Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests with six intelligence agencies for any records about the unmasking of members of President Trump’s campaign and transition team. Plaintiff sought to uncover what he alleges was inappropriate intelligence surveillance for political purposes. Declining to produce any records, the Agencies issued so-called Glomar responses, explaining that even the existence or nonexistence of such records was exempted from FOIA. The district court granted summary judgment for the Agencies, concluding that FOIA exempted the information Plaintiff requested and that the Agencies had no obligation to search for responsive records before invoking Glomar.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that an agency properly issues a Glomar response when its affidavits plausibly describe the justifications for issuing such a response, and these justifications are not substantially called into question by contrary record evidence. Because the Glomar procedure protects information about even the existence of certain records, an agency need not search for responsive records before invoking it. Here, the Agencies have properly invoked Glomar on the grounds that the information Plaintiff seeks is protected by FOIA Exemptions One and Three, and nothing in the record suggests the Agencies acted in bad faith in issuing their responses. View "Gene Schaerr v. DOJ" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court denying three plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in this suit brought to challenge the City of Des Moines' use of the state's income offset program to collect automated traffic citation penalties and granting summary judgment in favor of the City, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to a preemption claim and a claim for unjust enrichment.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' claims that, among other things, the City's use of the income offset program amounted to an unconstitutional taking and that their right to procedural due process was violated. As to Plaintiffs' contention that the City's use of the program was preempted by state law, however, the district court reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in dismissing one plaintiff's preemption claim with respect to his requests for declaratory and injunctive relief and in dismissing two plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment. The Court remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Livingood v. City of Des Moines" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from the tragic death of a man who died while in custody. Appellants appealed the district court’s orders dismissing their claims against the Sheriff and granting summary judgment to the Fulton County Sheriff’s Department Officers, NaphCare, and a NaphCare employee.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against the Sheriff and its grant of summary judgment to both the Officers and the employee. However, the court vacated and remanded the district court’s summary judgment in favor of NaphCare. The court explained that in Appellants’ response to NaphCare’s motion for summary judgment, Appellants relied mainly on the medical report and deposition of Dr. Timothy Hughes but also referred to the report and deposition of two other witnesses, as required by O.C.G.A. Section 9-11-9.1. Dr. Hughes’s report concluded the failure of NaphCare medical staff to properly screen, examine, and treat the decedent was the proximate cause of his death. This testimony is supported by the other witnesses. The court agreed with Appellants that, based on Dr. Hughes’s testimony, there is enough of a genuine issue of material fact for NaphCare’s liability to reach a jury. Dr. Hughes did not solely rest his argument on NaphCare’s failure to sedate the decedent. It was the failure of the staff to follow through with the decedent at all that was the problem. While this included the need for sedation, it also included immediate classification to suicide watch and observation. View "April Myrick, et al v. Fulton County, Georgia, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a federal inmate, brings claims under the Fifth Amendment for money damages against federal prison officials for alleged violations of procedural due process and equal protection. Plaintiff contended his claims are authorized by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and its progeny.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that “the Supreme Court has all but closed the door on Bivens remedies” that do not fit within the precise confines of its prior Bivens cases. The court explained that Plaintiff’s claims are brought against a “new category of defendants”—prison officials, as opposed to a former Congressman in Davis—operating in a different legal and factual context (prisoner litigation). Expanding Bivens to these types of claims would likely have “systemwide consequences” for the BOP in the form of increased litigation, and Congress has so far declined to create a damages remedy for these types of actions against federal prison officials.   Further, the court explained that special factors also counsel against extending the Bivens remedy to cover Plaintiff’s claims. First, the court wrote, Plaintiff’s claims would “require scrutiny of new categories of conduct and a new category of defendants—namely, BOP employees involved in transferring inmates and managing the agency’s housing system” and BOP employees involved in inmate discipline and employment, such as through the UNICOR program. Second, Plaintiff’s claims “intersect with the statutory scheme delegating authority over prison designation, transfer, and housing decisions to the BOP,” as well as those governing prison discipline and inmate employment. View "Joseph Mays v. T. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff has been incarcerated on death row in Arkansas since 1997. After he was denied relief in state court under Arkansas’s postconviction DNA testing statute, Plaintiff filed this federal lawsuit against several Arkansas officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on both standing and immunity grounds. The district court denied the motion, and Defendants appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that while Plaintiff does not expressly allege that the Attorney General currently possesses any of the DNA evidence he wants to test, Act 1780 provides the Attorney General an opportunity to play a critical role in the statute’s implementation. And here, the Attorney General responded to Plaintiff’s Act 1780 petition by opposing it in state court. The Attorney General “thereby caused,” in part, Plaintiff’s ongoing injury of being denied access to DNA testing that might prove his innocence. As such, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an injury in fact that was caused by Defendants and that would be redressed by the relief he seeks in his Section 1983 action. He has standing to bring his procedural due process challenge to Act 1780. Further, the court found that Defendants here are not immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment because Plaintiff seeks prospective declaratory and injunctive relief and has alleged a sufficient connection between the defendants and Act 1780’s enforcement. View "Stacey Johnson v. Tim Griffin" on Justia Law

