Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves Michelle Gilbank, who lost custody of her daughter, T.E.H., in state court proceedings in Wisconsin. Gilbank alleged that various officials involved in those proceedings violated her federal constitutional rights. The events began when Gilbank, who had a history of drug use, moved into her ex-partner Ian Hoyle's apartment. Following an anonymous tip, police and social workers investigated and found evidence of Gilbank's drug use. On August 21, 2018, Gilbank was arrested for drug possession, and her daughter was temporarily placed with Hoyle. Subsequent state court hearings resulted in the continued placement of T.E.H. with Hoyle until Gilbank regained custody in March 2020.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, the court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court found that some of Gilbank’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents federal courts from reviewing state court judgments. The court also ruled that the remaining claims failed on the merits, including claims of unreasonable search, denial of due process, and unlawful eviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case en banc. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred claims based on injuries caused by state court judgments. The court also affirmed summary judgment on the merits for claims not barred by Rooker-Feldman, including those related to the urinalysis, interrogation without an attorney, and the removal of T.E.H. The court found that Gilbank had consented to the urinalysis, that her Fifth Amendment rights were not violated as her statements were not used in a criminal proceeding, and that there was no seizure of T.E.H. by government actors. The court also rejected the existence of a "fraud exception" to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. View "Gilbank v. Wood County Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Governor of Delaware issued a series of emergency orders that included restrictions on religious services. These restrictions, which were lifted by June 2020, limited in-person worship to ten people and imposed various other mandates. Over 18 months later, two religious leaders filed suit in the Court of Chancery seeking injunctive relief against these restrictions, which were no longer in effect. The Court of Chancery dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of future harm.The plaintiffs then transferred their action to the Superior Court, seeking declaratory judgment and damages for alleged violations of their constitutional rights. The Superior Court dismissed the claims, ruling that the requests for declaratory relief were not justiciable because the restrictions had been lifted and there was no ongoing controversy. Additionally, the court found that the Governor was immune from the damages claims under the State Tort Claims Act and the doctrine of qualified immunity.On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court agreed that the plaintiffs failed to show a reasonable apprehension of future harm, which is necessary for injunctive relief. The Court also held that the plaintiffs' claims for declaratory judgment were not justiciable because there was no ongoing controversy and the alleged harm could not be redressed by a declaratory judgment. Finally, the Court upheld the Superior Court's finding that the Governor was immune from damages claims, as his actions were discretionary and taken in good faith during an unprecedented public health crisis. View "In re Covid-Related Restrictions on Religious Services" on Justia Law

Bilal Hankins, a passenger in a car with two other youths, was driving slowly at night looking for a neighbor’s lost dog. Hankins asked Officer Kevin Wheeler, who was on patrol for a local private security district, for assistance in finding the dog. Later, Officer Wheeler and another officer, Officer Ramon Pierre, stopped the car without reasonable suspicion and approached it with guns drawn. Hankins brought claims under Sections 1983 for unreasonable seizure, excessive force, constitutional conspiracy, supervisory liability, and Monell claims, along with related state-law claims.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana limited discovery to the issue of qualified immunity. The district court concluded that there was no question of material fact as to whether there was an underlying constitutional violation of either Hankins’ right to be free from an unlawful seizure or his right to be free from excessive, unlawful force. Consequently, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all federal claims, as each federal claim relied on an underlying constitutional violation. The court also declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims and dismissed those without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found that material fact disputes precluded summary judgment on the seizure claim. The court held that the factors relied upon by the district court, such as the car’s registration information, the time of night, and the car driving slowly, did not amount to reasonable suspicion when considered in the totality of the circumstances. The court also noted that Hankins’ testimony that Officer Wheeler said, “you know, three young men, in a nice car, in this neighborhood,” if credited, would undermine the officers’ justification for the stop. The Fifth Circuit reversed the summary judgment on the seizure claim, vacated the summary judgment on the other federal claims, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hankins v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

