Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In the winter of 2020, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) determined that the threat posed by the novel SARS-CoV-2 virus constituted a public health emergency. The CDC published the rule at issue—the Requirement for Persons to Wear Masks While on Conveyances and at Transportation Hubs, 86 Fed. Reg. 8025-01 (Feb. 3, 2021) (“Mandate”). Plaintiffs initiated this litigation, arguing that the Mandate was unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC Section 706(2) (APA), and unconstitutional under non-delegation and separation-of-powers tenets.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and instructed the district court to dismiss the case as moot. The court explained that it found Plaintiffs’ contention that there is a reasonable expectation that the CDC will issue another nationwide mask mandate for all conveyances and transportation hubs to be speculative. Conjectures of future harms like these do not establish a reasonable expectation that a mask mandate from the CDC will reissue. Further, the court reasoned that there is no “reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability that the same controversy will recur involving the same complaining party.” View "Health Freedom Defense Fund, et al v. President of the United States, et al" on Justia Law

Sterling Hotels sued a state elevator inspector (Defendant), asserting several claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Sterling first argued that Defendant violated its right to due process when he sealed Wyndham’s elevators without giving Sterling notice or an opportunity to object. Further, Sterling argued that Defendant engaged in an unconstitutional regulatory taking when he sealed the elevators. Defendant moved to dismiss, in part on qualified immunity grounds. The district court declined to address Defendant’s entitlement to immunity, and Defendant appealed.   The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court explained that when a deprivation of property “occurs pursuant to an established state procedure”—as Defendant acknowledges it did here—the state must provide adequate notice and an opportunity to respond before the deprivation. Here, Defendant sealed the elevators without providing any advance notice that the elevators should descend to the basement. Thus, Sterling alleged, Defendant failed to provide it with any opportunity to respond to that requirement. That is sufficient to state a due-process claim against Defendant. Further, Defendant’s potential individual liability for a regulatory takings claim was not clearly established when he sealed the elevators. That means Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. View "Sterling Hotels, LLC v. Scott McKay" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued a Missouri judge for putting his kids in jail twice, once after a custody hearing and again after ordering law enforcement to pick them up in Louisiana. The complaint alleged that Defendant’s action of placing Plaintiff’s children in jail and then later in a juvenile-detention facility violated their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendant argued that he should receive absolute immunity, but the district court disagreed and ruled that the case could proceed. At issue on appeal is whether judicial immunity shields these acts.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court explained that Defendant’s decision to personally escort the kids to jail took what would otherwise be a judicial act too far. Judges have the authority to order an officer or a bailiff to escort an unruly litigant to jail. The court wrote that Defendant crossed the line; however, when he personally escorted the kids to jail, stood there while they removed their clothes and belongings, and personally came back an hour later to release them. Further, the court explained that here, even if Defendant had no “express authority” to issue the pick-up order, he is immune because he had jurisdiction to issue one. He cannot be sued, in other words, no matter how erroneous his interpretation of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act may be. View "D. Bart Rockett v. The Honorable Eric Eighmy" on Justia Law

In November 2021, the Illinois General Assembly passed Public Act 102-667, which added a provision to the state’s Health Care Right of Conscience Act. The new provision purported to be a “declaration of existing law” that “shall not be construed as a new enactment.” The underlying lawsuit relates to COVID-19 vaccine mandates imposed by several Illinois state agencies. In October 2021, the plaintiffs, who work for these agencies, sued their employers and Governor J.B. Pritzker in Illinois state court, asserting the vaccine mandates were unlawful. The defendants then removed the case to federal court. In response to similar lawsuits, Illinois passed Public Act 102-667 on November 8, 2021. The district court determined that the new provision, by its terms, did not change and instead merely clarified existing law. The defendants then moved under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) to certify the following question for interlocutory appeal: Whether, given [the district] court’s correct determination that Section 13.5 is a declaration of existing law that did not change the HCRCA, [the district] court cannot grant Plaintiffs any meaningful relief. The district court certified this exact question for appeal.   The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ challenges to Public Act 102-667 for lack of standing. The district court is free on remand to issue a proper final judgment pursuant to Rules 54(a) and 58(a), which would cover all the claims in the plaintiffs’ amended complaint. Plaintiffs could then invoke 28 U.S.C. Section 1291 and notice an appeal on any issues not resolved by this interlocutory appeal. View "Illinois Department of Corrections v. Alvin Boone" on Justia Law

