Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Defendants, game wardens with the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, appealed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against them.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and rendered judgment for Defendants. The court concluded that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Defendant violated his constitutional rights. The court explained that because Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants knowingly withheld relevant, material information from the grand jury, he has not shown that the independent intermediary’s deliberations or decisions were tainted. Accordingly, the independent-intermediary doctrine defeats Plaintiff’s allegations that there was no probable cause to prosecute him and insulates Defendants from liability. The court wrote that this conclusion applies with equal force to Plaintiff’s claims for both retaliatory prosecution and prosecution without probable cause. View "Trevino v. Iden" on Justia Law

The Satanic Temple and one of its members sued the Texas Health and Human Services Commission (“THHSC”), its Executive Commissioner, and the Planned Parenthood Center for Choice, Inc., seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against several Texas abortion laws.Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and a preliminary injunction against the Commissioner; the district court denied the motion. The Satanic Temple appealed.While the appeal was pending, the litigation continued in district court. Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the suit without prejudice but without leave to replead.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court had jurisdiction to proceed on the merits of the case. An appeal from a grant or denial of a preliminary injunction does not divest the district court of jurisdiction or restrain it from taking other steps in the litigation. The district court, therefore, had jurisdiction to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims despite the pending appeal. Thus, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Satanic Temple v. TX Hlth and Human" on Justia Law

In 2022, New Jersey passed a law, N.J. Stat. 2C:58-33(a), that empowers only the state’s Attorney General to sue gun-industry members whose “unlawful … or unreasonable” conduct “contribute[s] to a public nuisance in [New Jersey] through the sale, manufacturing, distribution, importing, or marketing of a gun-related product.” It requires industry members to “establish, implement, and enforce reasonable controls” on these activities. The Attorney General has not attempted to enforce the law. Four months after the law was passed, the Foundation, a trade group of gun makers, retailers, and other industry members, filed suit, claiming that the law is preempted by the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. 7901–7903, and violates due process, the First and Second Amendments, and the dormant Commerce Clause. The Foundation moved for a preliminary injunction, attaching declarations that gunmakers “will continually be at risk of litigation and potential liability unless [they] cease[] doing business.” They gave no factual detail.The Third Circuit held that the challenges must be dismissed. “Pre-enforcement challenges are unusual,” the plaintiff must show that the stakes are high and close at hand. This suit “falls far short of even the “normal” pre-enforcement challenge.” A brand-new civil tort statute, without more, does not justify a federal court’s intervention. View "National Shooting Sports Foundation v. Attorney General New Jersey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is the former Chief Financial Officer of the Cypress Bayou Casino. The Casino is owned by the Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana. The Chitimacha Tribe is one of four federally recognized Indian tribes in Louisiana. According to the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, the Chitimacha tribal council authorized Spivey (as CFO of the Casino) to make a $3,900 bonus payment to the then-newly elected chairman of the tribal council. Plaintiff claimed that several members of the tribal council turned around and reported the bonus payment to federal and state law enforcement. Plaintiff initially sued the Tribe, the Casino, and four tribal council members in federal court under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1985 and Louisiana tort law. The district court, over Plaintiff’s objections, again adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations, denied Plaintiff’s remand motion, and dismissed all Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded to state court. The court first wrote that when a district court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a removed case, it must remand. The court held, in accordance with the statute’s plain text and the great weight of authority from across the country, that Section 1447(c) means what it says, admits of no exceptions, and requires remand even when the district court thinks it futile. Moreover, the court held that such a dismissal should be made without prejudice. View "Spivey v. Chitimacha Tribe" on Justia Law

This case arises from the September 2017 fatal police shooting of Ruben Galindo Chavez (who used the surname “Galindo”) during an encounter with officers of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department. The action was initiated by plaintiff Azucena Zamorano Aleman — Galindo’s girlfriend and the mother of his child — both as the administrator of Galindo’s estate and in her individual capacity. Plaintiff asserted five causes of actions, including a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court awarded summary judgment to the defendants on each of the plaintiff’s claims. The court therein determined that — because it was objectively reasonable for Officer Guerra to shoot Galindo, in that Galindo posed an immediate threat to Guerra and others — Guerra is entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim. For the same reason, the court awarded summary judgment to Guerra and the City on the assault and battery, wrongful death, and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. Citing a lack of sufficient evidence, the court also awarded summary judgment to the City on the negligent training claim.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment award to the City on the negligent training claim. The court vacated the award of qualified immunity to Officer Guerra on the Fourth Amendment claim, as well as the related summary judgment awards to Guerra and the City on the balance of the state law claims. Rather than directing the entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiff on any of those claims, the court remanded for further proceedings as to all of them View "Azucena Zamorano Aleman v. City of Charlotte" on Justia Law

