Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Appellant the Law Offices of Crystal Moroney (“Moroney”) is a law firm that principally provides legal advice and services to clients seeking to collect debt. As the agency charged with regulating this industry, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) served on Moroney a civil investigative demand (“CID”) for documents, which it subsequently petitioned to enforce in the district court. While that petition was pending, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020), holding that the provision that protected the Director of the CFPB from removal other than for cause was an unconstitutional limitation on the President’s removal power. The CFPB filed a notice to ratify the CID and the enforcement action against Moroney. The district court granted the CFPB’s petition to enforce the CID. On appeal, Moroney argues that the CID cannot be enforced.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that the CID was not void ab initio because the CFPB Director was validly appointed, that the CFPB’s funding structure is not constitutionally infirm under either the Appropriations Clause or the nondelegation doctrine and that the CID served on Moroney is not an unduly burdensome administrative subpoena. The court explained that under the nondelegation doctrine’s lenient standard, Congress has plainly provided an intelligible principle to guide the CFPB in setting and spending its budget. Therefore, the court concluded that the CFPB’s funding structure is proper under the nondelegation doctrine. View "CFPB v. Law Offs. of Crystal Moroney" on Justia Law

Tejas Motel, L.L.C. (“Tejas”)—the repeat litigant in question—owns and operates a small motel of the same name in Mesquite, Texas. The City of Mesquite (“City”) enacted a series of strict zoning ordinances that turned the motel property into a nonconforming use. It then ordered Tejas to comply with the minimum zoning requirements or cease operations. Tejas sued in state court, claiming that the City violated both the state and federal constitutions by effecting a taking without just compensation. The state trial court dismissed. The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Tejas’s state claim was procedurally barred and its federal claim was not “viable.” Tejas then brought the same federal takings claim in federal court, seeking a different result.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that while it understands that Tejas was forced into state court by Williamson County, and now cannot avoid the consequences of the adverse judgment it received. But nothing in Knick nullifies long-settled principles of res judicata. State courts are competent to adjudicate federal claims, and their judgments are entitled to full faith and credit in federal court. Because the Texas Court of Appeals issued a final judgment on the merits of Tejas’s constitutional claim, the motel does not get a second bite at the apple. View "Tejas Motel v. City of Mesquite" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed in part the order of the district court granting summary judgment rejecting Defendants' affirmative defense of qualified immunity against Plaintiff's procedural due process claim, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the federal claims against Defendants.Plaintiff brought this action against three former board members of the Town of Freetown Board of Selectmen, citing 42 U.S.C. 1983 and alleging deprivation of her right to procedural due process on the basis that Defendants removed her state court action to the federal district court. The district court rejected Defendants' argument for qualified immunity on summary judgment. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the doctrine of qualified immunity shielded Defendants from liability against Plaintiff's due process claim. View "Lawless v. Sadeck" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are landlords who filed an action against the City, alleging violations of their federal and state rights of free speech and substantive due process. The district court held that the Ordinance regulates speech, not conduct and that the speech it regulates is commercial speech. The district court applied an intermediate level of scrutiny to hold that the Ordinance was constitutional as a “reasonable means of achieving the City’s objectives and does not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to achieve them.”   The Ninth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part the district court’s judgment upholding the constitutionality of the City of Seattle’s Fair Chance Housing Ordinance, which prohibits landlords from inquiring about the criminal history of current or potential tenants and from taking adverse action, such as denying tenancy, against them based on that information.   The panel did not decide whether the Ordinance regulates commercial speech and calls for the application of intermediate scrutiny, or whether the Ordinance regulates non-commercial speech and is subject to strict scrutiny review because it concluded that the Ordinance did not survive the intermediate scrutiny standard of review. The panel held that the Ordinance’s inquiry provision impinged upon the First Amendment rights of landlords. The panel rejected the landlords’ claim that the adverse action provision of the Ordinance violated their substantive due process rights because the landlords did not have a fundamental right to exclude, and the adverse action provision survived rational basis review. Further, the panel remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the presumption of severability was rebuttable and for further proceedings. View "CHONG YIM, ET AL V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law

On November 22, 2021—the day federal employees were required to be vaccinated—Appellant filed suit in District Court, challenging the mandate’s constitutionality. Characterizing Appellant’s suit as a “workplace dispute involving a covered federal employee,” the District Court found Appellant’s claims were precluded under the CSRA and dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, Appellant insisted that he challenges the vaccine mandate’s constitutionality, as opposed to contesting a workplace dispute under the CSRA. According to his complaint, however, he alleged that the vaccine mandate is unconstitutional—at least in part—because it requires that he obtain the vaccine to avoid adverse employment action.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that all attempts to characterize his argument as anything but a challenge to adverse employment action fail for jurisdictional purposes because Appellant himself admitted that his standing to challenge the vaccine mandate is rooted in the looming disciplinary action he now faces as a result of his continued noncompliance. In other words, Appellant challenges the vaccine mandate to maintain his employment while continuing to defy the mandate that he views as unlawful. And while his constitutional arguments are relevant to the merits, they do not change the fact that one of Appellant’s interests in this suit is to avoid the impending adverse employment action. Appellant’s claims are not wholly collateral because challenges to adverse employment actions are the type of claims that the MSPB regularly adjudicates. Thus, the court found that should Appellant choose to continue challenging the vaccine mandate, he must do so through the CSRA’s scheme. View "Jason Payne v. Joseph Biden, Jr." on Justia Law

