Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was hired as a Law Enforcement Officer by the Sisseton, South Dakota, Police Department. Plaintiff and the City signed a Sisseton Police Department Employment Contract (the “Contract”) requiring Plaintiff to reimburse the City for the cost of her training if she left the Department before completing 36 months of employment. In January 2022, Defendant, the City’s Chief of Police, informed Plaintiff that the Police Commission had lost confidence in her, and Defendant asked Plaintiff to resign, which she did. Plaintiff filed this 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action, asserting, along with other claims, that the City and numerous individual defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due process rights. The district court granted Defendants’ motion. Plaintiff appealed only the dismissal of her due process claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the district court the Supreme Court of South Dakota would rule that the Contract did not change an at-will employment relationship. The court explained that for Plaintiff’s claim against the City to survive a motion to dismiss, her complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” The court agreed with the district court that the Complaint “failed to allege any unconstitutional policy or custom that enabled” Defendants to deprive Plaintiff of her alleged federal due process rights. Counsel for Plaintiff could only respond that the Complaint plausibly alleged the practice of violating the three-year term in the City’s employee reimbursement contracts. That practice was not alleged in the Complaint and, in any event, is nothing more than a “facially lawful municipal action.” View "Samantha LaCoe v. City of Sisseton" on Justia Law

The Texas Department of Criminal Justice fired Plaintiff after he refused to cut his hair and beard in violation of his religious vow. Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies. He then filed a pro se lawsuit against TDCJ and various officers, which alleged claims of religious discrimination and failure to accommodate under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants.   The Fifth Circuit, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Groff v. DeJoy, 143 S. Ct. 2279 (2023), reversed. The court explained that Title VII forbids religious discrimination in employment. The statute defines “religion” broadly to include “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” Further, the court explained that Title VII also requires employers to accommodate the religious observances or practices of applicants and employees. The court held that TDCJ breached both duties. TDCJ (A) failed to accommodate Hebrew’s religious practice and (B) discriminated against him on the basis of his religious practice   The court reasoned that the only issue is whether TDCJ has met its burden to show that granting Hebrew’s requested accommodation—to keep his hair and beard—would place an undue hardship on TDCJ. The court held that (1) TDCJ cannot meet the undue hardship standard and (2) the Department’s counterarguments are unavailing. The court noted that, in this case, TDCJ cannot hide behind its “otherwise-neutral policy.” This policy must “give way” to Plaintiff’s requested accommodation. View "Hebrew v. TDCJ" on Justia Law

The University of Iowa expelled graduate student John Doe after investigating two accusations of sexual misconduct brought against him by different complainants. The Iowa Board of Regents affirmed the decision. Doe sued the University and University officials, claiming, in part, discrimination on the basis of sex under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. Section 1681(a), and procedural due process violations, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court granted qualified immunity to the University officials, dismissed the procedural due process claims against them, and granted the University summary judgment on the remaining claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it is not convinced that institutional efforts to prevent sexual misconduct on campus, including educational programs that challenge students to evaluate the impact of gender norms on rape culture, amount to evidence of external pressure on the University that supports an inference of bias. The court held that Doe failed to provide “sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that [the University] disciplined him on the basis of sex.” Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Doe’s Title IX claim. Further, the court explained that the University provided adequate notice of the charges. Therefore, the court wrote that because Doe failed to show the University officials’ conduct violated his federal rights, it affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Doe’s claims against the University officials. View "John Doe v. University of Iowa" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendants Jeff Jenkins, Jeff Jenkins Productions, LLC, and Bongo, LLC, for breach of contract and eight other causes of action. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged she conceived the idea for and worked to develop and coproduce a popular television program that came to be known as Bling Empire on Netflix. In the spring of 2018, Plaintiff presented the idea for the program to Defendant Jenkins during a series of discussions, and she gave Jenkins written development material concerning the program. Plaintiff alleged causes of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional and negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent inducement, and other claims. Defendants responded with an anti-SLAPP motion.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order denying Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion to strike Plaintiff’s complaint. The court concluded that adhering to the two-part test announced in FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133 (FilmOn), that while the creation of a television show is an exercise of constitutionally protected expression, in this case, there is no “functional relationship” between the activity challenged in the complaint and the issue of public interest, as required by FilmOn.  Further, the court wrote that the conduct challenged, while it “implicates” a public issue, does not “contribute to public discussion of that issue” Consequently, Defendants’ activity excluding Plaintiff and failing to compensate her was not undertaken “in furtherance of free speech ‘in connection with’ an issue of public interest.” View "Li v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that two sheriff deputies unlawfully entered his home. The deputies claim Armstrong’s then-wife invited them in. But although they disagree on whether the deputies’ conduct was reasonable, they do not dispute the historical facts as to what happened. Plaintiff filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The deputies moved for summary judgment on the merits claiming that, even construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, their conduct was objectively reasonable. Alternatively, the deputies claimed they should be granted summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court agreed with the deputies on the merits, finding the deputies reasonably believed that Roadcap had the authority to consent to the deputies’ entry.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the deputies did, as the district court concluded, briefly detain Plaintiff. But the court agreed with the district court that the deputies acted reasonably as a matter of law because they were responding to a domestic situation, there were guns in the house, and Plaintiff was argumentative. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment on the seizure of person claim as well. Moreover, the court wrote that, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the deputies exercised some care. Thus, the district court properly dismissed the gross negligence claim. Last, as to the conversion claim, the district court properly explained that there is no evidence in the record that the deputies possessed, touched or exercised any authority over Plaintiff’s personal property. View "Adam Armstrong v. Bryan Hutcheson" on Justia Law

