Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Gregory Gliner, a dual citizen of the United Kingdom and the United States, sought to identify the anonymous operator of the PoliticalLore.com website and the pseudonymous author of an allegedly defamatory article published on the website. Gliner intended to use this information for a defamation lawsuit in the United Kingdom. He filed an ex parte application under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 to obtain discovery from Dynadot, Inc., a California-based company that provided domain registration and privacy protection services for the website.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied Gliner’s application, citing the First Amendment interests of the website operator and the article author. The court did not make any relevant factual findings and did not address the statutory requirements or the Intel factors for granting discovery under § 1782. Gliner subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which the district court also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court abused its discretion. The appellate court held that the First Amendment protections cited by the district court did not apply because there was no evidence that the website operator or the article author were U.S. citizens or present in the United States. Additionally, the court found no indication that the website had a U.S. audience whose First Amendment rights might be implicated. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for further consideration of the § 1782 statutory factors and the Intel factors. The district court was instructed to allow Dynadot and any affected parties to contest the subpoenas if issued. View "IN RE EX PARTE APPLICATION OF GLINER" on Justia Law

The case involves the State of Alaska's statutes that allow local school districts to operate correspondence study programs and provide public funds for educational expenses. Parents of public school students sued the State, arguing that these statutes violated the Alaska Constitution by allowing public funds to be used for private school tuition, which they claimed was unconstitutional.The Superior Court of Alaska ruled that the statutes were facially unconstitutional and invalidated them entirely. The court did not address the narrower question of whether the statutes were unconstitutional when applied to allow public funds to be used for private school tuition. The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of Alaska.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and determined that the Superior Court's ruling went too far. The Supreme Court noted that the statutes allowed for a substantial number of constitutionally valid uses of allotment funds, such as purchasing books, supplies, and other educational materials. The court emphasized that even if using allotment funds for private school tuition were unconstitutional, it would not justify invalidating the entire statutes.The Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court instructed that the proper parties must be joined, and the Superior Court must first determine whether the statutes actually permit the use of allotment funds for private school tuition before addressing the constitutionality of such use. The Supreme Court did not decide whether using allotment funds for private school tuition is constitutional, leaving that question open for further consideration. View "State of Alaska, Dept. of Education & Early Development v. Alexander" on Justia Law

This case involves the termination of parental rights and an adoption proceeding. Jane Doe 1 ("Mother") and John Doe ("Father") had a child out of wedlock. Approximately eight months after the child's birth, Mother and her fiancé filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights and allow the fiancé to adopt the child. Mother did not serve the petition on Father, and he did not participate in the proceedings. The magistrate court terminated Father's parental rights and granted the adoption. Father later filed two motions to set aside the judgment, arguing that his due process rights were violated due to lack of notice. This appeal concerns Father's second motion.The magistrate court denied Father's second motion, finding it barred by res judicata. The district court disagreed, reversed the magistrate court's order, and remanded the matter for the magistrate court to consider the motion on its merits. Mother appealed, arguing that Father's motion was barred by procedural doctrines, including res judicata and waiver.The Supreme Court of Idaho held that Father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion alleged a fundamental error that deprived him of his right to procedural due process, which in turn violated his fundamental constitutional right to raise his child. The Court concluded that the fundamental error doctrine applies to create an exception to the doctrines of res judicata and waiver. The Court affirmed the district court's decision and remanded the matter to the magistrate court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion was timely and, if so, whether the termination and adoption judgment is void. The Court also awarded partial attorney fees to Father for defending against certain arguments raised by Mother on appeal. View "Doe v. Doe" on Justia Law

