Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Providence Alaska Medical Center terminated Dr. Michael Brandner’s hospital privileges without an opportunity to be heard after determining he had violated hospital policy by failing to report an Alaska State Medical Board order requiring him to undergo an evaluation of his fitness to practice medicine. Brandner unsuccessfully challenged this action through the hospital's hearing and appeal procedures. Brandner thereafter took his cause to court, seeking reinstatement and damages for the alleged due process violations both in the procedures used and in the substantive standard applied in his termination. The superior court found no such violations and that he was not entitled to reinstatement. Brandner appealed. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that Brandner was not entitled to reinstatement or post-termination-hearing damages. However, the doctor's due process rights were violated when he was not given a hearing following termination of his hospital privileges. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Brandner v. Providence Health & Services" on Justia Law

Federal tobacco laws do not preempt state tort claims based on the dangerousness of all the cigarettes manufactured by the tobacco companies. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the jury verdicts of negligence and strict liability in Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006) (Engle III), and decertified the class to allow individual actions about the remaining issues. In this case, R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris challenged the jury verdict against them in one of the individual actions. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed its holding in Walker v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 734 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2013), and concluded that giving full faith and credit to the Engle jury findings of negligence and strict liability does not deprive R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris of property without due process of law, and that federal law does not preempt the Engle jury findings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgments against R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris. View "Graham v. R.J Reynolds Tobacco" on Justia Law

Appellant challenged two district court orders directing him to produce various documents in response to a subpoena issued by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. While the appeal was pending, appellant turned over some of the documents and the Subcommittee completed its investigation, issuing a final report. The DC Circuit held that the case was moot because the relief appellant seeks is barred by the separation of powers. The court explained that the separation of powers, including the Speech or Debate Clause, barred the court from ordering a congressional committee to return, destroy, or refrain from publishing the subpoenaed documents. Furthermore, there was no reasonable expectation that the Subcommittee, having completed its work and issued its final report, will nonetheless reopen its investigation and again issue a subpoena to appellant. Accordingly, the DC Circuit vacated the district court's judgments and dismissed the case as moot. View "Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations v. Ferrer" on Justia Law

Appeal of dismissal of challenge to city’s order requiring that police officers cover tattoos was rendered moot by city’s revocation of the order. Plaintiffs, military veterans employed as Chicago police officers, have tattoos relating to their military service and religion. The department issued an order without prior notice, requiring all officers on duty or otherwise “representing” the department to cover their tattoos. The announced reason was to “promote uniformity and professionalism.” Plaintiffs complained that covering their tattoos with clothing caused overheating in warm weather and that cover-up tape irritated their skin. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the order violated theirs’ First Amendment rights, attorneys’ fees and costs, and “other legal and/or equitable relief.” Without addressing class certification and before discovery, the court dismissed the suit on the merits, finding that wearing tattoos was a “personal expression,” not an effort at communicating with the public on matters of public concern, and was not protected by the First Amendment. Meanwhile, the police union filed a grievance. An arbitrator ruled that the order violated the collective bargaining agreement. The city conceded and agreed to reimburse officers for expenses in complying with the invalidated policy. The Seventh Circuit directed that the judgment vacated as moot. View "Medici v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

A lawsuit filed primarily to chill the valid exercise of free speech is called a "SLAPP" suit and, if without merit, such an action may be dismissed early under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. In this anti-SLAPP case, investigative newsource (inewsource), an independent, nonprofit journalism organization, entered into contracts with KPBS, San Diego's public radio and television station, to gather and produce news stories with and for KPBS, in exchange for the right to use KPBS offices, media equipment, and related news facilities. KPBS was a department of San Diego State University (SDSU), and inewsource and KPBS have jointly created hundreds of news stories. In February 2015 inewsource began publishing articles critical of attorney Cory Briggs. After inewsource published about a dozen more critical stories about Briggs, San Diegans for Open Government (SDOG), an entity inewsource reported is controlled by Briggs, sued inewsource, along with its founder, Loretta Hearn, and also SDSU, California State University (CSU), and San Diego State University Research Foundation (SDSURF), alleging the contracts between KPBS and inewsource violate statutory prohibitions on self-dealing involving public funds because Hearn was allegedly influencing both sides of the transaction - for SDSU as a faculty member, and for inewsource as its executive director. SDOG also alleged inewsource and Hearn misappropriated the names KPBS and SDSU. Asserting SDOG's lawsuit was based on the exercise of their constitutionally protected speech rights and lacked merit, Defendants brought anti-SLAPP motions. The trial court granted the motions. SDOG appealed, contending the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply because: (1) its lawsuit is a public interest lawsuit, exempt from the anti-SLAPP law under section 425.17, subdivision (b); and (2) the exception to that exemption for media defendants under section 425.17, subdivision (d) was inapplicable because its lawsuit has "nothing to do with stopping news reporting" but was instead directed to stopping "self-dealing by a public employee." The Court of Appeal affirmed. View "San Diegans for Open Government v. San Diego State" on Justia Law

