Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of their complaint, alleging that the City of New Braunfels’s zoning regulation banning short-term rentals of residential properties in certain areas of the city is unconstitutional. The district court ordered dismissal.   The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that Plaintiffs are entitled to engage in discovery in an attempt to surmount the currently high bar for challenging local zoning ordinances under the Constitution. View "Marfil v. City of New Braunfels" on Justia Law

The National Marine Fisheries Service promulgated a rule requiring shrimp trawlers 25 feet or longer operating in offshore waters from North Carolina to Texas to install turtle excluder devices (TEDs), subject to a few preconditions. In 2012, NMFS proposed a more restrictive rule requiring TEDs for skimmer trawlers. The Final Rule required TEDs on all skimmer trawlers over 40 feet, including those that operate inshore. Louisiana’s Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF) sued NMFS under the Administrative Procedure Act, challenging the Final Rule as arbitrary and capricious. Louisiana moved for summary judgment, focusing on the merits of its claims. NMFS opposed and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The district court granted NMFS’s motion, holding that Louisiana had not carried its summary judgment burden to establish standing.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that based on the record and procedural history of the case, the district court did not err in concluding that Louisiana failed to establish that it has standing to challenge the NMFS’s, Final Rule. The court reasoned that while the Final Rule’s EIS noted that the rule would adversely affect the shrimping industry across the Gulf of Mexico, Louisiana failed to provide evidence, particularly substantiating the rule’s impact on its shrimping industry or, ergo, “a sufficiently substantial segment of its population.” Nor does Louisiana’s invocation of the “special solicitude” afforded States in the standing analysis rescue this argument, or for that matter, the State’s other arguments. View "Louisiana State v. NOAA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a convicted sexually violent predator, was held in the Lubbock County Detention Center as a pre-trial detainee for approximately one month from December 2017 to January 2018. Soon after his arrival, he was placed in administrative segregation away from the facility’s general population, where he was held for most of the remainder of his time there. He subsequently brought suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against Lubbock County and several law enforcement officials, asserting a series of claims regarding his alleged mistreatment there. The district court entered an order dismissing the claims against the county and all but one of the officials, which he now appeals in the first of the consolidated cases. Plaintiff challenged the process by which he was placed and remained in administrative segregation. After the district court subsequently dismissed the remaining named official, Plaintiff moved to reconsider that dismissal and the dismissal of several of his other claims. The district court rejected both motions for lack of new evidence, which Plaintiff appealed in the second of the consolidated cases. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding no reversible errors. View "Welsh v. Lubbock County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a lieutenant in the Kankakee Fire Department (“KFD”)—was attacked by another firefighter while responding to a fire at a senior living facility. The City suspended the other firefighter for twenty-four hours without pay, ordered him to complete an anger management course, and directed him to avoid working on the same shift as Plaintiff for three months. Plaintiff experienced ongoing physical and mental injuries from the incident, causing her to take leave from work and apply for workers’ compensation. She returned to work six months later but permanently left her position shortly after. She then filed a lawsuit, alleging that Defendants, among other things, retaliated against her for certain protected activities under Title VII and condoned aggressive and inappropriate behaviors as part of a “code of silence” that resulted in her attack. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, and this appeal followed.   The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that on the merits, Plaintiff’s claim fails because none of her evidence, separately or taken together, creates a genuine dispute regarding whether Defendants had a practice of condoning aggressive behavior, resulting in a constitutional injury. Further the court wrote that the record does not support Plaintiff’s contention that there was such a high risk of constitutional injury from the other firefighter that the “single incident” theory of municipal liability applies here. The court held Plaintiff failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact precluding summary judgment regarding her Fourth Amendment Monell claim and her Title VII retaliation claim. The district court, therefore, properly granted summary judgment to Defendants. View "Michelle Giese v. City of Kankakee" on Justia Law

Not long after getting a new boss at the Priority Automotive Honda dealership, Plaintiffs effectively resigned from their jobs. They then sued, alleging racial discrimination—claiming that the new boss and the company fostered a hostile work environment and demoted them because they are Black—along with various state torts. Plaintiffs lost at summary judgment and appealed.   The Fourth Circuit largely affirmed but remand their state-law conversion claims for further proceedings. First, the court explained that a reasonable person might conclude that the employee’s alleged “white side” was race-based harassment. But the statement, on its own, does not create a severe or pervasive hostile work environment. Next, the court held that, since Plaintiff failed to support a reasonable inference of unlawful intentional discrimination, the magistrate judge rightfully rejected his disparate-treatment claim. Further, the court held that no reasonable jury could find that Defendants’ alleged conduct “rises to the level of ‘outrageous and extreme’ as the term has been interpreted and applied” in North Carolina. The court reasoned that courts do not weigh the evidence when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. So when both parties raise facts sufficient for a reasonable jury to find for them at trial, the claim must survive. But discrimination claims need more than neutral facts, an adverse action, and speculation about discriminatory motives to make it past this stage. As such, on the current record, a reasonable juror could find for Plaintiffs on their conversion claim. View "Kenneth Robinson v. Priority Automotive Huntersville, Inc." on Justia Law