Kevin Vericker published an internet blog questioning the credentials, character, and competency of Norman Christopher Powell, who was appointed as the attorney for North Bay Village. Powell filed a defamation lawsuit against Vericker, claiming the blog posts were defamatory per se. Vericker responded with a motion for summary judgment and an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that Powell, as a public official, needed to prove actual malice, which he could not. The trial court denied Vericker's motion.Vericker then sought a writ of certiorari from the Third District Court of Appeal to review the denial of his anti-SLAPP motion. The Third District held that certiorari was not appropriate for reviewing such orders, aligning with the Fourth District's position that public policy favors interlocutory review through rule amendments rather than expanding certiorari jurisdiction. The Third District certified conflict with the Second District's decisions in Gundel, Baird, and Davis, which had allowed certiorari review for anti-SLAPP motions.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case and held that denials of anti-SLAPP motions do not constitute irreparable harm sufficient to support certiorari relief. The court emphasized that the Anti-SLAPP statute does not provide immunity from suit but rather aims for the expeditious resolution of meritless, speech-targeted lawsuits. To align with legislative intent, the court amended Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3) to allow interlocutory review of nonfinal orders denying anti-SLAPP motions. The court approved the Third District's decision and disapproved the Second District's conflicting decisions. View "Vericker v. Powell" on Justia Law

In 2020, Article 13 LLC filed a quiet title action against LaSalle National Bank Association (now U.S. Bank) to discharge a mortgage as time-barred, arguing that the statute of limitations had expired since a foreclosure action was commenced in 2007. U.S. Bank contended that the statute of limitations had not expired because the 2007 foreclosure action was invalid to accelerate the mortgage debt. The district court found a disputed issue of material fact regarding the validity of the 2007 foreclosure action and denied both parties' motions for summary judgment.Following the district court's ruling, New York enacted the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA), which bars the defense of the invalidity of prior accelerations of mortgages in quiet title actions. Article 13 LLC moved for reconsideration, and the district court applied FAPA retroactively, granting summary judgment in favor of Article 13 LLC. U.S. Bank appealed, arguing that FAPA should not be applied retroactively and that such retroactivity would be unconstitutional under both the New York and U.S. Constitutions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the questions of FAPA's retroactivity and its constitutionality under the New York Constitution were novel and essential to the resolution of the appeal. Consequently, the Second Circuit certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals: whether Section 7 of FAPA applies to foreclosure actions commenced before the statute's enactment, and whether FAPA's retroactive application violates substantive and procedural due process under the New York Constitution. The Second Circuit deferred its resolution of the appeal pending the New York Court of Appeals' response. View "Article 13 LLC v. Lasalle Nat'l Bank Ass'n" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Michael Etchegoinberry, Erik Clausen, Barlow Family Farms, L.P., and Christopher Todd Allen, own land in the Westlands Water District, part of the San Luis Unit in California. They alleged that the United States failed to provide necessary drainage for their irrigated lands, leading to a rise in the water table and accumulation of saline groundwater, which they claimed resulted in a taking of their property without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.The United States Court of Federal Claims initially denied the government's motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, agreeing with the plaintiffs that their claim was timely under the stabilization doctrine. This doctrine postpones the accrual of a takings claim until the damage has stabilized and the extent of the damage is reasonably foreseeable. The case was then stayed for nearly seven years for settlement attempts. In 2023, the Court of Federal Claims revisited the issue and dismissed the case sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the stabilization doctrine did not apply and the claim was time-barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the dismissal. The court held that the stabilization doctrine did not apply because the plaintiffs' claim was based on the regular and known lack of drainage over many years, not an irregular or intermittent physical process. Even if the doctrine applied, the court found that the plaintiffs' claim accrued before the critical date of September 2, 2005, as they were aware of the permanent nature of the damage to their land well before that date. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' claim was time-barred and affirmed the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "ETCHEGOINBERRY v. US " on Justia Law

A fourteen-year-old boy, Tanner Smith, was vaccinated against COVID-19 at his school clinic without his or his mother Emily Happel's consent. The school clinic, operated in partnership with Old North State Medical Society (ONSMS), administered the vaccine despite lacking the required parental consent. Plaintiffs, Smith and Happel, sued the Guilford County Board of Education and ONSMS for battery and violations of their state constitutional rights.The Superior Court of Guilford County dismissed the case, agreeing with the defendants that the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act preempted the plaintiffs' state law claims, granting them immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, holding that the PREP Act's broad immunity shielded the defendants from liability for all of the plaintiffs' claims.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the PREP Act's immunity only covers tort injuries and does not bar state constitutional claims. The court concluded that the PREP Act does not preempt claims brought under the state constitution, specifically those related to the right to control a child's upbringing and the right to bodily integrity. The court affirmed the dismissal of the battery claim but reversed the dismissal of the state constitutional claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Happel v. Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Education" on Justia Law