This litigation challenges the bail practices of one Louisiana parish. The claim is that money bail is required for pretrial detainees without consideration of alternatives, violating the rights of indigents to substantive due process and equal protection. The district court denied all relief.   The Fifth Circuit held that abstention is mandated and remanded in order that the district court may dismiss the suit. The court explained that Texas courts are neither unable nor unwilling to reconsider bail determinations under the proper circumstances, thus providing state court detainees the chance to raise federal claims without the need to come to federal court. Here, Plaintiffs have failed to show that Louisiana is unable or unwilling to reconsider bail determinations. How quickly those can be reconsidered is irrelevant because “arguments about delay and timeliness pertain not to the adequacy of a state proceeding, but rather to ‘conventional claims of bad faith.’” View "Little v. Doguet" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an aspiring sidewalk counselor, brought a First Amendment challenge to Westchester County’s recently enacted “bubble zone” law, which makes it illegal to approach within eight feet of another person for the purpose of engaging in “oral protest, education, or counseling” when inside a one-hundred-foot radius of a reproductive health care facility. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that Plaintiff lacks standing to mount a pre-enforcement challenge to the bubble zone law and that, in any event, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) forecloses her First Amendment claim.   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling insofar as it dismissed Plaintiff’s suit for lack of standing. The court nevertheless affirmed the judgment on the merits because the district court correctly concluded that Hill is dispositive of Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim. The court concluded that Plaintiff has standing to seek pre-enforcement relief because she has pleaded sufficient facts to support a credible threat that Westchester County will enforce the bubble zone law if she pursues her stated intention to engage in sidewalk counseling. View "Vitagliano v. County of Westchester" on Justia Law

Appellants in these tandem appeals are each a parent of a disabled child. Arguing that his or her child was entitled to benefits under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(i), each parent brought an administrative action against his or her local education agency and prevailed. Subsequently, each parent brought a federal action for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(i)(3)(B). In each case, the district court awarded less attorneys’ fees than the parent requested, and the parents appealed.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of travel-related fees in No. 21-1961 and remanded for further proceedings. The court otherwise affirmed the judgments of the district courts. The court found that it was persuaded that there was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s calculation of reasonable attorneys’ fees in each case. Further, the court wrote that the district courts that declined to award prejudgment interest did not abuse their discretion because “delays in payment” may be remedied by “application of current rather than historic hourly rates.” However, the court held that the district court abused its discretion when it denied any travel-related fees to M.D.’s counsel. A district court may permissibly adjust excessive travel costs. But the district court could not “eliminate all of the hours submitted by [CLF] as travel time” by denying travel-related fees altogether. View "H.C. v. NYC DOE, et al." on Justia Law

Two Texas employers: Braidwood Management, Inc. (“Braidwood”) and Bear Creek Bible Church (“Bear Creek”), filed suit, as per their closely held religious beliefs, asserting that Title VII, as interpreted in the EEOC’s guidance and Bostock, prevents them from operating their places of employment in a way compatible with their Christian beliefs. Plaintiffs have implicitly asserted that they will not alter or discontinue their employment practices. all parties admitted in district court that numerous policies promulgated by plaintiffs (such as those about dress codes and segregating bathroom usage by solely biological sex) already clearly violate EEOC guidance. Both plaintiffs also contend that they are focused on individuals’ behavior, not their asserted identity.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable; reversed the class certifications; affirmed the judgment against Bear Creek; affirmed the ruling that Braidwood is statutorily entitled to a Title VII exemption; vacated the judgment that Braidwood is constitutionally entitled to a Title VII exemption; and vacated the judgment regarding the scope-of-Title-VII claims as a matter of law. The court reasoned that under the facts presented, it cannot determine a more appropriate, limited class definition for any of the classes presented here. Accordingly, the court held that both Braidwood and Bear Creek have standing and bring individual claims. Further, the court explained that the EEOC failed to show a compelling interest in denying Braidwood, individually, an exemption. The agency does not even attempt to argue the point outside of gesturing to a generalized interest in prohibiting all forms of sex discrimination in every potential case. View "Braidwood Management v. EEOC" on Justia Law

Texas and Missouri filed suit seeking to compel DHS to employ the $2.75 billion Congress allocated “for the construction of [a] barrier system along the southwest border” before those funds expire. The district court dismissed Texas for “claim splitting,” held that Missouri did not have standing to sue, and denied the States’ motion for a preliminary injunction as moot. The states appealed.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions for the district court to "expeditiously consider the States’ motion for a preliminary injunction." The court explained Texas should not have been dismissed for claim splitting because Texas’s Article III standing confers federal jurisdiction. In terms of causation, Texas needs only to have alleged facts showing the Federal Defendants’ conduct is a cause-in-fact of the injury that the State asserts. Here, Texas claimed that border barriers (i) reduce illegal entries in areas where constructed, and (ii) increase the rate at which illegal aliens are detected and apprehended.However, the court declined to order the states' requested remedy, instead remanding the case to the district court. View "State of Missouri v. Biden" on Justia Law

San Diego City Attorney Mara Elliott successfully moved to strike a defamation complaint filed against her by a former political rival, Cory Briggs, under the California anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute. Elliott spent the next seven months fruitlessly trying to collect on the unsatisfied judgment. She then filed a verified memorandum of costs claiming $13,789.10 in postjudgment collection costs, including $12,941.20 in attorney’s fees and $847.90 in other costs. The trial court awarded her the claimed costs, as well as $2,294.07 in postjudgment interest. Briggs appealed the cost award. Finding that the trial court properly awarded Elliott all of the costs identified in the memorandum of costs, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Briggs v. Elliott" on Justia Law