Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and four of her neighbors appealed an order dismissing as an anti-SLAPP, Code Civ. Proc., 425.16, action their complaint against the city council of Culver City and five of its council members for allegedly violating the state’s open meeting laws, Gov. Code, 54950 et seq. (the Brown Act). In this case, plaintiffs sought personal relief in the form of a halt to any attempts by the church to undo the long-standing parking restrictions. Therefore, the court concluded that the public interest exception to the anti-SLAPP provisions does not apply. The court further concluded that plaintiffs are not likely to prevail on the merits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order dismissing plaintiffs' action. View "Cruz v. City of Culver City" on Justia Law

On April 21 and April 29, 2015, the Oklahoma Senate and the Oklahoma House of Representatives, respectively, passed House Joint Resolution Number 1012, directing the Oklahoma Secretary of State to refer a proposed constitutional amendment to a vote of the people of Oklahoma. The proposed amendment would add a new section to Article II, prohibiting the Legislature from passing any law "which abridges the right of citizens and lawful residents of Oklahoma to employ agricultural technology and livestock production and ranching practices without a compelling state interest." Plaintiffs filed a petition in the district court, urging that the measure was facially unconstitutional. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, submitting that the challenge was untimely. The district court granted the motion to dismiss finding the challenge was timely and was not facially unconstitutional. Plaintiffs appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the case, but on grounds that the district court should have abstained from review of a referendum before voted on by the people. View "Save the Illinois River, Inc. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Election Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action alleging that Urban Outfitters’ and Anthropologie’s zip code requests at the cashier stand violated two District of Columbia consumer protection laws. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide the merits of the case because neither plaintiff has alleged a concrete Article III injury tied to disclosure of her zip code that could support standing. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for dismissal of the case. View "Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc." on Justia Law

In the midst of a federal investigation into activities of the former Governor of Oregon, John Kitzhaber, a grand jury subpoena seeks a broad range of information from the State of Oregon. For several years before Kitzhaber left office, copies of his personal emails were archived on Oregon’s computer servers. Because this cache would be turned over to the government under the subpoena, Kitzhaber argues the subpoena is unreasonably broad. The government disclaims any interest in Kitzhaber’s communications with his personal attorneys but argues it is otherwise entitled to everything it has requested. The court agreed with Kitzhaber that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in much of his personal email (although the Fourth Amendment’s protection does not extend to any use of a personal email account to conduct public business), and that the subpoena in this case - which is not even minimally tailored to the government’s investigatory goals - is unreasonable and invalid. The court disagreed, however, that Kitzhaber may assert the attorney-client privilege for his communications, including communications regarding potential conflicts of interest and ethics violations, with the State of Oregon’s attorneys. Whatever privilege may protect those communications belongs to the State of Oregon, not to Kitzhaber as an individual officeholder in his personal capacity. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to quash the government’s present subpoena in its entirety. View "In re Grand Jury Subpoena" on Justia Law

These cases arose out of an on-going South Carolina Law Enforcement Division ("SLED") investigation into the past conduct of certain members of the General Assembly (the "redacted legislators"), and was filed in the South Carolina Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Petitioner David Pascoe ("Pascoe"), Solicitor of the First Judicial Circuit, asked the Supreme Court to require "the Attorney General" to recuse himself and his Office from the redacted legislators matter, and vest Pascoe with the legal authority to act autonomously as the designee of the Attorney General with the powers of that Office. Pascoe further asked that respondent James Parks ("Parks"), clerk of the state grand jury, be ordered to cooperate with Pascoe's initiation of the state grand jury investigation. Attorney General Alan Wilson appointed Pascoe as the "designated prosecutor" in the investigation. Wilson acknowledged that there might have been "inherent conflicts" between himself and certain members of the house. Chief Deputy General John McIntosh was thereafter made supervising prosecutor. On March 28, 2016, McIntosh sent a letter to Pascoe purportedly terminating all authority delegated to Pascoe "on July 17 and July 24, 2015," because of Pascoe's attempt to "unlawfully" initiate a state grand jury investigation. Pascoe petitioned for a declaration that he was imbued with the powers of the office of Attorney General, which included convening a state grand jury. After review, the Supreme Court granted the petition for declaratory relief and declared that respondent Attorney General Wilson and the Attorney General's Office were recused from the redacted legislators investigation; Pascoe lawfully sought to initiate a state grand jury investigation; and the Attorney General's Office's purported termination of Pascoe's designation was not valid. Recognizing the integrity of the parties involved, the Court declined to formally issue relief in a related mandamus action, "confident that our resolution of the declaratory judgment action makes clear the responsibilities and roles of the parties." View "Pascoe v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Laroe, a real estate development company, appealed the denial of its motion to intervene under FRCP 24 in pending litigation in which a now-deceased land developer filed suit against the Town of Chester, alleging a regulatory taking. The court vacated and remanded because the court does not require proposed intervenors in this circumstance to show that they independently have standing. Because neither a proposed intervenor’s lack of Article III standing nor its failure to state an independent claim necessarily renders a motion to intervene futile, the district court should have instead focused its analysis on the requirements of Rule 24. Because the factual record before the court is insufficiently developed at this stage to allow the court to resolve the issues, the court vacated and remanded for the district court to determine in the first instance whether Laroe satisfies the requirements of Rule 24. View "Laroe Estates, Inc. v. Town of Chester" on Justia Law

