Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was repeatedly tased while he was a pretrial detainee at the McLennan County jail in Waco, Texas. Plaintiff insists that he did nothing to warrant the use of force—that he was neither threatening nor resisting the officer who tased him. The principal question on appeal is whether Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment on his ensuing civil rights claims.   The Fifth Circuit reversed summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Defendant and remanded that claim to the district court for trial. The court reversed and remanded the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s policy and practice claims to afford Plaintiff the opportunity to discover evidence relevant to those claims. But the court affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim. The court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that a rational jury could find that Defendant’s decision to tase Plaintiff was not justified by any exigency, in which case Defendant’s qualified immunity defense would not shield him from liability because the court’s precedents clearly establish that resort to force in such circumstances is unconstitutional.   Further, the court wrote that it was inappropriate for the court to then dismiss Plaintiff’s policy and practice claims on the ground that Plaintiff failed to present “adequate summary judgment evidence of any official or unofficial policy,” depriving him of his rights. If a jury finds, as it could, that Defendant tased a non-threatening, compliant inmate, then he is not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Boyd v. McNamara" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued police officers under Sec. 1983 after the officers made warrantless entry into their apartment. The district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs and Defendants appealed.On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed. While warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, there is an exception when officers act with probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and an objectively reasonable basis to believe that exigent circumstances exist.Here, the officers were dispatched to the scene in response to a report of domestic violence. The report received by the officers explained that the 911 call came from a neighbor who thought “abuse” was occurring and heard a “verbal argument,” “someone being thrown around,” and “yelling and screaming” in the upstairs apartment. The neighbor stated that a woman, her boyfriend, and a child lived in the apartment. This created anm exigency, justifying warrantless entry. View "Benedda Cotten v. Ryan Miller" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the trial court’s denial of her peremptory challenge. The Second Appellate District denied the petition for failure to demonstrate a prima facie case entitling her to extraordinary relief. After Petitioner filed a petition to review, our Supreme Court stayed all further proceedings pending its review. The court ultimately granted the petition and transferred the matter back to the court with directions to vacate its order denying the petition for writ of mandate and issuing an order to show cause. Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in denying the peremptory challenge because the subsequent lower court proceeding, specifically the subject hearing, constitutes a “new trial” within the meaning of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2).   The Second Appellate District denied the petition. The court explained that there is no indication, despite the constitutional and practical distinctions between a new trial and the subject hearing, that the Legislature intended such a hearing on remand be considered a new trial under section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2). To the contrary, the legislative history of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2) “does not support the assertion that the Legislature intended to permit a [peremptory] challenge at any hearing on remand in a criminal case.” Thus, section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2), was not intended “to counter every possible situation in which it might be speculated that a court could react negatively to a reversal on appeal.” The court concluded that the hearing conducted after a reversal and remand of a trial court’s order denying a petition for resentencing is not a “new trial” within the meaning of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2). View "Estrada v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling denying the Deputy’s motion for qualified immunity in Plaintiff’s lawsuit, alleging that the Deputy’s conduct amounted to deliberate indifference to her seizure condition after she was arrested for driving while intoxicated. The Deputy asserted qualified immunity in his motion for summary judgment, which the district court denied.   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court explained that the Deputy promptly attended to Plaintiff and asked her whether she was hurt or suffered from medical problems. She said no and did not advise him of her seizure disorder. Emergency medical personnel also observed Plaintiff and were content not to take her to the hospital, advising the Deputy that she had refused further treatment. He then took Plaintiff and her medications to jail. Barton I did not provide the Deputy with fair notice that his failure to seek further medical treatment for Plaintiff or to speak with the jailors about what Plaintiff’s boyfriend told him constituted deliberate indifference. Thus, Plaintiff failed to show that clearly established law prohibited the Deputy’s conduct, and the Deputy is entitled to qualified immunity. View "Kelly Martin v. Jordan Turner" on Justia Law

Respondent G.W. had, in her lifetime, received a variety of mental health diagnoses, including depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and borderline personality disorder. In May and June 2019, G.W. was arrested on a number of criminal charges, including criminal threatening and violation of a protective order, based upon her conduct towards a man with whom she previously had a romantic relationship and that man’s current partner (the complainants). G.W.’s conduct leading to her arrest included trespassing on the complainants’ property, contacting them after a protective order was in place, placing two improvised explosive devices and one incendiary device in the complainants’ vehicles, and making a bomb threat to the workplace of one of the complainants. G.W. appealed a circuit court decision ordering her involuntary admission to the Secure Psychiatric Unit (SPU) of the New Hampshire State Prison for a period of three years with a conditional discharge when and if clinically appropriate. On appeal, G.W. challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that she met the involuntary admission standard. She also argued the court erred when it ordered that she remain in jail, where she had been detained on pending criminal charges, until a bed became available at the SPU. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the admission. View "In re G.W." