Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued Forensic Laboratory, Inc., KHS, the KISD Police Department, the KISD Board of Trustees (“KISD Board”), and a number of KHS, KISD, and KISD Police Department employees in their individual and official capacities. That suit was filed in the state district court in Fort Bend County, Texas. McClelland alleged (1) violations of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; (2) violations of his procedural and substantive due process rights; and (3) various state law claims, including defamation, spoliation, and civil conspiracy. The district court granted Defendants motion to dismiss and denied several other pending motions.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court correctly analyzed Plaintiff’s void-for-vagueness claim and did not err in dismissing it. It is well settled, in the educational context, that a plaintiff must allege a protected property interest. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint is devoid of any such allegations. And, even if he had alleged lack of participation on the football team or team captainship in connection with vagueness, he still would not prevail. Further, the court wrote that the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s substantive and procedural due process claims because Plaintiff did not allege the deprivation of his property or liberty interests. View "McClelland v. Katy Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law

The Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA, Civil Code, 1786) mandates certain disclosures for investigative consumer reports, which are often used by landlords to make decisions regarding consumers who apply for housing. ICRAA requires the adoption of “reasonable procedures” for providing consumer information “in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer," concerning the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of their information. Any investigative consumer reporting agency or user of information that fails to comply with the requirements is liable to the affected consumer for any actual damages or $10,000, whichever sum is greater. Courts of appeal disagreed about the constitutionality and enforceability of ICRAA.In 2018, the California Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of ICRAA. Bernuy had filed one of 27 consolidated actions seeking damages against BPMC for its commission of ICRAA violations in 2017. Bernuy’s action was designated a “bellwether” case for adjudicating certain issues. The court of appeal held that the California Supreme Court’s 2018 decision did not constitute a subsequent change in the law that relieved BPMC of liability for its ICRAA violations. However, certain plaintiffs’ ICRAA claims are time-barred under the applicable two-year statute of limitations. The limitations period was not tolled by the pendency of a putative class action. View "Bernuy v. Bridge Property Management Co." on Justia Law

During the summer of 2021, Appellants Edmond Public School Board Members and Edmond Public School District Superintendent, Angela Grunewald, (collectively "District") anticipated a complete return to in-person instruction for the 2021-2022 school year. Prior to the start of the school year, the Oklahoma City County Health Department ("OCCHD") expressed to District that quarantines should be recommended rather than required. In response, District prepared a standard letter that alerted parents when their child was exposed to a positive COVID-19 case, which left the responsibility "for carrying out a quarantine or not" up to the parents. School began on Thursday, August 12, 2021. By the fourth day of school, District reported 140 positive cases of COVID-19 which rose to 170 positive cases on the fifth day of the school year. The District thereafter implemented a policy consistent with the OCCHD’s recommendation and informed parents of the policy by email. As a result of the Policy, several unvaccinated students were required to quarantine due to being identified as a close contact. The Appellees, parents of children enrolled in Edmond Public Schools affected by the Policy ("Parents"), individually and on behalf of their children, filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief and an Application for Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") alleging the policy violated state statutory and federal constitutional rights. District objected, and the TRO was denied. The trial court denied relief on all three counts pleaded in the Petition, but granted a Temporary Injunction based on Parents' Equal Protection Clause argument and enjoined District from implementing or enforcing the Policy. The District appealed. The trial court determined Parents were likely to succeed on the merits of their Equal Protection Clause claim against District but were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Policy violated 70 O.S.Supp.2021, § 1210.189(A)(1). The Oklahoma Supreme Court found the trial court improperly interpreted § 1210.189(A)(1) and incorrectly concluded Parents were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Policy violated § 1210.189(A)(1). Because the Supreme Court determined the policy violated 70 O.S.Supp.2021, § 1210.189(A)(1), it did not address the Equal Protection Clause argument. The trial court’s order was vacated and a declaratory judgment was granted in favor of the Parents. View "Shellem v. Gruneweld" on Justia Law

