Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff saw Defendant, an officer, pointing a firearm at her 12- and 14-year-old sons down the street from their family’s home. When Plaintiff approached to ask what happened, Defendant repeatedly ordered her to “get back.” After Plaintiff questioned the order, Defendant briefly pointed his taser at her. Plainitff then complied with his orders. Her sons were eventually cleared of any wrongdoing. Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action against Defendant, claiming he used excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendant on the claim after concluding he was entitled to qualified immunity. Defendant appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant was placed in a position where he had two possibly armed suspects detained in front of him and a third unknown individual approaching from behind, creating a potentially serious safety risk. Adding to the circumstances, when Defendant ordered Plaintiff to “get back,” she moved to the side, but she did not immediately comply by moving backward. Rather, she questioned the order and moved sideways. Ordered to get back a second time, she again questioned the order and remained where she was until after the taser was drawn. Accordingly, the court wrote that under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant momentarily pointing his taser at Plaintiff to gain control of the scene was not unreasonable. View "Casondra Pollreis v. Lamont Marzolf" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Virginia-licensed mental health counselor, appealed from a district court judgment dismissing her First Amendment and Due Process challenges to a New York law requiring her to obtain a further license in that state to provide mental health counseling to New York residents. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in (1) dismissing her as-applied challenges for lack of standing, (2) construing her First Amendment facial challenge as alleging overbreadth and concluding therefrom that she failed to state a plausible claim for relief, and (3) overlooking her facial Due Process claim.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because Plaintiff need not satisfy the particular requirements for initial licensure to provide mental health counseling to New York residents, she can allege no injury from, and therefore has no standing to challenge, that part of the law. Moreover, as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims, the court explained that New York’s license requirement withstands intermediate scrutiny as a matter of law because there is no question that the law (i) serves an important government interest in promoting and protecting public health, specifically, public mental health; and (ii) is narrowly tailored by statutory definition and exemptions to advance that interest without unduly burdening speech. View "Brokamp v. James" on Justia Law

Pucillo, an Indiana resident who formerly used the last name Lock, had previously leased an apartment from Main Street. He filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in May 201, and listed as a debt past‐due rent he allegedly owed Main. The bankruptcy court granted him a discharge in September 2017, including any debt to Main. That bankruptcy discharge is listed on Pucillo’s credit reports but Main was not notified of Pucillo’s bankruptcy. In July 2017, 10 weeks before the discharge, Main had placed Pucillo’s account with National Credit for collection. Over the next 18 months, National sent Pucillo two collection letters, stating that if payment was made, National “will update credit data it may have previously submitted regarding this debt.”The week before Pucillo received the second letter, he filed suit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692e (demanding payment of a debt not owed) and section 1692c(c) (failure to cease communications and cease collections). He alleged that National’s continued communications “confused and alarmed” him. National did not actually give information to a credit reporting agency—before or after his bankruptcy discharge. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Pucillo lacked Article III standing to sue. Pucillo’s allegations of ʺconfusion,” “stress,” “concern,” and “fear” are not sufficiently concrete to result in an injury in fact that would give him standing to sue. View "Pucillo v. National Credit Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Greater Birmingham Ministries (“GBM”), an Alabamian non-profit organization dedicated to aiding low-income individuals, and several Alabamian felons (collectively “Appellants”) appealed the district court’s summary judgment denying their Equal Protection Clause challenge to Amendment 579 of the Alabama state constitution, their Ex Post Facto Clause, challenge to Amendment 579’s disenfranchisement provisions, and their National Voting Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA”), challenge to the format of Alabama’s mail voting registration form.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that (1) Amendment 579 successfully dissipated any taint from the racially discriminatory motives behind the 1901 Alabama constitution; (2) Amendment 579 does not impose punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause; and (3) Alabama’s mail voting registration form complies with the NVRA. The court wrote that it rejects Appellants’ invitation to review the extent the Alabama legislature debated the “moral turpitude” language of Amendment 579. Further, the court explained that Section 20508(b)(2)(A) is a notice statute enacted for the convenience of voting registrants. Alabama’s mail-in voting form has provided sufficient notice by informing registrants that persons convicted of disqualifying felonies are not eligible to vote and providing an easily accessible link whereby voters convicted of felonies can determine their voter eligibility. Accordingly, Alabama has complied with the requirements of Section 20508(b)(2)(A). View "Treva Thompson, et al. v. Secretary of State for the State of Alabama, et al." on Justia Law