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, who operate small venue theaters in New York City, brought claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and nominal damages, alleging that the City’s Key to NYC program—which required certain indoor venues to check the COVID-19 vaccination status of patrons and staff before permitting entry—violated their rights to free speech and equal protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Following the expiration of the Key to NYC program, the district court dismissed as moot Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court also dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim for nominal damages for lack of standing, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege an injury in fact. Plaintiffs now appeal that order.   The Second Circuit concluded that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged Article III standing. However, the court affirmed the judgment of dismissal on the alternative ground of failure to state a claim. The court explained that Key to NYC does not impair a fundamental right because it does not violate Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. Nor does it target a suspect class. These are locations where large numbers of unassociated individuals are likely to gather and spend significant amounts of time exposed to one another, thereby posing a relatively high risk of spreading COVID-19. Requiring individuals in those settings to be vaccinated mitigated that risk and incentivized vaccination among the people most likely to be in a position to spread the virus. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged an equal protection violation. View "Clementine Co. v. Adams" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claimed law enforcement officers violated the Constitution when they responded to a detainee’s epileptic seizure in a jail cell by restraining and tasing him several times. The district court either dismissed or granted summary judgment on all claims in favor of the Defendants.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the grant of qualified immunity for the individual Defendant Officers as to the Section 1983 claims and the grant of summary judgment on the claims for bystander liability. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on municipal liability and on the claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. The court explained that the record is insufficient to support a jury question that the use-of-force and ECW policies were so vague that they amounted to no policy at all. These policies “may have been inadequate,” and while a jury might conclude that the City was negligent in not requiring Plaintiffs’ specified actions, “that, of course, is not enough under Section 1983.” The court explained that without evidence showing that the higher level of care was obviously necessary, we cannot see how the jury could conclude that the use-of-force and ECW policies were deliberately indifferent. Accordingly, there was no substantial evidence that such a policy would obviously lead to the violation of pre-trial detainees’ constitutional rights. Further, the court found that Plaintiffs cite no binding caselaw in which liability under the ADA and RA has been extended to a context similar to this one. View "Austin v. City of Pasadena" on Justia Law

According to the complaint, Plaintiff John Jordan alleged he was thrown to the ground and arrested for criticizing the police. Moments before the arrest, Jordan stood across the street from Deputies Michael Donnellon and Chad Jenkins listening as the Deputies questioned his nephew about a car accident involving a truck owned by Jordan’s company. Jordan grew frustrated with what he was hearing and started criticizing the two Deputies. The Deputies retaliated with their own disparaging remarks about Jordan. Eventually, Deputy Jenkins became fed up with Jordan’s criticisms and performed a takedown maneuver on Jordan, placing him under arrest for obstruction of justice. As relevant to this appeal, Jordan sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful arrest, malicious prosecution, and excessive force. The magistrate judge granted the Deputies’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and dismissed each of these claims. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded granting summary judgment to the Deputies was improper: under the "Graham" factors, it was clearly established that the takedown maneuver utilized by the Deputies here was excessive as applied to Jordan at the time of his arrest. View "Jordan v. Adams County Sheriff's Office, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her friend, both dressed in “sexy cop” costumes, posed with pedestrians on the Strip and accepted tips in exchange for photos. Defendant police officers, working a plain-clothes Strip enforcement assignment, arrested Plaintiff and her friend for doing business without a license after the officers were asked to pay a tip or delete a photo. The charges against Plaintiff were ultimately dropped. Plaintiff sued various people involved in her arrest, asserting eleven federal and state causes of action. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages for injuries suffered during detention and attorney’s fees. The district court granted the Officers’ summary judgment motion and denied Plaintiff’s.   The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order denying a petition for panel rehearing, denying a petition for rehearing en banc, and amending the opinion filed on May 24, 2017; and (2) an amended opinion reversing in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The panel concluded that the First Amendment protections accorded to Plaintiff’s own activities did not lapse because of what her friend said or did without Plaintiff’s direct participation. There was no evidence at all, for example, of a prior agreement between the women to require a quid-pro-quo payment for posing in photos, nor of a demonstrated pattern of demanding quid-pro-quo payments during performances together. The panel held that the district court erred by deciding that the officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff despite the First Amendment protections afforded to her expressive association. View "MICHELE SANTOPIETRO V. CLAYBORN HOWELL, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 civil rights suit in Louisiana state court against Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections Secretary James LeBlanc. Among other claims, Plaintiff argued that LeBlanc violated his constitutional rights by misclassifying him as a sex offender and thereby illegally extending his detention in prison for 337 days past his release date. LeBlanc sought dismissal based on qualified immunity, but the district court denied the motion. LeBlanc argued that this complaint did not adequately allege the requisite “pattern” of constitutional violations by untrained employees “ordinarily necessary” under Connick to establish deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with Plaintiff that his complaint sufficiently alleges the requisite “pattern” of constitutional violations by untrained employees to establish deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train. Further, the court held that there is sufficient clearly established law regarding the constitutional right to a timely release from prison and that Plaintiff has sufficiently argued a violation of the right. Accordingly, construing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the court agreed they are sufficient to support the argument that LeBlanc had fair warning’ that his failure to address this delay would deny prisoners like Plaintiff their immediate or near-immediate release upon conviction. View "Parker v. LeBlanc" on Justia Law