**Summary:**The case involves the Planned Parenthood Association of Utah (PPAU) challenging Senate Bill 174 (SB 174), a law enacted by the Utah Legislature that prohibits abortion at any stage of pregnancy except in three specific circumstances. PPAU argues that SB 174 violates several rights guaranteed by the Utah Constitution and sought a preliminary injunction to halt the law's enforcement while its constitutionality was litigated. The district court granted the preliminary injunction after an evidentiary hearing.The State of Utah petitioned for interlocutory review, presenting two primary arguments: that PPAU lacks standing to challenge the law and that the district court abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. The State argued that PPAU did not have a personal stake in the dispute and that the district court erred in its application of the preliminary injunction standard.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that PPAU has standing to challenge SB 174, satisfying both traditional and third-party standing requirements. The court found that PPAU demonstrated a distinct and palpable injury, including the threat of criminal prosecution and economic harm, which would be redressed by enjoining the law. The court also concluded that PPAU could assert the rights of its patients due to the close relationship between PPAU and its patients and the genuine obstacles patients face in asserting their own rights.The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. The court determined that PPAU raised serious issues concerning the constitutionality of SB 174, which should be the subject of further litigation. The district court acted within its discretion in concluding that PPAU would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction, that the balance of harms favored an injunction, and that an injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. The preliminary injunction remains in place while PPAU litigates its claims. View "Planned Parenthood Association v. State" on Justia Law

In 2019, the California Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 218 (AB 218), which allowed plaintiffs to bring childhood sexual assault claims against public entities within a three-year window, even if those claims were previously barred by statutes of limitations or claim presentation requirements. A.M.M. filed a complaint against the West Contra Costa Unified School District, alleging sexual assaults by a District employee from 1979 to 1983. The District argued that reviving such claims constituted an unconstitutional gift of public funds under the California Constitution. The trial court overruled the District’s demurrer, leading the District to seek writ review.The trial court sustained the demurrer for the first three causes of action but overruled it regarding the gift clause argument. The District then petitioned the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, for a writ of mandate to sustain the demurrer in its entirety. The appellate court issued an order to show cause, and both parties filed responses, including amicus curiae briefs from various entities.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, held that AB 218’s retroactive waiver of the claim presentation requirement did not constitute an unconstitutional gift of public funds. The court reasoned that the waiver did not create new substantive liability but merely removed a procedural barrier to existing claims. The court also found that AB 218 served a valid public purpose by providing relief to victims of childhood sexual assault, aligning with the state’s interest in public welfare. Additionally, the court ruled that the District lacked standing to assert due process claims under both the federal and California Constitutions. The petition for writ of mandate was denied. View "West Contra Costa Unified School District v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Robert Decker, a federal inmate, requested electronic access to the full, daily editions of the Federal Register from his prison law library. The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) denied his request, prompting Decker to file a pro se lawsuit under the Administrative Procedure Act. He claimed that the denial violated his First Amendment rights to receive information and petition the government. The BOP argued that its policy was justified by the need to conserve limited resources.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of the BOP. The court applied the framework from Turner v. Safley, concluding that the BOP’s policy was reasonably related to its legitimate penological interest in conserving resources. The district court also denied Decker’s motions for the recruitment of counsel, finding that he was competent to litigate his case despite the challenges of incarceration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, agreeing that the BOP’s policy was reasonably related to its legitimate interest in conserving resources. The court noted that the BOP provided access to documents pertaining to the Bureau and the U.S. Parole Commission and allowed inmates to receive print copies of the Federal Register through the mail. The court found that Decker had alternative means to exercise his First Amendment rights, although they were less convenient. The court also upheld the district court’s denial of Decker’s motions for the recruitment of counsel, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion.In summary, the Seventh Circuit held that the BOP’s policy of providing limited electronic access to the Federal Register was constitutionally valid under Turner v. Safley and that the district court did not err in denying Decker’s request for appointed counsel. View "Decker v. Sireveld" on Justia Law

