Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The New York Court of Appeals held that the New York State Independent Redistricting Commission (IRC) failed to fulfill its constitutional duties for redistricting maps after the 2020 census. The court affirmed a lower court decision ordering the IRC to reconvene and deliver a second set of lawful redistricting maps.In 2014, New York voters amended the state constitution to mandate that the IRC, not the courts or the legislature, draw legislative districts. However, the IRC failed to deliver the required maps, resulting in a court-ordered redistricting plan for the 2022 elections.The court clarified that such court-directed plans are limited to the "extent" that the court is "required" to do so, and are not meant to last longer than necessary to remedy a violation of law. Therefore, the existing court-drawn districts are limited to the 2022 election.The court dismissed arguments that it was too late to compel the IRC to act, explaining that the court-ordered maps were not required to last a decade and that the IRC's constitutional obligation could be enforced at any time, unless barred by laches. The court also rejected arguments that the lawsuit was a collateral attack on an earlier decision, which dealt with a different issue.The ruling orders the IRC to submit a second set of redistricting maps and implementing legislation to the legislature as soon as possible, but no later than February 28, 2024. View "Matter of Hoffmann v New York State Ind. Redistricting Commn." on Justia Law

In this case, a group of New Hampshire voters challenged the constitutionality of the state's new boundaries for state senate and executive council districts. The plaintiffs claimed that the legislature violated the New Hampshire Constitution by drawing districts that unfairly benefitted one political party at the expense of another. They sought a declaration that the districts violated various parts of the state constitution and an injunction preventing the implementation of the new boundaries.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the issue of partisan gerrymandering raised a non-justiciable political question because the New Hampshire Constitution committed the task of redistricting to the legislature and did not provide any legal standard for the courts to review such decisions. The court noted that the plaintiffs did not claim that the redistricting plans violated any mandatory requirements of the state constitution.The court also rejected the argument that the constitution's guarantees of free speech, equal protection, and association were violated by the alleged gerrymandering. The court found that these constitutional provisions did not provide clear and manageable standards for adjudicating claims of extreme partisan gerrymandering.The court affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint, concluding that the challenge to the constitutionality of the districts based on claims of excessive political gerrymandering presented non-justiciable political questions. View "Brown v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law

In a consolidated case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, plaintiffs Ivan Antonyuk, Corey Johnson, Alfred Terrille, Joseph Mann, Leslie Leman, Lawrence Sloane, Jimmie Hardaway Jr., Larry A. Boyd, Firearms Policy Coalition Inc., Second Amendment Foundation Inc., Brett Christian, Micheal Spencer, and His Tabernacle Family Church Inc., sought to challenge certain provisions of New York's Concealed Carry Improvement Act ("CCIA"). The CCIA regulates the public carriage of firearms and includes licensing requirements and prohibitions on carrying firearms in "sensitive" and "restricted" locations. The plaintiffs argued that the provisions violated their First and Second Amendment rights.The court affirmed the preliminary injunction against the enforcement of certain provisions of the CCIA, but vacated the injunction in other respects. Specifically, the court upheld district court's injunctions with respect to the social media disclosure requirement, the application of restricted locations provision to private property open to the general public, and the application of the same provision to Pastor Spencer, the Tabernacle Family Church, its members, or their agents and licensees.However, the court vacated the injunctions in all other respects, concluding that either the district court lacked jurisdiction or that the challenged laws do not violate the Constitution on their face. The court rejected the plaintiffs' challenges to the CCIA's licensing requirements and sensitive locations provisions, holding that the laws did not infringe on the plaintiffs' Second Amendment rights.The court also held that the CCIA's restricted locations provision, which makes it a crime to possess firearms in a "restricted location", did not violate the plaintiffs' First and Second Amendment rights. Instead, the court found the provision to be a reasonable regulation consistent with the Second Amendment's protection of the right to keep and bear arms.The court's decision affirms in part, vacates in part, and remands the case for further proceedings. View "Antonyuk v. Chiumento" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska, a group of trade associations (Resource Development Council for Alaska, Inc., Alaska Trucking Association, Inc., Alaska Miners Association, Inc., Associated General Contractors of Alaska, Alaska Chamber, and Alaska Support Industry Alliance) sued the State and a ballot initiative group "Vote Yes for Alaska’s Fair Share" (Fair Share), seeking to invalidate the State’s approval of a ballot initiative petition. The litigation primarily revolved around the constitutionality of a statute limiting the compensation that could be paid for obtaining signatures on ballot initiative petitions. The superior court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional and dismissed the trade associations’ claims that a large number of petition signatures should be invalidated because the statutory compensation limits had been exceeded.Following this ruling, Fair Share moved for an attorney’s fees award against the trade associations, contending that it was a qualified prevailing constitutional claimant entitled to full reasonable attorney’s fees under AS 09.60.010, or at least an award of partial attorney’s fees under Alaska Civil Rule 82. The trade associations responded that Fair Share could not be a constitutional claimant because it was not a “plaintiff, counterclaimant, cross claimant, or third-party plaintiff.”The superior court concluded that Fair Share was a constitutional claimant because its claim was effectively a counterclaim. However, it also concluded that the Trade Associations did not have sufficient economic incentive to bring their claim, and thus were constitutional claimants protected from an award of full attorney’s fees under AS 09.60.010. The court nonetheless awarded Fair Share partial attorney’s fees under Rule 82.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s determination that the trade associations did not have a sufficient economic incentive to bring their claims. Thus, the trade associations are qualified, non-prevailing constitutional claimants and the Rule 82 attorney’s fees award must be vacated. View "Vote Yes for Alaska's Fair Share v. Resource Development Council for Alaska, Inc." on Justia Law

