Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In this case from the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Derrick Sherwood appealed a district court order denying his motion to vacate a domestic violence protection order (DVPO) under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60. The court held a hearing and entered a DVPO restraining Derrick Sherwood from having contact with Valerie Sherwood, his ex-wife, and their two minor children. The order also required Derrick Sherwood to surrender his firearms to law enforcement. Later, the court amended the DVPO to remove the restriction on Derrick Sherwood’s possession of firearms. Derrick Sherwood later moved to vacate the DVPO altogether.The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Derrick Sherwood’s request to treat Valerie Sherwood as a hostile witness or in denying Derrick Sherwood’s motion to vacate the DVPO. The court also held that the district court did not err in awarding Valerie Sherwood attorney’s fees.Furthermore, the court held that Derrick Sherwood did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-02(4)(g), which allows a DVPO to require, under certain circumstances, that the respondent surrender any firearm or other specified dangerous weapon. As the DVPO was amended to allow Derrick Sherwood to possess firearms, he did not have a justiciable controversy regarding the constitutionality of this statute.The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Sherwood v. Sherwood" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, a group of plaintiffs challenged a Seattle ordinance that criminalizes the intentional writing, painting, or drawing on property without the express permission of the property’s owner or operator. The plaintiffs, who were arrested for writing political messages in charcoal and sidewalk chalk near a Seattle Police Department precinct, argued that the ordinance was substantially overbroad under the First Amendment and facially vague under the Fourteenth Amendment.The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing because enjoining enforcement of the ordinance was substantially likely to redress plaintiffs’ injury by allowing them to chalk political messages on City sidewalks and barriers erected on public walkways without fear of arrest. However, the court found that the district court erred when it granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction on their First Amendment facial overbreadth claim and their Fourteenth Amendment facial vagueness claim. The court reasoned that the district court failed to acknowledge the numerous applications of the ordinance that would not implicate any protected speech, and speculated about possible vagueness in hypothetical situations not before the court.Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting the preliminary injunction and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "TUCSON V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law

In the case involving Katherine Blumenkron, David Blumenkron, and Springville Investors, LLC, versus Multnomah County, the Metro Regional Government, and members of the Oregon Land Conservation and Development Commission, the plaintiffs challenged the designation of their land in Multnomah County, Oregon, as "rural reserves" under the Oregon Land Reserves Statute. They claimed that the statute and regulations facially violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the federal constitution, and that the defendants’ rural reserve designations violated their federal procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to the designation, concluding that the requirements for Burford abstention (a doctrine that allows federal courts to refrain from deciding a case in deference to state courts) were met for each of the as-applied claims. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by abstaining from exercising jurisdiction over the claims in their entirety, including plaintiffs’ claims for damages. The court concluded that plaintiffs had abandoned their facial constitutional claims on appeal and therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal of these claims for failure to state a claim as a matter of law. View "BLUMENKRON V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Wyoming, State Representatives Rachel Rodriguez-Williams and Chip Neiman, and Right to Life of Wyoming, Inc., attempted to intervene in a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of two Wyoming laws restricting abortion. The district court denied their motion to intervene, and they appealed that decision. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the proposed intervenors did not meet the requirements for intervention as of right. The court found that the proposed intervenors did not demonstrate a significant protectable interest in the lawsuit. The court also found that the State of Wyoming, represented by the Attorney General, adequately represented the proposed intervenors' interests in defending the challenged laws. Additionally, the court found that allowing the proposed intervenors to participate in the lawsuit would unduly delay and prejudice the case's adjudication. Therefore, the court also denied the proposed intervenors' motion for permissive intervention. View "Rodriguez-Williams v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, plaintiffs Scott Sonda and Brian Corwin, both mineral rights owners in West Virginia, challenged Senate Bill 694, which amended the State's oil and gas conservation law to permit the unitization of interests in horizontal well drilling units, even for nonconsenting mineral rights owners. The plaintiffs claimed that this law constituted a taking of their property and deprived them of property without due process, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The West Virginia Oil and Gas Conservation Commission filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the plaintiffs lacked standing, that the Commission was immune under the Eleventh Amendment, and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.However, the district court abstained from ruling on the federal constitutional claims, citing the Pullman abstention doctrine, and ordered the proceeding stayed pending the outcome of a state court action that the plaintiffs may file. The Commission appealed the district court's abstention order.The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings, noting that the district court had erred by applying the Pullman abstention doctrine without first ensuring it had jurisdiction. The court directed the district court to first address the Commission's argument challenging the plaintiffs' Article III standing. The court did not express an opinion about the merits of the standing issue or any others before the district court. View "Sonda v. West Virginia Oil & Gas Conservation Commission" on Justia Law

