Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

This case centered on a public records request made by defendant Oregonian Publishing Company, LLC (The Oregonian), a newspaper, to plaintiff Oregon Health and Sciences University (OHSU), a public health and research university that provided patient care at its hospital, conducted research, and educated health care professionals and scientists. The circuit court ordered OHSU to disclose the requested record, and OHSU appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the circuit court to examine the public records at issue and then determine whether state and federal exemptions permitted OHSU to withhold some of the requested information. On review, the issues narrowed to whether the requested record contained “protected health information” and student “education records” under federal and Oregon law and, if so, whether that information nonetheless had to be disclosed pursuant to ORS 192.420(1), a provision of the Oregon Public Records Law (OPRL). The Oregon Supreme Court concluded the requested record contained protected health information and that ORS 192.420(1) did not require the disclosure of that information. The Court declined to consider whether the part of the requested record consisting of tort claim notices filed by students contained “education records,” and, if so, whether those records were exempt from disclosure. The Court therefore reversed in part, and affirmed in part the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "OHSU v. Oregonian Publishing Co., LLC" on Justia Law

This case involved a challenge under the Compelled Support Clause of the Vermont Constitution to the Town of Cabot’s grant of federally derived but municipally managed funds for the purpose of repairs to a historic church. Relying on Chapter I, Article Three of the Vermont Constitution, plaintiffs challenged the Town of Cabot’s award of a grant to fund repairs to the United Church of Cabot, and sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the grant. Defendants moved to dismiss the case on the ground that plaintiffs lacked standing. With respect to the Town’s motion to dismiss, the trial court concluded that plaintiffs did have standing on two independent bases: (1) as municipal taxpayers; or (2) alternatively, under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the federal Constitution. The court rejected the argument that municipal taxpayer standing did not apply because the funds at issue originated from federal coffers. Just as federal taxpayers have standing to pursue certain Establishment Clause claims, as recognized in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85 (1968), state taxpayers have standing to advance Compelled Support claims under the Vermont Constitution. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded plaintiffs had standing to challenge the grant. However, the Court determined the evidence did not support the issuance of an injunction. The Court therefore affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Taylor v. Town of Cabot" on Justia Law

The constitutionality of section 57 of the Administrative Worker's Compensation Act (AWCA) came before the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Claimant Brandon Gibby injured his right wrist and left knee in 2014 when he fell three to four feet from a pallet jack while in the course and scope of his employment. Employer, Hobby Lobby Stores, provided temporary total disability and medical benefits. However, when Claimant sought permanent partial disability, Employer asserted that the forfeiture provision, section 57 of the (AWCA) prohibited Claimant from receiving any further workers' compensation benefits because he had missed two or more scheduled medical appointments without a valid excuse or notice to his employer. At trial, Claimant attempted to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances for missing three scheduled medical appointments. The administrative law judge found none and denied the request for permanent partial disability despite the fact there was no dispute that Claimant's injury had left him disabled. The Workers' Compensation Commission affirmed. Following a review of the record on appeal, the transcripts of the proceedings below, and the briefs of the parties and amici, the Supreme Court held the forfeiture provision found at section 57 of title 85A violated the adequate remedy provision of Article II, section 6, of the Oklahoma Constitution. The section 57 forfeiture provision was therefore stricken in its entirety. View "Gibby v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Despite repeatedly asserting his innocence, Satterfield was convicted of first-degree murder in 1985 and sentenced to life in prison. After years of direct and collateral litigation, the district court, acting on his habeas petition, found that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim meritorious. The Third Circuit reversed, finding his petition barred by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA’s) one-year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). Years later, the Supreme Court decided, in McQuiggin v. Perkin, that a petitioner who can make a credible showing of actual innocence can overcome that limitations period. Satterfield sought relief from the judgment denying his habeas petition, characterizing McQuiggin’s change in law as an extraordinary circumstance to justify relief under FRCP 60(b)(6). The district court denied Satterfield’s motion. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that changes in decisional law may, under certain circumstances, justify Rule 60(b)(6) relief. “A district court addressing a Rule 60(b)(6) motion premised on a change in decisional law must examine the full panoply of equitable circumstances in the particular case.” In this case, the court did not articulate the requisite equitable analysis. If Satterfield can make the required credible showing of actual innocence, an equitable analysis would weigh heavily in favor of deeming McQuiggin’s change in law, as applied to Satterfield’s case, an exceptional circumstance justifying Rule 60(b)(6) relief. View "Satterfield v. District Attorney Philadelphia" on Justia Law