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled on an appeal by former President Donald J. Trump regarding his claim of presidential immunity from civil damages liability related to the January 6, 2021, Capitol riot. Plaintiffs included Capitol Police officers and members of Congress who alleged that Trump, through his actions and speech, incited the riot that resulted in physical injuries and emotional distress.The court determined that, at this stage in the proceedings, Trump has not demonstrated an entitlement to presidential immunity. It distinguished between actions carried out in a president’s official capacity, which are protected by immunity, and those carried out in a private or unofficial capacity, which are not. The court rejected Trump's argument that presidential speech on matters of public concern is always an official function, stating that such speech can be either official or unofficial depending on context.The court also rejected Trump's claim that his actions leading up to and on January 6 were official because they were under his Article II duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," stating that this claim is not independent of his ability to show that he engaged in the relevant actions in his official capacity as President rather than his unofficial capacity as a presidential candidate.The court held that Trump's actions as alleged in the complaints, if proven to be true, were carried out in his capacity as a presidential candidate, not as the sitting President. Therefore, he is subject to civil suits like any private citizen. However, the court specified that Trump must be allowed to present facts and make arguments in the district court that his actions were taken in his official capacity. View "Blassingame v. Trump" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the district court has unduly delayed holding a consolidated trial on the merits of her claims and a hearing on her motion for preliminary injunction.   The Fourth Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that after reviewing the petition and the record of the district court proceedings, that either of these latter two factors support the granting of a writ of mandamus. The court explained that in the petition, Petitioner refered to her right to a “prompt evidentiary hearing” and, alternatively, to her “clear and indisputable right to expedited treatment of her PI motion” She asserted that this right is rooted in a statute, 28 U.S.C. Section 1657(a), as well as Rule 40 and Rule 65(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court wrote that none of the sources entitle Petitioner to a trial prior to the currently scheduled trial date of December 11, 2023. To be sure, Section 1657(a) requires the district court in this case to “expedite the consideration of” Petitioner’s PI motion, and Rule 40 similarly requires the district court to “give priority” to that motion. But the record in this case, despite Petitioner’s protestations to the contrary, establishes that the district court has repeatedly attempted to do so. View "In re: Caryn Strickland" on Justia Law

This is the second appeal arising out of Defendant’s special motion to strike the complaint filed by Plaintiffs.  In the first appeal, the Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that Defendant failed to show Plaintiffs’ claims arose out of protected activity because he filed only a “perfunctory antiSLAPP motion.” In this appeal, Defendant challenges the fee award.   The Second Appellate District reversed and remanded the matter with directions for the court to enter a new order denying plaintiffs’ attorney fees motions. The court wrote that Plaintiffs don’t contend that it would have been impractical for them to provide Defendant safe harbor notice before filing their attorney fees motions. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ motions were not complex and include less than a single page of analysis explaining why Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous. Nor do Plaintiffs contend that Defendant could not have withdrawn or corrected his anti-SLAPP motion had they provided him timely notice of their attorney fees motions under section 128.5, subdivision (f). The court explained that the trial court should have denied Plaintiffs’ attorney fees motions because they failed to provide Defendant a 21-day safe harbor notice before filing their attorney fees motions. View "Zarate v. McDaniel" on Justia Law