Several young Utah residents filed a lawsuit challenging statutory provisions and government actions related to fossil fuel development. They claimed that these provisions and actions were designed to maximize fossil fuel development in Utah, which they argued endangered their health and shortened their lifespans by exacerbating climate change. They sought a declaration from the district court that these provisions and actions violated their rights under the Utah Constitution.The government defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the requested relief would not redress the alleged injuries. The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, agreed and dismissed the claims with prejudice, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their claims were not redressable.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the dismissal on the ground that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The court found that the challenge to the energy policy provision was moot because the legislature had significantly amended the statute since the complaint was filed. The plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the remaining statutory provisions because success on those challenges would not provide relief likely to redress their injuries. The court noted that the challenged provisions did not limit the government defendants' discretion in making decisions about fossil fuel development, and thus, striking these provisions would not necessarily lead to less fossil fuel development.The court also held that the challenges to the government defendants' conduct were not justiciable because they were not supported by a concrete set of facts. The plaintiffs had identified general categories of conduct without tying their claims to any specific government actions. The court instructed the district court to modify its ruling to reflect that the dismissal was without prejudice, allowing the plaintiffs the opportunity to refile their claims if they could address the jurisdictional deficiencies. View "Roussel v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner Deandre Arnold, an indigent pro se litigant, attempted to file a civil complaint with an affidavit of indigence through the Fulton County Superior Court’s mandatory e-filing system. His complaint was rejected because it lacked an order authorizing him to file using a waiver payment account. The Clerk’s office informed him that he needed to obtain an order authorizing indigent status by presenting the complaint in person before a superior court judge. Arnold, unable to travel the 25 miles to the Clerk’s office, argued that the Clerk’s policy violated OCGA § 9-15-2 and his constitutional rights.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case after Arnold filed a petition for a writ of mandamus against the Clerk. Arnold contended that he had no adequate remedy other than filing an original petition in the Supreme Court because he could not appear in person to present a writ of mandanus and affidavit of indigence, and the Clerk would not accept such a filing by mail.The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that it lacked original jurisdiction to grant the relief Arnold sought, as its authority to issue writs of mandamus is limited to matters related to its appellate jurisdiction. The Court determined that the case did not fall within its appellate jurisdiction and transferred the petition to the Court of Appeals for resolution. The Court of Appeals has the authority to grant writs of mandamus in aid of its jurisdiction and will decide whether to require the Clerk to accept Arnold’s affidavit of indigence and civil complaint by mail. View "Arnold v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against Nike, Inc., alleging gender discrimination and hostile workplace claims. During discovery, a collection of internal workplace complaints, known as the Starfish complaints, was produced under a protective order. Three media organizations, including The Oregonian, intervened in the case to gain access to these documents. Plaintiffs' attorney inadvertently sent confidential documents to a reporter from The Oregonian, who refused to return or destroy them upon request.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon initially granted a motion to intervene by the media organizations. However, when the inadvertent disclosure occurred, the magistrate judge ordered The Oregonian to return or destroy the documents. The district court vacated this order, reasoning that it lacked authority to compel a non-party to return the documents. The magistrate judge then denied the motion, and the district court affirmed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court had the inherent authority to order The Oregonian, as an intervenor and thus a party to the case, to return or destroy the confidential documents. The court determined that The Oregonian did not have a First Amendment right to withhold the documents because pretrial discovery proceedings are not public components of the judicial process. The court applied relaxed First Amendment scrutiny and concluded that the district court's exercise of its inherent authority over discovery furthered a substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "CAHILL V. NIKE, INC." on Justia Law