“Lowrie v. United States,” (824 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1987)), is still the controlling case law in matters challenging “activities leading up to and culminating in” an assessment. The Green Solution was a Colorado-based marijuana dispensary being audited by the Internal Revenue Service for tax deductions and credits taken for trafficking in a “controlled substance.” Green Solution sued the IRS seeking to enjoin the IRS from investigating whether it trafficked in a controlled substance in violation of federal law, and seeking a declaratory judgment that the IRS was acting outside its statutory authority when it made findings that a taxpayer trafficked in a controlled substance. Green Solution claimed it would suffer irreparable harm if the IRS were allowed to continue its investigation because a denial of deductions would: (1) deprive it of income, (2) constitute a penalty that would effect a forfeiture of all of its income and capital, and (3) violate its Fifth Amendment rights. The IRS moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. According to the IRS, Green Solution’s claim for injunctive relief was foreclosed by the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA), which barred suits “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.” Similarly, the IRS asserted that the claim for declaratory relief violated the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA), which prohibited declaratory judgments in certain federal tax matters. The district court dismissed the action with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on “Lowrie.” Green Solution timely appealed, contending the district court had jurisdiction to hear its claims because the Supreme Court implicitly overruled Lowrie in “Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl,” (135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015)). The Tenth Circuit concluded it was still bound by Lowrie and affirmed. View "Green Solution Retail v. United States" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit directed the district court to dismiss, as moot, a lawsuit by a Chicago-area family-owned firm, challenging the “contraception mandate” under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, 124 Stat. 119. Ozinga regards certain of the contraceptives covered by the mandate as potential abortifacients, the use of which is proscribed by its owners’ and managers’ religious tenets, and sued under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb, in 2013. The government had established an accommodation for certain religious employers that provided for alternate means of ensuring employee access to the contraceptive services specified by the mandate without payment or direct involvement by an objecting employer; the accommodation was not then available to for-profit employers like Ozinga. In light of Seventh Circuit precedent, the district court granted Ozinga a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court subsequently decided, in “Hobby Lobby” (2014), that the contraception mandate, as applied to closely-held private firms whose owners objected on religious grounds to contraceptives covered by the mandate, substantially burdened the exercise of religion by those owners and their companies, in view of the fines to which they were subject for noncompliance. The government then extended the accommodation to private employers, including Ozinga, rendering its suit moot. View "Ozinga v. Price" on Justia Law

The Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in dismissing the State Defendants under the Constitutionally Based Educational Claims Act (“CBECA”). This appeal arose from Russell Joki’s action challenging the constitutionality of: (1) fees charged to students of Meridian Joint District #21 ; and (2) the statewide system of funding Idaho’s public schools. Joki and sixteen other individuals (collectively referred to as “Joki”) initiated the suit against the State, the Idaho Legislature, the Idaho State Board of Education, and the Superintendent of Public Instruction (collectively referred to as the “State Defendants”), all 114 Idaho public school districts, and one charter school. The district court granted the State Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Joki argued the CBECA did not apply here, but the Supreme Court disagreed, finding: (1) the CBECA was constitutional, “it is not unreasonable for the legislature to also declare that allegations that the required educational services are not being furnished should first be addressed to the local school districts which have been given the responsibility and authority to provide those services;” and (2) Joki’s claims relating to the fees levied by the school districts fell squarely within the definition of a constitutionally based educational claim because the legislature’s duty was to provide free common schools. View "Joki v. Idaho Bd of Education" on Justia Law

An amended criminal complaint was filed charging Maria Escalante and Ramiro Funez (collectively, Escalante) each with one count of trespass in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 207.200(1)(a). Escalante moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that section 207.200(1)(a) is unconstitutionally vague. The Nevada Office of the Attorney General (AG) was not notified of the constitutional challenge to the statute. The justice court granted the motion to dismiss in part, determining that the “vex or annoy” intent requirement in the statute was void for vagueness. When it received notification of the justice court’s order, the AG filed a “motion to place on calendar,” arguing that the AG was entitled to notice of the constitutional challenge under Nev. Rev. Stat. 30.130. The justice court denied the AG’s motion, concluding that section 30.130 applies only to declaratory relief actions and has no applicability to criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 30.130 does not entitle the AG to notice and opportunity to be heard in criminal cases; and (2) Escalante was not required to notify the AG of their constitutional challenge to section 207.200(1)(a). View "Office of the Attorney General v. Justice Court" on Justia Law

Jerry Nix appealed the entry of summary judgment which found he was an adult in need of protective services under the Adult Protective Services Act of 1976. The Franklin County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") alleged that Nix, then 78 years old, was an "adult in need of protective services." The petition claimed that Nix had not been taking his medications for diabetes and hypertension and that he had been the victim of a postal scam costing him thousands of dollars. DHR further alleged that Nix urgently required nursing-home care to protect his health and safety and that, otherwise, Nix was in immediate danger. DHR requested emergency-protective placement for Nix and that the court set a hearing to determine Nix's need for protective services. The trial court thereafter ordered DHR to provide protective services for Nix, appointed a guardian ad litem to represent Nix in the proceedings, and appointed Nix's son, Darren Nix, as conservator of Nix's estate and guardian of his person. While the Alabama Supreme Court did not question that all involved in this case desired the best for Nix, it was troubled by the "apparent lack of urgency and attention to statutory formalities in the prosecution of this petition for protective services," finding the trial court granted DHR's emergency petition on December 7, 2015; Nix was entitled to a hearing within 30 days. Seven months passed before the trial court entered the summary judgment finding Nix to be an adult in need of supervision, and fifteen months had passed since Nix was removed from his home. "It may very well be that an assisted-living facility is the appropriate and lawful protective placement for Nix, but he is still entitled to all the procedural safeguards due him under the Act, including a timely adjudication of his need for such services. Indeed, without a faithful adherence to the Act and the due process protections owed to each person protected by the Act, we risk unnecessary and wrongful deprivation of liberty and property. For those 'protected persons' dispossessed of their house and their assets, this may seem a fate far worse than a foreign-lottery postal scam." View "Nix v. Franklin County Dept. of Human Resources" on Justia Law