A coalition of media companies petitioned the Idaho Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition to vacate a nondissemination order issued by the magistrate court in the pending criminal action of State of Idaho v. Bryan C. Kohberger. The Supreme Court expedited the case and ordered briefing from the parties. The Court also granted motions to intervene filed by the two parties to this case, the State of Idaho, Latah County Prosecutor (“the State”) and the defendant, Bryan Kohberger, who were also permitted to file briefs. After review of the briefs submitted, the Supreme Court dispensed with oral argument was unnecessary to resolve this case. The underlying case involved the 2022 murder of four University of Idaho students, for which Kohberger was arrested and charged with committing. The case drew widespread publicity. Recognizing the high-profile nature of the case and the extensive coverage it has received, along with the need to minimize possible pretrial prejudice, Kohberger’s attorneys and the attorneys for the State stipulated to the nondissemination order. Shortly after the order was entered, the medial companies challenged the constitutionality of the mondissemination order and sought extraordinary relief to protect free speech rights and the media’s ability to cover the case under the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that neither a writ of mandamus nor a writ of prohibition were appropriate remedies at this time. View "Associated Press, et al. v. Second Judicial District, et al." on Justia Law

In 2017, the County initiated an administrative tax foreclosure against BSI. The County Board of Revision (BOR) issued its final adjudication of foreclosure in June 2019. Because the County had opted for the alternative right of redemption, BSI had 28 days to pay the taxes before the County took title to the property. Days later, BSI filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, which automatically stayed the BOR’s final judgment and 28-day redemption period. The bankruptcy court granted the County relief from the stay on January 17, 2020. The BOR determined that the statutory redemption period expired on January 21, 2020. On January 30, rather than sell the property, the County transferred it to its land bank (Ohio Rev. Code 323.78.1). When a county sells foreclosed property at auction, it may not keep proceeds beyond the taxes the former owner owed; if the county transfers the property to the land bank, “the land becomes ‘free and clear of all impositions and any other liens.’”BSI filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that a significant difference between the appraised value of the property and the amount that the County alleged BSI owed meant that the County’s action violated the Takings Clause. The district court dismissed the case under the two-year statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The limitations period began to run when the redemption period ended on January 21, 2020. If BSI paid its delinquent taxes during that period, the County would have been prohibited from taking the property. View "Beaver Street Investments, LLC v. Summit County, Ohio" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that Defendant had interfered with a release and settlement agreement (“RSA”) entered into by Plaintiff and non-party Dr. Hans Peter Wild, establishing the terms of the breakup of their personal and professional relationship. Subsequently, Wild and Defendant began a personal relationship. In this action, Plaintiff claimed that Wild breached the RSA and that Defendant persuaded Wild to breach the RSA. Plaintiff sought recovery of $150 million in damages, as well as punitive damages. On April 10, 2020, the district court granted Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to file her notice of appeal and affirmed the district court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety pursuant to California’s Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (“anti-SLAPP”) statute and dismissing the action. The panel held that the notice of appeal was timely. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a) required a separate document to implement the district court’s April 10 Order on Plaintiff’s anti-SLAPP motion. But the judgment was not “set forth on a separate document” until May 1, 2020. Therefore, Plaintiff’s notice of appeal was timely when filed on May 28, 2020.   The panel held that where an anti-SLAPP defendant lodges a factual challenge, district courts may properly consider extrinsic evidence in evaluating whether a defendant has met her prima facie burden under step one. Here, the district court correctly evaluated Defendant’s challenge as a factual one based on her own statements in her anti-SLAPP motion and her reliance on extrinsic evidence at both steps. View "LEZLIE GUNN V. CHRISTINE DRAGE" on Justia Law