Officers shot and killed Brian Quinones-Rosario as he approached officers with the knife drawn. His widow as trustee, sued the officers and their employing municipalities. She alleged an excessive use of force that resulted in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court concluded that the officers did not commit a constitutional violation, and granted judgment for the officers and the municipalities. Plaintiff appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the use of force “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”. Applying those principles, and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Quinones, the court concluded that the officers’ use of force was objectively reasonable. The court explained that Quinones-Rosario posed an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury to the officers. He aggressively wielded a knife that he refused to drop despite repeated commands to do so. He then charged at the officers with the knife. One officer deployed a non-lethal taser against him, but it had no effect. The officers reasonably believed that Quinones-Rosario posed a serious threat to their safety. The officers fired more rounds when Quinones-Rosario survived the first round of shots and continued to approach the officers with the knife. The court concluded that their actions were a reasonable defensive response under the circumstances. View "Ashley Quinones v. City of Edina, MN" on Justia Law

San Benito police officer Hector Lopez approached Plaintiff while Plaintiff was standing in the front yard of his property. Lopez pushed open the gate into Plaintiff’s yard. Plaintiff told Lopez he needed a warrant and pushed back. Within seconds, the parties physically struggled, with the fifty-year-old, disabled Plaintiff brought to the ground. Plaintiff was taken into custody and, after receiving medical attention for his injuries, was charged with several offenses. All were dismissed. He now seeks recompense from Defendants Lopez and the City of San Benito for false arrest and excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants.   The Fifth Circuit concluded that Plaintiff had raised genuine issues of material fact as to his claim for false arrest against Lopez. The court reversed and remanded concerning the false arrest claim. The court otherwise affirmed. The court explained that because the hot pursuit exception does not apply (and because Lopez has not identified any other applicable exception to the warrant requirement), Plaintiff has raised genuine issues of fact as to whether Lopez had the authority to enter his property to arrest him for disorderly conduct. Further, the court wrote that its conclusion that Lopez lacked authority to make a warrantless entry onto Plaintiff’s property applies equal force to Lopez’s argument that he could have entered the property to arrest Plaintiff or failed to identify. Moreover, a rational factfinder could determine that Lopez arrested Plaintiff before Plaintiff applied any resistance. View "Sauceda v. City of San Benito, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District of South Dakota challenging the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court’s exercise of jurisdiction in a custody matter involving his minor daughter, C.S.N. Petitioner claimed that the Tribal Court’s refusal to recognize and enforce North Dakota state court orders awarding him custody of C.S.N. violated the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. Section 1738A. The district court granted summary judgment to the Tribal Court after concluding that the PKPA does not apply to Indian tribes. Petitioner appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the PKPA does not apply to Indian tribes. As a result, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Court is not obligated under that statute to enforce the North Dakota court orders awarding custody of C.S.N. to Petitioner. The district court properly granted summary judgment to the Tribal Court. The court further explained that its conclusion that the PKPA does not apply to Indian tribes is further supported by the fact that when Congress intends for tribes to be subject to statutory full-faith-and-credit requirements, it expressly says so. View "Aarin Nygaard v. Tricia Taylor" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Forro children attended St. Augustine, a self-identified Catholic school in Hartford, Wisconsin. Wisconsin provides transportation benefits for parents who send their children to private sectarian schools, Wis.Stat. 121.54. The school district and the state superintendent of public instruction denied the Forros' request because transportation was being provided to St. Gabriel, another Catholic school in the area. The law stipulates that only one school from a single organizational entity in each “attendance area” may qualify for benefits. While both claim an affiliation with Catholicism, the two schools are not affiliated with one another in other significant ways. St. Augustine and the Forros sued. Several years of litigation ensued, including a trip to the U.S. Supreme Court, two published Seventh Circuit opinions, and a Supreme Court of Wisconsin opinion, after which the Seventh Circuit concluded that the denial of transportation benefits violated Wisconsin law because it rested on an improper methodology for determining affiliation between two schools of similar faith.After noting that certain state law claims had been waived and that the federal constitutional issues did not require resolution, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that a declaratory judgment remains in effect against the Superintendent and the School District. The district court may decide what attorneys’ fees the plaintiffs should be awarded, if any, given that they have prevailed only in obtaining declaratory relief under state law. View "St. Augustine School v. Underly" on Justia Law

The Montgomery County Board of Education adopted Guidelines for Gender Identity for 2020–2021 that permit schools to develop gender support plans for students. The Guidelines allow implementation of these plans without the knowledge or consent of the students’ parents. They even authorize the schools to withhold information about the plans from parents if the school deems the parents to be unsupportive. In response, three parents with children attending Montgomery County public schools challenged the portion of the Guidelines that permit school officials to develop gender support plans and then withhold information about a child’s gender support plan from their parents. Terming it the “Parental Preclusion Policy,” the parents alleged the policy unconstitutionally usurps the parents’ fundamental right to raise their children under the Fourteenth Amendment.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for the case to be dismissed. The court explained that the parents have not alleged that their children have gender support plans, are transgender or are even struggling with issues of gender identity. As a result, they have not alleged facts that the Montgomery County public schools have any information about their children that is currently being withheld or that there is a substantial risk information will be withheld in the future. Thus, under the Constitution, they have not alleged the type of injury required to show standing. Absent an injury that creates standing, federal courts lack the power to address the parents’ objections to the Guidelines. Thus, the court remanded to the district court to dismiss the case for lack of standing. View "John and Jane Parents 1 v. Montgomery County Board of Education" on Justia Law