In 2019, Western Watersheds Project sued to challenge the issuance of permits that expired in 2018. The district court dismissed the case for lack of Article III standing. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with that decision: Western Watersheds Project’s claims were brought against expired permits that had already been renewed automatically by 43 U.S.C. § 1752(c)(2). And the timing of a new environmental analysis of the new permits was within the Secretary’s discretion under 43 U.S.C. § 1752(i). Western Watersheds Project, therefore, lacked Article III standing because its claims were not redressable. View "Western Watersheds Project v. Interior Board of Land Appeals, et al." on Justia Law

Individuals Plaintiffs, Uber, Inc. (Uber) and Postmates, Inc. (Postmates, and collectively Plaintiffs) appealed the district court’s orders denying their motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissing their Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs filed this action to enjoin the State of California and the Attorney General of California (Defendants), from enforcing California Assembly Bill 5, 2019 Cal. Stats. Ch. 296 (A.B. 5), as amended by California Assembly Bill 170, 2019 Cal. Stats. Ch. 415 (A.B. 170) and California Assembly Bill 2257, 2020 Cal. Stats. Ch. 38 (A.B. 2257, and collectively A.B. 5, as amended), against them. A.B. 5, as amended, codified the “ABC test” adopted by the Supreme Court of California in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 4 Cal. 5th 903 (2018).1 A.B. 5, as amended, however, incorporated numerous exemptions into its provisions.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part district court orders dismissing Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint and denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and remanded. The panel first held that, even under the fairly forgiving rational basis review, Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that A.B. 5, as amended, violated the Equal Protection Clause for those engaged in app-based ride-hailing and delivery services. Thus, Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the primary impetus for the enactment of A.B. 5 was the disfavor with which the architect of the legislation viewed Uber, Postmates, and similar gig-based business models. The panel held that the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs’ due process claims because Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that A.B. 5, as amended, completely prohibited them from exercising their “right to engage in a calling.” View "LYDIA OLSON, ET AL V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL" on Justia Law

A disabled public-school student was sexually assaulted by another student with known violent tendencies. Despite knowing of this attack, the victim’s teachers let both her and her aggressor wander the school unsupervised, and she was again assaulted by the very same student. The victim’s mother sued various school officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging liability under the so-called “state-created danger” doctrine, an exception to the general rule that government has no duty under the Due Process Clause to protect people from privately inflicted harms. The school officials sought dismissal on qualified immunity grounds, arguing that the state-created danger doctrine was not clearly established in this circuit when the underlying events occurred. The district court denied their motion.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the Section 1983 claim. The court explained that the circuit has never adopted a state-created danger exception to the sweeping “no duty to protect” rule. And a never-established right cannot be a clearly established one. The court further wrote that it does not think it is prudent to adopt a never-recognized theory of Section 1983 liability in the absence of rigorous briefing that grapples painstakingly with how such a cause of action, however widely accepted in other circuits, works in terms of its practical contours and application, details on which the court’s sister circuits disagree. Also, beyond the lack of thorough briefing, the court explained it is reluctant to expand substantive due process doctrine given the Supreme Court’s recent forceful pronouncements signaling unease with implied rights not deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition. View "Fisher v. Moore" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a petition asserting that Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools (CMS) failed to provide her daughter, A.C., with a free appropriate public education in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). An administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled for Plaintiff on two of the seven issues she had raised but against her on all others. Plaintiff sought review contending that the ALJ had improperly delegated the remedy for the two issues and erred in deciding the rest. Plaintiff further argued that the ALJ’s adverse findings were not entitled to deference. The district court granted summary judgment to CMS.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that based on the extensive process Plaintiff received in the handling of her case, as well as the detail provided in the ALJ’s written decision, the court concluded that the ALJ’s findings were regularly made. The court further held that the district court was correct to accord those findings deference and to determine that Plaintiff failed to prevail by a preponderance of the evidence on the five issues she disputes. While the deference in these cases is owed the ALJ, it is not remiss to point out that the district court likewise proceeded with its own thorough review in a lengthy opinion. Plaintiff does not persuasively challenge the court’s decision on appeal. Further, the court wrote, it discerns no abuse of remedial discretion on the part of the district court in allowing the respondent to fashion “benchmark(s) and criteria” in A.C.’s IEP indicating when she may move on from Metro School. View "Hind Bouabid v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools Board of Education" on Justia Law

In a custody dispute between Hadzi-Tanovic and her former husband, Pavlovich, an Illinois state court ordered that Hadzi-Tanovic’s parenting time with her children be supervised. She filed suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985 against her ex-husband, the children’s guardian ad litem, and the state court judge, alleging they conspired to violate her and her children’s rights to family association and her right to a fair and unbiased trier of fact. The district court dismissed her complaint on abstention grounds.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It is well established that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review such state court decisions. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine imposes a “jurisdictional bar” that prohibits federal courts other than the U.S. Supreme Court from reviewing final state court judgments The state court order at issue is final, so the Rooker-Feldman doctrine’s finality requirement is met. Allegations of state court corruption are not sufficient to avoid the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Hadzi-Tanovic has not argued that state law or procedures prevented her from raising her federal constitutional issues in state court. Parties may raise procedural and substantive due process challenges to custody orders in Illinois state court. View "Hadzi-Tanovic v. Johnson" on Justia Law