This case started more than fifty years ago when Minnie Liddell sued to desegregate the St. Louis public school system. The NAACP joined the lawsuit, and the State of Missouri (among others) became a defendant. The parties struck a deal that lasted until 1999 when they agreed to end Missouri’s remedial obligations. The Missouri Legislature ratified the parties’ settlement agreement and created a charter-school option. A group of charter schools complained to the Missouri Legislature, which altered the funding formula in 2006. The revised formula, part of Senate Bill 287, is what has led to the current dispute. The St. Louis Public School District and one of the plaintiffs asked the district court to enforce the settlement agreement by having Missouri reimburse it for the special-sales-tax revenue it had lost under the new funding formula. The district court sided with Missouri, and both sides appealed. Plaintiffs continued to believe that the St. Louis Public School District should receive all the special-sales-tax revenue. And Missouri argued that the desegregation-spending condition finds no support in the settlement agreement.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment but vacated the part requiring charter schools to spend those funds on “desegregation measures.” The court explained that there has been no “disproportionate adverse financial impact” on the St. Louis Public School District because it never had a right to keep all the special-sales-tax revenue for itself. Moreover, the court rejected the argument that allowing charter schools to spend their money as they see fit is inconsistent with the “purpose” of the settlement agreement. View "Deric Liddell v. State of Missouri" on Justia Law

Plaintiff spent more than twelve years in state prison because of his wrongful conviction for two murders. In 2015, the state district court granted the Harris County District Attorney’s motion to dismiss the charges against Plaintiff and Plaintiff was released from prison. Plaintiff filed a petition with the Texas Office of the Comptroller for compensation under the Tim Cole Act, which provides state compensation to individuals who have been wrongfully convicted of state crimes in state courts. His petition was denied because (1) it was not based on a finding that Plaintiff was “actually innocent,” (2) Plaintiff had not received a pardon, and (3) the district attorney had not filed a qualifying motion. While Plaintiff was pursuing compensation under the Tim Cole Act, he brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action in federal district court. The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissed the remainder of Plaintiff’s 1983 claims.   The Fifth Circuit previously certified a question to the Texas Supreme Court in this matter, asking whether the Tim Cole Act bars maintenance of a federal lawsuit involving the same subject matter that was filed before the claimant received compensation under the Tim Cole Act. Having received a response from the Texas Supreme Court in the affirmative, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. In light of this clarified meaning of Section 103.153(b) of the Tim Cole Act, the court analyzed the district court’s grant of Defendants summary judgment motion and found that Plaintiff’s federal lawsuit is barred by his acceptance of Tim Cole Act compensation. View "Brown v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

President Biden invoked his authority under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (“Procurement Act”) to direct federal agencies to include in certain contracts a clause requiring covered contractor employees to follow COVID-19 safety protocols, including vaccination requirements, in order for employees to be eligible to work on federal government projects. Plaintiffs sued to enjoin the vaccination mandate. This lawsuit revolved around four documents that comprise the Contractor Mandate: the Executive Order, the Task Force Guidance, the Office of Management and Budget Determination, and the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council Guidance. The district court granted a permanent injunction against the Contractor Mandate, effective in any contract that either involved a party domiciled or headquartered in Arizona and/or was performed “principally” in Arizona.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting a permanent injunction and dissolved the injunction. First, the panel held the Major Questions Doctrine—which requires that Congress speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast economic and political significance—did not apply. Second, the panel held that even if the Major Questions Doctrine applied, it would not bar the Contractor Mandate because the Mandate is not a transformative expansion of the President’s authority under the Procurement Act. Third, the panel held that the Contractor Mandate fell within the President’s authority under the Procurement Act. Fourth, the panel held that the nondelegation doctrine and state sovereignty concerns did not invalidate the Contractor Mandate. Finally, the panel held that the Contractor Mandate satisfied the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act’s procedural requirements. View "KRISTIN MAYES, ET AL V. JOSEPH BIDEN, ET AL" on Justia Law