In 2008, Olga Zarate-Martinez filed a medical malpractice complaint against Dr. Michael D. Echemendia, Atlanta Women’s Health Group, P.C., Atlanta Women’s Health Group, II, LLC, and North Crescent Surgery Center, LLC (collectively “Echemendia”), for damages for injuries she sustained during an open laparoscopic tubal ligation that was allegedly negligently performed and which resulted in a perforated bowel. Zarate-Martinez attached to her complaint an affidavit from Dr. Errol G. Jacobi. She later identified Dr. Charles J. Ward as an expert for summary judgment purposes, but she never submitted an affidavit from Dr. Ward in support of her complaint. Echemendia deposed Dr. Ward and Dr. Jacobi, moved to strike the testimony from both doctors on the grounds that they did not qualify as experts, and also moved for summary judgment. Without any reference to some constitutional issues raised, on February 21, 2013, the trial court issued an order striking both experts’ testimony, but granted Zarate-Martinez 45 days in which to file an affidavit from a competent expert witness. Zarate-Martinez timely submitted another affidavit, this time from Dr. Nancy Hendrix, and Echemendia again moved to strike. Zarate-Martinez then filed a supplemental affidavit from Hendrix outside of the 45-day time frame, and, in her reply to the motion to strike, reasserted her constitutional challenges to OCGA 24-7-702 (c). Zarate-Martinez also asserted a new constitutional claim, specifically, that the provisions of OCGA 24-7-702 (c) (2) (A) and (B) were unconstitutionally vague. The trial court struck Hendrix's affidavits, and, without any affidavits from qualified medical experts to support her claim, the trial court dismissed Zarate-Martinez's complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed and did not reach the constitutional issues since the trial court never addressed them. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals decision and that of the trial court with respect to the application of OCGA 24-7-702 (c) and remanded for the trial court to reconsider the admissibility of Hendrix's testimony. View "Zarate-Martinez v. Echemendia" on Justia Law

Mohamed Tawid Al-Saffy, an Egyptian-American Muslim employed by the Foreign Agricultural Service, filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., alleging that the Agriculture and State Departments each discriminated against him based on religion and national origin, and retaliated against him for filing an EEO complaint. The district court granted summary judgment to the government. The court concluded that, because Title VII requires final agency action to notify the employee of his right to appeal and the governing time limitation, the order dismissing the 2012 Complaint did not trigger the ninety-day deadline for Al-Saffy to file suit. Instead, given the lack of timely final action by the agency, Al-Saffy could have and did file a civil action more than 180 days after the filing of the 2012 Complaint with the agency. Therefore, Al-Saffy’s October 10, 2013 filing in district court thus preserved his claims from the 2012 Complaint. The court also concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the government on Al-Saffy's claims against the State Department because there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Al-Saffy had an employment relationship with the State Department within the meaning of Title VII, and whether Al-Saffy knew about the State Department’s alleged role in discrimination against him prior to 2013. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Al-Saffy v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Alaska Native tribes filed suit against the Department, challenging the regulation implementing the prohibition barring the Department from taking land into trust for Indian tribes in Alaska. After the district court held that the Department’s interpretation was contrary to law, the Department, following notice and comment, revised its regulations and dismissed its appeal. Alaska intervened and now seeks to prevent any new efforts by the United States to take tribal land to trust within the State's borders. In this case, Alaska intervened in the district court as a defendant and brought no independent claim for relief. The court concluded that once the Department rescinded the Alaska exception, this case became moot. Even assuming, as Alaska argues, that the district court’s interpretation of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), 43 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., injured the State, such injury cannot extend the court's jurisdiction by creating a new controversy on appeal. Accordingly, the court dismissed Alaska's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Akiachak Native Community v. DOI" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging that they prevented him from collecting on a California state court legal malpractice judgment. The district court granted Defendant Hummer's motion to strike plaintiff's claims under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the district court's order is not a "final decision" over which the court may exercise appellate jurisdiction. Under the Erie doctrine, it is long since settled that federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law. Rule 54(b), which the court must apply, clearly states that the order on appeal here is not final. The court also concluded that the grant of an anti-SLAPP motion to strike is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. View "Hyan v. Hummer" on Justia Law