President Biden issued Executive Order 14043, which generally required all federal employees to be vaccinated. Employees who didn’t comply would face termination. He also issued Executive Order 14042, imposing the same requirements and punishments for federal contractors. Plaintiffs, Feds for Medical Freedom, raised several constitutional and statutory claims. First, they asserted constitutional objections. They claimed both mandates were arbitrary, capricious, and otherwise not in accordance with law under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). And the contractor mandate violated the APA because it was not in accordance with law. Finally, they sought relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”). Plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctions against both mandates. The district court declined to enjoin the contractor mandate because it was already the subject of a nationwide injunction. But it enjoined the employee mandate on January 21, 2022. On an expedited appeal, the Fifth Circuit majority held that the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (“CSRA”) precluded the district court’s jurisdiction. The Government timely appealed that injunction. The Government’s contention is that the CSRA implicitly repeals Section1331 jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and held that it has jurisdiction over pre-enforcement challenges to President Biden’s vaccine mandate for federal employees. The court explained that the text and structure of the CSRA create a decades-old, well-established, bright-line rule: Federal employees must bring challenges to CSRA-covered personnel actions through the CSRA, but they remain free to bring other, non-CSRA challenges under the district courts’ general Section 1331 jurisdiction. View "Feds for Medical Freedom v. Biden" on Justia Law

The Food and Drug Administration denied Petitioner R.J. Reynolds Vapor Company’s (“RJRV”) application to market menthol-flavored e-cigarettes. Petitioners so ughta stay pending review of the denial order on the merits. RJRV petitioned the FDA for a stay, which was denied. RJRV and three other companies then petitioned the Fifth Circuit for review and moved to stay the Denial Order.   The Fifth Circuit entered a full stay pending resolution of RJRV’s petition on the merits. The court explained that the FDA’s disregard for the principles of fair notice and consideration of reliance interests is exacerbated by its failure to consider alternatives to denial. When an agency changes course, as the FDA did here, it must take into account “alternatives that are within the ambit of the existing policy.” Here, the court wrote, the FDA gave RJRV no such opportunity for its menthol PMTA. Further, the court explained that the FDA did not adequately address RJRV’s evidence that substantial health benefits would accrue to adult and youth cigarette smokers alike who switched to menthol Vuse, while popularity among youth would remain low overall. Moreover, the court found that RJRV has adduced evidence that the FDA has effectively banned all non-tobacco-flavored e-cigarettes, pursuant to its new and secret heightened evidentiary standard, without affording affected persons any notice or the opportunity for public comment. The court also held that given RJRV’s uncontested allegations and legal arguments, RJRV has met its burden of showing irreparable harm if denied a stay pending appeal. View "R.J. Reynolds v. FDA" on Justia Law

Appellant the Law Offices of Crystal Moroney (“Moroney”) is a law firm that principally provides legal advice and services to clients seeking to collect debt. As the agency charged with regulating this industry, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) served on Moroney a civil investigative demand (“CID”) for documents, which it subsequently petitioned to enforce in the district court. While that petition was pending, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020), holding that the provision that protected the Director of the CFPB from removal other than for cause was an unconstitutional limitation on the President’s removal power. The CFPB filed a notice to ratify the CID and the enforcement action against Moroney. The district court granted the CFPB’s petition to enforce the CID. On appeal, Moroney argues that the CID cannot be enforced.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that the CID was not void ab initio because the CFPB Director was validly appointed, that the CFPB’s funding structure is not constitutionally infirm under either the Appropriations Clause or the nondelegation doctrine and that the CID served on Moroney is not an unduly burdensome administrative subpoena. The court explained that under the nondelegation doctrine’s lenient standard, Congress has plainly provided an intelligible principle to guide the CFPB in setting and spending its budget. Therefore, the court concluded that the CFPB’s funding structure is proper under the nondelegation doctrine. View "CFPB v. Law Offs. of Crystal Moroney" on Justia Law