Representative Scott Perry’s cell phone, which was seized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation pursuant to a warrant. In a district court motion, Representative Perry argued the Clause bars the government from reviewing many of the messages stored on the phone. As to communications with Executive Branch officials and parties outside of Congress, Representative Perry argued that his messages are necessarily privileged because they constitute “informal factfinding”—a capacious category he asserts is always privileged and includes a Member’s attempts to obtain information related to topics of upcoming votes without express House authorization. The district court held none of these communications were privileged because they were “political” or not fact-finding at all. The DC Circuit stayed the district court’s order pending appeal and expedited the case.   The DC Circuit vacated the judgment in part and remanded. The court explained that as o Representative Perry’s communications with individuals outside the federal government, communications with members of the Executive Branch, and communications with other Members of Congress regarding alleged election fraud during the period before Congress’s vote certifying the 2020 election and before its vote on H.R. 1, the district court failed to apply the fact-specific privilege inquiry under Gravel. The court affirmed with respect to the remaining privilege determinations about Representative Perry’s communications with Members of Congress. View "In re: Sealed Case (PUBLIC REISSUED OPINION)" on Justia Law

The Verona Police Department twice arrested L.B. for his connection to violent shootings. Both times, however, he was released while his charges were pending. Just five months after his second arrest, L.B. drove to Annie Walton’s house and opened fire—killing Annie Walton and injuring her grandson, Aliven Walton. Annie Walton’s wrongful death beneficiaries (collectively, Plaintiffs ) believe the City of Verona and the Verona Chief of Police, J.B. Long, are responsible for the shooting at Annie Walton’s home, so they sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. At summary judgment, the district court initially dismissed all claims. But Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, and the district court reversed course—finding the City of Verona was not entitled to sovereign immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Plaintiffs and the City of Verona subsequently filed interlocutory appeals.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Plaintiffs appeal for lack of jurisdiction and reversed the district court’s finding against the City regarding sovereign immunity. The court explained that Long had no special duty to protect Plaintiffs besides his general duty to keep the public safe as the City’s Chief of Police. The court explained that the only evidence that demonstrates Long had knowledge of any connection between L.B. and Plaintiffs comes from Long’s investigative file, where there is a copy of a trespassing complaint that Annie filed against L.B. in 2016. Accordingly, the court held Long did not owe a duty to protect Plaintiffs from L.B.’s drive-by shooting. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot sustain their negligence claims or their MTCA claims against the City. View "Walton v. City of Verona" on Justia Law

