 of the Act and the registration fees were not paid at the time of the fuel releases that gave rise to the Shroms’ claim for remediation costs. The Commonwealth Court reversed the Board’s decision on appeal, concluding that: (1) the Shroms were eligible to receive payment from the Fund for remediation costs under the Act; (2) the Board’s holding relative to the timing of the payment of the Section 503 registration fees constituted an unlawful de facto regulation; and (3) contrary to the Board’s finding, payment of the Shroms’ claim did not appear to pose any imminent risk to the Fund’s solvency. Finding no error in the Commonwealth Court’s decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. View "Shrom, et al v PA Underground Storage Tank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff signed a one-year contract to teach criminal justice courses at Spartanburg Methodist College (SMC). Less than a year later, SMC decided not to renew Plaintiff’s contract and terminated her shortly thereafter. Plaintiff brought a mix of state and federal law claims against SMC, essentially arguing that her contract nonrenewal and termination were unlawful. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of SMC on all federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Plaintiff appealed. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Plaintiff accused SMC of discrimination, retaliation, and engaging in an unlawful health inquiry. Under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (Title IX), she accused SMC of retaliation.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that in analyzing the case, it becomes clear that Plaintiff’s retaliation claims cannot succeed. SMC offers nonretaliatory reasons for not renewing Plaintiff’s contract and terminating her employment, and she is unable to demonstrate that SMC’s reasons are pretextual. Further, the court explained that Plaintiff’s claim of pretext is undermined by the fact that the primary decision-makers at SMC were not aware of Plaintiff’s ADA or Title IX-protected activity. Second, any notion of pretext is further dispelled by the fact that SMC’s explanations have been consistent throughout. Moreover, the court explained that Plaintiff cannot show that SMC refused to make an accommodation because she cannot show that she ever properly requested one. Her failure-to-accommodate claim fails for this reason. View "Summer Lashley v. Spartanburg Methodist College" on Justia Law

Air Excursions, LLC provides air transportation services in Alaska and the Pacific Northwest. It claims that the United States Department of Treasury (Treasury) erroneously disbursed pandemic relief funds to a competitor airline and challenges that disbursement as unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).   The DC Circuit vacated the district court’s order dismissing the complaint on the merits and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the competitor standing doctrine supplies the link between increased competition and tangible injury but does not, by itself, supply the link between the challenged conduct and increased competition. The latter must be apparent from the nature of the challenged action itself—as in U.S. Telecom Association—or from the well-pleaded allegations of Plaintiff’s complaint. The court concluded that the complaint failed to establish that Air Excursions has suffered a competitive injury satisfying Article III’s injury in fact requirement. View "Air Excursions LLC v. Janet Yellen" on Justia Law

SR Construction held a lien on real property owned by RE Palm Springs II. The property owner is a corporate affiliate of Hall Palm Springs LLC, who had financed the original undertaking for a separate real estate developer. The latter requested leave of the bankruptcy court to submit a credit bid to purchase the property from its affiliate, which the bankruptcy court granted. The bankruptcy court later approved the sale and discharged all liens. The construction company appealed the bankruptcy court’s credit-bid and sale orders. Finding that the lender was a good faith purchaser, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court and dismissed the appeal as moot under Bankruptcy Code Section 363(m).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the pandemic dramatically changed not only the lender’s plans for the Property but it also severely impacted the affiliate’s ability to market and sell a hotel, particularly an unfinished one. In sum, these two factors must also be weighed in considering whether any of the actions or procedures, particularly with regard to pricing or timing issues, were performed in bad faith or as a result of sub-optimal external forces beyond the lender’s control. The court explained that the record facts, framed by the external context and circumstances, make plain that there is no error in the judgments of the able bankruptcy and district courts. Accordingly, the court held that the lender did not engage in fraud and was a “good faith purchaser.” View "SR Construction v. Hall Palm Springs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, one day before the expiration of the statutory limitations period, initiated suit pro se against federal prison officials on behalf of his deceased mother’s estate. Plaintiff, who had unsuccessfully attempted to retain counsel before filing suit, did not know that he could not represent his mother’s estate pro se and needed, instead, to secure legal representation. Several months later, but before responsive pleadings were filed by Defendants, he retained counsel who entered an appearance and filed an amended complaint on behalf of the estate reasserting the original cause of action, asserting additional causes of action, and adding the United States as a defendant. Plaintiff assumed that retaining counsel and filing an amended complaint corrected his original mistake. The district court disagreed and dismissed the suit.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed. The court explained that while Plaintiff was not legally authorized under 28 U.S.C. Section 1654 to represent the Estate pro se, the district court erred in dismissing the case without first providing Plaintiff an opportunity to rectify his mistake by obtaining counsel. Once properly represented, the Estate was entitled to file the amended complaint as a matter of course pursuant to Rule 15(a)(1). Further, the FTCA claims asserted therein were timely, and the Bivens claims relate back to the date of filing of the original complaint. Therefore, the Estate’s claims can proceed. View "Grant Sunny Iriele v. Richard Carroll Griffin, et al" on Justia Law

The Energy Policy and Conservation Act (“EPCA”), expressly preempts State and local regulations concerning the energy use of many natural gas appliances, including those used in household and restaurant kitchens. Instead of directly banning those appliances in new buildings, the City of Berkeley took a more circuitous route to the same result. It enacted a building code that prohibits natural gas piping into those buildings, rendering the gas appliances useless. The California Restaurant Association (“CRA”), whose members include restaurateurs and chefs, challenged Berkeley’s regulation, raising an EPCA preemption claim. The district court dismissed the suit.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that the CRA demonstrated that (1) at least one of its members had suffered an injury in fact, that was (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent rather than conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury was fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) it was likely, not merely speculative, that the injury would be redressed by a favorable decision. The panel held that, by its plain text and structure, the Act’s preemption provision encompasses building codes that regulate natural gas use by covered products. By preventing such appliances from using natural gas, the Berkeley building code did exactly that. The panel reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "CRA V. CITY OF BERKELEY" on Justia Law