Tejas Motel, L.L.C. (“Tejas”)—the repeat litigant in question—owns and operates a small motel of the same name in Mesquite, Texas. The City of Mesquite (“City”) enacted a series of strict zoning ordinances that turned the motel property into a nonconforming use. It then ordered Tejas to comply with the minimum zoning requirements or cease operations. Tejas sued in state court, claiming that the City violated both the state and federal constitutions by effecting a taking without just compensation. The state trial court dismissed. The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Tejas’s state claim was procedurally barred and its federal claim was not “viable.” Tejas then brought the same federal takings claim in federal court, seeking a different result.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that while it understands that Tejas was forced into state court by Williamson County, and now cannot avoid the consequences of the adverse judgment it received. But nothing in Knick nullifies long-settled principles of res judicata. State courts are competent to adjudicate federal claims, and their judgments are entitled to full faith and credit in federal court. Because the Texas Court of Appeals issued a final judgment on the merits of Tejas’s constitutional claim, the motel does not get a second bite at the apple. View "Tejas Motel v. City of Mesquite" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed in part the order of the district court granting summary judgment rejecting Defendants' affirmative defense of qualified immunity against Plaintiff's procedural due process claim, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the federal claims against Defendants.Plaintiff brought this action against three former board members of the Town of Freetown Board of Selectmen, citing 42 U.S.C. 1983 and alleging deprivation of her right to procedural due process on the basis that Defendants removed her state court action to the federal district court. The district court rejected Defendants' argument for qualified immunity on summary judgment. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the doctrine of qualified immunity shielded Defendants from liability against Plaintiff's due process claim. View "Lawless v. Sadeck" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are landlords who filed an action against the City, alleging violations of their federal and state rights of free speech and substantive due process. The district court held that the Ordinance regulates speech, not conduct and that the speech it regulates is commercial speech. The district court applied an intermediate level of scrutiny to hold that the Ordinance was constitutional as a “reasonable means of achieving the City’s objectives and does not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to achieve them.”   The Ninth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part the district court’s judgment upholding the constitutionality of the City of Seattle’s Fair Chance Housing Ordinance, which prohibits landlords from inquiring about the criminal history of current or potential tenants and from taking adverse action, such as denying tenancy, against them based on that information.   The panel did not decide whether the Ordinance regulates commercial speech and calls for the application of intermediate scrutiny, or whether the Ordinance regulates non-commercial speech and is subject to strict scrutiny review because it concluded that the Ordinance did not survive the intermediate scrutiny standard of review. The panel held that the Ordinance’s inquiry provision impinged upon the First Amendment rights of landlords. The panel rejected the landlords’ claim that the adverse action provision of the Ordinance violated their substantive due process rights because the landlords did not have a fundamental right to exclude, and the adverse action provision survived rational basis review. Further, the panel remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the presumption of severability was rebuttable and for further proceedings. View "CHONG YIM, ET AL V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law

On November 22, 2021—the day federal employees were required to be vaccinated—Appellant filed suit in District Court, challenging the mandate’s constitutionality. Characterizing Appellant’s suit as a “workplace dispute involving a covered federal employee,” the District Court found Appellant’s claims were precluded under the CSRA and dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, Appellant insisted that he challenges the vaccine mandate’s constitutionality, as opposed to contesting a workplace dispute under the CSRA. According to his complaint, however, he alleged that the vaccine mandate is unconstitutional—at least in part—because it requires that he obtain the vaccine to avoid adverse employment action.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that all attempts to characterize his argument as anything but a challenge to adverse employment action fail for jurisdictional purposes because Appellant himself admitted that his standing to challenge the vaccine mandate is rooted in the looming disciplinary action he now faces as a result of his continued noncompliance. In other words, Appellant challenges the vaccine mandate to maintain his employment while continuing to defy the mandate that he views as unlawful. And while his constitutional arguments are relevant to the merits, they do not change the fact that one of Appellant’s interests in this suit is to avoid the impending adverse employment action. Appellant’s claims are not wholly collateral because challenges to adverse employment actions are the type of claims that the MSPB regularly adjudicates. Thus, the court found that should Appellant choose to continue challenging the vaccine mandate, he must do so through the CSRA’s scheme. View "Jason Payne v. Joseph Biden, Jr." on Justia Law