Karen Carter filed a lawsuit against DTN Management Company after she slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk at her apartment complex on January 10, 2018. She alleged negligence and breach of statutory duties. Carter filed her complaint on April 13, 2021. DTN Management moved for summary disposition, arguing that the claim was time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations. The trial court agreed and granted the motion.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that Administrative Order No. 2020-3, which extended certain filing deadlines during the COVID-19 state of emergency, was within the Michigan Supreme Court's authority. The appellate court found that the order excluded days from the computation of time under MCR 1.108, making Carter's filing timely. DTN Management appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court.The Michigan Supreme Court held that Administrative Orders 2020-3 and 2020-18 were constitutional exercises of the Court's authority under Const 1963, art 6, §§ 4 and 5. The Court determined that these orders affected the computation of time rather than tolling the statute of limitations, which is within the Court's power to regulate practice and procedure. The Court concluded that Carter's lawsuit was timely filed, as the days during the state of emergency were not counted in the limitations period. Consequently, the trial court's grant of summary disposition was improper. The Court of Appeals judgment was affirmed, and the case was remanded to the Ingham Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "Carter V DTN Management Company" on Justia Law

Marc Susselman received a traffic ticket from a Washtenaw County Sheriff’s deputy for failing to yield to a police cruiser with flashing lights. This ticket was later dismissed, but Susselman received another citation for failing to obey a police officer directing traffic. The Michigan circuit court ultimately dismissed the second ticket as well. Susselman then filed a federal lawsuit asserting constitutional and state law claims against Washtenaw County, the Washtenaw County Sheriff’s Office, the sheriff’s deputy, and Superior Township, Michigan.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted the defendants' motions to dismiss all claims. Susselman appealed the decision. The district court had found that the Washtenaw County Sheriff’s Office could not be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that Susselman had waived certain state-law claims. The court also dismissed Susselman’s federal claims, including First Amendment retaliation and Fourteenth Amendment malicious prosecution, as well as state-law claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Susselman failed to plausibly allege a constitutional violation or behavior by the deputy that would support his claims. Specifically, the court found that the issuance of the second ticket did not constitute a violation of substantive due process or First Amendment rights. Additionally, the court determined that Susselman did not establish a civil conspiracy or meet the requirements for his state-law claims. The court also concluded that Susselman did not identify any municipal policy or custom that resulted in a constitutional violation, thus dismissing his claims against Washtenaw County and Superior Township. View "Susselman v. Washtenaw County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of a Nebraska legislative bill, L.B. 574, which regulates both abortion and gender-altering care. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc., and its medical director, Sarah Traxler, M.D., argued that the bill violated the single subject requirement of the Nebraska Constitution, which mandates that no bill shall contain more than one subject. The bill, titled "Let Them Grow Act," was initially introduced to prohibit gender-altering procedures for minors but was later amended to include provisions from a stalled bill, L.B. 626, which restricted abortions after 12 weeks of pregnancy.The District Court for Lancaster County ruled that Traxler lacked standing but found the single subject challenge justiciable. The court concluded that L.B. 574 did not violate the single subject requirement and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, including Nebraska Attorney General Mike Hilgers. Planned Parenthood appealed, and Hilgers cross-appealed, arguing that the single subject challenge was a nonjusticiable political question.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that L.B. 574 did not violate the single subject requirement of the Nebraska Constitution. The court reasoned that the bill's title, "public health and welfare," was sufficiently broad to encompass both the regulation of abortion and gender-altering care. The court found that all provisions of the bill were germane to the subject of public health and welfare, thus meeting the constitutional requirement. The court also rejected Hilgers' argument that the single subject challenge was nonjusticiable, reaffirming its authority to review legislative acts for constitutional compliance. View "Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Hilgers" on Justia Law

Phillip Robbin was removing a tree from a residential lot in the City of Berwyn when he was confronted by Sarah Lopez, a city inspector. Lopez berated Robbin using racial slurs, which led Robbin to demand disciplinary action against her. The Mayor of Berwyn denied Robbin's request for Lopez's termination, leading Robbin to sue the City, the Mayor, and Lopez for violations of his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and state law.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Robbin’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), finding that he failed to state a federal claim. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, leading to Robbin's appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Robbin failed to allege a violation of a fundamental right and that the conduct described did not "shock the conscience," which are necessary elements for a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that while Lopez's use of racial slurs was deplorable, it did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Robbin's complaint. View "Robbin v. City of Berwyn" on Justia Law