In April 2017 and June 2017, Appellant Diane Zilka filed petitions with the Philadelphia Department of Revenue (the “Department”), seeking refunds for the Philadelphia Tax she paid from 2013 to 2015, and in 2016, respectively. During the relevant tax years, Appellant resided in the City, but worked exclusively in Wilmington, Delaware. Thus, she was subject to four income taxes (and tax rates) during that time: the Philadelphia Tax; the Pennsylvania Income Tax (“PIT”); the Wilmington Earned Income Tax (“Wilmington Tax”); and the Delaware Income Tax (“DIT”). The Commonwealth granted Appellant credit for her DIT liability to completely offset the PIT she paid for the tax years 2013 through 2016; because of the respective tax rates in Pennsylvania versus Delaware, after this offsetting, Appellant paid the remaining 1.93% in DIT. Although the City similarly credited against Appellant’s Philadelphia Tax liability the amount she paid in the Wilmington Tax — specifically, the City credited Appellant 1.25% against her Philadelphia Tax liability of 3.922%, leaving her with a remainder of 2.672% owed to the City — Appellant claimed that the City was required to afford her an additional credit of 1.93% against the Philadelphia Tax, representing the remainder of the DIT she owed after the Commonwealth credited Appellant for her PIT. After the City refused to permit her this credit against her Philadelphia Tax liability, Appellant appealed to the City’s Tax Review Board (the “Board”). The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review as whether, for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis implicated here, state and local taxes had to be considered in the aggregate. The Court concluded state and local taxes did not need be aggregated in conducting a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, and that, ultimately, the City’s tax scheme did not discriminate against interstate commerce. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court order. View "Zilka v. Tax Review Bd. City of Phila." on Justia Law

Officers Timothy Wright and Brett Willey responded to a domestic violence call where they shot and killed Robert Anderson. Anderson’s estate and family sued Wright, Willey, and the County of Lyon under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Nevada law. Defendants moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted qualified immunity to the officers on the Section 1983 claims.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment excessive force claim because Plaintiffs’ rights were not clearly established. First, it was not obvious that defendants were constitutionally precluded from firing given that they were responding to an active domestic violence situation, lacked the benefit of having time to fully assess the circumstances, and needed to make split-second decisions as they were being charged. Second, Plaintiffs failed to show controlling authorities (or a consensus of persuasive ones) that would have put every reasonable officer on notice that defendants’ conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. Distinguishing this case from other cases, the panel noted that Anderson was in a narrow hall and rapidly approaching the officers, with no barrier between them. He could have accessed the officers’ weapons at any time or otherwise harmed them. Further, if the officers took the option to retreat to the house’s entryway, they would have left Jennifer Anderson—for whom they had just called an ambulance—alone with her husband or risked injury themselves if Anderson obtained a weapon from somewhere in his home. View "FREDRICK WAID, ET AL V. COUNTY OF LYON, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an action alleging that he received constitutionally inadequate medical care as an inmate in the custody of the Connecticut Department of Correction. But before the district court could proceed with his case, Plaintiff, like all civil litigants in federal court, was required to pay a filing fee of $402. Plaintiff believed he could not pay the fee while also paying for the necessities of life. So, he moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 23 U.S.C. Section 1915, which would allow Plaintiff to bring his suit without having to prepay the full filing fee. The Second Circuit denied Plaintiff’s motion, finding that the prison provided Plaintiff’s necessities of life. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, and the district court again denied his motion. On reconsideration, the district court found that Plaintiff had the resources to pay for both the necessities of life and the filing fee but had instead chosen to prioritize contributions to his family members for their necessities. Plaintiff argued that both conclusions are the result of legal error.   The Second Circuit reversed and remanded for consideration of the rest of Section 1915’s requirements. The court concluded that Plaintiff demonstrated that he lacks the resources to pay the costs of the lawsuit and for his own necessities of life and those of his dependents. The court explained that Plaintiff would not be immediately destitute if required to pay the $402 filing fee; he has nonetheless established that he cannot pay the costs associated with this suit and still provide the necessities of life for himself and his dependents. View "Rosa v. Doe" on Justia Law