In Montana, a group of plaintiffs, including Forward Montana, Leo Gallagher, Montana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and Gary Zadick, challenged two amendments to Senate Bill 319 (SB 319) on the grounds that they violated Article V, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution. The amendments, added in the final days of the legislative session without public comment, expanded the bill's scope beyond its initial focus on campaign finance to include regulations on political activities on college campuses and judicial recusal requirements. The District Court found that the amendments violated the Single Subject Rule and Rule on Amendments of the Montana Constitution, and permanently enjoined their enforcement. However, the court declined to award attorney fees to the plaintiffs under the private attorney general doctrine, reasoning that the case was a "garden-variety" constitutional challenge.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana disagreed, reversing and remanding the decision regarding attorney fees. The court held that the plaintiffs had satisfied all three factors required for attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine: the societal importance of the public policy vindicated by the litigation (constitutional limitations on legislative power), the necessity for private enforcement and the burden on the plaintiffs, and the large number of people standing to benefit from the decision. Despite the District Court's finding that the case was a "garden-variety" constitutional challenge, the Supreme Court determined that the Legislature's willful disregard of constitutional duties and legislative rules and norms in adopting these amendments justified the award of attorney fees. The case was remanded to the District Court for calculation of attorney fees. View "Forward Montana v. State" on Justia Law

In the case at hand, a group of reproductive health centers and Planned Parenthood affiliates in Pennsylvania challenged the constitutionality of sections of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act and corresponding regulations which prohibit the use of state Medicaid funds for abortions except in cases of rape, incest, or to avert the death of the mother. The petitioners argued that the exclusion of abortion from Medicaid coverage violated the Equal Rights Amendment and equal protection provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the health centers had standing to bring the lawsuit on behalf of their patients who are enrolled in or eligible for aid under Pennsylvania's Medical Assistance program but whose abortions are not covered because of the exclusion. The court further held that the Commonwealth Court erred in permitting individual members of the Pennsylvania Senate and House of Representatives to intervene in the case.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Commonwealth Court's order dismissing the petition for review. The court concluded that the providers' petition for review was legally sufficient to survive demurrer. The court noted that its precedent may have misstated the breadth of the exclusion and remanded the case to the Commonwealth Court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court did not rule on the constitutionality of the challenged provisions. View "Allegheny Reprod. Health v. PA DHS" on Justia Law

Kaboni Savage, a federal prisoner, brought a lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Justice arguing that the department was infringing upon his First Amendment rights by limiting his communication with family and friends. Savage claimed that the restrictions imposed under the Special Administrative Measures (SAMs) were unjust. However, Savage did not complete the Justice Department's Administrative Remedy Program (ARP), a process designed to seek relief from such restrictions. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Savage's lawsuit, citing the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA), a law requiring prisoners to exhaust all available administrative remedies before bringing a lawsuit. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, stating that Savage did not fully pursue all available administrative remedies and hence, his lawsuit was barred under the PLRA. View "Savage v. DOJ" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed a dispute involving the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority (TBTA) and several plaintiffs who had been fined for failing to pay tolls at TBTA crossings. The plaintiffs claimed that the fines were unconstitutional under the Eight Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause and that TBTA was unjustly enriched under New York law. The court considered the case on appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which had granted summary judgment in favor of TBTA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.The plaintiffs had failed to pay their tolls for various reasons, such as receiving bills at old addresses or having malfunctioning transponders. They then received substantial fines, which they eventually paid at reduced amounts. The main issue was whether these fines were excessive in relation to the seriousness of the offenses. The court applied the four-factor test from United States v. Bajakajian, which considers the nature of the offense, whether the defendant fits into the class of persons the law was designed for, the maximum potential sentence and fine, and the harm caused by the defendant's conduct.The court found that the fines were not excessive. It pointed out that the plaintiffs' violations were not willful or fraudulent, and that the fines were in line with those for similar offenses in other states. The court also noted that the fines helped TBTA prevent the harms it would suffer if people did not pay their tolls.Regarding the unjust enrichment claim, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had not shown that it was inequitable for TBTA to retain the fines. The plaintiffs' non-payment of tolls had violated TBTA regulations, and it was not inequitable for such violations to result in fines. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of TBTA on the unjust enrichment claims as well. View "Reese v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority" on Justia Law

In Maine, former President Donald J. Trump submitted a petition for his candidacy for the Republican Party’s presidential primary. Three challengers subsequently claimed that Trump was disqualified from running because he had previously sworn to support the U.S. Constitution as President and then engaged in insurrection, which they argued precluded him from holding office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Secretary of State held a hearing and decided that Trump was not qualified to appear on the ballot. Trump appealed this decision to the Superior Court, which remanded the matter back to the Secretary of State for a new ruling after the Supreme Court reaches a decision in a related case. The Secretary of State and the three challengers appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, which dismissed the appeal as interlocutory and not justiciable, holding that it was not from a final judgment. The court reasoned that uncertainties regarding issues of federal law pervaded the proceedings and were likely to require additional proceedings. The court deemed that an immediate review would likely result in an advisory opinion and could cause additional delay that the existing interlocutory order might avoid. View "Trump v. Secretary of State" on Justia Law