In May 2022, Defendant filed a motion to vacate his sentence on the basis that the 230 years to life sentence was unauthorized because his three prior violent or serious felony convictions under the “Three Strikes” law all arose from the same underlying case. Consequently, appellant contended he should only be sentenced as a second strike offender. The court construed this as an application for writ of habeas corpus and denied relief.Subsequently, Defendant appealed the order denying post-conviction relief. Because courts have the discretion to initiate an independent review of the denial of a post-judgment motion, the court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Defendant's petition. View "P. v. Hodges" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to his former employer, the Georgia Department of Public Safety (“Department”). Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in concluding that he failed to make out a prima facie case of Title VII race discrimination regarding (1) the Department’s investigation of an incident stemming from his alleged intoxication at work and (2) the Department’s failure to promote him to corporal while he was on administrative leave. Plaintiff also raised a separate evidentiary argument, alleging that the district court erred in refusing to admit a document he alleges is from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the investigation claim for different reasons than those relied upon by the district court. Further, the court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the document allegedly from the EEOC. The court wrote that Plaintiff has forfeited any arguments as to the district court’s findings that the purported EEOC document was inadmissible because it contained ultimate legal conclusions and an unsupported expert opinion because he did not challenge either of these grounds in his opening brief. Further, no extraordinary circumstances apply to warrant consideration because a refusal to consider the issue would not result in a miscarriage of justice, the issue is not one of substantial justice, the proper resolution is not beyond any doubt, and the issue does not present significant questions of general impact or of great public concern. View "Clyde Anthony v. Georgia Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

In 2018, Mary Jackson and a nonprofit organization, Reaching Our Sisters Everywhere, Inc. (“ROSE”), filed a complaint against the Georgia Secretary of State challenging the constitutionality of the Georgia Lactation Consultant Practice Act (“the Act”), OCGA §§ 43-22A-1 to 43-22A-13. Under the Act, the Secretary issues licenses authorizing lactation care providers to provide lactation care and services for compensation. Only lactation care providers who obtain a privately issued certification as an International Board Certified Lactation Consultant (“IBCLC”) were eligible to obtain a license. Jackson and ROSE (collectively “Plaintiffs”) alleged their work included the provision of lactation care and services and that the Act was irrational and lacked any real and substantial connection to the public health, safety, or welfare because there was no evidence that non-IBCLC providers of lactation care and services ever harmed the public. They also contended the Act would require them to cease practicing their chosen profession, thus violating their rights to due process and equal protection under the Georgia Constitution. In the first round of this litigation, the trial court granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but the Georgia Supreme Court reversed and remanded with direction. Following remand, the Secretary withdrew his motion to dismiss, and the parties engaged in discovery and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On the due process claim, the trial court granted the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment, and on the equal protection claim, the trial court granted Plaintiffs’ motion. The Secretary appealed, and Plaintiffs filed a cross-appeal. The Supreme Court concluded in the cross-appeal that the Act was unconstitutional on due process grounds and that the trial court therefore erred in granting summary judgment to the Secretary and denying it to Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court on the due process claim and did not reach the equal protection claim raised in the main appeal. View "Raffensperger v. Jackson, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was convicted of a double murder in Durham, North Carolina. But after new exculpatory DNA evidence was discovered, a state superior court judge vacated Plaintiff’s conviction, and he was released after 21 years in prison. Plaintiff then filed this civil rights action for his wrongful conviction. Ultimately, a jury found that former Durham Police Department Officer violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights during the murder investigation, and it awarded Plaintiff $6 million. On appeal, Plaintiff asked the Fourth Circuit to reverse the district court’s dismissal on summary judgment of his claims against the City of Durham and two other officers. He also sought a new damages trial, arguing that the jury’s award was impacted by improper character evidence. On cross-appeal, Defendant asked the court to set aside the jury verdict and remand for a new trial.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the jury verdict against the former police officer and the dismissal of the claims against the City; however, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the two other officers and remanded for further proceedings on those claims. The court explained that the jury could find that by not turning over the video of an alternative suspect making incriminating statements or their notes related to that interview, the two officers intentionally hid evidence from Plaintiff in his innocence proceedings—evidence that cast serious doubts on his conviction and, potentially, on DPD’s underlying investigation. The court wrote that any competing testimony is a credibility issue that should be left to the jury View "Darryl Howard v. City of Durham" on Justia Law

Appellant, as personal representative of the estate of Decedent, filed a second amended complaint alleging Decedent suffered deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs while in custody at the Alleghany County, Maryland Detention Center (“ACDC”), which led to his death. Appellant asserted claims against various individuals (the “Individual Medical Defendants”) and against the company contracted to provide medical care services to inmates at ACDC, Wellpath, LLC, (collectively “Appellees”). The district court dismissed Appellant’s second amended complaint.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court concluded that the complaint sufficiently alleged a Fourteenth Amendment violation for deliberate indifference to Decedent’s serious medical needs. The court disagreed with the district court’s conclusion that Appellant failed to plead actual knowledge when she alleged that none of the Individual Medical Defendants “thought it necessary to take Decedent to the hospital.” In so holding, the district court failed to consider the context of the allegation and disregarded the obvious sarcasm in the full allegation. Appellant actually alleged that none of the Individual Medical Defendants “thought it necessary to take Decedent to the hospital despite an obvious ongoing medical emergency.” Further, the court held that Appellant sufficiently alleged that the Individual Medical Defendants’ treatment and/or attempts at treatment were not “adequate to address Decedent’s serious medical needs,” that Decedent’s deterioration was persistent and obvious, and that the factual allegations allege more than mere disagreements regarding Decedent’s medical care. As such, Appellant has plausibly alleged a Fourteenth Amendment violation. View "Shelly Stevens v. Dawn Holler" on Justia Law