Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs were arrested by Sheriff’s deputies for stashing their client’s cell phone in a bag only minutes before the police executed a search warrant for child pornography on that phone.  Plaintiffs alleged that District Attorney and Assistant District Attorney ordered the arrest. Following the arrest, the DA, in a statement to the press, and ADA, on the courthouse steps, publicly accused Plaintiffs of concealing evidence of a crime and knowingly possessing child pornography. After Plaintiffs were acquitted they filed this federal lawsuit for unlawful arrest. The district court entered judgment against the Deputies and denied the DA’s and ADA’s motion for summary judgment on the false arrest claim. The district court also denied the district attorneys’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ defamation claims.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded to the district court with instructions to enter judgment for Defendants on Plaintiffs’ false arrest claims. The court wrote that on remand, the district court should determine whether to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the defamation claims. The court held that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because they had arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs. The court explained it believes “a reasonable officer, looking at the entire legal landscape at the time of the arrests, could have interpreted the law as permitting the arrests here.” However, even if Defendants made their allegedly defamatory statements as part of their official duties, the Supreme Court of Alabama has held that state-agent immunity does not protect against intentional defamation. View "Megan Garcia, et al v. Pamela Casey, et al" on Justia Law

An officer deployed pepper spray on Plaintiff and others during a protest in downtown St. Louis. Plaintiff sued various parties (collectively, “City Officials”), alleging various federal and Missouri law claims, including First Amendment retaliation. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. The district court granted summary judgment to the City Officials on some of the claims. As relevant to this interlocutory appeal, however, the district court concluded that neither the City nor one officer was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim and therefore denied the motion in part. The district court also reserved a ruling on the City Officials’ motion for summary judgment on two state law claims.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and remanded for the district court to resolve the motion on the state law claims. The court explained that based on Plaintiff’s interaction with the officer and taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, “a jury could find that the officer acted with the prohibited . . . malice” if he deployed the pepper spray with the ulterior motive of retaliation. Or a jury may determine that the officer’s actions upheld his duty, but the court explained that it has no basis to decide that factual question on an interlocutory appeal. However, the court remanded with instructions for the district court to reach the merits of the sovereign immunity issue as to the state law claims. View "Amir Brandy v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

Appellants were each pepper-sprayed by Police Officer William Olsten while participating in a protest in downtown St. Louis. Each of them sued various officials, alleging First Amendment retaliation and excessive force claims, as well as various other federal and state law claims. In each case, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city officials on all the federal claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction on the state law claims.   The Eighth Circuit consolidated the cases and affirmed. The court explained that here, Appellants admit that “every other non-police officer in the vicinity was actively involved in a protest” and that the officer “moved his arm side to side and indiscriminately sprayed numerous protestors.” One cannot simultaneously single out Appellants and “indiscriminately” spray the crowd. And there is no evidence in the record that either Appellant had any interaction with the officer or that the officer was aware of their presence, or that either did anything to differentiate themselves from the other protestors in the crowd. While one Appellant argued she was filming the protest, there is no evidence that the officer observed her filming or deployed pepper spray in retaliation for her doing so. Regardless of whether the officer’s action was appropriate or reasonable under the circumstances, the lack of evidence causally connecting the officer’s adverse action of using pepper spray to Appellants’ protected expression is fatal to the retaliation claims. View "Rasheen Aldridge v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, survivors and the administrator of a man shot and killed by Defendant police officers filed a lawsuit alleging claims of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and battery and negligence under Georgia law. And it demanded monetary damages. Both officers moved for summary judgment. They argued that they are entitled to qualified immunity from the claim of excessive force. They also argued that they are entitled to official immunity under Georgia law from the claims of battery and negligence. The district court denied the officers’ motions.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Defendants’ appeal based on a lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that it lacks appellate jurisdiction over the denial of qualified or official immunity that turns on issues of evidentiary sufficiency. The court explained that in this case, the only issues in this appeal are issues of evidentiary sufficiency. In their motions for summary judgment, the officers argued that their use of force was reasonable under the circumstances because they encountered a suspect who had brandished a gun, discharged it at least once, and ignored their commands to show his hands. The officers argued that in the light of these facts when they saw the man move, they had actual and probable cause to use deadly force on him. View "Joshua Paul English, et al v. Officer Jonathan Fowler, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs individually and as next friends of their minor daughter, I.B., appealed the district court’s dismissal of disability discrimination and civil rights deprivation claims, and denial of their motion to reconsider dismissing with prejudice a state law negligence claim against the Bentonville, Arkansas School District (“the District”).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Arkansas law provides a direct cause of action against the liability insurer of a school district that is “not subject to suit for tort.” Plaintiffs’ Complaint named “John Doe” as an additional defendant, alleged on information and belief that the District maintained liability insurance, identified the insurer as John Doe, and stated that “the joinder of [John Doe] will be made upon verification of its identity.” Eleven months later, the district court ordered Plaintiffs to show good cause for an extension of the deadline to add parties, if they opposed dismissal of the John Doe defendant without prejudice. When Plaintiffs did not respond, the district court dismissed John Doe without prejudice, leaving the District, with its statutory immunity, the only negligence defendant. Plaintiffs were not deprived of a remedy for the alleged negligence of District employees and agents. View "Rodney Baker v. Bentonville School District" on Justia Law

