Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2005, a federal district court entered a permanent injunction against several pro-life advocates enjoining them from entering the public sidewalk within fifteen feet of the entrance of any abortion clinic in the Western District of New York. Twelve years later, in 2017, Plaintiff, who was not a named party to the 2005 permanent injunction, started sidewalk counseling near the Planned Parenthood facility in Rochester, New York. After Defendants, the New York Attorney General and the City of Rochester decided that Plaintiff was bound by the 2005 permanent injunction, he sued, seeking a declaratory judgment that he was not bound by the injunction. He also moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Defendants from applying the injunction to his counseling activities. The district court dismissed his suit for failure to state a claim and denied his motion for a preliminary injunction.   The Second Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court insofar as it dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint and vacated the judgment insofar as it denied Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court remanded for further proceedings. The court held that a person who is not a named party to an injunction or legally identified with a named party is bound by the injunction only from acting for the benefit of, or to assist, an enjoined party in violating the injunction. The allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint do not establish that he so acted and therefore state a claim for declaratory relief. View "Havens v. James" on Justia Law

Brothers pleaded guilty to conspiring to participate in a racketeering enterprise, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act. The district court ordered the forfeiture of various real properties and financial accounts linked to the RICO conspiracy. Several third parties came forward to claim an interest in one or more of the forfeited assets, including the brothers’ sister, Ilana Bangiyeva (“Bangiyeva”), and one brother’s wife, Irina Alishayeva (“Alishayeva”). The court rejected most of Bangiyeva’s claimed ownership interests. As to Alishayeva the court granted a life estate in and the exclusive use of one of the properties after finding that she owned a one-third interest in that property as a tenant in common with the Government, which owned the remaining two-thirds interest. Bangiyeva appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the final order of forfeiture in that respect. Additionally, the Government cross-appealed, asserting that the district court erred as a matter of law in granting Alishayeva a life estate in the relevant property at the expense of the Government’s majority ownership interest. The court agreed with the Government and vacated that part of the final order of forfeiture and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that in granting Alishayeva full and exclusive use of the 110-37 69th Ave. property for the remainder of her life and marriage, the district court accorded the Government less than the full bundle of property rights that it would otherwise be entitled to as a tenant in common under New York state law. The district court was without legal authority to do so. View "US v. Ilana Bangiyeva" on Justia Law

This consolidated case concerns three appeals from orders entered by magistrate judges in the Western District of Pennsylvania in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983. One case was involuntarily dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute; in the others, magistrates entered summary judgment for all defendants.Under 28 U.S.C. 636, precise limits govern a magistrate judge’s jurisdiction absent parties’ consent. A magistrate judge can oversee pretrial discovery even without the consent of the parties, but he cannot grant summary judgment or involuntarily dismiss a case; those limits dissolve if the parties voluntarily consent to a magistrate judge’s final judgment jurisdiction.The Third Circuit dismissed one appeal for lack of jurisdiction because all parties did not consent and, therefore, the magistrate judge lacked the power to involuntarily dismiss the case. However, the magistrate judges were empowered to enter summary judgment in the other cases because all parties either expressly or impliedly consented. The court then affirmed summary judgment based on the plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies. View "Prater v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs asserted claims in district court under Section 1983 against various officials for failing to protect a man in custody, claiming violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. They also have claims against individual defendants under a theory of bystander liability and a claim against the Sheriff for supervisory liability. And, against Culberson County, Plaintiffs asserted a claim under Section 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York City, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), on the basis that its policies related to jail-suicide prevention caused a violation of Schubert’s constitutional rights. But, this interlocutory appeal concerns only the failure-to-protect claims against Appellants.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and held that Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege Appellants possessed the requisite subjective knowledge. The court explained that although Plaintiffs alleged that the man in custody was cooperative and appeared truthful in his responses, Plaintiffs also alleged: the Sheriff was still required to conduct a mental-health screening form in accordance with TCJS; and, because “the form had not been completed,” the Sheriff “had to operate on the belief that the man was suicidal” and “was required to put the man on suicide watch.” The court explained that it requires that a defendant have “actual knowledge of the substantial risk of suicide.” Plaintiffs failed to allege that the man did or said anything to indicate he was suicidal. Because Plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to plausibly show the Sheriff was subjectively aware of the risk of suicide, their allegations do not state a failure-to-protect claim against him. View "Edmiston v. Borrego" on Justia Law

