Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Jane Doe is a transgender man residing in Marion County, Indiana. Doe is originally from Mexico. The U.S. granted him asylum because of the persecution he might face in Mexico for being transgender. Doe alleges that he faces harassment and discrimination in the U.S. when he gives his legal name or shows his identification to others. Doe sought to legally change his name from Jane to John so that his name conforms to his gender identity and physical appearance, which are male. Doe asserts that the statute governing name changes is unconstitutional because it requires petitioners to provide proof of U.S. citizenship, Ind. Code 34‐28‐2‐2.5(a)(5). As an asylee, Doe cannot provide such proof. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Doe’s case for lack of standing. The Eleventh Amendment generally immunizes state officials from suit in federal court unless the official has “some connection with the enforcement” of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute. The Governor, the Attorney General, and the Executive Director of the Indiana Supreme Court Administration, do not enforce the challenged law. The County Clerk of Court is not a state official, but Doe cannot establish “redressability” because the Clerk has no power to grant or deny a name-change petition but may only accept and process petitions. View "Doe v. Holcomb" on Justia Law

Jane Doe is a transgender man residing in Marion County, Indiana. Doe is originally from Mexico. The U.S. granted him asylum because of the persecution he might face in Mexico for being transgender. Doe alleges that he faces harassment and discrimination in the U.S. when he gives his legal name or shows his identification to others. Doe sought to legally change his name from Jane to John so that his name conforms to his gender identity and physical appearance, which are male. Doe asserts that the statute governing name changes is unconstitutional because it requires petitioners to provide proof of U.S. citizenship, Ind. Code 34‐28‐2‐2.5(a)(5). As an asylee, Doe cannot provide such proof. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Doe’s case for lack of standing. The Eleventh Amendment generally immunizes state officials from suit in federal court unless the official has “some connection with the enforcement” of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute. The Governor, the Attorney General, and the Executive Director of the Indiana Supreme Court Administration, do not enforce the challenged law. The County Clerk of Court is not a state official, but Doe cannot establish “redressability” because the Clerk has no power to grant or deny a name-change petition but may only accept and process petitions. View "Doe v. Holcomb" on Justia Law

When the complaint itself alleges protected activity, a moving party may rely on the plaintiff's allegations alone in arguing that the plaintiff's claims arise from an act "in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech" under the anti-SLAPP statute. The Court of Appeal explained that, while Code Civ. Proc., 425.16 requires a court to consider both the "pleadings" and the "supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based," it does not require a moving party to submit declarations confirming the factual basis for the plaintiff's claims. In this case, the prelitigation conduct encouraging third parties to sue was protected petitioning activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e). The court held that appellants could rely on Bel Air's allegations that they urged other employees to quit and sue, even though appellants denied engaging in this conduct. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's order denying appellants' motion to strike. View "Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Morales" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s action against Defendants in their individual capacities was properly dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.Plaintiff, an inmate, brought this action against defendant state employees in their official and invidious capacities, alleging that they had violated his constitutional rights because they were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims against Defendants in their individual capacities because Plaintiff failed properly to serve Defendants in their individual capacities pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-57(a). The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court fully considered and properly resolved the issue against Plaintiff. View "Harnage v. Lightner" on Justia Law