During a regularly-scheduled meeting, the SAU’s Board voted to go into a nonpublic session to discuss two topics: the superintendent’s evaluation, and “emergency functions.” While in nonpublic session, the Board voted to seal the minutes of the meeting. In June 2016, plaintiff David Taylor asked the executive assistant to the superintendent to send him the minutes of the May 12 nonpublic session by e-mail. She informed plaintiff that she could not provide him with those minutes because they were sealed. A month later, plaintiff e-mailed the executive assistant again, asking her to forward to him, by e-mail, a June 22 e-mail regarding the nonpublic session that had been sent to the Board. The executive assistant again denied plaintiff’s request, referring him to the SAU’s Right-to-Know procedure, requiring the public seeking electronic records to come to the SAU’s offices with a thumb drive in sealed, original packaging or to purchase a thumb drive from the SAU at its actual cost. In August, plaintiff filed a complaint in which he alleged the SAU had violated RSA chapter 91-A by voting in closed session to seal the minutes of the nonpublic session of the May 12 meeting and by refusing to e-mail the records he requested. He also challenged the SAU’s practice of charging 50 cents per page for hard copies of public records. Plaintiff sought: invalidation of the vote to seal the minutes of the nonpublic session; release of the sealed minutes; a declaration that the SAU’s thumb drive policy violated RSA chapter 91-A; an order requiring transmission of the requested records to him by e-mail; other injunctive relief; and litigation costs. After review, the trial court found the SAU’s policy for transmitting public records complied with RSA chapter 91-A. Because of the SAU’s decision to keep sealed only the portion of the nonpublic session with respect to emergency functions, the trial court also found that the plaintiff’s challenge of the SAU’s action was “moot in all but one respect,” specifically, the single redacted sentence of the superintendent’s evaluation. On this issue, the court ordered that the SAU provide it with an un-redacted copy of the public minutes for in camera review. The trial court also determined that petitioner’s lawsuit had been necessary to ensure the Board’s compliance with RSA 91-A:3, and, therefore, awarded him litigation costs. However, the trial court ruled that plaintiff had no standing to challenge the cost of paper copies, because there was no evidence that he had asked for, or paid for, such copies. The trial court also found that the Board did not violate RSA 91-A:3, III by producing two sets of minutes for the May 12 meeting, one containing the public portion and the other the sealed portion. Finally, the court declined to enter the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff. Finding no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Taylor v. School Administrative Unit #55" on Justia Law

Three of Hand’s four wives died, two as victims of violent, unsolved home invasions. The death of Hand’s fourth wife, Jill, occurred while he was at home. Hand confronted and shot the intruder, who turned out to be his friend and employee Welch. An investigation revealed a plot between the men to kill all three women in order to receive life insurance proceeds. Hand was convicted of the aggravated murders of Jill and Welch, with death-penalty specifications, conspiracy to commit the aggravated murders, and an attempt to escape police custody after he was arrested. The jury recommended and the judge imposed the death penalty. After unsuccessful state appeals and post-conviction proceedings, Hand unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit rejected several claims involving the adequacy of the voir dire at his trial to screen jurors because of pretrial publicity and ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to the voir dire; ineffective assistance claims related to mitigation evidence and the reintroduction of evidence of guilt during the sentencing phase; and the adequacy of evidence supporting the death penalty specifications. View "Hand v. Houk" on Justia Law

The Republican Party sued the Cook County Board of Election Commissioners, arguing that the Board must include on the ballot a candidate that the Party slated for the House of Representatives in the November 2016 election. The Board had never announced a plan to exclude the candidate. The district court entered an injunction compelling the Board to keep this candidate on the ballot. The Seventh Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Party’s dispute with two additional defendants, elected as ward committeemen, based on the Party’s refusal to seat them, is not a federal claim. The Party’s “anticipatory federal contention,” that ”if state law does not respect the Party’s eligibility rules, then Illinois violates the First Amendment,” was only a potential response to a potential contention by the committeemen that all elected ward committeemen must be seated on the Party’s central committee. The district judge did not consider the fact that public officials were not contesting the Party’s claims or the possibility that he was issuing an advisory opinion. If the committeemen had sued the Party, demanding membership on its central committee, their claim would have arisen under Illinois law. View "Cook County Republican Party v. Sapone" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order setting aside a planned development permit (PDP) issued by the City. The court held that issues regarding the legal status of the individual lots under the Subdivision Map Act were not ripe for judicial review. In this case, the approval of the PDP in Phase 1 of the Project involved only the development of an infrastructure for the land involved, and the SMA was not implicated in Phase 1. View "Save Laurel Way v. City of Redwood City" on Justia Law

In Romano v. Rockwell Int'l, Inc., 14 Cal.4th 479, the court held that under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Government Code section 12900 et seq., a party alleging that a discriminatory act led to the termination of his or her employment has until one year from the date the employment terminated to file an administrative claim. In light of Romano, the Court of Appeal held that the one year limitations period for plaintiff to file a timely Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) complaint began to run from the last day of his employment. Because he filed his DFEH complaint within that period, his claim was timely. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal reversed the dismissal of the third amended complaint. View "Aviles-Rodriguez v. Los Angeles Community College District" on Justia Law

In 2012, plaintiff filed suit against Doe No. 1, a public entity, alleging that she was molested by defendant's employee when she was a high school student from 1993-1994. After the claim was denied, she filed this instant action against Doe No. 1 and Doe Nos. 2-20, alleging that latent memories of the sexual abuse resurfaced in early 2012, when she was about 34 years old. The Supreme Court of California held that the 2012 claim was not timely in light of Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201. The court explained that when the Legislature amended Code Civ. Proc., 340.1 without modifying the claims requirement, and later overruled Shirk, but only prospectively, it took measured actions that protected public entities from potential liability for stale claims regarding conduct allegedly occurring before January 1, 2009, in which the public entity had no ability to do any fiscal planning, or opportunity to investigate the matter and take remedial action. View "Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1" on Justia Law