Two freelance journalists, Spencer Woodman and George Joseph, brought separate actions at the Michigan Court of Claims against the Michigan Department of Corrections (the MDOC), arguing that the MDOC wrongfully denied their requests under Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Plaintiffs sought video and audio recordings of a prisoner altercation that resulted in the death of inmate Dustin Szot. The MDOC denied their FOIA requests, claiming the records were exempt from disclosure. Plaintiffs and the MDOC both moved for summary judgment. The Court of Claims ordered the MDOC to disclose the audio recording to plaintiffs and to produce the videos for an in camera review. The trial court permitted the MDOC to submit the videos in a format that obscured the faces of the employees and prisoners in the videos to protect those individuals. However, the MDOC provided the unredacted videos for in camera review. The Court of Claims ultimately ordered the MDOC to disclose the unredacted videos to plaintiffs. The MDOC moved for reconsideration, arguing that it did not need to disclose the videos or, alternatively, that it should have been allowed to redact the videos by blurring the faces of the individuals in the videos. The Court of Claims denied the motion but nevertheless permitted the MDOC to make the requested redactions and permitted plaintiffs’ counsel to view both the redacted and unredacted videos. Plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s reduced amount of attorney fees and the denial of punitive damages. The MDOC cross-appealed, challenging only the trial court’s determination that plaintiffs prevailed in full and thus were entitled to attorney fees under FOIA. The Michigan Supreme Court determined plaintiffs prevailed under MCL 15.240(6) because the action was reasonably necessary to compel the disclosure of the records and because plaintiffs obtained everything they initially sought; accordingly, the court was required to award reasonable attorney fees. Furthermore, pro bono representation was not an appropriate factor to consider in determining the reasonableness of attorney fees; accordingly, the Court of Claims abused its discretion by reducing the attorney-fee award to plaintiffs' law firm on the basis of the firm's pro bono representation of plaintiffs. View "Woodman v. Department Of Corrections" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants L.A. Central Plaza LLC and Central Liquor & Market, Inc. for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). After Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the merits, the district court instead sua sponte dismissed the case on the ground that Plaintiff’s amended complaint had failed adequately to plead the elements of Article III standing. Plaintiff timely appealed the dismissal.   The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded. The panel held that because Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to prove his case as to standing, the district court had discretion in resolving Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, to also consider sua sponte whether to grant summary judgment against Jones on the issue of standing. The panel held, however, that when presented with the issue of standing in the context of Plaintiff’s fully briefed summary judgment motion, the district court could not ignore the factual evidence of standing presented at summary judgment and instead sua sponte examine the adequacy of the complaint’s allegations of standing. View "GEORGE JONES V. L.A. CENTRAL PLAZA, LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) was dismissed for lack of standing. Thereafter, the district court considered and granted Malibu Road and Bungalow Lighting’s motion for attorneys’ fees under the ADA’s fee provision. Plaintiff did not appeal the dismissal of his ADA claim for lack of standing, but he appeals the award of attorneys’ fees, arguing that his lawsuit was not frivolous. However, the issue before the court was not whether Plaintiff’s claim was frivolous and therefore justified an award of fees, but rather whether there is a basis to award attorneys’ fees under the ADA’s fee provision after the underlying claim has been dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.   The Ninth Circuit reversed and vacated. The panel held that because the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for lack of standing, it lacked jurisdiction to award fees under the Americans with Disabilities Act’s fee provision, 42 U.S.C. Section 12205 View "ANTONIO FERNANDEZ V. 23676-23726 MALIBU ROAD, LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing this lawsuit against the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (FOMB) and its executive director challenging the FOMB's alleged failure to review a sale agreement on untimeliness grounds, holding that the dismissal was proper, albeit on standing grounds.Appellants - several Puerto Rico corporations and individuals - brought this action claiming that the FOMB's alleged failure to review a $384 million loan sale agreement between the Economic Development Bank for Puerto Rico (BDE) and a private investment company violated their constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, and a statutory violation under the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability act . The district court granted the FOMB's motion to dismiss, concluding that the claims were time-barred. The First Circuit affirmed but on different grounds, holding that Appellants lacked standing because their complaint failed to allege that the FOMB's inaction caused their claimed injury. View "R&D Master Enterprises, Inc. v. Financial Oversight & Management Bd. for P.R." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this action in May 2018, alleging federal claims under Section 1981 and Section 1983 and state law claims against a building inspector Troy Seguirant, the City and County of Honolulu, and other defendants. Only Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claim against Seguirant is at issue in this appeal; the district court dismissed the Section 1983 claims against Seguirant with prejudice.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying qualified immunity on a claim under Section 1981, and remanding, the en banc court held that Section 1981 does not provide an implied cause of action against state actors. Joining other circuits and overruling Federation of African American Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 1996), the en banc court held that Section 1981, as amended in 1991, establishes substantive rights that a state actor may violate but does not itself contain a remedy against a state actor for such violations. Thus, a plaintiff seeking to enforce rights secured by Section 1981 against a state actor must bring a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The en banc court remanded with instructions to allow the plaintiff to replead his Section 1981 claim as a Section 1983 claim. View "HITOSHI YOSHIKAWA V. TROY SEGUIRANT, ET AL" on Justia Law