The Fellowship of Christian Athletes (FCA), is a ministry group formed for student-athletes to engage in various activities through their shared Christian faith. FCA holds certain core religious beliefs, including a belief that sexual intimacy is designed only to be expressed within the confines of a marriage between one man and one woman. The San Jose Unified School District (District) revoked FCA’s status as an official student club on multiple campuses for violation of the District’s nondiscrimination policies. FCA filed a motion for a preliminary injunction for violation of FCA’s First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion and free speech and directed the district court to enter an order reinstating FCA’s recognition as an official Associated Student Body (ASB) approved student club. The district court denied the motion.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial. The en banc court held that the District’s Pioneer High School FCA had representational organizational standing and its claims for prospective injunctive relief were not moot. FCA National had organizational standing, and its claims were not moot because the District’s actions frustrated FCA National’s mission and required it to divert organizational resources, which it would continue to do in order to challenge the District’s policies. The en banc court next held that the district court erred in applying a heightened standard applicable to mandatory injunctions. The en banc court held that FCA and the other plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their Free Exercise claims. View "FELLOWSHIP OF CHRISTIAN ATHLETES, ET AL V. SAN JOSE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATIO, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kyle Wolfe appealed the dismissal of his lawsuit against Vermont Digger and its editor (collectively, “VT Digger”), arguing that dismissal was improper and alleging that VT Digger’s publication of articles about him was defamatory and constituted a hate crime. VT Digger cross-appealed, arguing that its special motion to strike under Vermont’s anti-SLAPP statute should not have been denied as moot after its motion to dismiss was granted. In October 2021, plaintiff was arrested at the Vermont Statehouse on charges of aggravated disorderly conduct, disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest based on conduct directed toward the Speaker of the Vermont House of Representatives. VT Digger published an article in October 2021, titled, “Man arrested at the Vermont Statehouse after threatening House speaker.” In December 2021, plaintiff was released on conditions that required him to stay in Rutland County and prohibited him from possessing firearms or contacting the House Speaker. The same day, VT Digger published an article titled, “Defendant who threatened House speaker released with several conditions.” In February 2022, plaintiff allegedly posted annotated photographs of firearms to his social media accounts, “tagged” the House Speaker in a Facebook post, and asked others to contact the House Speaker, noting in a comment on Facebook, “Yes, I am aware this is technically ‘illegal.’ ” Due to this conduct, plaintiff was charged in March 2022 with violating the anti-stalking order. VT Digger subsequently published an article on March 3, 2022, detailing plaintiff’s new conditions of release. Finally, on March 7, VT Digger published another article describing plaintiff’s social media posts that led to the charge of violating the order against stalking and his conditions of release. Plaintiff filed a complaint against VT Digger in May 2022 accusing it of defamation by libel and slander and requesting the civil division enjoin VT Digger from publishing further articles about him. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim, but concluded the trial court should have granted VT Digger’s motion to strike, and therefore reversed and remanded for the court to award attorney’s fees to VT Digger pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. View "Wolfe v. VT Digger et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the Chief Meteorologist at CBS46, an Atlanta news station. But during his tenure, female colleagues raised repeated complaints that he engaged in inappropriate conduct and sexual harassment—including “compliments” about appearance, sexually charged language, requests for nude photos, and more. Plaintiff, who is white, alleges that he was terminated because of his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The sexual harassment justification, he says, was just a pretext. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that the ultimate question in any discrimination case is whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff based on race. Here, Plaintiff failed to show that a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant terminated his employment because he was white.   The court explained that Plaintiff notes that the station’s new meteorologist is a Hispanic woman. However, Plaintiff mostly argued that the existence of race data on the corporate form meant that he was fired because he was white. The court explained Plaintiff lacked direct evidence of discrimination, he lacked evidence that Defendant treated his race as a factor favoring his termination, and he lacked evidence that Defendant treated similarly situated non-white employees more favorably. On the other hand, Defendant has produced extensive evidence of Plaintiff’s sexual harassment, which is a valid, nondiscriminatory reason for his termination. The court explained that on this record, no reasonable jury could infer that Defendant’s justification was pretext for race discrimination. View "Paul Ossmann v. Meredith Corporation" on Justia Law