Nevada enacted Senate Bill 248 (“S.B. 248”), Act of June 2, 2021, ch. 291, 2021 Nev. Stat. 1668, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. S.B. 248 requires debt collectors to provide written notification to debtors 60 days before taking any action to collect a medical debt. Plaintiffs are entities engaged in consumer debt collection. They filed suit in district court against Defendant, Commissioner of the Financial Institutions Division of Nevada’s Department of Business and Industry, bringing a facial challenge to the law. They moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, contending that S.B. 248 is unconstitutionally vague, violates the First Amendment and is preempted by both the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs timely appealed the denial of the preliminary injunction.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The panel first rejected Plaintiffs’ claim that the term “action to collect a medical debt” in S.B. 248 was unconstitutionally vague, noting that the implementing regulations set forth examples of actions that do, and do not, constitute actions to collect a medical debt. The panel held that: S.B. 248 regulates commercial speech and therefore is not subject to strict scrutiny; communications to collect a medical debt “concerned lawful activity” and were not “inherently misleading.” The panel next rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the FCRA expressly preempts S.B. 248 under 15 U.S.C. Section 1681t(b)(1)(F). View "AARGON AGENCY, INC., ET AL V. SANDY O'LAUGHLIN" on Justia Law

In this case, three Latino voters from Franklin County, Washington alleged that the county’s system for electing its board of commissioners violated the Washington voting rights act of 2018 (WVRA) by “dilut[ing] the votes of Latino/a voters.” The plaintiffs (respondents on appeal) ultimately settled with defendants Franklin County and the Franklin County Board of Commissioners. The issues on appeal were raised by James Gimenez, a Franklin County voter who was allowed to intervene by the trial court. Immediately after his motion to intervene was granted, Gimenez moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim, arguing that the plaintiffs did not have standing and that the WVRA was facially invalid. The trial court denied Gimenez’s motion to dismiss, and he was not an active participant in the case thereafter. After the trial court entered a final order approving the parties’ settlement, Gimenez appealed directly to the Washington Supreme Court, arguing that in his view, the WVRA protected some Washington voters but excluded others. Based on this interpretation, Gimenez argued that plaintiffs did not have standing because the WVRA did not protect Latinx voters from Franklin County as a matter of law. Gimenez also argued that the WVRA was repealed by implication and was facially unconstitutional because it required local governments to implement electoral systems that favored protected voters and disfavored others on the basis of race. The Supreme Court disagreed with Gimenez's interpretation of the WVRA, and found plaintiffs had stnging and the WVRA was valid and constitutional on its face. View "Portugal v. Franklin County" on Justia Law

Appellant, a Maryland Capitol Police officer, appealed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on several First and Fourth Amendment claims brought by picketers whom he arrested on the sidewalk outside the Maryland State House. Appellant arrested the picketers after they disobeyed his orders to back up off the sidewalk and protest instead from an adjoining square.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held a reasonable officer in Appellant’s position could have believed that the orders constituted lawful time, place, or manner restrictions on the picketers’ First Amendment rights. Therefore, Appellant is entitled to qualified immunity. The court explained no law, clearly established or otherwise, required Appellant to wait for an imminent traffic accident. Preventive measures to promote public safety are a basic contribution of government. Appellant’s assessment of safety risks and attempts to mitigate them were informed by common sense and the facts on the ground, not animus or conjecture. It was at least reasonable for him to believe that his orders promoted a substantial governmental interest. View "Clayton Hulbert v. Brian Pope" on Justia Law

Student H.P.-B. resides with her adult cousin Q.T. within the geographical boundaries of Pottsgrove. H.P.-B. enrolled in Pottsgrove during the 2014–2015 school year. Q.T. does not have legal custody of H.P.-B—an August 2008 order grants primary physical and legal custody to H.P.-B.’s grandmother, E.E. Q.T. filed an IDEA due process complaint on H.P.-B’s behalf. The district court held that a straightforward application of C.F.R. 34 Section 300.30 (b)(2) “dictates that Q.T. does not qualify as H.P.-B.’s ‘parent’ for purposes of the IDEA.” Q.T., E.E., and F.P. appealed the district court’s order. Appellants argued that the district court erred by holding that Q.T. does not qualify as H.P.-B.’s parent for purposes of the IDEA and, thus that Q.T. is unable to file a due process complaint on H.P.-B.’s behalf.   The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained the district court erred in finding that Q.T. did not qualify as H.P.-B.’s parent and thus lacked standing to file a due process complaint on H.P.-B.’s behalf. The court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded with instructions to vacate the hearing officer’s order dismissing Q.T.’s due process complaint. The court explained there is ample evidence in the record that Q.T. was acting in the place of H.P.-B.’s natural parent, satisfying the third definition of “parent.” The record shows Q.T. affirmed that she was supporting H.P.- B. assumed all personal obligations related to school requirements for H.P.-B. and intended to keep and support H.P.-B. continuously, and not merely through the school year. View "Q. T. v. Pottsgrove School District" on Justia Law

The City of Pomona (the City) decided to allow commercial cannabis activities in specific locales within its boundaries. In doing so, the City determined it was exempt from the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and the Guidelines adopted to implement CEQA (Cal. Code Regs.) (Guidelines). Thus, when the City chose areas to locate commercial cannabis activities, it did not conduct additional environmental review under CEQA. Appellant wanted his storefront property included among the locales where commercial cannabis activity would be allowed. The City, however, excluded Appellant’s property. Appellant then filed a petition for writ of mandate to overturn the City’s designation of areas for permissible commercial cannabis activities. He contended the City made the decision improperly by foregoing further environmental review. The superior court denied the petition and entered judgment in favor of the City.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the City properly determined that the Project is Exempt per Guidelines Section 15183 and requires no additional environmental review. The court explained that substantial evidence shows the Project’s proposed commercial cannabis activities were similar to or “consistent” with existing land uses or development density established by the 2014 EIR and General Plan Update and thus meet the statutory exemption per Guidelines section 15183. Further, the court found that substantial evidence—the General Plan Update, the 2014 EIR, the Project, the DOS, and Findings of Consistency—shows the Project “has no project-specific effects” that are “peculiar” to it. View "Lucas v. City of Pomona" on Justia Law