The Hagys took a loan to purchase a mobile home and property on which to park it. In 2010, they defaulted. Green Tree initiated foreclosure. Hagy called Green Tree’s law firm, Demers & Adams, wanting to settling the claim. Demers sent a letter containing a Warranty Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure, stating, “In return for [the Hagys] executing the Deed … Green Tree has advised me that it will waive any deficiency balance.” The Hagys executed the Deed. Demers wrote to the Hagys’ attorney, confirming receipt of the executed Deed and reaffirming that “Green Tree will not attempt to collect any deficiency balance.” Green Tree dismissed the foreclosure complaint but began calling the Hagys to collect the debt that they no longer owed. Green Tree realized its mistake and agreed that the Hagys owed nothing. In 2011, the Hagys sued, citing the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act. Green Tree resolved the dispute through arbitration. The court granted the Hagys summary judgment, reasoning that Demers’ letter “fail[ed] to disclose” that it was “from a debt collector” under 15 U.S.C. 1692e(11). The court awarded them $1,800 in statutory damages and $74,196 in attorney’s fees. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal and the underlying suit. The complaint failed to identify a cognizable injury traceable to Demers; Congress cannot override Article III of the Constitution by labeling the violation of any statutory requirement a cognizable injury. View "Hagy v. Demers & Adams" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint sua sponte on the ground of res judicata. Plaintiff filed the present case after the dismissal of his first case, alleging nearly identical claims with a single additional claim that defendants terminated his employment in retaliation for filing the first case. The court held that the termination claim could have been raised in the prior action and was, and that res judicata precluded plaintiff from asserting the claim in this subsequent action. In this case, the termination claim was reasonably related to the original administrative charge so the exhaustion requirement would not have foreclosed raising the claim added in the first case. Nonetheless, the court also held that the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies did not disturb the court's holding that the termination claim was barred by res judicata. View "Soules v. Connecticut" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded in part and dismissed in part the circuit court’s denial of the motion filed by Appellants - employees of Arkansas State University - to dismiss Appellee’s complaint asserting that Appellants denied her due process under the Arkansas Constitution and violated the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). In their motion to dismiss, Appellants argued that the complaint was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity because Appellee did not state a cognizable due process violation and that the FOIA claim failed as a matter of law because the records Appellant requested were shielded from disclosure under Ark. Code Ann. 25-19-105(b)(2). The Supreme Court held (1) Appellee’s complaint failed to state sufficient facts to support a due-process violation, and therefore, Appellee’s due-process claim was barred by sovereign immunity; and (2) because Appellant’s argument regarding Appellee’s FOIA claim did not implicate sovereign immunity, this issue was dismissed on appeal. View "Williams v. McCoy" on Justia Law

The Milchteins have 15 children. The two eldest refused to return home in 2011-2012 and were placed in foster care by Wisconsin state court orders. In federal court, the Milchteins argued that state officials violated the federal Constitution by either discriminating against or failing to accommodate their views of family management in the Chabad understanding of Orthodox Judaism. Those children now are adults. State proceedings with respect to them are closed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Milchteins’ suit as moot, rejecting arguments the district court could have entered a declaratory judgment because the Milchteins still have 12 minor children, who might precipitate the same sort of controversy. The Milchteins did not seek alteration of the state court judgment, so the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not block this suit but it is blocked by the requirement of justiciability. The Milchteins want a federal judge to say where a state judge erred but not act on that error: “a naked request for an advisory opinion.” If Wisconsin again starts judicial proceedings concerning the Milchteins’ children, the "Younger" doctrine would require the federal tribunal to abstain. Younger abstention may be inappropriate if the very existence of state proceedings violated the First Amendment but the Milchteins do not contend that it is never permissible for a state to inquire into the welfare of a religious leader’s children. View "Milchtein v. Chisholm" on Justia Law

The Milchteins have 15 children. The two eldest refused to return home in 2011-2012 and were placed in foster care by Wisconsin state court orders. In federal court, the Milchteins argued that state officials violated the federal Constitution by either discriminating against or failing to accommodate their views of family management in the Chabad understanding of Orthodox Judaism. Those children now are adults. State proceedings with respect to them are closed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Milchteins’ suit as moot, rejecting arguments the district court could have entered a declaratory judgment because the Milchteins still have 12 minor children, who might precipitate the same sort of controversy. The Milchteins did not seek alteration of the state court judgment, so the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not block this suit but it is blocked by the requirement of justiciability. The Milchteins want a federal judge to say where a state judge erred but not act on that error: “a naked request for an advisory opinion.” If Wisconsin again starts judicial proceedings concerning the Milchteins’ children, the "Younger" doctrine would require the federal tribunal to abstain. Younger abstention may be inappropriate if the very existence of state proceedings violated the First Amendment but the Milchteins do not contend that it is never permissible for a state to inquire into the welfare of a religious leader’s children. View "Milchtein v. Chisholm" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Adrian and Angela Lee asked the bankruptcy court to declare that the automatic stay in Adam and Jennifer Peeples’ bankruptcy case applied to a separate lawsuit Adrian Lee filed in state court against defendant Scott McCardle. The Lees also asserted that the automatic stay prevented McCardle from collecting attorney’s fees levied against Adrian Lee in that state-court lawsuit. The Lees sought damages against McCardle for willfully violating the automatic stay. The bankruptcy court found, and the district court agreed, that the automatic stay didn’t apply to the state-court lawsuit, thus granting summary judgment to McCardle. The Lees appealed, arguing that the district court erred in ruling that the automatic stay didn’t apply. The Tenth Circuit did not reach that question; instead, the Court vacated the district court’s judgment against Angela Lee because she lacked Article III standing to bring this lawsuit, and affirm summary judgment against Adrian Lee because his claims didn’t fall within the Bankruptcy Code’s “zone of interests.” View "Lee v. McCardle" on Justia Law