This action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 arises out of a man’s death while in pretrial detention in the Callahan County, Texas, Jail. Plaintiffs’ challenged the adverse summary judgments, including contesting evidentiary rulings.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs failed to show the requisite genuine dispute of material fact for whether the four defendants had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of suicide; therefore, they fail to show a constitutional violation. Further, the court wrote that even assuming the court abused its discretion, the contested exhibits concern only Defendants’ knowledge regarding the risk of telephone cords as ligatures; they do not bear on Defendants’ subjective knowledge regarding whether the man was a substantial suicide risk. Accordingly, the court’s sustaining Defendants’ objections did not affect Plaintiffs’ substantial rights. Therefore, this assumed error was harmless. View "Crandel v. Hastings" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment for Defendants, a former Immigration and Customs Enforcement officer. Plaintiff, Jane Doe, alleged she was sexually and psychologically abused by Defendant, a former Immigration and Customs Enforcement officer. Four years after the abuse ended, Doe initiated this action against Rodriguez and various government defendants. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing Doe’s claims were untimely. Doe asked the district court to equitably toll the applicable statutes of limitations. The court granted summary judgment to Defendants.   The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court explained that in this case, the district court denied equitable tolling as a matter of law, purporting to draw every inference in favor of Doe. The court vacated its judgment because the record allows for a finding that Doe faced extraordinary circumstances and acted with reasonable diligence. On remand, the district court should act in a fact-finding capacity and determine whether Doe has demonstrated extraordinary circumstances and reasonable diligence. The court explained that if the court determines that she has established these prerequisites for equitable tolling, then it should engage in the discretionary determination of whether to grant her request for equitable tolling. View "Doe v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were arrested by Sheriff’s deputies for stashing their client’s cell phone in a bag only minutes before the police executed a search warrant for child pornography on that phone.  Plaintiffs alleged that District Attorney and Assistant District Attorney ordered the arrest. Following the arrest, the DA, in a statement to the press, and ADA, on the courthouse steps, publicly accused Plaintiffs of concealing evidence of a crime and knowingly possessing child pornography. After Plaintiffs were acquitted they filed this federal lawsuit for unlawful arrest. The district court entered judgment against the Deputies and denied the DA’s and ADA’s motion for summary judgment on the false arrest claim. The district court also denied the district attorneys’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ defamation claims.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded to the district court with instructions to enter judgment for Defendants on Plaintiffs’ false arrest claims. The court wrote that on remand, the district court should determine whether to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the defamation claims. The court held that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because they had arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs. The court explained it believes “a reasonable officer, looking at the entire legal landscape at the time of the arrests, could have interpreted the law as permitting the arrests here.” However, even if Defendants made their allegedly defamatory statements as part of their official duties, the Supreme Court of Alabama has held that state-agent immunity does not protect against intentional defamation. View "Megan Garcia, et al v. Pamela Casey, et al" on Justia Law

An officer deployed pepper spray on Plaintiff and others during a protest in downtown St. Louis. Plaintiff sued various parties (collectively, “City Officials”), alleging various federal and Missouri law claims, including First Amendment retaliation. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. The district court granted summary judgment to the City Officials on some of the claims. As relevant to this interlocutory appeal, however, the district court concluded that neither the City nor one officer was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim and therefore denied the motion in part. The district court also reserved a ruling on the City Officials’ motion for summary judgment on two state law claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and remanded for the district court to resolve the motion on the state law claims. The court explained that based on Plaintiff’s interaction with the officer and taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, “a jury could find that the officer acted with the prohibited . . . malice” if he deployed the pepper spray with the ulterior motive of retaliation. Or a jury may determine that the officer’s actions upheld his duty, but the court explained that it has no basis to decide that factual question on an interlocutory appeal. However, the court remanded with instructions for the district court to reach the merits of the sovereign immunity issue as to the state law claims. View "Amir Brandy v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

Appellants were each pepper-sprayed by Police Officer William Olsten while participating in a protest in downtown St. Louis. Each of them sued various officials, alleging First Amendment retaliation and excessive force claims, as well as various other federal and state law claims. In each case, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city officials on all the federal claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction on the state law claims.   The Eighth Circuit consolidated the cases and affirmed. The court explained that here, Appellants admit that “every other non-police officer in the vicinity was actively involved in a protest” and that the officer “moved his arm side to side and indiscriminately sprayed numerous protestors.” One cannot simultaneously single out Appellants and “indiscriminately” spray the crowd. And there is no evidence in the record that either Appellant had any interaction with the officer or that the officer was aware of their presence, or that either did anything to differentiate themselves from the other protestors in the crowd. While one Appellant argued she was filming the protest, there is no evidence that the officer observed her filming or deployed pepper spray in retaliation for her doing so. Regardless of whether the officer’s action was appropriate or reasonable under the circumstances, the lack of evidence causally connecting the officer’s adverse action of using pepper spray to Appellants’ protected expression is fatal to the retaliation claims. View "Rasheen Aldridge v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, survivors and the administrator of a man shot and killed by Defendant police officers filed a lawsuit alleging claims of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and battery and negligence under Georgia law. And it demanded monetary damages. Both officers moved for summary judgment. They argued that they are entitled to qualified immunity from the claim of excessive force. They also argued that they are entitled to official immunity under Georgia law from the claims of battery and negligence. The district court denied the officers’ motions.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Defendants’ appeal based on a lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that it lacks appellate jurisdiction over the denial of qualified or official immunity that turns on issues of evidentiary sufficiency. The court explained that in this case, the only issues in this appeal are issues of evidentiary sufficiency. In their motions for summary judgment, the officers argued that their use of force was reasonable under the circumstances because they encountered a suspect who had brandished a gun, discharged it at least once, and ignored their commands to show his hands. The officers argued that in the light of these facts when they saw the man move, they had actual and probable cause to use deadly force on him. View "Joshua Paul English, et al v. Officer Jonathan Fowler, et al" on Justia Law